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THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE

THE
POETICS OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED FROM GREEK INTO ENGLISH AND FROM ARABIC INTO LATIN, WITH A REVISED TEXT, INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARY, GLOSSARY AND ONOMASTICON

BY

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH

LAUDIAN PROFESSOR OF ARABIC; FORMERLY CRAVEN AND IRELAND SCHOLAR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

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PREFACE

THIS work began with the translation of the Arabic text of Abu'l-Bashar[1] Mattā, published more than twenty years ago by the present writer. The desire to render that translation trustworthy has caused the book to assume a form which he never contemplated.

The intermediate Syriac being, except for one page, lost, in order to interpret the Arabic with certainty it was necessary to know the history of the Greek tradition, so far as it could be ascertained. On this subject there was little that could be used except M. OMONT's facsimile of the Paris MS. 1741 and his valuable introduction to it. A facsimile of the MS. Riccardianus 46, kindly procured for the writer by the Librarian of the Riccardiana, exhibits a line and a half of Aristotelian Greek, the genuineness of which is attested by the Arabic, and which has fallen out of all other MSS. through homoeoteleuton; it follows that this MS. cannot be a copy of Par. 1741, and it fully answers besides the test of an independent

[1] This, the form used by 'Alī Ibn Khalifah (on whom see Yakut, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, v. 206), quoted by Usaibi'ah (ii. 135), is doubtless the correct form of the *kunyah* (paternal name); for, as a monk, Mattā would not be called after a real son, and as a Christian would scarcely call his son Bishr. The form Bashar may, however, be used without the article (Dhahabī, *Mushtabih*, p. 45). This, then, is why POCOCKE and ASSEMANI wrote the name Bashar.

MS. suggested by Prof. BYWATER.[1] Hence the theory that the sole source of the Greek text of the Poetics was Par. 1741 was untenable, and it was desirable to know what the other MSS. contained. Of this there was no account accessible that was moderately complete, accurate or methodical. The writer had therefore himself to construct an *apparatus criticus* for the Greek text.

Of the twenty-three MSS. known to him he has studied eleven in facsimiles, eleven in the original, and neglected one—the Guelferbytanus, said to be a copy of Par. 2040. The brouillons of J. LASCARIS and Fr. MEDICI, wrongly confused with MSS., have also been studied in the original. Five MSS., A, B, C, D, E, practically contain the whole of the genuine tradition. The facsimiles of A and B have already been mentioned; of C (APOSTOLIS'S MS.) a facsimile has been supplied him by the Rev. H. M. BANNISTER, and of E (SULIARDOS'S MS.) by Sign. RATTI and Sign. GRIFFINI of the Ambrosiana. D (Laur. xxxi. 14) has been collated at Florence. All readings of importance in these five MSS. have been (to the best of the writer's belief) recorded. Besides, he has had facsimiles of the two Vatican MSS., also supplied by Mr. BANNISTER; of three Paris MSS., obtained by M. BLOCHET and Mr. AMEDROZ; of the Leidensis, procured by Prof. SNOUCK

[1] P. xlvi. If a MS. were independent it should exhibit several good readings, and not only one. The selection made is of five : παραλογισμός (1455 a 16), ἀνῄει (1455 a 27), ἀρύσας (1457 b 14), μίμησις (1459 b 37), βάδιζε (1457 a 22). Of these Ricc. 46 has the first, second and fourth. The other two are quoted from no MSS. ; the third is wrongly ascribed to the Leidensis, which has αἰρύσας = ἐρύσας the reading of B, E, and of the archetype, as represented by the Arabic *intaza'a* "evulsit," and ἀερύσας of A, where the correction was misunderstood (ROBORTELLO'S MSS. are doubtless fictions); the fifth is an emendation of PAZZI, copied by Fr. MEDICI, whose brouillon makes no pretensions to containing genuine tradition.

Urgronje; and of the Dresdensis, obtained at great trouble to themselves by the Librarians of the Royal Library, Dresden, and the University Library, Leipsic. The writer begs to thank all these gentlemen most sincerely for their valuable help.

The Greek text and the translation of the Arabic facing it contain, to the best of the writer's belief, the whole of the tradition, both Eastern and Western. The Arabic was unintelligible to its author's contemporaries, and the Latin version of it aims at no greater elegance. Where the Arabic obviously mistranslates a Syriac word, the rendering of the Syriac has been substituted in small capitals; thus where the Arabic has "laid the foundations" for *took a wife*, the latter has been substituted, since the former is the Syriac expression for that notion. Where the Arabic is corrupt, but can be emended from some source or other, the emendation has been translated, but with an asterisk following the rendering. Where it has been supplemented, the supplement is printed in italics. Agreement with the Arabic is indicated in the critical notes by an asterisk. MSS. other than A, B, C, D, E are only occasionally quoted, chiefly when their readings are followed. Except in the case of A, B, C, D, E, the editor has endeavoured to follow chronological order in the matter of ascription of readings; thus Victorius is later than Italus (Ricc. 16), Italus later than Paccius, Paccius later than the Aldine, the Aldine later than Lasc (Par. 2038). If therefore Italus is quoted, the reader may infer that the emendation so ascribed has not been found by the editor in any earlier document.

The third task, translating and interpreting, could not be shirked by the writer either. When a text is

pieced together out of several MSS.—and this is done by all editors of the Poetics, whether they talk of Apographs or not—if it is meant to be intelligible it ought to defend itself. But the Poetics was not intended by its author to be understood except by members of his school, persons who accepted his system, and learned his works by heart. Were it an Oriental text, doubtless it would be accompanied by an authoritative commentary, which would guide the reader; none such exists, whence it is the editor's business to supply some kind of substitute. For owing to the reason that has been mentioned, in such a case the maxim *difficilior lectio potior* assumes an importance that is altogether extraordinary.

That which is difficult to one who has not Aristotle's glosses before him or in mind becomes easy so soon as they are produced. Thus the second proposition of the book, viz. that creative art simulates with things differing in kind just as reproductive art simulates with Colour, Figure and Sound, is difficult only to one who does not know the meaning of "differing in kind"; which Aristotle repeatedly explains as "differing in Category,"[1] *i. e.* appealing to different senses[2] or faculties, like Colour, Figure and Sound.[3] The text becomes easy so soon as the glosses are quoted, while the German emendation which substitutes "in" for "categorically" becomes difficult, because it violates a canon of the Topics.[4] These glosses, then, it becomes the duty of the editor to collect, and the form chosen, that of a translation with com-

[1] Metaphys. 1016 b 33, 1024 b 12; Physics 227 b 4, etc.
[2] *Parva Naturalia* 455 a 22.
[3] Metaphys. 1057 a 27 (Colour and Figure); 1071 a 25 (Colour and Sound); Post. Analytics 97 b 35 (Colour and Figure, followed by Sound).
[4] 144 b 31.

mentary, appears to be the most convenient. Considerable use has been made of the Aesthetic writers, who act as a kind of microscope for Aristotle's ideas. Obligations have been acknowledged to these and to other authors from whom the writer is conscious of having borrowed; but he believes that the present work will not be found to interfere or compete with that of any other editor.

The Arabic text was photographed by the writer in 1896, and from these photographs he has been able to emend his former readings here and there; these corrections may some day be published in the *Journal* of the R. Asiatic Society; it did not seem desirable to use Oriental types in this volume. M. Duval in one or two places interpreted the Syriac better than had been done by the writer; the latter has seen nothing else on the subject which seemed in any way to advance it.

Besides the gentlemen mentioned above, Prof. Geyer of Vienna has with Dr. Bick earned the writer's gratitude by procuring him photographs of the two letters addressed to Scutariotes. To Mrs. Margoliouth he owes some references to Syriac literature (signed J. M.); to Messrs. Allen and Madan some valuable help with the Greek palaeography; and to the distinguished scholar to whom this book is dedicated he owes gratitude not only for the permission to so dedicate it, but for innumerable elucidations on points of scholarship and literary criticism.

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LIST OF MSS. AND AUTHORITIES FOR THE TEXT.

* Indicates that the MS. has been rotographed for this edition, and that the rotograph is to be found in the Bodleian Library.

† Indicates that the MS. is seriously interpolated.

A Parisinus 1741, belonged to Theodorus Scutariotes, identified with a Metropolitan of Cyzicus, ob. 1282. Probably of the twelfth century.

*B Riccardianus 46 (see Vitelli in *Studii Italiani di filologia classica* ii. 503). Imperfect at the beginning and near the end. Fourteenth century. Discovered by Susemihl.

*C Urbinas 47 (in Vatican Library). Written by Mich. Apostolis, probably in Crete, about 1460.

D Laurentianus xxxi. 14. Fifteenth century, *possibly* about 1410.

*E Ambrosianus B 78. Written by Mich. Suliardos, probably before 1497 ; used by Lascaris for the Aldine edition. See the Catalogue of Martini and Bassi.

The remaining MSS. may be roughly classified into the C, D, E and mixed groups.

C Group—

*F Parisinus 2040, of which Guelferb. Gr. 26 is said to be a copy. Late fifteenth or early sixteenth century.

*G Vaticanus 1400. Corrected here and there by a skilful hand. Early sixteenth century.

H Laurentianus lx. 14. Late fifteenth century.

†I Riccardianus 15. Sixteenth century, early.

K Ambrosianus O 52. Belonged to Majoraggio, 1514–1555.

L Ambrosianus P 34. Belonged to J. Chrys. Zanchi, 1490–1566.

*M Dresdensis Gr. D 4. Belonged to Alex. Agathemerus or Bondino, a physician of Venice and member of Aldus's Academy. Probably acquired after 1495. See F. Didot, *Alde Manuce*, p. 446.

D Group—

d Marcianus 215. Copy of D, *perhaps* made by Aurispa.

N Bodleianus Canon. 7. Sixteenth century. Written in Venice.

*O Leidensis 34. Sixteenth century?

E Group—

*P Coislinianus 324 (Paris). A MS. bound up with it and apparently of the same age bears date 1462.

Mixed MSS. resembling D—

*Q Vaticanus 1388. Fifteenth century.

†R Marcianus 200. Copied by J. Rhosus in Rome, 1457, perhaps from a Crypta Ferrata MS. mentioned in 1432.

S Laurentianus lx. 21. Borrowed by Lascaris in 1492?

†T Laurentianus lx. 16. Fifteenth century.

*U Parisinus 2551. Written by Antonius Damilas in Crete, 1480–1. Breaks off at 1456 a 35. See Omont, *Manuscrits Grecs de Fontainebleau*, p. 52.

*X Parisinus 2938. Sixteenth century. Breaks off at 1451 b 15.

Lasc brouillon of Janus Lascaris, preserved in Par. 2038.

Ald editio princeps of 1508, made with Lascaris's aid.

Paccius edition and translation of Alex. Pazzi, finished 1527, published posthumously, 1536.

Italus brouillon of Francesco Medici, preserved in Riccardianus 16; based on Paccius, so about 1540.

Ar. Arabic version by Abu' l-Bashar Mattā b. Yunan, published about 930 A.D., preserved in Parisinus Ar. 882a, copied 1016 A.D., printed in *Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam*, 1887.

Robortello, first Commentator, 1548.

Maggi or Madius, Vinc., second Commentator, 1550.

Vettori or Victorius, P., third Commentator, 1560.

(The first Latin translation, by G. Valla, 1498, is worthless.)

The works of Aristotle are cited by page, column and line of the Berlin edition of 1831. In the case of the Poetics the lines are cited according to this edition.

CHIEF AUTHORITIES ON THE SUBJECT MATTER.

(*The asterisk indicates that considerable use has been made of the work*)

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

ON THE ESOTERIC STYLE

In a correspondence attributed by Plutarch [1] and Gellius [2] to Alexander and Aristotle, the world-conqueror complains of the publication of his teacher's esoteric writings, which should, he thinks, have been the monopoly of the pupil. Aristotle replies that Alexander's monopoly is in no way affected by their publication; for without his personal instruction they would be unintelligible. This correspondence is not usually regarded as genuine, though it goes back to a respectable date; partly, perhaps, because the esoteric works are said not to have been published till some centuries after their author's death. Yet the philosopher's reply is at least well fabricated, because it accurately indicates the nature of esoteric work. It is not only intended to be conveyed orally to privileged persons, but should be so constructed as to be of little use to others. And so an admirer of Aristotle in the fourth century A.D. reckons it among the inventions of Aristotle to have so arranged his esoteric works that the uninitiate should not have access to them even when they possessed them; the volumes might be rolling before their feet, yet they were as impenetrable as the palace of Ecbatana.[3]

[1] Alexander § 7. [2] *Noctes* xx. § 5.
[3] Themistius, *Oratio* xxvi.

Since the Poetics acknowledges itself an esoteric work,[1] it is desirable before approaching it to form some idea of the way in which a book in a well-known language about a familiar subject can be rendered inaccessible; and the esoteric literatures of the East furnish us with some suggestions. As good an example as any is to be found in the grammatical aphorisms or *sūtras* of Panini, no sentence of which would, without teaching, be understood even by one whose native language was Sanskrit. Brevity is studied therein to the extent of saving not only sentences and words, but syllables and letters. The language is artificial in both vocabulary and syntax. Each part of the system assumes every other, whence the first aphorism is unintelligible except to one who knows the last and many others. The Indian plan is therefore to acquire the whole collection by heart before learning the meaning of any aphorism.

From the Nicomachean Ethics we learn that the practice of getting philosophical treatises by heart first and afterwards becoming acquainted with their meaning was familiar to the Greeks; this, we are told, was done in the case of the poems of Empedocles.[2] Epicurus also required his followers to commit his writings to memory.[3] A mediæval Aristotelian, Avicenna, tells us similarly that he committed the Metaphysics to memory, without understanding the sense; presently he came across the treatise of Al-Farabi, which explained it to him.[4] When the memory is to be burdened in this way, it is evident that it should be spared as much as possible. Either, then, the treatise should be metrical, and so more easily acquired; [5]

[1] 1454 b 18. [2] 1147 a 21. [3] Diogenes Laertius x. § 12.
[4] Kifti, *Tales of the Physicians* (ed. Cairo), p. 270.
[5] Rhetoric 1409 b 6.

or it should be set to music;[1] or every syllable of the text and the order of all the words should be of consequence. This last is the practice of the Sūtra-composers, and Aristotle follows it.

The other signs of the esoteric style, technicality and interdependence, are also to be found in his works. In the Metaphysics Nature (according to a certain theory) is compared to a bad, episodic Tragedy;[2] for the meaning of the term "episodic," and the reason why such a Tragedy is bad, reference would have to be made to the Poetics;[3] otherwise the expression would be unintelligible. In the Rhetoric the "four types of Metaphor" are referred to as though they were generally known;[4] but this phrase is clearly a technicality of the Poetics. In the *Parva Naturalia* we have the cryptic sentence "feeling is not after the style of *μανθάνειν*, but after that of *θεωρεῖν*";[5] this utterance will be understood by one who has in mind a discussion in the *de Anima*,[6] but scarcely by any one else.

Since works of reference were far rarer in Aristotle's time than ours, even if the books had been published, this interdependence of so large and encyclopædic a collection would have rendered a teacher necessary; and careful reading enables us to find the need for oral explanation in many places where casual perusal might overlook it. The places in the Poetics which illustrate this phenomenon may be exemplified by a series of instances, selected in the order of obviousness.

In § 24 Homer is said to have taught other poets how

[1] Problems 919 b 39.
[2] 1090 b 19. Cf. 1076 a 1.
[3] 1451 b 34.
[4] 1410 b 36.
[5] 441 b 23.
[6] 417 a 21, sqq.

to romance: "the process is illusion. When the existence or occurrence of one thing is regularly accompanied by the existence or occurrence of another, people, if they find the second, suppose the first also to be real or actual: which is a fallacy. If, therefore, the first be a fiction, but were it real, it would by law of nature be attended by the existence or occurrence of something else, add that other thing; for the mind, knowing that law to be true, falsely supposes that the first is real. Example: That [1] in the Bath-scene."

The Bath-scene occupies more than 150 lines of Odyssey xix.; how are we to know which line furnishes the example? The formula of the quotation implies that the example is known; and the teacher will know it, because the rest of the passage occurs in the Rhetoric, bk. iii.[2] There the same precept is given to the romancing orator, and Homer quoted. The precept is to give plenty of detail, because what people know is a sign to them of the truth of what they do not know: "numerous examples are to be got from Homer," and the example from the Bath-scene adduced—

> "Thus spake she, and the old dame held her face with her hands, and shed hot tears"

"for those who are about to weep take hold of their eyes."[3]

This example takes us to a passage of the *Sophistici Elenchi*,[4] where the process is still further explained. It is there shown that the amateur can detect the charlatan by "the consequences," which are such that a person may know them without knowing the science, yet cannot

[1] The reading of B *τούτου τὸ* is evidently right.
[2] 1417 b 5. The correct interpretation is given by Victorius.
[3] Od. xix. 361. [4] 172 a 23.

know the science without knowing them. He can detect the charlatan; but he cannot make sure of the expert. Similarly here what we know is neither that Euryclea shed tears, nor that she put her fingers to her eyes; what we do know is the law of nature whereby those who are going to do the first do the second. Homer, by introducing this detail, satisfies the amateur's test; he has let something known to be true accompany his statement, whence the mind falsely concludes the truth of the statement.

It is clear that of ourselves we should never have known to which line in the Bath-scene the author refers, and that, in order to understand the reasoning thoroughly, the reference to the *Sophistici Elenchi* is requisite.

In 1461 a 27 we are told that certain difficulties in the poets can be solved by "the usage of ordinary language"; thus "people say a dilution is wine,[1] whence we get the half-verse 'greaves of new-wrought tin.'" The reader will probably fail to see the connexion, whence amateur emendations are suggested; but the teacher is expected to refer the student to the discussions in the first book *de Generatione* on "molecular mixture." There we are told why a dilution is called wine; viz. because in certain mixtures one element counts as form and the other as matter, and in such a case the whole is named after the element that gives form; wine and water does the work of wine, and therefore is called wine.[2] If, however, the amount of wine be so small that the whole does the work of water, then it should be called water.[3] The same, we are told in the last chapter,

[1] The reading of B *τὸν κεκραμένον* is clearly right. *ὁ κεκραμένος* is the Greek for "wine and water." Problems 874 a 30.

[2] 321 b 1.

[3] Cf. 328 a 27.

is what happens with tin and copper; the tin counts as form and the copper as matter; for the tin colours the surface but adds little or nothing to the bulk;[1] and that which is at the top belongs to the form.[2] Tin and copper, therefore, in their molecular mixture come under the rule which causes wine and water to be called wine; and the whole may on the same principle be called tin. That the two mixtures to some extent follow the same rule is also insisted on in the *de Generatione Animalium*.[3] Hence this matter, which is obviously a puzzle to the outsider, is a commonplace to the Aristotelian. But it is only to the Aristotelian that it will be intelligible; for it is based on the philosophy of form and matter, and the doctrine that things are called after the work which they do.[4]

The need for the oral instructor can escape no one in these cases; it is scarcely less obvious where the author introduces allusions which are explained or terms which are defined later on in the book. In § 15 there is an allusion to the "unaccountable" point in the Oedipus Tyrannus; different critics might apply this epithet to different features; Mr. Clayton Hamilton[5] finds it in the fact that Oedipus's marriage with his mother had not come to light during all those years. In § 24 we find that Aristotle is thinking of something different. In § 15 the *deus ex machina* in the Medea is criticized; Robortello declares that there is no such thing in the play; Victorius finds it in the sun's chariot mentioned near the end—which will not serve, since

[1] 328 b 9. [2] *De Caelo* 312 a 12.
[3] 747 b 4, 7. [4] Meteorology 390 a 12.
[5] *Theory of the Theatre*, p. 38.

the author is dealing with the " solution " or *dénouement :* which according to § 18 should come far earlier. What is it then ? It is the character Aegeus, as we are told in § 25. The Greek word *ἄλογον* is explained fully in the Physics; [1] it means " that which does not come in the order of nature." Medea's chariot is no more " unnatural " than a witch's broomstick; but there is nothing in the antecedents (according to Aristotle) to bring Aegeus on the scene.

In § 4 Homer is said to have been " in the full sense a fabricator (poet), for he alone not only coined good verse, but also dramatic fictions." What is meant by " dramatic " ? The definition comes in § 23: " having a beginning, middle and end," *i.e.* having unity of theme, such as is described in § 8, where Homer is said to have discovered the principle. What is meant by " in the full sense a poet " ? This is a reference to § 9 (1451 b 27), where it is shown that the poet or fabricator should be fabricator of stories rather than of verses. Naturally, for the use of the word *poet* itself, *i.e.* " fabricator," we should be referred to the Metaphysics or *de Generatione*, where it is explained that what is made is " the form." Homer not only fabricated verse, but he fabricated the story, and gave it artistic form. And this, as will be seen, takes us to the first sentence of the treatise, which like Panini's opening *sūtra* contains the whole book in germ.

A careful reader will notice cases in which the author's statements seem to conflict with each other. The definition of Tragedy is said to be all drawn from what has preceded; it begins *μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ*

[1] 252 a 13.

τελείας. μίμησις is from § 1; πρᾶξις from § 2 or § 3; σπουδαία from § 2; but whence comes the remaining word? It has not been used once in the book. Doubtless the learner was intended to ask this question; and the reply would be as follows. In § 3 the dramatist is said to present his characters πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας; where καὶ is a particle of explanation. The *praxis* is therefore specified as an *energeia*. This takes us to the Metaphysics,[1] where we learn that it is only a *praxis teleia* that is called an *energeia*. Presently in the Poetics the *praxis* which has been so described is identified with "life and happiness," also without previous explanation. These are indeed given in the passage of the Metaphysics as illustrations of a *praxis teleia*; for the identification we have to go to the Ethics, where the definition of happiness is "an *energeia* according to complete virtue," which is exactly equal to the phrase which describes the subject of Tragedy.[2]

This passage is worth considering for a moment, because it indicates very clearly that the Poetics is meant only for those who have assimilated the Ethics, just as the preceding passage shows that it demands acquiescence in the doctrine of the Metaphysics. Since Tragedy portrays persons of extraordinary virtue functioning, and happiness means to the Aristotelian functioning according to complete virtue, to him there will be nothing surprising in the theme of Tragedy being identified with happiness; to him it follows from the premises which he has accepted. It is true that the Tragedy involves a transition from "good fortune" to "ill fortune"; but

[1] 1048 b 34.

[2] πρᾶξις τελεία καὶ σπουδαία = ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

any objection that may be drawn from that to the identification of the theme of Tragedy with happiness is answered eloquently in the Nicomachean Ethics, where happiness and good fortune are clearly distinguished.[1] The next clause, "and wretchedness is in experience," similarly will not puzzle the Aristotelian, because he will have in his mind the rule of the Topics by which a genus when assigned to a species is to be tested by seeing whether the contrary species is found in it also.[2] The meaning of the particle "in" is told us in the Physics.[3]

In the brilliant chapter on the Origin of Art we are told that poetry is traceable to two definite causes. One of these, Mimicry, is explained in detail; then to it are added Harmony and Rhythm. Since in § 1 it is pointed out that these belong to different categories, this sounds like three, not two, definite causes. And doubtless the pupil was intended to ask for an explanation of this. That explanation would be to refer the student to some such discussion as that preserved in Problem xix. 38, where it is shown that both Harmony and Rhythm belong to the class Order, and that what is orderly is more "according to nature" than what is out of order. Hence the second cause is not really stated in the Poetics, viz. the love of order, but is to be communicated by the teacher out of that other text, where the proof that both are "according to nature" is also given; viz. that operations of every sort are aided by them—the text of BÜCHER'S admirable work *Arbeit und Rhythmus*—that health consists in the proper temperature of the body (a doctrine, as will be seen, of some consequence

[1] Page 1100 b. [2] 124 a 3.
[3] 210 a 18, ὅλως εἶδος ἐν γένει.

for the Poetics), and that infants delight in them. Or the further reference might be to the Physics,[1] where the connexion between nature and order is explained.

In another class of cases the need of the teacher's help is no less real, but only the careful reader will feel it. These are cases in which we have a series of propositions that are apparently untrue or unmeaning.

What sense—to take a paragraph near the commencement of the Poetics (§ 2)—will the following convey to the ordinary reader of Greek ?—

> *ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας,*
> *ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι,*
> *τὰ γὰρ ἤθη σχεδὸν ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις,*
> *κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες,*
> *ἤτοι βελτίονας, κ.τ.λ.*

We begin with a plain and honest amateur translation.

"(1) Now since the imitators imitate men in action,
(2) and these must be either virtuous or vicious men,
(3) for character almost always follows these only,
(4) for all men differ in character by vice and virtue."

If the translator choose to think as well as translate, he will comment as follows :—

Clause 1. Clearly untrue. The imitator can imitate a dead man or a woman in a faint, or a landscape or a scene.

Clause 2. Grossly untrue. Of men in action 99 per cent. at least are neither virtuous nor vicious exclusively, but *both* virtuous and vicious.

Clause 3. Unmeaning.

Clause 4. Obscure, because we are not told from whom

[1] 252 a 12.

they differ. If it means that they differ from each other, its truth cannot be assumed. For we often say of people that they are as like as two pins or that there is nothing to choose between them.

Three courses are now open to us. We may, like the tutor of Saladin's son, condemn the book as decidedly silly and of no practical use.[1] A far less intelligent course would be to attempt to persuade ourselves that these propositions were defensible, *e. g.* that a dead man was really a man in action, and that landscapes were not really painted. A third course—which we propose to attempt—is to see whether Aristotle has not left us both a vocabulary and a grammar to his books, the use of which may show us that his statements are both clear and true.

Clause 2. *ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι* has to be compared with the statement in the Categories[2] which seems to contradict it: "good and bad are predicated of men and many other subjects, but it is not necessary that one of the two should belong to those of whom they are predicated," *οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν* "for not all are *either* good *or* bad; there is an intermediate, the neither good nor bad." This sound doctrine is taught elsewhere,[3] and we are reminded in the Metaphysics[4] that the intermediate has in this case no name. Evidently the difference of the Greek formulæ (*ἤτοι — ἤ* and *ἢ — ἤ*), which we may call those of the exhausted and balanced alternatives, must constitute a radical difference in the sense. What

[1] Diyāū 'l-dīn al-Jazarī, *The Current Proverb*, ed. 1, p. 187. The astute Abū Sa'īd Sīrāfī suspected mistranslation.

[2] 12 a 13–15. [3] Topics 123 b 17; Metaphys. 1055 b 23.

[4] 1056 a 25.

is the meaning of the formula of balanced alternatives? This is carefully explained in the Meteorology.[1] "That which is composed of dry and moist must be *ἢ σκληρὸν ἢ μαλακόν*. Hard is that which does not sink into itself along the surface, soft that which sinks, without compensatory elevation; for water is not soft, since the surface does not sink downwards by pressure, but has compensatory elevation. Absolutely hard or soft is that which is absolutely such, relatively what is so in relation to a particular thing. In relation to each other there is between things infinite difference of degree; but since we refer all sensible things to the sense, it is clear when we speak of absolutely hard or absolutely soft that we do so with reference to the touch, the touch being used as standard. That which is above it is hard, that which is below it is soft in our nomenclature."

The formula of balanced alternatives then means the one or the other relatively to some standard or other, that of exhausted alternatives the one or the other relatively to a particular standard. Hence in the *de Generatione*[2] the author can say "the water must be *or* white *or* black," meaning relatively light or dark in colour, whereas he frequently points out[3] that between white and black there are numerous varieties of colour; which, however (*e.g.* scarlet[4] and grey[5]), *are* white or black relatively to darker and lighter colours. Similarly we get the assertion that everything "must of necessity be *or* light *or* heavy"[6] in a paragraph which

[1] 382 a 10. [2] 332 b 22.
[3] Metaphys. 1056 a 30; Topics 106 b 11.
[4] Meteorology 375 a 14. [5] Physics 224 b 34.
[6] *De Caelo* 301 b 30. In Metaphys. 1056 a 22 *πεφυκὸς ἢ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν εἶναι* is identified with what has *μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον*.

demonstrates that things are both. And that this is the true explanation in the passage with which we are dealing is evident from the fact that the standard "ourselves" is immediately introduced. The *differentia* "virtue" attaching to all character by law of nature, every character must in relation to some other possible character be good or bad; in relation to ourselves be equal, better or worse. Hence it is quite true to say with the Categories that it is not necessary for them to be *either* good *or* bad,[1] and with the Poetics that it is necessary for them to be "*or* good *or* bad." For just as adjectives can be used for both dynamis and energeia, so they can be used to signify the possession of *any* of the quality or *much* of the quality. "Gravity and velocity have each two significations, meaning *any* falling power and *high* falling power, *any* motion and a *high* degree of motion."[2] The Poles are really not to be found apart;[3] things being called one or the other according to predominance.

The English for the formula of balanced alternatives must then not be "either virtuous or vicious," but "relatively virtuous or vicious." For it is quite clear that this formula includes the intermediate state, whereas the formula of exhausted alternatives excludes it.[4] It is not true to say that an article must be either cheap or dear; it is true to say that it must be relatively cheap or dear.

Clause 3 gives very little trouble when we have learned the meaning of *ἀκολουθεῖν*, which is not explained at all

[1] For ἤτοι—ἤ after *ἀνάγκη* see Politics 1260 b 38; *de Caelo* 274 a 30; *de Generatione* 332 a 5, etc.

[2] Metaphys. 1052 b 28.

[3] Meteorology 359 b 32

[4] It is not asserted that ἤ—ἤ is never used for ἤτοι—ἤ; but that ἤ—ἤ has a sense which ἤτοι—ἤ has not.

in LIDDELL and SCOTT, and is unsatisfactorily glossed by BONITZ. It is a technicality of logic, meaning "to come after in the order of thought," *i. e.* to be the genus of a species [1] or the species of an individual.[2] "Of these species only is character regularly the genus" is an intelligible expression. Its meaning is "only thus can character regularly be classified." Of any character we may say that it is relatively good or bad, but not necessarily anything else.

But is this true? It is, if we accept the doctrine of the Categories, the Ethics and the Politics. The author's comment on it later in this book is "even a woman or a slave may be good; although women are inferior beings and slaves generally worthless." The doctrine of "privation" is expressed by the formula: he only is blind who was intended by nature to see. He only then is miserly who was intended to be generous; unchaste who was intended to be chaste; low-minded who was intended to be high-minded. But according to the Politics the capacity for complete virtue is to be found only in the ruler of the state; [3] the capacity diminishes the farther people are removed from the top. If the proper sphere of courage is war,[4] then those who do not fight cannot be divided into comparatively courageous and cowardly. Those who have no "honour" cannot be classified as

[1] Defined in *Sophistici Elenchi* 181 a 23, 24. ἔστι διττὴ ἡ τῶν ἑπομένων ἀκολούθησις ἢ γὰρ ὡς τῷ ἐν μέρει τὸ καθόλου οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ ζῷον "either as general to particular, *e. g.* animal to man." (The other is based on the Law of Contradiction.) This use pervades the logic, *e. g.* Topics 113 b 31 τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἀρετὴ ἀκολουθεῖ "courage is a virtue." 128 b 4 ὡς γένους τοῦ ἀεὶ ἀκολουθοῦντος. Numerous cases of it and ἕπεσθαι in Prior Analytics 43 b 44 a.

[2] *De Generatione Animalium* 768 b 13, πᾶσιν ἀκολουθεῖ τοῦτο (τὸ ἄνθρωπος) τοῖς καθ ἕκαστον "Man is the species of all the individuals."

[3] 1260 a 17.

[4] Nic. Ethics 1115 a 30.

chaste or unchaste; those who have no property cannot be comparatively liberal or miserly. Hence by the time we get to the bottom of the state the capacity for one virtue after another has been eliminated; but even so there is comparative goodness and badness, because the humblest member of the state has a function to fulfil, and virtue is what makes him fulfil it well.

The fourth clause gives the reason for the last proposition, and means neither that every person's character is good or bad, nor that no two persons' characters are equally good or bad, but that where there is difference of character it is a question of relative goodness and badness. And from this the previous proposition follows. If the difference between (say) cameras is in size, the only classification of them is into comparatively large and small, *i.e.* trichotomy by standard. The theory involved is that a genus has one ultimate differentia only, which is stated in the Physics.[1] If for "character" we substitute the literal rendering "in their moral qualities" or "in any moral quality," this assertion will seem less hazardous; for in comparing A with B we should say A is (perhaps) less courageous than B, but more just. And so we are told that a courageous woman would make a cowardly man, but a chaste man a loose woman. The moral qualities have, however, relative importance,[2] whence it is possible to sum up, and assert that a woman is worse than a man. But just as a definition of hardness can be given, viz. what has been quoted above, so there is a definition of moral virtue, viz. choosing according to right reason in matters of pleasure and pain. The extent to which that is requisite is determined by one's

[1] 189 a 13. [2] Topics 117 a 35.

place in society, whence, as has been seen, potential virtue varies with social position.

The true principle of classification is to find the contrariety of the genus.[1] And this must be that wherein members of the genus, *qua* members of it, differ.[2] This then is the problem which this sentence solves.

The question which remains is how the proposition should be rendered. The Greeks found some difficulty, as Aristotle observes in connexion with "gravity and levity."[3] Sometimes there is a single word, like "temperature"; for we should say "bodies differ in temperature," where the Greek would usually be "in heat and cold." More often we treat one of the Poles as positive and the other negative, and should say "bodies vary in solubility, magnitude, multitude," etc., where the Greeks mention both Poles, solubility and insolubility, etc.[4] Aristotle in general agrees with us in regarding one Pole only as positive, but (for once) is not quite consistent. "One of the contraries is a negation" is the general principle,[5] but though cold is given as an example of this, elsewhere it is said to be a "reality" and not a negation.[6] In the present case the right rendering seems to be "in relative goodness and badness." Difference between any two characters is relative goodness and badness; thence it follows that the only way in which they can be classified is into relatively good and bad; whence we get trichotomy by standard, *i.e.* by comparison with ourselves.

There remains the first clause. In this esoteric style it is quite certain that there are no superfluous words;

[1] Topics 143 a 35; Metaphys. 1037 b 20.
[2] Metaphys. 1038 a 15.
[3] *De Caelo* 307 b 32.
[4] Meteorology 385 a 19.
[5] *De Generatione* 332 a 23.
[6] *De Partibus Animalium* 649 a 18.

and the order is arranged with the utmost care. The construction, then, cannot be "since the imitators imitate *prattontas*," for the word "imitators" would be useless; it must be since "those who imitate *prattontas*"—there follows a long parenthesis—"imitate such as are better or worse than, or on a level with, ourselves; *e.g.* painters." This section, then, anticipates § 3, where we are told that Sophocles and Aristophanes both "imitate *prattontas*"; the word *drontas* is there added to distinguish the case of the dramatist from that of the painter. The difference is between *dynamis* and *energeia;* the subject of portrait-painting is potentially *pratton;* that of the drama is so actually.

Let us try to discover the sense of the verb *πράττειν*, which occupies so much space in this treatise. Literally it means "to go through," with *περαίνειν* for causative, meaning "to bring through"; and it is possible to go through either an action or a passion; both teacher and taught go through the lesson; one goes through a performance as one goes through misery. The classification, according to Aristotle, is not between active and passive going through,[1] but between going through to get beyond, and going through when there is no beyond. Let us now examine his actual usage.

πράττειν is the genus of the verb "to be fortunate,"[2] a verb of which it is used as a synonym is *πάσχειν*,[3]

[1] In the Politics 1325 b 29 there is a distinction between *ἐξωτερικαὶ* and *οἰκεῖαι πράξεις*.

[2] Physics 197 b 1–13. *ὅσοις τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις.*

[3] *Ibid.* 247 a 9 *αὕτη [ἡ ἡδονὴ] ἐν τῷ πράττειν ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσαι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν. ἡ γὰρ οἷα ἔπαθον μεμνημένοι ἥδονται* = Rhetoric 1370 a 32 *ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι*, etc. Eudemian Ethics 1220 a 31 *πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη.* Nic. Ethics 1154 a 32 pleasures are *πράξεις*.

and it is associated with that verb in such a way that there seems to be some difficulty in knowing when one should be used and when the other. "Birth, growth, procreation, waking, sleep, movement" is given as a list illustrating both together.[1] In parallel texts the word *πάθος* can be substituted for the word *πρᾶξις*.[2] Examples of *πράττειν* are "to keep still,"[3] no less than "to walk," "to love and hate,"[4] etc. It is in usage absolutely distinct from *δρᾶν*, for *μεγάλα πράττειν* means to be highly successful,[5] and *ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι* usually "to derive a benefit,"[6] whereas the verb *δρᾶν* would in these contexts mean "to do great things,"[7] and "to confer a benefit."[8] *ἔπραξεν ὡς ἔπραξεν* means "he fared as he fared," *ἔδρασεν ὡς ἔδρασεν* would mean "he acted as he acted."

The two most important passages for this question are probably those in the Metaphysics (1048 b 18 foll.) and in the *de Caelo* (292 a 20 foll.). In the first it is stated that "since of *praxeis* which have a limit none is an end aimed at but concerned with the end aimed at, *e.g.* the process of emaciation in the case of emaciating,[9] the processes which produce it being in motion only while producing it, not being themselves the object of the process; such processes are not *praxis*, or at least, not

[1] *De Partibus Animalium* 645 b 33. *λέγω δὲ πάθη καὶ πράξεις γένεσιν, κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Nic. Ethics 1105 a 4 *κανονίζομεν δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ* = Eudemian Ethics 1221 b 36 *τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ διώρισται.*

[3] *De Motu Animalium* 701 a 16; Metaphysics 1048 b 29.

[4] Rhetoric 1389 b 4.

[5] Rhetoric 1387 b 28 = *εὐτυχοῦντες.*

[6] Rhetoric 1386 a 12 = Great Ethics 1207 a 28, where *ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν* is given as an equivalent. But 1212 a 8 seems to disagree with this.

[7] Tropics 126 a 35; 126 a 38 is uncertain.

[8] Rhetoric 1380 b 15.

[9] Explained in Problems 956 a.

perfect *praxis;* for they are not an end aimed at, whereas within the perfect *praxis* there is both the end aimed at and the *praxis.* Examples are 'he sees,' 'he is conscious,' 'he understands and has understood'; but you cannot say (in the case of the imperfect *praxis*) 'he makes out and has made out' or 'he is being cured and has been cured.' As another illustration of the perfect *praxis*—'he lives and has lived well; he is and has been happy.' Otherwise (if both perfect and present were not simultaneously true) he should have stopped, just as he stops emaciating (when he has become lean). But this is not the case, as he both lives and has lived. To the former (the imperfect *praxeis*) I give the name *motions*, to the latter (the perfect *praxeis*) the name *energies* (realizations). Every *motion* is imperfect, emaciation, learning (or making out), walking, building. These are motions and imperfect: for he cannot at the same time be walking and have walked (the same yard) nor be building and have built (the same house)."

No *action* in the English sense is ever of the kind described; the author, by saying "such processes are not *praxis*, or at least *perfect praxis*," admits that the word is at times used for the other process; and in the passage quoted from the *de Caelo* he makes it characteristic of *praxis* that it "is aimed at a mark." "We are to think of the heavenly bodies as having *praxis* and life; the result will not be surprising. It would seem that he who is best off has what is good without *praxis*, he who is next best by means of one slight *praxis*, those that are a long way off by means of several; just as in the case of bodies one is in good condition, without doing exercises, another after a little walking, while another requires

running, wrestling and the arena, and another could by no amount of trouble get this good, though it might some other. Further, it is difficult to do many things successfully or to succeed often, just as it is impossible to throw sice ten thousand times, but not so hard once or twice. Again, when you must do one thing for the sake of another, a third for the second, and a fourth for the sake of the third, it is not so hard to succeed in one or two, but the more the operations the harder success becomes. Whence we must suppose the *praxis* of the stars to be similar to that of animals and plants; for here, too, man's *praxeis* are the most numerous; for he can hit many worthy marks, so that he does many *praxeis* and for different ends. But he that is best off requires no *praxis*, for he has the *what for;* and a *praxis* has always two factors when there is the *what for* and the *for that.*"

It is clear that the idea which the author connects with *praxis* is a *conscious process;* and ordinarily a fully conscious process, in which the will has a voice. So we are told that *praxis* belongs neither to the inanimate, nor the lower animals, nor infants;[1] yet at times it is certainly used of lower forms of consciousness (as above).[2]

The difference between the author's psychology and that which underlies our language renders the translation of the word unusually difficult. A word which will include driving in a nail and being in misery, building a house and being angry or afraid, growing and killing, is scarcely to be found in English. We have therefore to bear in mind in each place what is in the author's thought. At times it is the equivalent of *life*;[3] in such cases "faring,"

[1] Physics 197 b 7; Great Ethics 1187 b 8.
[2] Nic. Ethics 1111 a 26; Natural History 588 a 17, 596 b 20, etc.; *de Anima* 415 b 1.
[3] Politics 1281 a 3; *de Caelo* above.

"career," "chapter of life," "destiny" will serve. Often "to experience" will serve as a rendering for the verb; so in the second passage quoted above from the Physics a pleasure may be said to be *experienced*, remembered or awaited. Where it is "imperfect," the substantive may be rendered (though with caution) by "action," and in the plural by "conduct."

In clause 1, then, *πράττοντες* means "such as fare," "experience" or "conduct themselves"; but this present participle can be used of potentiality or actuality;[1] for which rendering shall we decide? For potentiality; since that is required for classification;[2] and we have seen that the painter's subject can only be a potential "experiencer," or *person;* for the denotation of that word corresponds with that of *πράττων*.

We have only the word *μιμεῖσθαι* left. Like *prattein*, it combines two conceptions which we usually regard as not only distinct but contradictory.

The heading promises to tell us what is poetry *itself*, and the *self* is the *essence*.[3] This promise must of course be fulfilled, and its fulfilment is only perceived by one who knows the meaning of the word *σύνολον*; for we are told that Poetry is *μίμησις τὸ σύνολον*. That word is a technicality of the Metaphysics,[4] and means form + matter, and is also, as such, one sense of the word "essence." The essence of poetry, then, meaning both form and matter, is "imitation." But where the matter as well as the form is "imitated" the term *we* use is not "imitation,"

[1] Metaphysics 1017 b 2.

[2] Topics 142 a 20; *de Partibus Animalium* 649 b 13, 15; *de Caelo* 281 a 12; Great Ethics 1205 a 35; Metaphysics 1087 a 16.

[3] Metaphys. 1029 b 20.

[4] 1039 b 21 and often (*e.g.* 1029 a 5). Post. Analytics 97 a 39.

but "imagination" or "creation"; this, then, is the radical difference between the creative arts called poetry, and the reproductive arts, of which Aristotle uses the term *ἀπεικάζειν*, "to copy." A statue by Phidias is an imitation in form, not in matter; the poetry of a Tragedy is "imitation" altogether.

The thought of imitation "in its entirety" might be elucidated as follows. A counterfeit coin of genuine metal would be an imitation in one respect only—pretending to be authorized when it was not. One of base metal would not only pretend that, but would also pretend to be gold when it was not. A coin in a picture would further pretend to be of three dimensions when it was of two, and to be detached when it was part of a surface. But a coin of fiction, like BENTLEY'S "Sicilian drachma," would pretend in every respect; it would touch reality nowhere. Of it, then, the term *παράδειγμα* "ideal model" might be used, but not *εἰκών* "copy."[1] Hence the first sentence of the treatise contains in germ the doctrine which is afterwards elaborated, that poetry must not be a reproduction of the actual history; it must be imaginary, and stand to history in the relation of algebra to tradesmen's books. It is remarkable that FECHNER, by what might seem to be a mistranslation of Aristotle's words, has come near Aristotle's theory. Aristotle, he says, desired "not a pure but a purifying imitation of nature";[2] which he further explains thus: "the pure nature of things which in reality appears blurred, disturbed, confused, imperfectly reproduced, or so as not to be distinguishable, is displayed before our eyes by art in a form which attracts

[1] 1461 b 13; Metaphys. 1079 b 35.
[2] *Vorschule*, ii. 41.

the mind and fills us directly with pleasure." [1] Aristotle, however, confines this doctrine to Poetry, *i.e.* creative art, while leaving it to reproductive art to copy nature.

Hence this passage is not free from polemic against Plato's observation in the Laws [2] that all *mousike* is both *mimetike* and *eikastike*. And the difference between the two philosophers goes back to the theory of Ideas. With Plato the best poem is that which resembles the imitation of the beautiful. According to this formula the difference betwen the creative and the reproductive arts is obscured. The model is the Idea; that both the creative and the reproductive artist endeavour to reach through one of Nature's copies. According to Aristotle, creative art reproduces the model, reproductive art the copy; the latter is "copying" (*ἀπεικασία*), the former *μίμησις τὸ σύνολον*. The painter represents Agamemnon *qua* Agamemnon; the poet uses the name Agamemnon as the algebraical formula for a group of qualities; there need for him have never been such a name in history, just as Agathon invented the name Antheus. If, however, there has been, he may profit by the fact that the audience are familiar with his fortunes, and therefore unable to say that a conquering hero could not possibly be murdered on his return by an adulterous wife.

For the words *μίμησις τὸ σύνολον* the writer has adopted the rendering "immaterial portrayal of the imaginary," believing that this gives the author's meaning exactly. On the one hand it is clear that the word *ὕλη* is intentionally avoided throughout this treatise, because the

[1] *Vorschule*, ii. 56. This is not really a mistranslation of *katharsis*, but comes from SCHASLER, *System der Künste*, p. 8.

[2] 668 a.

synolon is without *hyle;* further it will be remembered that VISCHER places poetry at the head of his hierarchy of the arts on that very ground, that it is released from matter, and therefore its products are potentially immortal.[1]

The English words "simulate" or "feign" would give the technical meaning of *μιμεῖσθαι* in this treatise, and for the substantive "fiction" has been adopted. In many places, however, "feign" would be unnatural English, and "simulate" might be misunderstood; on the other hand "portray" does not suggest "pretending," which is often required. HEGEL regarded the Greek art critics as wrong in thinking it a sign of excellent painting that the likeness could be mistaken for the reality; the grapes at which birds pecked and the curtain which some one tried to raise were bad art. Probably there is justice in this criticism, and LANGE has analysed with great acuteness the "illusion-disturbing elements" which are no less necessary than the elements which constitute illusion. Nevertheless the Hellenic view of the artist was that of a feigner rather than portrayer. In employing the phrase "portrayal of the imaginary" for creative art we clearly admit no misconception; the amount that is admitted where the word "portray" is used of reproductive art does not seem sufficient to render the use of it objectionable in the sentence with which we are dealing.

For the word *σπουδαῖος* in the definition of Tragedy Aristotle gives us in the Problems the rendering "heroic,"[2] and to this he adheres in the Nicomachean Ethics.[3] His theory that the Tragic hero is morally superior to modern

[1] Metaphysics 1071 b 22. [2] 922 b 17. [3] 1145 a 20.

man is in complete harmony with his system: according to which perfect virtue belongs to the ruler only, whereas otherwise it varies with social rank. A slave has practically none, and the case of an artisan is very doubtful.[1] Of course this has to be interpreted of *dynamis*, not of *energeia;* a king has the capacity for the highest virtue and the highest happiness; and we classify by potentiality, not by actuality.

An admirable writer on the theory of the Drama, G. Freytag, explains the fact that in modern times an ordinary citizen may be the hero of a Tragedy by the advance in individual liberty which has taken place, giving the ordinary citizen scope for the development of character which in ancient times he did not possess.[2] Similarly the author of *The Origins of Art*[3] explains our feelings after losses as largely due to the fact that an occasion of activity for our senses, thoughts or bodily powers has been withdrawn. Carlyle *tells* us that the most remarkable (*σπουδαῖον*) event of modern times was George Fox making himself a suit of leather; it is strange, if he believed this, that whereas he made two pages serve for the shoemaker and his suit, he devoted three volumes to the French Revolution, and nine volumes to the life of a king. Vanity Fair is vastly more consistent.[4]

Classification by potentiality, not by actuality, is, of course, right and natural. An automobile would be classified as 70 H.P., though the chauffeur never let it

[1] Politics 1260 a 14–37, *τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.*

[2] *Technik des Dramas*, 11th ed., p. 58. [3] Ÿ. Hirn, p. 46

[4] Carrière (*Poesie*, p. 525) says "it is indifferent whether the tragedy comes to pass in a private house or in a royal palace." This, however, was not Aristotle's view.

develop more than 5 H.P. An artist is classified by his successes, not by his failures.[1]

So far, then, we have seen that the *sūtras* of Aristotle resemble those of Panini in requiring knowledge of the whole system in order to understand any part of it; for these four sentences have taken us over a large number of the treatises.

The study of these sentences has also shown us that before charging Aristotle with propositions which are either obscure or untrue, it is desirable to search his works for elucidations. In many cases at least such will be found. In § 4 the ordinary translations charge him with asserting that "to learn is delightful to all alike," and that the picture of something which you know gives you pleasure, because when you see it you learn. The former proposition implies that Aristotle knew less of human nature than a schoolboy knows; if learning were so delightful, why should we cajole, coax and frighten boys and girls into learning? And does the reward which the world has given to its greatest teachers, to Socrates and the rest, indicate that learning is a pleasure? But indeed, the author himself in the Politics [2] states that learning is accompanied *by pain*. The proposition that we learn when we see the picture of some one or something known to us already is simply self-contradictory. But in the *Sophistici Elenchi* [3] we are warned that the word *μανθάνειν* (translated "learn") has two distinct meanings, *to obtain knowledge*, which in English is "to learn," and *to understand by the use of one's knowledge*, for which the English is

[1] Great Ethics 1205 a 35. [2] 1339 a 28 *μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις.*

[3] 165 b 33 *τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.* Nic. Ethics 1143 a 12 *τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται ξυνιέναι ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.*

not " to learn," but " to make out." The assertion that all mankind enjoy *making out* needs no defence; the child, which dislikes learning, enjoys solving puzzles; and it is also true that the pleasure of seeing the likeness of what is familiar lies—at any rate to a considerable extent —in detecting resemblances. The word *μανθάνειν* is of course familiar in Attic conversation in the sense of " to make out," and is used of the solution of riddles.[1] Aristotle, in this place, has taken some trouble to make it clear which sense he intends. His words are *συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν*, which, of course, cannot be construed " their sight of the picture is accompanied by learning," since that would require *θεωροῦσι μανθάνειν*. The process which the teacher should go through is the following. In the Nicomachean Ethics[2] *θεωρεῖν* is identified with *χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ*. In the *Sophistici Elenchi*, as has been seen, one sense of *μανθάνειν* is *συνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ*. Hence the words of the text can only mean " the process is accompanied by 'making out with the exercise of one's knowledge,'" *i. e.* the solution of a problem. This, then, takes us to a discussion in the Physics,[3] where we are told that " that which is possessed of knowledge comprehends at once, unless anything prevent "; and this to the Nicomachean Ethics, where we are told that such unprevented exercise of a hexis is a pleasure.[4] The reference to the *Sophistici Elenchi* then shows us that the word is ambiguous; and the first to the Nicomachean Ethics tells us positively which of the two senses is meant in this place; but there is yet another to the Problems,[5] where we are told that

[1] Herodotus vi. 37; Plutarch, *Sept. Sap. Conv.* § 10 (585 R).
[2] 1146 b 33. [3] 255 b 22. [4] 1153 a 15. [5] 918 a 7.

the sense " to receive knowledge " is *not* meant in this place. What more could Aristotle have done ? LANGE [1] has therefore taken unnecessary pains to show wherein the *hinzulernen* postulated by Aristotle in addition to the *wiedererkennen* lies; for the philosopher does not postulate it.

One feature of the esoteric style about which it is not easy to convince oneself is that the author by preference uses a word in different senses in the same paragraph or sentence. In that which has been discussed it is clear that *θεωρεῖν* is used first for " to gaze at," the sense which belongs to it in connexion with pictures, statues, etc.; [2] and presently in the sense " to use the understanding," assigned it in the Nicomachean Ethics. Similarly in the passage 1450 b 34–1451 a 4, where the word *ζῷον* occurs four times, in the first and fourth it means " image," in the second and third " animal." In 1449 b 9 the word *μέτρον* is used in the sense " extent " in a context where the reader naturally thinks of *metre*, and for " metre " immediately after; causing readers in all ages to stumble. That the word *ἁρμονία* can be used in 1449 b 29 for " mixture of the familiar with the unfamiliar in diction " may seem surprising, yet consideration of the passage may modify the surprise in the manner suggested in the Metaphysics. In the definition we are told that the language is sweetened separately in the parts with each sort [of sweetening]; and this is explained to mean that the " sweetenings " are Rhythm, and Harmony and Tune, and by " separately in the parts " is meant that only certain parts are restrained (*περαίνεσθαι*) by metre, and only certain by tune. The equation

[1] *Wesen der Kunst*, p. 412. [2] Great Ethics 1191 b 7.

"sweetening = restraint" is from the Rhetoric;[1] that which restrains sweetens. Restraining can only be effected by number; but there is another mode of sweetening, whereon not only the Rhetoric insists,[2] which couples it with rhythm, but to which considerable space is devoted in the Poetics itself, viz. mixture of the familiar with the unfamiliar in vocabulary. That the author can have forgotten this sweetening here seems unthinkable. It has been suggested that the second "and" in the list means "*i.e.*"; but this is excluded by the employment of the word ἑκάστῳ, which cannot be used for ἑκατέρῳ, unless the author violates his own rule for the use of the numbers.[3] The word "restrain," then, is used where the sweetening is numerical, the word "sweeten" where the third mode is included. Moreover, we apparently have the same use in 1449 a 28.

The purpose, then, of one who composes in this style is to be understood only by members of his school; and the fact that so ardent a student of Greek poetry and poetics as ATHENÆUS takes no notice of Aristotle's esoteric work shows that the author's purpose was accomplished. Reference is rarely made to it, and until the sixteenth century it appears to have had little or no influence.[4]

Strabo asserts that the older Peripatetics merely uttered

[1] 1408 b 27, etc. [2] 1414 a 26. [3] Rhetoric 1407 b 10.

[4] The Orientals supposed "imitation" to mean "similes" or "metaphorical language"; and CARRIÈRE'S theory that poetry is largely *Gleichniss Rede* shows that this mistake was not absolutely unpardonable. The two classical authors on Poetic in Arabic (Kudāmah, Ibn Rashīk, and Al-Karl) do not appear to allude to Aristotle, although the first is said to have been present at the debate in which Abu'l-Bashar was exposed. Ibn al-Haitham (*ob.* about 1030) wrote a treatise on Greek and Arabic poetry combined (Ibn Abi Usaibi'ah, ii. 94), which would probably be a curiosity, if it could be found.

grandiloquent propositions,[1] having no access to the esoteric works, while the later Peripatetics, owing to corruption of the copies, said what was probable rather than what was certain. Some specimens of the sort of comments on the Poetics which these philosophers contributed still exist.

Brandis published a scholium of Alexander on *Sophistici Elenchi* 166 b 3, where there is an example of solving a difficulty by change of accent, also found in the Poetics. It is *διδόμεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.* Alexander cannot find this half-line in Homer, and suggests that Aristotle composed it himself! He then adds that *διδόμεν* is the Doric for *διδόναι.* His comment on the other case in which a difficulty was solved by "intonation" is not more helpful. There was some difficulty about the lines—[2]

ἕστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον τ' ὄργυι' ὑπὲρ αἴης
ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης· τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ,

which Hippias of Thasos solved by reading *ου* "somewhat more sharply." According to Alexander[3] it had originally been read *οὗ*, and construed "part of which moulders," and people thought it absurd that one part should moulder and not another, for the latter if not stated was implied. "Hippias emended *οὐ*, *i. e.* 'that kind of tree, the pine, does not moulder in the rain,' and Theophrastus observes that the pine does not rot in spring or rain water, but chiefly in sea water."

Now in the first place Theophrastus makes this observation about the *oak*,[4] not the pine, and speaks of rivers

[1] *θέσεις ἐληκύθιζον.* [2] Iliad xxiii. 327 8.
[3] Commentary on *Sophistici Elenchi* 166 b 5.
[4] *Historia Plant.*, V. iv. 3

and lakes, not of rain and springs; the oak is used for boats intended for fresh water, in which it does not rot, whereas it rots in sea water; "the other trees"—which must include the pine—"are naturally seasoned by the brine." Alexander then merely garbles a quotation already garbled by the Homeric Scholiast, who substitutes "such trees" for the oak. "Anonymus" retains the observation about the pine, but omits Theophrastus's name.

Secondly, there appears to be nothing absurd about the sense "part of it moulders in the rain," for there immediately follows, "on either side of it are two white stones"; the sense then will be "it is partly exposed to the rain, but on two sides it is protected." The difficulties are that the Homeric form is not *οὖ*, but *εὖ*; Zenodotus is charged with error by Apollonius Dyscolus for admitting *οὖ* in *one* place against Homer's usage;[1] that this word is so tenacious of its digamma that its introduction spoils the metre; and that *τὸ μὲν οὖ* for *οὖ τὸ μὲν* (relative) is unnatural.

There is a further difficulty. Aristotle says Hippias solved the difficulty by pronouncing the *ου* "more sharply" (*ὀξύτερον*) or "more acutely"; and it is ordinarily supposed that the negative *οὐ*, so far from being "more acute" than *οὖ*, has not an accent at all. How do the Graeculi deal with this point? "Anonymus" quite honestly contradicts Aristotle; he says the *οὐ* should be read neither perispomenon nor oxytone, but as the negative without any accent.[2] Alexander is not quite so clear, yet he implies the same.[3] "The word is to be read

[1] Syntax, p. 164; Pronouns, p. 97 (Bekker).

[2] *μὴ περισπωμένως μηδ' ὀξυτόνως προφέρειν τὸ οὐ ἀλλ' ἀνειμένως καὶ ἀποφατικῶς.*

[3] *ἀποφατικῶς ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὀξύτερον εἴρηκεν.*

negatively, which Aristotle calls 'more acutely.'" Now the esoteric style does not consist in using words in wrong senses, whence if Aristotle had meant the word to be read "without accent," for which "Anonymus" gives the phrase *ἀνειμένως*, which in Aristotelian Greek is identical with "grave,"[1] he would not have said "more acutely."

Since in the other place[2] in which we are told that the meaning of *ου* varies according as it is pronounced "more acutely" or "more gravely" between *οὗ* "where" and *οὐ* "not" we get no indication which accent goes with which meaning, and "Anonymus" confirms the ordinary view that the negative *οὐ* has no accent and is therefore *less* acute than the word which means "where," "of whom" and "*sui*"; it is best to invert the explanation of Alexander and suppose that the reading which occasioned difficulty was that of our ordinary texts, which Hippias remedied by changing *οὐ* into *οὗ*; and then everything will be clear. The old reading was simple and easy: "now that does not moulder in the rain," to which, however, there was the objection that though true of the oak it was not true of the pine;[3] Hippias substituted *οὗ* for *οὐ*, producing the reading which, as we saw, is sensible enough, but violates Epic grammar, metre or usage. Since the accent which we call perispomenon is with Aristotle the mean between acute and grave, he

[1] See Bonitz, col. 776. The examples are Physiognomonics 807 a 17 *τὸν τόνον ἀνίησι καὶ βαρὺ φθέγγεται*, *De Audibilibus* 804 a 26 *τόνοις ἀνειμένοις καὶ βαρέσιν*, Problems 900 b 12. Writers on accents similarly, Bekker's *Anecdota* 676, 31 and 684, 29.

[2] *Sophistici Elenchi* 178 b 3.

[3] It is a question of being worn away by raindrops (Physics 253 b 15); and the resistance of the oak to friction is so much greater than that of the pine, that pine keels were strengthened with oaken keels for beaching (Theophrastus, l.c. V. vii. 2).

calls it quite rightly "more acute" than the grave. As a mean it is the combination of the contraries;[1] and as a mean it is the opposite of both.[2] Compared with the grave it *is* acute.[3]

But are we not told by Prof. BLASS that the supposed "atonics" are, according to the older grammarians, all oxytone? That is so, but we are told by the same authorities—or rather authority, Herodian—that for an acute accent at the end of a word, when neither a stop nor an enclitic follows, a grave accent is substituted; and he assumes that this is the case with *οὔ*, as with the others. It is sufficient to quote his note on Iliad i. 114[4]: "Thus the negative *οὐ* should be given the oxytone accent, in order that *ἕθεν* may be treated as a simple pronoun ('her' not 'her-self'). For if we give *ἕθεν* its proper accent it will stand for the compound." Only then because *οὐ* is followed by an enclitic does it become oxytone; were it followed by an accented word it would be "grave." Now a perispomenon sound is, as has been seen, less grave, *i.e.* more acute than a grave sound. And that "grave" is identical with "unaccented" we know on the authority of Plato.

BLASS therefore was quite right to condemn HERMANN'S doctrine of "proclisis," for which there is no authority; what he does not express clearly is the obvious fact that so far as intonation goes it is indifferent whether we write a grave accent or no accent; and these signs mean *intonation*. Between *ὁ* and *τὸ*, *οὐ* and *μὴ* there is no difference in pitch;[5] the writing of the accent in the

[1] Physics 188 b 24. [2] Metaphys. 1056 a 25. [3] Physics 224 b 36.
[4] See LEHRS, *Herodiani Scripta Tria;* reprinted by LENTZ.
[5] So there was no difference in sound between *αὐλὴ τρὶς* and *αὐλητρὶς* Diog. Laert. vii. § 62.

one case and the omission of it in the other are purely conventional. And we must either adopt the whole of the traditional system or abandon the whole of it.

Here, then, as before, we cannot understand Aristotle's observation even about an accent without familiarizing ourselves with a considerable part of his system. The Poetics refers us to the Organon; the Organon to the Physics and Metaphysics. And the ordinary accentuation of our Greek texts involves the doctrine of dynamis and energeia. For when we accent words barytone, what we mean is that they are dynamically oxytone; but though they are classified by their dynamis, they must be described in any particular case by their energeia. And Aristotle has so worded his account of the accent in these cases that he can only refer to energeia.

If we estimate the service of the Graeculi in interpreting these two passages, it comes to a negative quantity; the one charges Aristotle with forgery, the other contradicts Aristotle flatly, and both misquote Theophrastus.

In Iliad x. 252 some found fault with the logic : *παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέων νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται,* rendering the verse " night, more than two portions is gone, and a third remains "; for if more than two-thirds were gone, a third would not remain. Aristotle observes that the word *πλέων* may certainly be the nominative of the comparative, but it may also be the genitive plural feminine of *πλέος* " full," and the meaning will then be " night is gone, two parts being full, and only a third remains "; neither the use of " full " for " complete," nor the genitive absolute in such a context, nor the accent, needs defending. Indeed confusion between

these two words appears not to be confined to Homer; for when Aristotle says in the Meteorology[1] that "the rivers run into the sea and the sea is no more," *i.e.* larger, Ecclesiastes reproduces this in the form "the sea is not full." The Homeric Scholiast reproduces this explanation in such a way as to produce two barbarisms; he thinks *πλέω* was used by Homer for *πλέων* or for *πλέα*, though what "full of two parts" would mean is not obvious.

This, however, is not according to these authorities Aristotle's explanation; what Aristotle said was that Homer had furnished a sum in simple equations: viz. $\frac{1}{2} + x = \frac{2}{3}$; whence $x = \frac{1}{6}$, *i.e.* two hours out of twelve. According to this Aristotle knew Greek so well as to suppose that "two parts" meant "one half." Now if Aristotle had been accustomed to think of day and night as each consisting of twelve hours, it would be strange that in his astronomical writings he should make no allusion to so useful a division. Yet he never once alludes to it; he himself reckons in Homer's style "the third part of the night, counting from dawn or eve";[2] in his Natural History an "hour" is a *time* of the day, sunrise, sunset, breakfast time, etc.[3] The only place in the Aristotelian *Corpus* in which "hour" might be interpreted in our sense of the word is in the Botany, of which the Greek is not by him. But even if he had meant what this Scholiast says, it would not be the work "more" that was ambiguous, but the phrase "two parts," which, according to this doctrine, could also mean one half. Hence we need have no hesitation in rejecting

[1] 355 b 23.

[2] Meteorology 350 a 32. [3] 564 a 20; 602 b 9.

this comment as later by some centuries at least than Aristotle's time.[1]

One other mode of dealing with the matter was to render "the night has passed the greater part of two-thirds," *i.e.* seven hours out of eight; but in that case more than the third part would remain.

BERNAYS, in two interesting papers, called attention to some comments of Graeculi on other passages of the Poetics.[2] One of these was the philosopher Iamblichus, of the fourth century A.D., regarded by some who were nearly his contemporaries as a charlatan.[3] The passage of his treatise "On the Mysteries" is reprinted in BYWATER'S edition of the Poetics, whence it need not be quoted in full here. The theory is that the *Katharsis,* which is the "peculiarity" of Tragedy according to Aristotle, means a slight indulgence of a passion in lieu of excessive indulgence. Tragedy and Comedy give a harmless vent to passions which otherwise might be dangerously indulged.

For the doctrine BERNAYS quoted another philosopher of the same stamp as Iamblichus, and himself adopted it as the correct interpretation of *katharsis.* He was vehemently attacked by BAUMGART in his *Poetik,*[4] but his views won wide acceptance.

Let us begin by seeing what Aristotle himself says on this question. Every one agrees that the first clue is the passage near the end of the Politics, where there is a reference to the Poetics for further light; it runs as follows—

[1] Thus whereas in the treatise on Time in the Physics Aristotle does not mention the hour, his commentator Themistius mentions it repeatedly. [2] *Zwei Abhandlungen,* etc. (reprinted), Berlin, 1880.
[3] Photius, *Bibliotheca* 337 b 8–10.
[4] Pp. 434 foll. BAUMGART rightly observes that Iamblichus was not a Peripatetic.

"*The ailment which befalls some minds severely is to be found in all*, only differing in intensity; viz. pity, fear and religious excitement: for to this last ailment, too, some are liable; and we see these persons when treated with the melodies which ordinarily excite the mind orgiastically *kathistamenoi* as though they had undergone the medical operation called *katharsis*. The same must be possible with the pitiful, the timid, and in general the emotional, viz. there must be some pleasurable mode of *katharsis*, *i.e.* being relieved, for all."

The first of these sentences is interpreted in Problem xxx.,[1] which deals with *the black bile*. It is there shown that excess of heat or cold in the black bile may be chronic or temporary; and the ailment "which befalls some minds severely, but is to be found in all," is this excess.

"If black bile, which is by nature cold and not superficially cold, abound in the body in that condition, it occasions apoplexies, numbnesses, *despair* and *fear*. . . . And just as the temperature of black bile makes people variable in sickness, so it is variable itself; at times it is cold and at times hot, like water. If terrible news is announced, should the temperature be too cold, it makes the man a coward; for it has cleared the way for fear and fear chills, as is shown by the trembling of the frightened. If the temperature be warm, the terror restores the mean condition, and makes the man his own master and callous. Similar is the case with daily despondency; for we often feel doleful, but cannot say why; at other times we are discouraged[2] without obvious cause. *These emotions*,

[1] Problems 954 a 22.
[2] The context suggests that ἀθύμως should be read for εὐθύμως.

to a certain extent, are to be found in every one; for every one has something of this power in his composition; but those in whom it goes down deep derive therefrom a definite character." Illustrations are then given of the effects of the temperature of the black bile, and cases of suicide, etc., explained.[1]

Now that we know who our patients are—for that the persons described in this Problem are identical with those mentioned in the Politics should not be doubted—we must consider how they can be treated. Hippocrates, who holds that in such cases the ailment is due to the water in the mixture being excessive, prescribes as follows:[2] " if the fire should be overcome by the existing water, these persons are called by some *insane,* by others *thunderstruck;* the madness of such persons has a slower tendency, *they cry when no one vexes or beats them, they fear what is not terrifying,* and they are grieved over what is no occasion for grief. These persons should be treated with vapour baths and be purged with hellebore after the vapour baths."

The law of nature invoked in the Politics is then the familiar rule " the science of contraries is the same "; if an excess of heat in the black bile can be cured by homœopathy, then an excess of cold in the same must be capable of cure by homœopathy also. The homœopathic cure in the case of the excessive heat is *Kataulesis;* for the homœopathic cure in the case of excessive cold we are referred to the Poetics, where we learn that the cure is Tragedy.

Owing to the regular cure for madness being purgation with hellebore, the verb *καθαίρειν,* " to cleanse," acquires

[1] In the Nic. Ethics 1154 b 12 it is said that the *μελαγχολικοὶ δέονται ἰατρείας.*

[2] Ed. LITTRÉ vi. 518.

the sense of "to cure madness"; it is so used in the Physiognomonics, where it is argued that since physicians "cleanse" madness by drugs, the connexion between mind and body must be close.[1] One example out of a fragment of Theopompus will serve instead of a number: "when the Lacedaemonian women went mad, Apollo sent Bakis as cleanser, and he cleansed them."[2] He who looks at the Greek for *Hercules sanatur* in the *Bibliotheca* of Photius will find that it is *καθαίρεται*. *Κάθαρσις*, as Galen says, means "*qualitative* evacuation of what is troublesome,"[3] and *qualitative* means with reference to *heat* and *cold*. Quality in the body is the heat and cold, whereas quantity is the moist and dry.[4] *Κάθαρσις* is ordinarily performed by a drug, which works qualitatively,[5] *i. e.* by excess of heat or cold.[6] It means, then, not excretion, but restoration of equilibrium, and so is used as a synonym of *ὁμαλύνειν*,[7] or *ἀποκατάστασις* or *κατάστασις*.[8] All these words mean the same: restoration of that equilibrium between heat and cold which is health;[9] called *eukrasia*, or the proper mixture of these two contraries.[10] Ill health is caused by excess of the one or the other.[11]

[1] 808 b 22 *μανία δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ φαρμάκοις καθαίροντες τὸ σῶμα . . ἀπαλλάττουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῆς μανίας.* [2] Suidas, *s.v. Bakis.*

[3] *ἡ τῶν λυπούντων κατὰ ποιότητα κένωσις.* [4] *Parva Naturalia* 466 a 30.

[5] *τῷ ποιῷ ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ ποσῷ*, cf. Problems 864 b 1. [6] *Ibid.* 864 b 10.

[7] Physics 197 a 23 *τὸ ἀποκεκαθάρθαι* = *ὁμαλυνθῆναι* Metaphysics 1032 b 19 (cf. 1013 b 1). In the passage of the Physics the *ἀποκεκαθάρθαι* is represented as a result of two accidental modes of warming = *θερμανθῆναι*. The "shaving of the hair" has no connexion with the subject.

[8] Problems 888 a 17 *ἡ ἀποκάθαρσις* = *κατάστασις εἰς τὴν φύσιν.*

[9] Problems 859 a 12.

[10] Problems 860 b 11; Physics 246 b 5 *ὑγίειαν ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν*; Post. Analytics 78 b 19.

[11] Problems 862 b 10.

Hence we need deplore the loss of no treatise upon *Katharsis*, because Aristotle in the Problems has explained every detail; he has even added the grammatical rule whereby we may speak of *adjusting the disorder* instead of *adjusting the disordered.* "At times we speak of the patient being cured, at times of the suffering;[1] at times we say the man is heated, at times the cold." The physical side of fear and pity is chilling of the black bile; the adjustment of that disorder, the equalization of the cold and the heat, is *κάθαρσις*.

The suggestion of Iamblichus is therefore one of the *λήκυθοι* ridiculed by Strabo, based on ignorance of the sense belonging to a technical term: the fundamental error lies in confusing quantitative with qualitative "purgation"; and the true explanation involves the medical and the physical systems of Aristotle.

Two questions remain: how the philosopher conceived the "clearance" to be effected; and how this function of Tragedy is implied in what precedes.

To the first question the reply is to be found in the theory of homœopathy which recurs in the Problems. An external chill can drive out an internal chill; "when people, owing to the cold of their composition, or of melancholy humours which produce a surplus of wind that is undigested owing to its coldness, have certain pneumatic motions, then if their intelligence be moved [by reading], but do not steadily interpret, the second motion, which is chilling, drives the first out."[2] The equilibrium is thus restored, and (in the case dealt with) the patient sleeps. Fear, as we are constantly told, chills. Tragedy then acts like reading in the case discussed, it drives out an

[1] *τὸ κάμνον*, *de Generatione* 324 a 15. [2] Problems 916 b.

internal by an external chill. The same is the reason why people in fever are to be kept warm; the external heat extinguishes the internal.[1] Where there is much fire, a candle will not burn; for the great [fire] draws the little to itself.[2] Much fire should, therefore, be put into the body, because the amount of fire in the fever is small.

To us who are not accustomed to think in terms of the four elements this explanation does not convey very much. The first of these references, however, enables us to introduce the word "divert,"[3] which represents the underlying truth. The theory of the *de Generatione* that only contraries can affect each other requires a contrariety to explain homœopathy; and this is found in the internal and external.

It remains to consider whence this idion of Tragedy is obtained. It must strike any student that whereas Aristotle discusses the etymology of Epopoiia and Comedy, he says nothing about that of Tragedy, on which he treats at such length. Either, then, the etymology was so well known that such trouble was unnecessary, or, as elsewhere, it is the teacher's business to furnish the references. That the latter is the case we learn from the *de Generatione Animalium*, where it is implied that not every one knows the meaning of *τραγίζειν*.[4] This verb in reference to the voice means "to be cracked," *i.e.* "when at puberty it begins to change in the direction of harshness and irregularity of pitch,[5] being neither still treble nor yet bass,

[1] Problems 871 a 37. [2] 866 b 2. [3] *ἐκκρούειν*.

[4] 788 a 1 *καλοῦσί τινες τραγίζειν ὅταν ἀνώμαλος ᾖ ἡ φωνή*.

[5] Aristotle's account of the phenomenon does not differ from that of modern authorities. See G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence and Psychology* (1908), ii. 27: "Often the vocal cords and cartilages to which they are attached do not grow in exact proportion the one to

nor all of uniform pitch, but resembling ill-strung and harsh chords." [1] A "tragic song" is, then, a song of *irregular pitch;* and in the Problems the word "tragic" is used in an association which leaves no doubt that this is the author's view of its meaning.[2] "Why is *parakataloge* in songs tragic? Possibly because of the *irregularity of pitch.* For the irregular pitch is pathetic and is found in great crises or great sorrows. The regular, on the other hand, is less doleful." A "tragic song" is thus in a pitch which is characteristic of great crises and sorrows: the terror and the pity which it inspires belong to its musical nature. "Tragic" is not named from Tragedy, but Tragedy from tragic; "the voice is symbolic of pleasure and pain," [3] and "things get their names from the functions which they are meant to fulfil." [4] Great grief and the sense of overwhelming disaster are naturally symbolized by irregularity of pitch in the voice; the rudiment of Tragedy will then be a howling and wailing of this sort; out of this nucleus such masterpieces as the Oedipus of Sophocles developed.

It will be seen in the next chapter that the sentence about the origin of both Tragedy and Comedy has at any

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the other; the tension is unsteady, and the voice occasionally breaks to a childish treble, often with notes that are higher than were normal before the change began. . . . Sometimes the voice is literally *broken*, perhaps into three or even more parts with gaps between them, and slowly the intervals fill in."

[1] Natural History 581 a 17 ἡ φωνὴ μεταβάλλειν ἄρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ τραχύτερον καὶ ἀνωμαλέστερον, οὔτ' ἔτι ὀξεῖα οὖσα οὔτε πω βαρεῖα, οὔτε πᾶσα ὁμαλή, ἀλλ' ὁμοία φαινομένη ταῖς παρανενευρισμέναις καὶ τραχείαις χορδαῖς, ὃ καλοῦσι τραγίζειν.

[2] 918 a 10 διὰ τί ἡ παρακαταλογὴ ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς τραγικόν; ἢ διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν; παθητικὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀνωμαλὲς καὶ ἐν μεγέθει τύχης ἢ λύπης· τὸ δὲ ὁμαλὲς ἔλαττον γοῶδες.

[3] Politics 1253 a 10.

[4] *Ibid.* 1253 a 23.

rate in the latter case been deliberately altered by Christian hands; hence it is likely that the statement which makes Tragedy originate from the dithyrambic performance is not intact. According to the Sicyonian view of its origin it commenced with the wailing over Adrastus. According to Aristotle it began as a rudiment, and the Dithyramb, in his view, was so far from being a rudiment that he recognizes it as a form of poetry. Moreover, the context implies that the rudiment of Tragedy was obsolete, whereas that of Comedy was still kept up in some states. The performance whence Tragedy was developed probably then had some name which gave offence to Christian sentiment. The name *Adonia* would perhaps do this, but it is not the present writer's business to offer conjectures.

This, then, is what Tragedy, according to Aristotle, means; and the interpretation is obtained by putting together the *sutras* scattered over his works. Let us now see whether the Graeculi are more trustworthy on this matter than we have found them to be elsewhere. "Tragedy," the Dictionary tells us, is "properly a Goat-song"; which should be a *he-goat-song; τράγος* is no more the Greek for "goat" than "ram" is the English for "sheep." It is sufficient for this matter to refer to the Index of BONITZ. What, then, is a He-goat-song or Buck-song? "A song for which the prize was a buck," answers the Arundel Marble, which BENTLEY reproduces; though the great critic thought the masterpieces of Greek Tragedy insufficiently rewarded with such a prize, and fancied the buck must have been prehistoric;[1] "Does Mr. B. believe that sorry prize was continued after

[1] *Phalaris*, p. 252.

Tragedy came into reputation?" he asks. However, after a few pages (to use his own metaphor) the wind blows a little less violently; and he thinks some people might be induced to believe that it was continued.[1] This is because the Scholiasts on Pindar and Aristophanes inform us that the prize for a Dithyramb was a bull, and that for harp-playing a calf. Prof. RIDGEWAY has pointed out in his valuable treatise on the Origin of Tragedy that according to the Scholiast on Plato a buck was not only the prize for Tragedy but the third prize for the Dithyramb; when the Athenian spoke of a Buck-song, then, he might mean either a first-rate Tragedy or a third-rate Dithyramb; and this would occasion serious ambiguity.

BENTLEY could apparently find nothing about this prize of a buck in places where mention of it would have been unavoidable, had it existed in historic times, *e.g.* the Symposium of Plato, where it should have played a rôle as important as that of the cake at a wedding-feast. His explanation, then, was that the name had lasted on after the occasion for it had passed away. He had, however, to charge Herodotus with something like anachronism in speaking of "tragic choruses" in Sicyon. For his authorities spoke of the buck as the Attic prize for Tragedy, which according to Herodotus had been transferred in Sicyon from Adrastus to Dionysus. In Athens, then, the song must first have been associated with the buck.

Later writers, having abandoned the theory of the prize on these grounds and others well stated by Prof. RIDGEWAY, have endeavoured to assign some other sense to

[1] *Phalaris*, p. 303.

Herodotus's *buckish choruses*. Thus he may mean "choruses clad in buckskin," because goatskins were the dress of the ancient inhabitants of the Peloponnesus. Or he may mean "buck-dancers" on the analogy of the Siberian bear-dance, in which the fortunes of a bear are portrayed. Similarly *Hierosolyma* was explained by the contemporaries of Josephus either as "the holy city of the Solymi," whence they inferred that the Israelites were the Homeric Solymi, or as "Sacrilege-town," which seemed exceedingly appropriate for the metropolis of a nation notorious for their contempt of the gods. Historical etymology is valuable and scientific; etymological history is otherwise.

To him, therefore, who asks Aristotle for his explanation of the Tragic *katharsis* the answer will be what has been given; the medical theory of the Problems is too consistent and too clear to admit of any doubt. The Poetics is mentioned in the Politics; the passage in the Politics cannot be dissociated from Problem xxx.: Problem xxx. cannot be dissociated from Problem i. BERNAYS could neither show that any respectable writer of Greek ever used *katharsis* in his sense of *erleichternde Entladung*—the ordinary medical usage suggests "adjustment," as is shown by the coupling with it of the adjective "exact" or "accurate"[1]—nor did he attempt to reconcile his theory with the doctrine of the Ethics, according to which a passion grows by being indulged. The fact that Iamblichus took the view is very far indeed from recommending it. With regard to BERNAYS himself, the personal character that appears in his dissertations is pleasing; but the

[1] Aretaeus, p. 318 (in KUHN'S *Medici Graeci*) ἀκριβὴς κάθαρσις τοῦ πάθεος.

Greek scholarship is decidedly otherwise. His notion of the Attic for " he put on a garment " is *ἔδυσεν ἱμάτιον* (p. 172); COBET calls a far less serious violation of usage[1] *foeda barbaries*. *σκευοποιός* means, he thinks, *Maschinenmeister* (p. 157); *τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων* is, he holds, the equivalent of " these passions " (p. 28), as is proved by the expression *ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις* (p. 104); " the *katharsis* of such passions " would have been *τὴν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν* (p. 27). It is clear that even his followers have not been convinced that " this " is identical in meaning with " such," nor is the phrase he suggests Greek for anything at all. The definite can no more in such a case be annexed to the indefinite in Greek than in Arabic. When Plato in the Phaedo makes Socrates say that the poet should versify myths, not discourses, and that he, being no myth-maker, must have recourse to Æsop, this, according to BERNAYS, is identical in meaning and almost in expression with the precept of Aristotle that the poet should be myth-maker rather than verse-maker. The propositions are surely not only distinct, but even contradictory. For the word *φορτική* he suggests the rendering " overloaded," and for *πρᾶξις* " situation." Errors of this sort may be committed by any one of us, especially when we are defending a thesis, and uncourteous language need not be used about them; but though they may not discredit the writer, they serve to indicate that his thesis had not been very carefully considered before he gave it to the world.

This prepares us for the discussion of an emendation suggested by BERNAYS, which has found wide acceptance, and even been " confirmed by the Arabic "; he remarked

[1] *ἀπεδύσατο*.

that the passage 1447 a 28 *ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία [μιμεῖται] τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις καὶ τούτοις εἴτε μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων εἴθ' ἑνί τινι γένει χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων τυγχάνουσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν,* had been found difficult by his predecessors, possibly because they were insufficiently acquainted with Aristotelian formulae; he, being better equipped, could restore what was wanting with the certainty with which the formulae of inscriptions can be supplemented; no one versed in Aristotle would hesitate to accept his supplement of *ἀνώνυμος* before *τυγχάνουσα*. He then renders the whole—

Word-poetry imitates only in prosaic words or verses, and indeed it either mixes the different verses together, or confines itself to a definite genus [Gattung] of verse; still for this extension of the notion there is as yet no word in the ordinary Greek language.

The Aristotelian usage which should have been illustrated is not the word "nameless," which requires no explanation, but the phrase "epopoiia has as yet no name," meaning "epopoiia has not hitherto been used in the above sense"; and BERNAYS can adduce no example of it. Where Aristotle gives a term greater extension than the ordinary language gives it, he expresses himself intelligibly; so in the Meteorology, when using "Fire" for what we call the æther, he says "which we call Fire, because the genus of all the smoky secretions is nameless, still owing to that which is of this sort being most inflammable it is necessary thus to use the names."[1] He does not say "Fire has hitherto no name," which would be untrue. Similarly a writer might say that in a certain context the word "horse" is to signify all mounts,

[1] 341 b 15.

including bicycles; but he could not say "the horse has hitherto been nameless."

The proposition that in ordinary Greek *epopoiia* was only used of hexametric poetry, which BERNAYS ascribes to Aristotle, is said by the former to be "well known" (*bekanntlich*); but in fact no one knows it; for the dictionaries can only cite *one* case of the word that is outside Aristotle and B.C., from Herodotus, where there is no reference to metre; and one of *epopoios* out of Lucian, who is not B.C., where the context shows that he may compose in any metre; whilst a passage is cited from Xenophon implying that *epē* need not be in verse at all,[1] and one from Plato showing that "skill in *epē*" meant skill about poetry generally; for the poem on which this skill is exemplified is lyric.[2] Further Proclus asserts that iambics also were called *epē*,[3] and in the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax we are told that it meant a verse of any metre.[4]

Owing to the first of these objections BERNAYS'S successors endeavoured to correct the passage further; since Aristotle cannot have said that *epopoiia* is nameless, *epopoiia* is ejected; however it declines to go, first because Aristotle, going through the clothing of the forms of Poetry enumerated in the first sentence, cannot omit the first, to which he devotes much space in his treatise; secondly because the sentence cannot be construed without it. Meanwhile difficulties display themselves at the end of the sentence, and *τυγχάνουσα* is altered to *τυγχάνει οὖσα*. So the introduction of BERNAYS'S interpolation has a tendency to destroy the whole book.

[1] *τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετροις γεγραμμένα ἔπη.*
[2] *Protagoras* 338 d.
[3] Photius, *Bibliotheca* 319 a 17.
[4] BEKKER'S *Anecdota*, 751.

To BERNAYS's rendering there are further grave objections. In the first place it is not true that in epopoiia metres were habitually mixed; in 1449 b 11 we are told that the metre of epopoiia is simple, *i.e.* unmixed;[1] and in 1460 a 2 that no *lengthy* composition of the sort had been made in any other metre than the hexameter; and Chaeremon's experiment is ridiculed as an exception which proves the rule. Hence mixture of metres cannot be given as the normal procedure of the epopoioi.

Secondly, what is meant by "one genus of metres"? A genus should either be a *race*, or a group of species.[2] That metres are neither viviparous nor oviparous is obvious; on the other hand if epopoiia employs one genus of metres in the latter sense, then it can mix them at the same time: for mixture is of species within the same genus.[3] Possibly, however, this objection would not by itself be serious.[4]

Thirdly, the formula *εἴτε—εἴτε* from its nature implies an apodosis, which may be either "I know not," as in 2 Corinthians xii. 3, "whether in the body, I know not, or whether out of the body, I know not," or a statement which is to hold good with any of several assumptions. Some examples of this formula of hypothetical alternatives are given in a note,[5] and it will be seen that wherever it is used some supplement like "I know not," "no matter,"

[1] Metaphys. 989 b 17, etc.
[2] *Ibid.* 1024 a b.
[3] *De Generatione* 328 a 31.
[4] Politics 1342 a 27.
[5] *De Caelo* 280 b 15 *τὸ γενητὸν* [λέγεται] *ἕνα μὲν* [*τρόπον*] *εἰ μὴ ὂν πρότερον ὕστερον ἔστιν, εἴτε γενόμενον, εἶτ' ἄνευ τοῦ γίνεσθαι.*
Physics 209 a 19 *εἴπερ τούτων ὁποτερουοῦν ἐστιν, εἴτε ἡ ὕλη, εἴτε τὸ εἶδος.*
Parva Naturalia 442 a 14 *κατὰ λόγον δὴ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕκαστοί εἰσιν εἴτε κατ' ἀριθμούς τινας εἴτε καὶ ἀορίστως.*
De Generatione 318 b 11 *οἷς οὖν διώρισται, εἴτε πυρὶ καὶ γῇ εἴτε ἄλλοις τισίν.*

" equally," is expressed or (more often) implied. So when KANT speaks of *das Geleis einer ich weiss nicht ob vernünftigen oder vernünftelnden, wenigstens natürlichen Schlussart*, the Greek might omit the *ich weiss nicht*. It is clear that none of these supplements have any place in the sentence before us. We have therefore to translate the whole sentence afresh.

It is certain that the author interprets *epopoiia* etymologically as " hexametric fabrication." As we have seen, and as this passage attests, the word is popularly applied to compositions in any metre, and even in prose; it corresponds, then, with our " romance." Of this usage some account must, or at any rate should, be given; and the suggestions are drawn from § 25, where the " usage of language " whereby to " wine-pour " is applied to nectar is explained. Either it is owing to confusion, " for those who know not of nectar think the gods drink wine,"[1] and similarly those who knew not of iron[2] thought those who worked it copper-smiths; or it is conscious metaphor, a species being used for the genus when the genus is nameless.[3] Thus, not having any generic name for " dry vapour," we are compelled to use a specific name, *e. g.* " smoke," for the genus.[4] " Hexametric fabri-

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Nic. Ethics 1160 a 17 *συστρατιῶται δὲ [ἐφίενται] τοῦ [συμφέροντος] κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι.*

Ibid. 1177 a 15 *ὃ δὴ δοκεῖ ἄρχειν, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον.*

These cases have been selected because there is no finite verb. Where there is a finite verb (Metaphys. 992 a 6, 1074 b 17; Nic. Ethics 1114 b 16, 1165 a 10, 1176 a 26; *de Caelo* 275 b 18, with *ἀμφοτέρως*, etc.) the hypothetical character of the alternatives is clear.

[1] Great Ethics 1205 b 15. [2] Herodotus i. 68. [3] Rhetoric 1405 a 36.

[4] Meteorology 359 b 30 *ἡ δὲ [ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις] τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀνώνυμος, τῷ δ'ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνάγκη χρωμένους καθόλου προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν οἷον καπνόν.*

cation " is applied to prose fiction either because the difference is ignored, as in the case of atomic mixture;[1] or owing to the want of a generic term for literary fabrication or fiction, " hexametric fabrication " is used as genus. The words are then to be construed " whether because it confuses the styles, or happens up to our time to have been treating one particular metric style as genus." The difficulty that is then acknowledged is that the ordinary man means by " hexametric fabrication " not fabrication or fiction *in* hexameters, but fabrication *of* hexameters; the genus in such a case is therefore not fiction, but versification, and the theory of metaphor will not hold. This view is then refuted by two highly technical arguments.

τυγχάνουσα, which BERNAYS thought meaningless, is not an unimportant word in the sentence. Clearly if owing to the genus being nameless a species has to be used for it, it is a matter of chance which species is used, and different species might well be used by different persons. So in the case of the " dry vapour " within a few pages the author calls it " fire " and " smoke." Thus a place in which stocks, shares and bonds, etc., are exchanged is called a "Stock-exchange "; we can explain this as a case of confusion, " the term ' stock ' being used in a loose way to signify bonds, shares and financial securities of any kind whatever ";[2] or we can explain it as metaphor, on Aristotle's theory. But in the latter case the names " Share-exchange " or " Bond-exchange " might conceivably be used, and very likely are used as well; it would be an accident if one only were used regularly " up till now."

[1] *De Generatione* 328 a 14. [2] Encyclopædic Dictionary.

With regard to the construction, the phrase "using as genus" does not require justification;[1] the combination of the two participles is clumsy, but not solecistic;[2] and the personification is quite in Aristotle's style.[3]

If BERNAYS's supplement has here the interest that it involves the same theory of the passage which was entertained by the Syriac translator, his suggestion on the opposite page with regard to 1449 a 7 does not appear to have been anticipated. "The consideration whether Tragedy in its different species is already sufficiently developed or not both with reference to its inner being and to the theatrical representation is reserved for another place." The Greek which is thus represented runs as follows—

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἆρ' ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγῳδία τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἱκανῶς ἢ οὔ, αὐτό τε καθ' αὑτὸ κρίνεται εἶναι [*κρινόμενον* LASC.] *καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα ἄλλος λόγος.*

BERNAYS continues: "the place to which we are referred, owing to one of the most grievous offences of the Excerptor, is not found in our Poetics."

Why, one wonders, should this question of the Varieties of Tragedy be raised here, before we have even learned that there are varieties? Clearly the passage has been both mistranslated and generally misunderstood. The idiom used does not mean "is sufficiently developed in its *eide*," but "is sufficiently provided with *eide*." That

[1] Great Ethics 1183 a 38 *τούτῳ τἀγαθῷ ἀρχῇ χρησάμενος*, Rhetoric 1394 b 28 *γνώμῃ χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι.*

[2] *ἐγκεκρυμμένοι τυγχάνοντες* occurs in the Botany (822 b 30), of which the Greek is late; Eudemian Ethics 1238 a 20 *διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόν* is not very different. *τεθεωρημένῃ ὑπαρχούσῃ* (Diog. Laert. vii. § 90) is quite parallel.

[3] Cf. *de Generatione* 319 a 8 *τὸ δ' ὕστερον εἰρημένον οὐ τοῦτο διαπορεῖ.*

word may mean "varieties," or it may mean "factors,"[1] "abstract constituents"; and since the question whether it has sufficient of the former is futile, whereas the question whether it has sufficient of the latter is equivalent to asking whether *it is full-grown*, doubtless the latter is intended.

Now it is to be observed that the question whether or not Homeric Tragedy has all the necessary factors has already been decided in the affirmative. Homer was "in the full sense a poet"; which means that poetry as he composed it had reached its full development. This, then, cannot be a matter for further consideration.

It is a curious Attic idiom by which the words for "other" are used in the singular where we should use the plural. "Are *to become* and *to be* the same thing or different things?" is expressed in Attic "are they the same thing or another thing?"[2] A good example may be quoted from the Metaphysics[3]: "another genus is the broad and the narrow, and deep and shallow": meaning "different genera are," as BRANDIS's Scholiast paraphrases it.[4] The verb *κρίνειν* means "to distinguish," and the passage which throws most light on its usage in this place is in the Eudemian Ethics[5]: "it is ill-breeding

[1] *μόρια κατ' εἶδος de Caelo* 268 b 13, glossed *ἀρχαί de Generatione* 329 b 9.

[2] Plato, *Protagoras* 340 b *ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο; ἄλλο νὴ Δί', ἔφη.* Physics 249 a 28 *τῷ κρινοῦμεν ὅτι ταὐτὸν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ ἢ ἄλλο;*

[3] 992 a 15 *ἄλλο γὰρ γένος τὸ πλατὺ καὶ τὸ στενὸν καὶ βαθὺ καὶ ταπεινόν.* Poetics 1456 a 8. Metaphysics 1064 a 11, *καὶ πρακτικῆς ἑτέρα [ἐπιστήμη] καὶ ποιητικῆς ἔσται.* 1024 b 12 *τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἕτερον τῷ γένει.* Physics 201 b 1. *μιᾶς ἢ ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης* of Metaphysics 1005 a 19 is the equivalent of *μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων* 996 a 19.

[4] iv. 581 a 20.

[5] 1217 a 9 *ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τούς τ' οἰκείους καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.* Without *τε* in Politics 1339 b 3, 1341 a 38; Physics 254 a 32.

to be unable in each case to distinguish between the appropriate questions and the inappropriate."

In this light we may now render the whole sentence: "Consideration whether Tragedy at this point has or has not the necessary factors is in the abstract a distinct matter from the same question with reference to audiences." And the latter topic is left for § 26, though the reply is prepared before. Tragedy is what Tragedy does; and a Tragedy can be read no less than a Romance, and will perform its work in this way. Hence the two extra *eide*, Exhibition and Music, merely intensify the pleasure; and since the more intellectual the entertained, the less interpretation he requires, for some audiences these intensifiers are not required, and for them the Homeric Tragedy has all the requisite factors.

In practically identifying Romance and Tragedy Aristotle is followed by numerous aesthetic writers. So Volkelt in his excellent treatise *Ästhetik des Tragischen* shifts from Tragedy to Romance and back. And doubtless the novel-reader is ordinarily identical with the playgoer.

Here, as before, the keys to the interpretation appear to be found in the author's works, and in order to understand the early part of the treatise the reader or hearer must be acquainted with the latter part. § 4 is not intelligible without §§ 6 and 26. But if the reader will consider what question can be left for discussion, he will scarcely be able to think of any other which is not excluded by the author's words. The question cannot be whether Tragedy in the ordinary sense has all the requisite factors; for the next sentence asserts that having attained its nature, it ceased changing. Hence there is no room

left for discussion; and in § 6 it is shown that the factors can be no more than six. Of these, however, only four count; and the number of varieties is in § 18 said to be four and no more, one for each factor; and on this the author again insists in § 24. Hence the only question remaining is that which is discussed in § 26.

The few passages which have been examined are, then, sufficient to justify the account of the esoteric works which is given by Plutarch, Gellius and Themistius. To understand them at all in the original one must know Greek, and it is here that the Athenian would have had an advantage over us. BENTLEY knew that *epopoiia* meant "hexameter-making," which is more than the ordinary dictionary knows; but that in ordinary usage it meant "Romance," "unacted fiction," would be known by no one now without Aristotle's assertion. The Athenian would have been quite familiar with this usage, just as an Englishman knows what an *oilshop* is; but he may never have reflected on the reason why he goes to the oilshop for candles, and the ordinary Athenian would probably be in the like case with regard to *epopoiia*. The suggestions that they may be cases of "atomic mixture" or else of "metaphor" convey nothing to one who has never heard of either; and, indeed, he who was unacquainted with Aristotle's particular doctrine of metaphor would not perceive that "oilman" was a metaphorical appellation for a dealer in candles. We have, perhaps, a slight advantage over the Athenian in that many of Aristotle's ideas now underlie our modes of thought; whereas to his contemporaries they were new. It agrees wonderfully with Aristotle's doctrine that what is prior in nature is posterior to ourselves, that so many

languages which have their own word for "species" have to borrow his word for "genus."

He who appreciates the terrible ingenuity of the Topics, and the skill with which any form of inaccuracy is there exposed, will not readily attribute to its author any violation of his own rules; for his audience are likely to have been worthy of him.

The canons of interpretation at which we have arrived are, then, the following—

No interpretation is certain for which chapter and verse cannot be cited from Aristotle's works.

No interpretation is satisfactory which fails to account for every syllable of the text.

No interpretation is tolerable which ascribes to Aristotle propositions which are unmeaning or which conflict with common sense.

CHAPTER II

THE TEXT OF THE POETICS

THE ultimate aim of textual criticism is to restore the work of an author to the condition in which it left his hands; but at times it has to content itself, at least provisionally, with an intermediate aim, viz. that of restoring the text as it existed at some particular epoch. For if all existing copies are traceable to an archetype, which was later than the author's own copy, and that archetype have perished, it is clear that the text of that intermediate stage must be restored before we can hope to get at anything more original.

Aristotle's esoteric works were written by him on wax tablets, as we learn from the Metaphysics;[1] the earliest material on which we possess them in Greek is parchment; this is the substance of A, R and (in the form vellum) of d; the rest of the Greek copies and the Arabic are on paper.

The Paris MS. of the Arabic version is not dated; but the copy of the Rhetoric which is bound with it, and appears to be of about the same date, was made in 407 A.H. or 1016 A.D.,[2] from a copy in the possession of the philosopher, ABU 'ALI IBN SAMḤ, who lectured in Baghdad in the year 400 A.H. or 1009 A.D.,[3] and died in

[1] 1035 a 15. *τάδε τὰ κήρινα.* Cf. Themistius Phys. iii. 9, *τόδε τὸ μέλαν.* [2] *Studies in Memory of* ALEX. KOHUT, p. 376.

[3] *Luzūmiyyāt* of Abu'l-'Alā Ma'arrī, Cairo, 1891, i. 235.

1027.[1] The Arabic version was published some time before 320 A.H. or 932 A.D., because in the debate between the translator and the Grammarian Abū Sa'īd Sīrāfī, which took place in that year, the translator was taunted with "professing Poetic without knowing it"[2]—not wholly without reason. The Syriac whence it was made had long been in existence in the year 800; for a letter is extant from the Catholicos Timotheus I, who died about 823 A.D., to one Rabban Pethion, demanding that a search be made for Syriac commentaries upon it;[4] the answer to this letter appears to have perished, nor can we identify the correspondent with certainty. Clearly, however, the Syriac version is assumed by the Catholicos to have been long in existence, and we shall probably be right in assigning it to the sixth century A.D. In the Debate to which reference has been made both parties assume that the whole of Greek literature has perished and is preserved only in Syriac translations: an extraordinary assumption, since Greek books were at the time being translated in Baghdad.

Of Greek MSS. the oldest extant is Paris. 1741, called by BEKKER Ac, and in this edition A; M. OMONT, who has published a facsimile of it, tells us that in the sixteenth century it belonged to Cardinal RIDOLFI, nephew of Pope LEO X, and in the thirteenth to THEODORUS SCUTARIOTES, *sacellarius* of S. Sophia and metropolitan of Cyzicus. This personage is comparatively well known, being mentioned more than once in the Chronicle of Pachymeres, which makes it appear that he perished in

[1] Kifti.
[2] *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1905, p. 124.
[3] WRIGHT, *Syriac Literature*, p. 193.
[4] *Oriens Christianus*, ii. (Rome, 1902); article by BRAUN (J. M.).

a religious riot in Constantinople in 1282.[1] He was in possession of the volume before that date, because he styles himself "Levite," i. e. *deacon;* and we still possess the diploma whereby he was raised to higher ecclesiastical rank, which may have been as early as 1275.[2] The book was presented to him by one MANUEL ANGELUS, who cannot certainly be identified; possibly he is the person of that name who wrote in a copy of Josephus now in the Medicean Library, and describes himself as *λογιστὴς αὐλικός*.[3]

In the collection of GREGORIUS CYPRIUS'S[4] correspondence there are two letters addressed to SCUTARIOTES, whom we may identify with the whilom owner of A. As they are of some interest for literary history they are produced here, from the Vienna MS.[5]

1. *τῷ Σκουταριώτῃ*

ἐβουλόμην μὲν λέγειν ἐν προοιμίῳ ὅτι βιβλίον εἰληφὼς παρὰ σοῦ καὶ ἀποδιδούς, ἐπειδὴ ἀποδίδωμι ἕτερον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ αἰτοῦμαι λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ χρεωστικῶς τις οἴηται ἀξιοῦν λαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὐ κατὰ χάριν, οὕτω μὲν αὐτίκα παραιτοῦμαι λέγειν · αἰτῶ δὲ μόνον τὰ ἐς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην ἐκπονηθέντα τῷ Συριανῷ · εἰ δ' ἴσως αὐτὸς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀείμνηστον παροιμίαν καὶ διὰ τὸν φιλικώτατον τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πάντα τὰ σαυτοῦ κοινοποιεῖσθαι ἡμῖν, καὶ ὅ τι ἄρα δίδως χρεωστικῶς λέγεις διδόναι, ἕτερος οὗτος λόγος οὐ πρὸς ἐμέ. τὸ δ' οὖν ἐμὸν ἀρτίως, ἀξίωσίς ἐστι · καὶ αὕτη σοῦ γε χάριν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἁπάσης καθαρείου [*καθάρειος*?] *παρα-*

[1] Ed. Bonn, ii. 53.

[2] ZACHARIÄ-LINGENTHAL, *Jus Graeco-romanum* iii. 590–598.

[3] *Catal. Bibliothecae Laurentianae* ii. 643.

[4] On this personage (patriarch 1282–1289) see MIGNE'S *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. cxlii.

[5] Cod. Hist. Graec. 101, *Epistolae* 30 and 58.

κλήσεως · σὺ γὰρ οὐ χαίροις εἴ τις φίλος ὤν, ἐν οἷς ζητεῖ τι τῶν σῶν λαβεῖν, μεθ' ἱκεσίας σοι καὶ θερμῶν λόγων πρόσεισι, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου φθέγγῃ ἐσσύμενον κατεπείγεις. ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἀπαξιῶ εν τοῖς τοιούτοις φορτικός τις καὶ δημώδης προσαίτης καὶ ὡς εἷς τουτωνὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν τριόδων καθημένων φαίνεσθαι · ἀλλ' οὖν σοῦ χάριν ὡς εἴρηται ἁπλῶς οὕτωσὶ αἰτῶ τὸ βιβλίον λαβεῖν · ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀποδίδοταί σοι ὅ πρόσθεν εἰλήφειμεν καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς ἅμα τοῖς σοῖς βιβλίοις τὸν οἰκίσκον καταβαρύνομεν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν τοῦ προτέρου ἀντεισάγομεν ἕτερον, εἰ καὶ ἄντικρυς οὐκ ἐμφαίνει τὰ γράμματα · ἀλλ' οὖν ὁ τῶν γραμμάτων διάκονος ἔργῳ τοῦτο παρίστησιν, οὐ μόνος ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ βιβλίου σοι παριστάμενος.

2. *τῷ Σκουταριώτῃ*

τὴν βίβλον τῶν προφητῶν ἀπαιτῶ νῦν ἤδη ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰτῶ · καὶ σύγε πέμψας αὐτὴν ἀποδεδωκὼς ἔσει, ἀλλ' οὐ δεδωκώς · τὰ μὲν γάρ πάλαι πεποίηκας, καὶ ἐμὸν σαφῶς ἦν ἐξ ἐκείνου τὸ χρῆμα εἰ καὶ τὸν ἐς δεῦρο χρόνον ἐκράτεις · τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι, οὐκ ἄρα παρέξεις ἀλλ' οὐ τοσοῦτον, ὥστε χρέους τοῦτ' ἀπόδοσιν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δόσις. εἰ δὲ φιλονεικεῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ διδόναι λέγεις ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποδιδόναι, οὐκ ἔσομαί σοι τοσοῦτον ἐντελής, ὁπόσον Δημοσθένης πρὸς Φίλιππον, περὶ δόσεως καὶ ἀποδόσεως γλισχευόμενος. δίδου μόνον λαβέσθαι τῆς πυξίδος καὶ τῶν δύο ὁποτέρως σοι φίλον τὴν πρᾶξιν ὀνόμαζε. κἀμὲ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδοσιν εἰ βούλει, καὶ δόσιν λέγε εἰ τοῦτό σοι αἱρετώτερον. μόνον δίδου λαβέσθαι τῆς πυξίδος.

Translation.

1. "I should have liked to say at the start that having taken one of your books and returned it, I claim, in virtue of my returning it, to take another instead; but lest I should be supposed to be demanding one as a debt rather than as a favour, I decline to say this straight

out; I merely request the Commentary of Syrianus on Plato's Parmenides. If, however, by any chance you on account of the familiar proverb [the goods of friends are common] and your own amiability think you ought to share all your goods with me, and call your gifts payments, that is another matter with which I have no concern. All I have to do now is to ask, and that without any pleading, and indeed on your account not mine; for you would not be pleased if one of your friends who desired to get something from you approached you with supplications and prayers; why urge the zealous, you would say in Homer's style. I personally have no objection in such a case to acting the sturdy beggar at the crossing; but, as I have said, to please you I merely request to be given the book. And if this letter does not state in so many words that I am returning that which I took before, and in order not to encumber my dwelling with many of your books at once I export one before I import another, the bearer of the missive will realize it, as he will present himself not alone but accompanied by your book."

2. "I am asking to have back, and not merely asking for the copy of the Prophets; and you when you send it will be giving it back, not giving it. For the latter you did long ago, and it has been mine since then, though remaining in your possession ever since; if, therefore, you do the favour I ask, it will not be so great as the former, so this must be called repayment, not a gift. If, however, you insist on the term, and maintain that you are giving, not repaying, I will not be as nice about the distinction as was Demosthenes with Philip. Let me but lay hands on the case, and you may call the action what you choose. Call it repayment if you please, a gift if you prefer. Only let me lay hands on the case."

The gap, then, in the *isnād*, or chain of authorities, is from the time of Aristotle to that of this person, roughly speaking, 1550 years. Part of the gap is covered by the story told by Strabo that Aristotle's library was left to Theophrastus, who handed it over to Neleus, from whom, according to Athenaeus, it was purchased by Ptolemy Philadelphus, who took it to Alexandria. According to Al-Farabi [1] the books were found in Alexandria by Augustus, who ordered that they should be used in the schools, whence they had been displaced by other manuals. According to Eusebius there was a Peripatetic school in Alexandria near the time of the Conversion of the Empire.[2] According to Al-Farabi, after the Conversion of the Empire there was an examination made of Aristotle's books by an Alexandrian Council, and while such of them as confirmed the Christian religion were ordered to be taught, the study of the rest was forbidden; nevertheless they continued to be studied secretly, in Alexandria, until the taking of Egypt by the Moslems, when the study was transferred to Antioch.

How much truth there is in this it is hard to say. The destruction of the treatise on Comedy is probably due to Christian objections, and Tragedy is also attacked by Christian writers in no measured terms.[3] In several places all our MSS. of the Poetics, and in some the Arabic also, show Christian interpolation. The story of the Alexandrian Council may then represent some fact, and account for the preservation of the book in one copy. The esoteric nature of the work prevented it from being

[1] In Ibn Abī Usaibi'ah, ii. 135. [2] H. E. vii. 32. 269 A.D.
[3] Augustine, ed. Migne, vii. 46. Gregory Nazianz., ed. Par. ii. 1094. Severus Antiochenus, Homily 54 (J. M.).

widely read, and those who quote it during this period usually quote it inaccurately. Tzetzes, in the twelfth century, makes some references to it in his list of the members of a Tragedy, without, however, mentioning Aristotle's name; he bases his account of the matter by preference on that of one Eucleides.[1]

Next in order of age (and importance) comes the fourteenth century MS. Riccardianus 46, discovered by Susemihl; it is imperfect, commencing 1448 a 27, and has a gap from 1461 b 2 till near the end. That this MS. is independent of A is proved by its preserving a line of the original, which has fallen out of A and the other MSS. by homoeoteleuton, viz. 1455 a 14, where the words between [ ] are found only in this MS. : *τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τόξον [ἐντείνειν ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα, πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, καὶ εἴγε τὸ τόξον] ἔφη ἐντείνειν ὃ οὐχ ἑωράκοι . τὸ δὲ, κ.τ.λ.* This supplement agrees closely with what is found in the Arabic version : *nam arcum quidem dixit quod non posset quisquam alius, et dixerat illud poeta, inque narratione etiam quae venerat de illo narratum est de re arcus quod certo sciturus esset quod non vidisset.* The idioms are Aristotelian : *καὶ εἴγε* can be compared with Physics 257 a 27 *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἴγε δέοι σκοπεῖν* (cf. 196 a 7), and *ὑπόθεσις* with Physics 253 b 5 *ὑπόθεσις γὰρ ὅτι ἡ φύσις ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως*, Eudemian Ethics 1227 a 8 *τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις*.[2] That the words are slightly corrupt may be admitted; clearly we should emend from A *γνώσεσθαι* for the second *ἐντείνειν* (the source of this corruption is obvious), and perhaps supply from the Arabic *τὸν μὲν . . . δύνασθαι.*

[1] Cramer, *Anecdota Graeca*, iii. 344, 25 = 1452 b 23; 345, 10 = *ibid.* 24.

[2] *De Spiritu*, 483 a 35 *τοῦτ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.*

These corruptions, however, indicate that we have to do with genuine tradition; and that no human ingenuity could have restored this line—even with the guidance of the Arabic—will probably be granted.

This reading is amply sufficient to prove the independence of this MS., which we shall call B; one more, of some interest, may be added. In 1456 a 10 it is pointed out that some dramatists are able to tie, but unable to solve; the following words are thus read—

A C D E *δεῖ δ' ἄμφω ἀεὶ κρατεῖσθαι*
B *δεῖ δ' ἀμφότερα ἀντικρατεῖσθαι*
Ar. *si prensata sunt ambo permutatione.*

It is clear that the Ar. represents *ἀντικρατεῖσθαι*, which differs only by half a letter from B's *ἀντικρατεῖσθαι*. Since Aristotle speaks in fixed formulae, the true reading is probably to be got from Politics 1331 b 37 *δεῖ δ' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα κρατεῖσθαι*. The question, however, of the correctness of the reading is of little consequence for determining the matter which we are discussing. Of the Arabic words *in umsikā kilaihimā bil-tabdīl* there is no question. That it would occur to any one to introduce *ἀντι* into this sentence by conjecture seems most improbable.

The readings of this MS. have therefore to be studied with great care; it is observable that almost wherever *ὁμοίως* occurs the scribe is in doubt whether to read *ὁμοίως* or *ὅτι*; clearly, then, his MS. had an abbreviation which is found in eleventh century MSS., which might well puzzle the reader.[1] But where it offers an easier text than A, it must not be assumed that it is to be

[1] Tseretlo, *Sokrashchenia*, etc., 1896, table 16.

preferred. Indeed, the text of B exhibits signs of deliberate emendation, by a not over-skilful hand. Ordinarily the Arabic guards us from being seriously misled.

It does not indeed always perform this service; for occasionally the Ar. conspires with B in amateur emendations. A case of such conspiracy, where B betrays itself, is in 1459 a 22: *δεῖ τοὺς μύθους συνεστάναι* [CHRIST for *συνιστάναι*] *δραματικοὺς καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τέλος . . . καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίας τὰς συνήθεις εἶναι ἐν αἷς, κ.τ.λ.* The words do not admit of alteration; for even if we took *ὁμοίους* from E and *ἱστορίαις* from B, and altered the following words into *τὰς συνθέσεις, ἐν αἷς* would be wrongly placed. We have therefore to follow the definition of the *de Generatione*[1] in rendering *ὅμοιος* by "uniform," "monotonous," and interpret the whole from the Physics,[2] where it is pointed out that in the circumference of the circle each point is "similarly" beginning, middle and end. The plots should be dramatically *constructed*, and should not be left "monotonous histories of the familiar type"; for of course not every history is of this sort, as indeed the Trojan War had a beginning and an end. The Ar. evidently follows the reading *ὁμοίας ἱστορίας* which is altered in B; but, like B, it substitutes for *συνήθεις* a word meaning "compositions," which B exhibits as *συνθήσεις*, though the compiler must have known that this word was not Greek.

Another case of conspiracy between B and Ar. is in 1449 b 10: *ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου μίμησις εἶναι σπουδαίων ἠκολούθησεν.* For *μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου* of A C D E the Ar. has *ad modum quemdam de metro cum sermone;* B *μόνου μέτρου μέτα*

[1] 323 b 19 *πάντη πάντως ἀδιάφορον.* [2] 265 a 33.

λόγου. In the reading of B *μέτα* is of the same type as *συνθήσεις*; it is a confession of interpolation. That Aristotle would describe the Iliad as "metre with language" was not credible; any one would rather describe it as "language with metre"; but the prepositions do not undergo anastrophe in prose. It is noticeable that in the Ar. the word rendered *cum* is altered out of that for *de*.

In either case the sentence is untrue. We have been told that *epopoiia* includes unacted fiction of all sorts, prose or verse, heroic, ordinary or low-class. Hence it is not true that it coincided with Tragedy so far as being a metrical representation of heroism; for it can also be an unmetrical representation, and represent the two other classes. Therefore this emendation introduces two misstatements.

But *μέτρον*, though it means "metre," also means "measure," "extent." So we read in the *de Generatione*,[1] "Every life is measured by a period; only not all by the same; for to some a year is the period, to others it is larger or smaller in extent." In the Rhetoric similarly we read: "The period ought not to be curt nor long: for the hearer, hurrying on to what is beyond, even to the extent of which he has the limit in his mind";[2] and the use of the word in connexion with "roads" is as old as Homer. The rule for the treble usage of this word is to be got from the Physics,[3] where we are told that that with which we number, and that which can be numbered, and that which is being numbered, are all called *number;*

[1] 336 b 15 *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐνιαυτός, τοῖς δὲ μείζων ἡ περίοδός ἐστι τὸ μέτρον.*

[2] 1409 b 20.

[3] 219 b 6 *καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν.*

and this rule can be applied by analogy to measure.[1] "Measure," then, is either that with which we measure, in the case of verse the *metre;* or that which admits of being measured, as here an *extent;* or that which is being measured, e.g. *verse*, or an allotted length of time.[2] The two last are not always to be distinguished with precision.[3] The use of "measure" in the sense of what is measured or meted is familiar from St. Paul's Epistles. In the Metaphysics it is stated that a "magnitude" is what can be measured, whence "a great measure" is a correct phrase; and so too is "the length of the measure" in the final paragraph of the Poetics, since length is used of one dimension of the measurable.[4] Here the author is speaking of coincidence of content, with reference to more than one dimension. Hence the words in the text of A C D E appear to give what is correct and true: "Romance coincided with Tragedy in being a portrayal of heroism only to a great extent"; the finest monuments of Romance were in that style, but not all. And then with the reading of E and the Ar. we are able to construe the next sentence:[5] "but they differ in that *this form of Romance* has its metre simple and is narrative." These restrictions apply only to the heroic romance; the Mimes of Sophron and the Dialogues of Plato which we have been taught to call Romance are neither necessarily in the narrative form, nor have they metre. But the next difference, unlimited time, applies to all forms of Romance; whence the sentence is so framed as to include the whole genus.

[1] Metaphys. 1020 a 9.
[2] 1462 b 7.
[3] Cf. LONGINUS, quoted by SCHLEUSNER, *Lex. Nov. Test.* λέγεται δὲ μέτρον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μετρούμενον.
[4] Metaphys. l.c.
[5] ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι ταύτην.

Yet another example of similar conspiracy is to be found in § 8. *πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ γένει συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕν.*

For *τῷ γένει* B and Ar. offer *τῷ ἑνὶ*. At first sight this seems not only plausible, but to be a quotation from Physics 196 b 29 *ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίη*. But whether in the Poetics "the one" means the one person or the one subject, what is meant by saying that out of some of its numerous accidents there is no one thing? Who would have supposed that there was? The Physics throws no light on this proposition; for the argument there is that since one subject has unlimited accidents, there can be an unlimited number of accidental causes. Therefore this emendation lands us in an *impasse*. But the reading of A C D E "to the genus" is sound sense. A genus is not "one thing,"[1] whereas a species is "one thing."[2] A genus is *τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς διαφοραῖς* and of a differentia the verb *συμβαίνειν* is used.[3] A certain differentia will turn a genus into a species; but a certain other differentia will not do so.[4]

Similarly a certain condition of life, to which the name "happiness" applies, cannot be produced by any group of occurrences, but only by a certain group.

With regard to the history of B, it may be remarked that one of its good readings (*δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαι* in 1458 a 30) is quoted by Maggi from the *Codex Lampridii*, *i.e.* of Benedetto Lampridio (ob. about 1542), who studied in the years 1510–1520 at the "Collegio Greco" founded by J. Lascaris in Rome.[5] However, this codex of

[1] Physics 249 a 21.
[2] *Ibid.* 190 b 28. See especially *de Interpretatione* 21 a 9.
[3] *De Generatione Animalium* 725 b 25.
[4] Topics 143 b 8.
[5] Tiraboschi, vii. 1379.

Lampridius is quoted by Maggi for what is so obviously an unskilful emendation in 1461 a 28 that the former reading is probably a conjecture, though a felicitous one; Victorius has occasion repeatedly to charge his Italian predecessors with romancing on the subject of MSS., and Maggi's reputation is not otherwise favourable.

Are all other Greek MSS. copies direct or indirect of A? Before considering this opinion we might ask ourselves what evidence we should require in order to be convinced that this was the case. Convincing internal evidence would be the occurrence in all MSS. of defects traceable to A only, *e.g.* the loss of words caused by rents in its material or blots on its pages. Convincing external evidence would be the statement of a good authority to the effect that A was the first MS. of the book brought to Western Europe, and statements of other good authorities connecting the other MSS. with it.

Evidence of the former kind is not produced. Where A is corrupt or unintelligible, some MSS. have the same, others have better readings, and yet others have blanks. A may very well be in the same case as the first of these classes, viz. have faithfully reproduced what was in the copy whence it was made.

No evidence of the latter kind is adduced either. We have, however, to consider the probabilities.

The owner of A, Theodore Scutariotes, as has been seen, suffered in a persecution at Constantinople in the year 1282, when he took refuge first in the monastery of Prodromus, then in a church; and in this persecution he appears to have perished. What became of his books we are not told, but we know that one of them, the Bodleian MS. Cromwell 19, was purchased by a Greek

(Scuterius Stephanus Altamoras) out of the loot of Constantinople in 1453. The probability is, then, that the collection of Scutariotes remained in Constantinople till the fall of the city, when it was dispersed as loot.[1] The Paris MS. of the Rhetors emerges in the sixteenth century in Western Europe, and there appears to be no evidence showing how it got there.[2]

If all the other MSS. are copies of A, they or their ancestors must have been made in Constantinople before the fall of the city, or in Latin Europe after its fall. Hence we should expect the earliest dated MS., which was made in 1457, four years after the fall of Constantinople, to be derived directly from A. This MS. forms part of a "complete Aristotle, except the Logic," copied in Rome by the well-known scribe, Joannes Rhosus, who continued his vocation till 1515,[3] having late in life been made scribe of Aldus's Academy. Since Rhosus's copy was made by order of Bessarion, it is possible that its source was some copy purchased cheap by the Cardinal after the fall of Constantinople.[4] It was conceivably brought over by Rhosus himself, who rather more than four

[1] The Venetian MS. 407, which belonged at one time to a Theodorus Scutariotes, must have come from another collection, since the writer, Joannes Argyropulus, is of the fifteenth century.

[2] Vahlen states that A was used by Victorius, and the latter does ndeed speak of a MS. of great antiquity which he used in the library of Cardinal Ridolfi (*Epistolae*, p. 26); but this MS. in 1461 a 35 had a blank in place of καταντικρὺ, which was supplied on the margin (*Comm.* p. 290); it also had ὃ ἔνιοι in the following line. The description does not tally with A, but bears some resemblance to Par. 2038, where originally there was a blank in place of καταντικρύ, but the word is filled in in the blank, not on the margin. The reading ἔνιο is mentioned in the appendix to Paccius; ὃ is in the Aldine edition. The probability seems in favour of Victorius's *antiquissimus* being Par. 2038.

[3] Firmin Didot, *Alde Manuce*, p. 580.

[4] Bandinius, *Vita Bessarionis*, 1778, p. 84.

months before the completion of this volume had made another copy of many Aristotelian treatises,[1] also in Rome. Or the original may have been a copy of "55 books of Aristotle," in possession of PETRUS CALABER, Abbot of the Crypta Ferrata Monastery, which TRAVERSARIUS saw in 1432, and tried to purchase or at any rate get copied for NICCOLI.[2] Like the Marcian MS. this was on membrane, and in a small hand; conceivably, then, it might have been made by NILO, the founder of the Crypta Ferrata Monastery in 1004, who was an industrious copyist and wrote a small character.[3] Since BESSARION came to live in Rome shortly after 1439, he must have been familiar with this Greek monastery, of which he was made head in 1462.[4] Now this MS. belongs in the main to the D group, and where it differs from D exhibits a text which is farther from, not nearer to, A.[5] On the supposition, then, that the C D E recensions developed after A had been brought to Latin Europe, we are obviously cramped for time.

We are also cramped for space. For the Urbinas is the work of M. APOSTOLIS, who, after the fall of Constantinople, copied MSS. in Crete. Crete may also have been the home of E (Ambros. B 78), which was copied by Michael SULIARDOS, who was writing in that island in 1475, though in Rome as early as 1452; [6] he continued his

[1] LAMBECIUS, *Catal. Bibl. Caesareae*, vii. 165.

[2] *Epistolae*, viii. 43.

[3] RODOTA, *del Rito greco in Italia*, ii. 102, etc.

[4] The MSS. belonging to it were afterwards transferred to the Vatican and Barberina.

[5] 1448 a 18 τίνι τρόπῳ for ὡς [it should have been τίνα τρόπον], *ibid.* 35 μήδους for δήμους, *ibid.* b 22 πεφυκότα, 1449 b 21 τῆς ἑξαμέτροις, etc. Laur. lx. 16 agrees with this MS. in many readings.

[6] *Catal. Vat. Ottob.* 192.

vocation till 1497.[1] Yet another Cretan scribe of the Poetics is Antonius Damilas, to whose labour we owe the Fontainebleau MS. (Par. 2551); he appears to have succeeded to the business of Apostolis[2] in Crete; and since he was in that island in August of 1480,[3] we cannot doubt that the Fontainebleau MS., which bears date of the end of that year,[4] was copied there also. Indeed, he seems to have remained in Crete until 1489.[5] The probabilities are much against any of these Greeks bringing their archetypes from Italy to Crete; they are more likely to have found them in Crete or else to have brought them thither from Constantinople.

The cases in which we can declare existing MSS. to be copies of other existing MSS. without any hesitation are rare; the most certain case is that of D and d; the Dresdensis appears to be a copy of C, yet if so, some other MS. must have been used with it; and the Guelferbytanus appears to be a copy of Par. 2040. The Coislinianus shows signs of having been copied from E, but if so, another MS. must have been consulted. It must be remembered that we have no knowledge of the number of Greeks possessing copies of this work before the fall of Constantinople; that the earliest dated Italian copy (Marc. 200, of the year 1457) is the parent of no other, unless it be Laur. lx. 16; and that within the few decades that separate the fall of Constantinople from the rise of the Aldine press we find numerous MSS., copied in places far apart and belonging to different recensions.

Hence it may be asserted with plausibility that the

[1] Montfaucon, *Palaeographia*, p. 85.
[2] *Catal. Graec. Palat.* 74. [3] *Catal. Bibl. Laurentianae* iii. 6.
[4] Omont, *Fontainebleau MSS.* 145.
[5] Miller, *Escurial Catalogue*, p. 157.

groups C, D, and E were distinguishable earlier than 1453, for there was not time for them to develop between that date and the work of Apostolis and Rhosus. On the other hand, D may well be earlier than the dated MSS. The supposition, however, that A was the only MS. of the Poetics besides B that existed before the fall of Constantinople is, as has been seen, a conjecture which has nothing in its favour.

Of the existence of the Greek Poetics in Latin Europe before the fall of Constantinople it is not perhaps easy to find a decided trace. As early as 1432 the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* was translated into Latin by Filelfo,[1] the son-in-law of Chrysoloras, and this work is often bound up with the Poetics. According to Vespasiano da Bisticci[2] the library of Cosmo dei Medici contained a complete Aristotle, though others deny that it contained any Greek books at all.[3] If it be true that the bankers in Europe and Asia with whom Cosmo corresponded "had all of them orders to buy ancient MSS. and rare books,"[4] this seems extraordinary. In the letter recording the results of his journey to Greece of 1405–1413[5] Aurispa mentions that he has got the two Rhetorics and various works of Aristotle unknown till then. He tells Traversarius that he is having these treatises, together with the Eudemian Ethics, copied on the whitest vellum, to be presented to Nicolaus.[6] The Marcian MS. d would correspond with this description so far as the material and

[1] Filelfi *Epistolae*, lib. x. Rosmini, *Vita di Filelfo*.
[2] *Uomini illustri del Secolo xv.* iii. 80. Bologna, 1893.
[3] Müntz et Fabre, *Bibliothèque du Vatican*, 1887, p. iv.
[4] Janet Ross, *Lives of the Early Medici*, 1911, p. 7.
[5] Sabbadini, *Le Scoperte dei codici Greci*, p. 46.
[6] Traversarii *Epistolae* xxiv. 53.

the two Rhetorics go: but no farther. Yet we may *suspect* that Laur. xxxi. 14 was brought over by AURISPA, and that d is the copy intended for NICCOLI.

In any case it is certain that the Poetics was neglected (*jacebat*, as VICTORIUS says) long after the Ethics had been the subject of lectures. GRÄFENHAN'S suggestion may account for this, viz. that the Aristotelians of the fifteenth century were under the influence of the Arabs, and the miserable summary of AVERROES afforded no basis for the study of the Poetics.[1]

We have seen that the dated MSS. of the fifteenth century are not directly derived from A; nor do the printed works in which the Poetics was first introduced to Western Europe come directly from it. The first of these is the translation into Latin by GEORGIUS VALLA, published in 1498;[2] a translation so literal that it is almost equivalent to a MS. of the Greek. That its basis was not A is shown by the occurrence in 1458 a 16 of the five substantives ending in *u*; as well as by some other readings, *e.g.* *μιμεῖσθαι* for *λυγκεῖ* in 1452 a 28, *ἀγερμανῷ* for *ἀγερμῷ* 1451 a 25, *πάσας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας* 1448 a 9, *ὁμαλὸν* for *οης* 1456 a 2, *μὴ γνοίη* for *μιγνύῃ* 1460 a 2. It may be observed that VALLA'S translation is not very much more intelligent than ABU'L-BASHAR'S, and reproduces errors which the merest tiro in our time could correct with ease (e.g. *Chloephoroe*).

Ten years later appeared the Aldine *editio princeps*,

[1] My distinguished colleague, M. HARTMANN (*der islamische Orient* iii. 119), praises AVICENNA for "making Aristotle's Poetics accessible to Islam." Having myself published AVICENNA'S work, I regret that I cannot subscribe to this.

[2] The year before the translator's death. DINGER (*Dramaturgie als Wissenschaft*, i. 167) pays this work the same undeserved compliment as HARTMANN pays Avicenna's.

dedicated to J. Lascaris, who was in Venice 1503–8,[1] and helped the editor. M. Omont, by an oversight, asserts that the Aldine edition was based on A; it is based on the Paris MS. 2038, which at one time belonged to Lascaris. This MS. in its original form was a copy of d, for the first hand ordinarily omits the same words :

1448 a 29 all between the two *κωμῳδίας*, inclusive of the latter.
1449 a 2 *παραφανείσης—κωμῳδίας.*
1451 b 7 *ἱστορίας ἐστί.*
1452 a 13 all between *μύθων* and *πράξεις.*
1452 a 21 all between the two *γίνεσθαι*, inclusive of the latter.
1452 b 20 all between the two *τραγῳδίας*, inclusive of the latter.
1454 a 35 *ὥστε—εἰκός.*
1456 a 10 *χρὴ—μεμνῆσθαι.*
1456 a 12 *οἷον—μῦθον.*

Further, it exhibits the characteristic readings of d, *e.g.* 1448 a 8 *μιμήσασθαι*,, 1447 b 20 *ἐπίταυρον*, 1452 a 28 *μιμεῖσθαι* (pr. m.), 1454 a 32 *ὑστεραία*, 1462 a 18 *ἐπίστανται*; and where d has blanks, *e.g.* 1454 b 23 for *καρκίνος*, Lascaris either leaves them, or inserts the same words as are inserted in d by a later hand (probably Lascaris's own), *e.g.* *κακομιμήτως* 1460 b 31. The improvements on d are partly inserted in the text, partly above the lines, and in the margin. In 1461 a 12 there is a blank in d where the words *ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι* should stand; Lascaris omits them, and they are omitted in the Aldine.

[1] See Vast, *de Vita et Operibus Iani Lascaris* (1878).

Besides d, Lascaris employed another MS., of which the readings are inserted in the Paris MS. over erasures;[1] these are characteristic readings of B, and in many cases noteworthy emendations; the following list is sufficient to justify this statement—

1448 b 22 *οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς αὐτά.*
1452 b 3 *ἔτι δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεις αἱ μέν εἰσι θατέρου . . ὅταν ᾖ δῆλος ἄτερος.*
1449 b 9 *μέτρου μέτα* [B: *μετὰ* Lasc.] *λόγου.*
1452 a 17 *πεπλεγμένην δὲ ἐξ ἧς* B, *πεπλεγμένη δὲ ἐξ ἧς* Lasc.
1455 b 16 *δράμασι.*
1455 b 1 *τούς τε λόγους.*

It seems not impossible that B itself was employed by Lascaris for this purpose, and if we find that some of the best contributions of B to the text have been neglected by him, this may have been due to carelessness. Now in the list of the MSS. borrowed from the private library of Lorenzo dei Medici we find Lascaris's name down for a copy of the Poetics in 1492; its number was 176, and its history after this date is obscure.[2] The MS. B would not have borne this title. Further, in 1449 a 11, where the correct *φαλλικὰ* is written over an erasure (doubtless of *φαυλικὰ*) B, which, like all the other MSS. contains this euphemism, cannot be the source of the emendation. Apparently, too, Lascaris consulted M. Marc. 200, since his *ἱπποκένταυρον* appears to be based on *ἐπικένταυρον*, its marginal reading in 1447 b 20.

[1] That the notes are by Lascaris is asserted by Omont.
[2] *Archivio Storico Italiano* xxi. 289, noticed by Müller, *Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, i. 373.

But besides employing other MSS., Lascaris also conjectured with great boldness; and whereas some of his conjectures were afterwards deleted in consequence of better knowledge, others were introduced into the Aldine edition, and retained by Bekker, who indicates in these cases that his MSS. have something different, though he leaves it to the reader to guess the source of this text. The emendation admitted by Bekker in 1454 b 32 *ἀνεγνώρισε τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἀναγνωρισθεὶς ὑπ' ἐκείνης* is an illustration.

Between the brouillon of Lascaris and the Aldine edition we can trace the influence of the MS. E, whence several readings are adopted: *e.g. ἀγαθῶν* in 1450 a 28, *τοῦτό γε* in 1461 a 30, *τραγῳδική* in 1461 b 27. E, then, is the source of "the five substantives" exhibited by the Aldine in 1458 a 16.

Lascaris's emendations constitute an important epoch in the history of the Poetics. The marginal corrections of various MSS., *e.g.* Ambr. O 52 and Vat. 1400, seem clearly to be the work of readers who consulted the Aldine edition; Vat. 1400 was, it would appear, used by Pazzi, and these corrections are probably to some extent his. Many of the worst are retained by Bekker; some bad ones even by Christ. Still, a certain number will be retained so long as the Poetics is studied; and it is probable that the contribution of Lascaris to the text is the greatest which any one scholar has made.

After Lascaris comes the work of the Italian scholars of the sixteenth century. The first of these is Pazzi, nephew of Leo X, whose text and translation, finished in 1527, were published posthumously in 1536; his contribution to the text is not slight: he emends *Laius* for *Iolaus*

(1460 a 31), *οἷς* for *δὶς* (1459 a 36), *οὕτω* for *οὔτε* (1460 b 35), etc. The effects of the invention of printing have begun to be felt.

Two persons about this time worked together at Aristotle, one of whom afterwards became famous, Pietro Vettori or Victorius, and Francesco Medici, son of Raphael,[1] whose praises are recorded by Victorius in his edition of the Rhetoric published in 1548.[2] An emendation of Fr. Medici recorded by Victorius enables us to solve the mystery of Ricc. 16, a MS. containing the Poetics only, in an Italian hand. This MS. is certainly later than 1526, the date of the first edition of Simplicius, whence the writer of the MS. supplements the citation from Empedocles in 1461 a 25.[3] The emendation is *πέρσας καὶ* for *περγᾶς* in 1448 a 14, and is embodied by this MS. Evidently the *magni nominis philosophus* who, according to Victorius, suggested *ἐπιτιμᾶται* for *ἐπιτίμᾳ τῷ* in 1455 a 27 is the person responsible for Ricc. 16, on whose margin appears the suggestion *ἐπιτιμᾶτο* (*sic*); Victorius may have corrected the grammatical form. In general the agreement between Ricc. 16 and Victorius is what might be expected where two friends work together at a text. So in 1453 b 32 for *ὁ Ἀλκμαίωνος Ἀστυδάμαντος* Ricc. 16 exhibits *ὁ ἀλκμαίων ἀστυδάμαντος*, Victorius with a slight improvement *ὁ Ἀλκμαίων ὁ Ἀστ.* In the critical apparatus, where the person responsible for this MS. agrees with Victorius, the reading is assigned to the former, because the edition of the latter appeared in 1560, whereas one of the readings of Ricc. 16 is, as has been

[1] Bandinius, *Epistolae ad Victorium*, I, xxxv. [2] Page 560.

[3] *ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκριτα* (*sic*) *διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους*. The passage was not known to Paccius.

seen, quoted in 1548. Robortello in 1548 cites that very reading (*Πέρσας καὶ Κύκλωπας*) as being found in a MS., which Maggi amplifies into *multis manu exaratis codicibus;* but these MSS. are doubtless fictitious, the emendation being known from Victorius's edition of the Rhetoric.

Ricc. 16 is so obviously based on Paccius and the Aldine edition that to speak of it as an Apograph is like speaking of Vahlen's edition as an Apograph. Where Lascaris's interpolations are taken over by the Aldine, they are found in Ricc. 16, *e.g.* 1458 b 11, 1450 a 18, 1454 b 31; where the Aldine does not exhibit them, Ricc. 16 also fails to do so, *e.g.* 1454 b 31 *ἔντεχνοι*. Similarly the Aldine, Paccius, and Ricc. 16 insert the five substantives in 1458 a 17, where Lasc. omits them; the difference between Lasc. and the Aldine being largely due to the intervention of E.

The recensions which meet us in Latin Europe when the study of the Poetics first commences are not, then, based directly on A, but on other MSS., chiefly D, but also MSS. of the types B, E, and C. The groups C D E are likely, from the date of the earliest of the MSS. still existing (other than B and A), to have existed separately before the fall of Constantinople in 1453. That the parent MSS. were all copied there from Scutariota's MS. would only be credible if there were evidence for it.

The scholarship of the fifteenth century must not be judged by that of the sixteenth, and no arguments which confuse the work of Lascaris and Pazzi with that of Apostolis, Rhosus or Suliardos can be admitted. The invention of printing has made a vast difference; Francesco Medici goes to the right places for emendations, to Simplicius, to Plutarch, to Homer; Pazzi, his predecessor,

did the like, whence he can emend *Iolaus* to *Laius*, etc. APOSTOLIS, though he knew the name of Laius, does not think of making this change.[1] LASCARIS feels the responsibility of an *editor;* hence, though not a brilliant scholar, he anticipates much which would be suggested by any editor of to-day. But the fifteenth century scribes are not editors, and feel no responsibility. To any one who knows Greek at all the emendation *ἢ τρίτῃ* for *ἤτοι τῇ* in 1454 b 35 is glaringly obvious; but no fifteenth century scribe makes it. The fact that a negative is lost in 1450 a 30 is also obvious; LASCARIS is the first to supply it, perhaps from B. He who studies the readings of C D E will easily add to this list. Hence it is not possible to credit APOSTOLIS with brilliant emendations such as *Οἰδίπους* for *δίπους* in 1453 a 11, or *ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως* for *ἢ κἀμιμήτως* in 1460 b 31. The latter was above the calibre not only of LASCARIS, but of BEKKER.

But even if their intellectual calibre had been equal to emending the text skilfully, the time which they devoted to their copies would not have permitted of their doing so; how long does RHOSUS allow himself for copying all Aristotle's works except the Logic, in 594 leaves folio? From March 2, 1457, until July 15 of the same year: 124 days, or rather 107, if we omit Sundays. By August 4 of the same year he has finished another MS.[2] The work was therefore absolutely mechanical. Nor did these scribes copy for pleasure, but for money; APOSTOLIS usually complains of his work in his colophons. With the Moslems

[1] *Lettres*, ed. NOIRET, p. 120, *τὸν Λάϊον καὶ Οἰδίποδα.*

[2] The date of the Marcian 200 is wrongly given as 1447 in the Catalogue; VAHLEN read it rightly 1457, and the Indiction shows that 1457 is intended. The date of the Vienna MS. is given by LAMBECIUS, vii. 165. That of Par. 3219 is quoted by MONTFAUCON.

things were similar; the profession of scribe was a humble one, and was regarded as an indignity. The vizier Ibn Abbād rebuked a scribe for rising up when he entered the room; it implied that he thought himself some one.[1]

The test, however, which we propose to apply is the Arabic Version; agreement in any considerable matter with that document on the part of a Greek MS. against A may be regarded as evidence of independence of A; and though the sorting of the MSS. into groups is a difficult matter, perhaps some three may be distinguished in addition to A and B.

The *Ennoian* Group

Med. xxxi. 14 (D); Marc. 215 (d); Bodl. Can. 13; Leidensis. Of d it is to be observed that it does not figure in the list of BESSARION'S books of the year 1468,[2] nor in that published by MIGNE,[3] yet it appears to be included among the MSS. presented by the Cardinal to the Marciana. The MS. must, then, have come, if at all, into his possession between that date and 1472.

In 1454 b 33 a reason is given why the disclosure of his identity by Orestes in the Iphigeneia in Tauris comes near the "error which has been mentioned."

The last words exhibit the following varieties in the MSS.—

ACE	*ἐξῆν γὰρ ἂν ἔνια καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν.*
B	*ἐξῆν γὰρ ἔνια καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν.*
Leid.	*ἐξῆν γὰρ ἂν ἔνοιαν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν.*
D	*ἐξῆν γὰρ ἂν ἔννοιαν ἐνεγκεῖν.*
Ar.	*et existunt alia quae extempore dicantur secundum hanc opinionem.*

[1] Yakut, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, v. 392.
[2] OMONT, *Manuscrits de Bessarion.* [3] *Patrologia Graeca*, clxi. col. 701

There can be no doubt that the Arabic *ra'yun opinionem* stands for the reading *ἔννοιαν*, for the same word is used in the Poetics for *διάνοια*, and the Syriac word whereby *ἔννοια* is rendered in 1 Peter iv. 2 is glossed by the Arabic word in the Syro-Arabic glossaries. Hence the Leid. and D do not here depend on A, but follow an independent line of tradition. Since *ἔννοια* is by far the less common word of the two, and three corruptions are required to explain one word from the other, it is more likely that *ἔννοιαν* was corrupted into *ἔνια* than conversely. The Leid. reading gives us the first stage of the corruption, *ἔνοιαν*. It is also unlikely that the corruption was repeated.

Which is the right reading here? That of D is so difficult that Lasc. omitted it; yet the reading of A C E or B is little easier, since the rendering "he might as well have brought some tokens" is not permissible, and "he might have *brought* some tokens" (and not merely mentioned them) is far from lucid, since the use of tokens has been condemned. The purpose of this sentence must then be learned from what has preceded; and it seems that we must accept the emendation of the Ar. and Lasc. *διὸ* for *διότι*. We may then render: "For she [discloses her identity] by the letter, whereas he himself says what is wanted by the poet, though not by the story; wherefore it [the disclosure] comes near the error that has been noted." The error noted is adducing the tokens as evidence instead of letting them disclose the identity without the bearer of them designing it; and this, he says, might have been done in Orestes's case, just as it is done in the case of Iphigeneia. Now the word used here in the text of D and the Arabic takes us to the *Parva*

Naturalia, where it is used of the process whereby in cases where we seem to have heard or seen the same thing before, we *recognize* and recollect the occasion.[1] Now there would clearly be nothing illicit in making Iphigeneia recognize her brother (by both parents), if there were something to put it into her head. For there is a law of nature, explained in the *de Generatione Animalium*, whereby children resemble their parents, and in communistic states children can be affiliated thereby—a fact which would have made havoc with Plato's Republic.[2] But, as the author says in his treatise on recollection, which has been cited, we cannot always "be put in mind" and recollect to whom the face belongs.

This would have been "permitted," *i.e.* not regarded as unnatural by the audience.

Yet we should not be able to emend this sentence without the help of a fragment quoted by Prof. BYWATER in his note on 1454 a 31, where we are made acquainted with a Greek phrase: *εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ὃν μὲν προτίθενται οὐ μιμοῦνται, ἄλλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καλῶς, εἰ τυγχάνοιεν* [read *τυγχάνομεν*] *ἐνέχοντες ἔννοιαν καὶ παράδειγμα παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς*. The meaning must be, "If we happen to have a notion and an exemplar in our own minds, of the character whom the poet wishes to represent."

Hence we get the true reading for the place with which we are dealing, *ἐξῆν γὰρ ἂν ἔννοιαν ἐνέχειν* "For she (Iphigeneia) might have had a notion in her mind of what Orestes was like."

The fact that the reading of D is not absolutely correct yet preserves part of an unusual Greek expression,

[1] 451 a 5. [2] Politics 1262 a 20.

seems to evince the independence of D without the possibility of doubt.

In 1456 a 2 where the varieties of Tragedy are mentioned A B exhibit a corruption and C a blank—

A B *τὸ δὲ τέταρτον οης οἷον αἵ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προμηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα.*

D *οἰκεῖον.*

E *ὁμαλόν.*

Ar. *Quarta autem res* [plur.] *Phorcidas et Prometheus, et quod dictum est iis.*

The difference between *ΟΗCΟΙΟΝ* and *ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ* is clearly a case of that corruption of *κ* into *ιc* of which Cobet has given interesting examples; Athenaeus mistook *σκύφος* for *σίσυφος*. The reading of Ar. also seems to represent *οἰκεῖον*, *i. e.* "the private affairs of"; *quod dictum est iis* represents a corruption *ὡς ἃ* for *ὅσα*.

Which of these readings, if any, is right? An obvious correction of *οης* is *ὄψις*; it is however excluded by § 24, in which we are told that Epic has the same varieties as Tragedy, and Epic, we are repeatedly informed, has not "exhibition." In § 6 the author insisted that there were only four factors out of the six which were essential; and that the four varieties correspond with these four factors is asserted in the passage before us. It is evident that it is a question of predominance of a factor; just as in a mixture of wine and water the result is "watery" if the water predominates. Hence the fourth variety must be that in which the language predominates. It need no more be called the linguistic tragedy on that account than the story tragedy is called the mythical; the better sort of story being a plot, it is called a plot

tragedy. Similarly, since it is the function of Intelligence to rouse the emotions (§ 19), the tragedy wherein the Intelligence predominates is called the emotional tragedy. The language, as we learn from the Rhetoric (iii. § 7), should be *appropriate*[1] to the characters and situations; hence the linguistic tragedy is called the appropriate tragedy, *i. e.* the Tragedy of appropriate expression. As before, the phrase is unconstruable without the Rhetoric; with the aid of that treatise we can interpret it with certainty. But that the scribe of D argued in this way seems highly improbable. Whence it may be concluded that D here preserves the original text.

For the purpose of proving kinship between MSS. it is not necessary that the reading on which they agree should be sound. We notice, then, that D and Ar. agree in 1460 a 2 in the erroneous reading *μὴ γνοίη* for *μιγνύοι*; the nature of the corruption is obvious, yet as it involves three itacisms, it is unlikely to have occurred more than once.

In 1451 b 26 D as well as Ar. omits *γνώριμα ὀλίγοις* in the words *ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν.*

In 1452 a 13 both Ar. and D omit certain words; what is curious is that they do not omit quite the same. It may be noticed that the omission in Marc. 200 here corresponds with that in the Arabic.

In 1458 a 18 D and its Venetian copy both omit the word *not* in the definition of "the virtue of speech," *σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι.* The Arabic also omits the negative, though it must be added that it omits the conjunction as well. It is possible that the negative has been omitted accidentally in the Medicean MS., as well

[1] *ἡ οἰκεία λέξις.*

as in that which was before the Oriental translator. Yet it seems no less probable that the negative was omitted intentionally by a Christian scribe, who was shocked at the sentiment that the diction ought *not* to be humble. Surely humility is a virtue ! As, however, Aristotle's real doctrine is unaltered in 1458 a 30 in both authorities, we are at least to some extent justified in regarding this as a further proof of relationship between the *ἔννοιαν* group and the Arabic.

A curious reading of this group, but also of some other MSS. (Ambr. B 78, Med. lx. 16, Vat. i. and Vat. ii.) is in 1452 a 28 *μιμεῖσθαι* for *λυγκεῖ*. The origin of this corruption can be partly explained by COBET'S observation of the confusion of *κ* with *ικ* and of *ε* with *θ*. This gives us the origin of *ισθι* (= *εἶσθαι*) for the latter half of *ΛΥΓΚΕΙ*. The rest of the corruption can be explained, though not quite so simply, from the uncial character; and indeed it became necessary to interpret the strokes so as to produce a Greek word. But the cursive script of A gives no account whatever of this corruption. Hence we hold that it goes back to a different line of tradition.

The Arabic here has "in a litter." This probably represents the word *κλίνῃ*, which according to the glossaries was used in Syriac, and is merely a transposition of the consonants of LINKE, which to the Syrians was unintelligible. Since B transposes *Λυγκεῖ* to *γλυκεῖ*, the transposition of LINKE to KLINE in the Syriac is not surprising.

Another reading of D which appears to have the support of the Arabic is in 1455 b 5 *θύουσιν* for *θύσασιν* in the sketch of the principles illustrated by the Iphigeneia in Tauris.

The Arabic there has *surrexit inter mactatos*, but the difference between this and *mactantes* in Syriac is a question of a point or a stroke. It is to be observed that the participle *τυθείσης* in what precedes is rendered by the perfect. That Iphigeneia was rescued before the sacrifice was consummated is obvious; whence the present participle is truer than the aorist. The participle *τυθείσης* in the previous sentence still remains, according to both Eastern and Western tradition, and contains an obvious inaccuracy. However, on the principle embodied in the Arabic proverb "some mischief is lighter than some," it is an advantage to get rid of part of the inaccuracy.

The *Mimesis* Group

The MS. of this type selected by BEKKER is Urbinas 47, a MS. of the Rhetors, described by STERNUAIOLO in his Catalogue of the Urbino collection, which was incorporated in the Vatican library by Alexander VII.[1] This MS. was written by the celebrated Michael APOSTOLIS, who fled from Constantinople in 1453, and died in 1480, having during his exile spent much of his time in Crete copying Greek books.[2] The date of this MS. may, then, be put at about 1460. The reading after which this group may be named is found in 1459 b 37, where A D E exhibit *περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ κίνησις τῶν ἄλλων*, but B C *μίμησις*, which agrees with the Arabic *simulatio*, and is generally agreed to be correct. It is of course conceivable that this reading may have come in from B, though the hypothesis has no probability; and the same holds good of another excellent reading, to which

[1] *Codices Urbinates*, Rome, 1895.
[2] H. NOIRET, *Lettres Inédites de M. Apostolis*, Paris, 1889.

attention has already been called, in 1460 b 31 *ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως*, also shared by C with B; but in 1450 a 14 C only among the five has the true reading *ὄψεις*, where one may question the ability of APOSTOLIS to emend *ὄψις* correctly; and particularly we may doubt his ability to suggest *πάσας* in 1448 a 9 for *ταύτας*, which is indeed "confirmed" by the Arabic, but does not appear to be correct. For the words which end the section evidently mean that Tragedy and Comedy are at the opposite Poles of this *differentia* or *enantiosis;* whence there must in what preceded have been an allusion to the fact that in the case of the other forms of Poetry the intermediate also was represented.

The enormous number of MSS. copied by APOSTOLIS renders it unlikely that he considered emendation of the text part of his business; and indeed C, like D, in cases of great difficulty simply leaves blanks; there is no suggestion of the boldness of LASCARIS. Such a correction as *οὖν* for *οὐ* in 1447 b 27, or *καὶ ἐν* for *καὶ* in *ibid.* a 21 seems above the calibre of this scribe. Hence the probability is that he followed his archetype in these cases; and of course we have no means of knowing how old it was.

The Dresden MS. is probably a copy of the Urbinas, but here and there shows improvement, resulting from the collation of some other MS.; perhaps it is not a direct copy.

Vat. G.N. 1400 is of this group; its most remarkable reading is in 1461 b 21 *τῷ Αἰγεῖ ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ*, where it has the right accents, but the A C D E groups err either in accents or orthography. This is probably the MS. of the Vatican which was lent to PACCIUS, and it may be that some

corrections are by him. Several of them come from the Aldine edition; others appear to be original.

A secondary group of C MSS. is furnished by Par. 2040, of which the Guelferbytanus is said to be a copy, Ambros. O. 52, and Ambros. P 34. Their margins here and there exhibit the influence of the Aldine edition.

The Group of the Five Substantives

In 1458 a 15, after the observation that five neuters end in U, a list of the five is given in Ambr. B 78, Coisl. 34, and the Aldine edition, whence it has got into Ricc. 16. The same list occurs in the Arabic, in a slightly different order. Of course such a list would be easy to add; but it would be still easier to add *sigma* to the list of masculine terminations, yet no one had the courage to do so before Fr. Medici. The Ambrosian MS. has an excellent reading of its own in 1454 a 23—

C D *ἔστι γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τὸ ἦθος ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁρμόττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι.*

B . . . *οὐ τῷ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι.*

A the same, omitting *οὐ*.

Ambr. B 78 *τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἤδη εἶναι.*

Ar. *tamen non convenit mulieri ne ut appareat quidem in ea omnino.*

The true reading here is evidently to be learned from what Aristotle says elsewhere on this subject. Courage is a virtue in women no less than in men, but the species is different. This is his doctrine in the Politics,[1] in the Natural History,[2] and the same is found in the Physio-

[1] 1260 a 22, 1277 b 21: *ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία*, where *ἑτέρα* interprets *εἴδη ἔχουσα*. [2] 608 b 15.

gnomonics.[1] The female is less courageous than the male, her courage being of the subject, his of the masterful species. On the other hand, the female is *less* scrupulous than the male, whence if *δεινότης* means "unscrupulous cleverness" the assertion that a woman should not display it is not only contrary to experience and the practice of the best artists, but contrary to Aristotle's philosophy; for since *δεινότης* is connected with *πλεονεξία*,[2] and *πλεονεξία* is a species of injustice,[3] a woman, as being "more unjust than a man,"[4] may well be represented as *δεινή*. Hence *δεινήν* has no place here: nor indeed is *δεινότης* either a virtue or a vice, since it belongs to the intellect.[5]

The true reading is then given by E, only for *ἤδη* we must substitute *εἴδει* and for *ἀνδρείαν ἀνδρεῖον*. The construction is "it is possible for the character to be courageous—and therefore virtuous in agreement with Rule 1—but for the courage to be unsuitable to a woman in species." If she be given the ruler's courage instead of the subject's courage, then the virtue is unsuitable. *εἴδει εἶναι* is by itacism corrupted to *ηδει ειναι* and by dittography to *ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι*. Probably the Arabic represents *εἴδει*, which it rendered "in any sort."

It is further to be observed that E has the true reading *ἀπόπλουν* in 1454 b 2, of which *ἁπλοῦν* in A B C D is the converse form of corruption to that with which we have been dealing. *ἀπόπλουν* might have been restored by a Græculus perhaps. Clearly *ἤδη* is a relic of the true text.

The difficulty of affiliating MSS. is illustrated by the

[1] 809 a 38. [2] Problems 917 a 2. [3] Great Ethics 1251 a 30.
[4] Physiognomonics 814 a 9; cf. Natural History, l.c.
[5] Nic. Ethics 1144 a 22.

case of the Ambros. B 78 and the Coisl. 324. These appear to be the only MSS. which exhibit the "five substantives"; and, as has been seen, it is most improbable that any one who had the courage to add them would have failed to insert the termination S, too, in the place where it is badly needed, and exhibited by the Arabic. These MSS. exhibit agreement in some other matters: they both have the curious reading *εἰ δ' ἂν οὐ τοῦτό γε* in 1461 a 30, the corruption *διαφέρειε τῶν* in 1458 b 15, *συμπαραλαμβάνουσι* in 1450 a 22, and *ἀγαθῶν* in 1450 a 28 (altered in Coisl.); but in various other cases Coisl. does not confirm the peculiar readings of E. Neither the theory that E is a copy of Coisl., nor the theory that Coisl. is a copy of E, is without further hypotheses workable; neither is everything easily explained by supposing them both to be copies of the same. Neither of the scribes has informed us in this case whence he made his copy; and to guess without knowledge of this matter is no profitable occupation. As, however, of the two E exhibits many more signs of antiquity, E will be often quoted in the *Apparatus*, Coisl., though perhaps the older, rarely. Perhaps these scribes, by frequent copying, got to know their texts by heart, and reproduced readings which had stuck in their memories.

The conclusion, then, with regard to these Greek MSS. is that they all spring from one archetype, saved from a Christian holocaust, in the fourth or fifth century, and which on the whole between them they faithfully represent. Since, when MSS. are books, people prefer those that are new and in the writing of their time, it is not surprising that no old MSS. are preserved, and that

the bulk of those which we possess are not earlier than the fifteenth century; a market for Greek books sprang up unexpectedly in Western Europe, and the MSS. of the last edition, so to speak, were those which naturally fell into collectors' hands. The meaning of the text was understood by no one even moderately well till the time of Lascaris at the beginning of the sixteenth century; hence the marginal corrections of the MSS. before that date are as often foolish as they are wise;[1] and the practice of contaminating from different copies is what renders the precise tracing of families difficult. But because the text was not understood, it was fairly well preserved; and of wilful alteration there are not many signs except in B.

The MSS. exhibit a gradual loss of matter owing to inaccurate copying, homoeoteleuton being a frequent cause of omission. A suffers less than the rest from this cause, yet we have seen that in one case it can be supplemented from B. It does not appear, however, that A preserves any portion of the text absolutely alone; the case in which it comes nearest doing so is in 1457 a 33, where C D E omit the words *πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματος σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου*; but B preserves them. And they are also found in an interpolated MS. of the D group (Laur. lx. 16). The text which lay before the Syriac translator was somewhat, but not much, fuller.

In 1448 b 37 the Greek texts offer—

τὸ [B *δ*] *γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει ὥσπερ Ἰλιὰς καὶ ἡ* [om. C D E] *Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμῳδίας.*

Ar.: *nam ecce-libidinis ratio analoga est, et qualis*

[1] *E.g.* Rhosus's suggestion *νευίμων* for *νόμων*.

est Ilias ad compositionem et dicta Odyssea ad tragoedias, tale est hoc ad genera Comoediae.

The Syriac rendering *hā zalīlūthā* is here retained by Abu'l-Bashar, though he translated the words above. The Syriac translator thought the words "his the Margites" were an example of a lampoon, meaning "he is lustful." The reading *ὁ* for *τὸ* exhibited by B is apparently to be accepted, and illustrations of the same corruption are furnished by B itself. The supplement *κατὰ τὴν σύστασιν* which the Arabic offers should also be accepted, being indispensable for the sense; further, the prefixing of the article to "Odyssey," whereas it is omitted before "Iliad," becomes less harsh if the words are thus separated.

That the Iliad and Odyssey structurally resemble Tragedies is explained at length in § 8; the substance of the doctrine is given in the preceding words about Homer, where he is said to have invented fiction and unity of theme; "fiction" is explained in §§ 8 and 9 as being that which deals with the typical and not with the actual. The whole, then, is an expansion of the first sentence, in which we have the formula "portrayal of the imaginary."

To Christian influence some few alterations may be ascribed. One, a reading of D, has already been discussed. Another, the euphemism *Φαυλικά* or *φαυλικά* for *Φαλλικά* is common to both the Oriental and Occidental traditions. A third, the alteration of *παθημάτων* to *μαθημάτων* in the Definition of Tragedy belongs to the groups A C D E. That these words gave offence is clear from the Syriac paraphrase: "mixing the passions and making a purgation of those who suffer." Perhaps the

Syrian read *κεραννῦσα* for *περαίνουσα*, but he does not ordinarily paraphrase to this extent. It seems clear that the words suggested "clearing away pity and fear," and this would, from the Christian point of view, be most undesirable—

> "Give us tears,
> Give us deep, heart-searching fears!"

Pity and fear are the equivalent of piety. The substitution of *μαθημάτων* gets rid of this objection very easily; and since the pleasure of Tragedy is in *μανθάνειν* (§ 4), and Gregory Nazianzene calls the plot a *μάθημα*, the alteration seemed plausible.

Christian sentiment underlies the reading *διαμένειν* in 1449 a 12, apparently first emended by BESSARION'S scribe. That these unclean ceremonies were retained in many of the states could not be asserted; either, then, the word was thrown out—as in the MSS. F H; or it was rendered harmless by a change which seemed to permit of the construction *νομιζόμενα διαμένειν* "thought to persist."

The Syriac and Arabic versions have been described by the writer in his *Analecta;* Prof. BYWATER well says that both "worked in the dark." ABU'L-BASHAR, the Arabic translator, is known to us from his Discussion on the merits of Grammar and Logic, wherein he reveals an incredible degree of density. At times he treats the Syriac as though it were the original language;[1] at times he interprets the Syriac from Arabic; so "elegy" he first interprets as the Arabic *alghāz* "riddles"; then as the Arabic *al-ghāyā* "ends," which has a metrical signification

[1] 1459 a 14, where *ṣefta* was a corruption for *ṣabta;* this occurs repeatedly in WRIGHT'S Apocryphal Acts.

in Arabic.[1] His interpretation of Iphigeneia in Aulis as " Iphigeneia in the Convent called that of the Jackals," is of some interest. Such a name is by no means unlikely for a Convent; we hear of a Convent of Foxes near Baghdad very often;[2] probably ABU'L-BASHAR was thinking of the fate of a real Iphigeneia, a nun at the Convent of this name.

The comments of the Syrian translator were somewhat less wide of the mark; we have seen how he treats *katharsis*. In 1453 b 38 his addition, *sed sciturus atque etiam scientibus aut insciis*, so far as the first words are concerned, is meritorious; ignorance in the case of the tragic murderer is to be followed by knowledge. The remainder of the supplement is erroneous.

What is more unfortunate is that the Greek original was somewhat seriously interpolated, whence the mere fact that the Arabic " confirms " a reading, does not prove its genuineness.

Perhaps the most remarkable rendering in the work is in 1457 b 27, where the author has provided a puzzle.

οἷον τὸ τὸν καρπὸν μὲν ἀφιέναι σπείρειν, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὸ σπείρειν πρὸς τὸν καρπόν.

For the word *φλόξ* the Arabic has in both places *al-dāl*, which the writer first thought was corrupt for *al-nār*, " the fire "; but the double emendation is improbable, and this word is to be interpreted as *δαλός*, which Mrs. MARGOLIOUTH has found in a Syriac writer, in the form *dālā*. Now, what puzzles the ordinary reader

[1] *Index Operum Abu'l-'Alae Ma'arrenis* (*Centenario di* M. AMARI), p. 229.

[2] Yakut, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, v. 158.

of the Greek is that whereas we expect the proportion to be

sowing : fruit : : x : flame,

as Aristotle gives it, it is

sowing : fruit : : x : sun,

whence either the fruit must sow or the sun must be sown; and each of these suggestions is embarrassing. Now the interpretation of *φλόξ* as "meteoric flame," whether correct or not, at any rate gives us the reference which we require, viz. to the Meteorology. An explanation has there to be given of the extraordinary fact that in certain cases *fire goes downwards*, whereas by nature it goes upwards. The explanation is that it is squeezed out in the direction of least density; and this process is compared with the shooting of a stone out of a date, where we find a similar law of nature violated: the stone often going upwards because it follows the line of least density.[1] The comparison is a commonplace, since we find it repeated.[2] For the process the compound *διασπείρειν* appears to be used, at least in reference to flame and heat.[3]

What we learn from the Meteorology is, then, that the same process goes on when a date-stone is naturally shot upwards, as when a flame is discharged downwards; only when the date shoots its stone it is said to "sow" it, whereas when the sun does the same, Greek has no name for the process.

It is possible that the order of words in *τὸ τὸν καρπὸν μὲν* is intended to indicate that "the fruit" is the subject;[4] but whether this be so or not, "to let go the fruit"

[1] 369 a 22. [2] 342 a 10.
[3] 369 a 25; cf. 341 b 33. Aristotle invented the term *ἐκπυρηνίζειν*.
[4] As in Nic. Ethics 1162 b 3.

is no proper definition of the verb " to sow "; on the other hand, " the fruit letting go " can only refer to the process described in the Meteorology, and compared to that whereby flame goes downwards. Although, then, we are not prepared to regard the interpretation *δαλός* as correct, it may be confessed that it puts us on the right track.

It has been seen that in the case of BERNAYS's supplement the " confirmation " of the Arabic does not help it, but merely shows that an infelicitous suggestion of the nineteenth century had been anticipated before the tenth. The same is found to be the case with other emendations of the text. One which appears to have won general praise is in the argument which immediately follows the passage with which BERNAYS tried to deal (1447 b 15): *καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἰατρικὸν ἢ μουσικόν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν.* The word *μουσικόν* is emended *φυσικόν*; and this undoubtedly the Arabic confirms. He who glances at the passage will think it necessary or plausible; he who tries to understand the passage will see that it ruins the argument and is questionable Greek. For the author proceeds: " Now Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common but the hexameter, whence the former should be called poet, the latter scientist rather than poet." We see why Empedocles should be called " scientist," for medicine is a part of science, and to some extent coincides with what Aristotle calls " physical science "; [1] but the statement that Homer ought to be called poet is apparently *aus der Luft gegriffen*, unless *μουσικόν* be retained. In the nextargument " even if any one *ποιοῖτο τῇν μίμησιν* in a mixture of all the metres "

[1] *Parva Naturalia* 464 b 33; *de Caelo* 298 b 2.

the purpose of the expression " make the imitation " is obscure unless *μουσικόν* be kept. For we learn from Plato's Laws—the primary source of the Poetics—that all *mousike* is *mimesis*,[1] and of this doctrine Aristotle makes the first propositions of his own treatise. " Rhapsody," the class to which Chaeremon's work is assigned, is a branch of *mousike*.[2] Hence with *μουσικόν* the argument is sound. Men call a work on medicine (science) in hexameters and a work of art in hexameters equally " hexametric art "; but since Homer's work (hexametric art) and Empedocles's (hexametric science) have nothing in common save the hexameter, it is better to call Homer art, and Empedocles science. Similarly if a person were to compose a *work of art* in all the metres, as indeed Chaeremon did in Homer's style, he should be classified in Homer's genus " artist."

Further, *ἰατρικὸν ἢ φυσικόν* does not appear to be correct Greek, because the *ἤ* should separate distinct things, and, as has been seen, *φυσικὸν* is the genus of *ἰατρικόν*. The Greek would probably be *φυσικὸν καὶ ἰατρικόν* or *ἰατρικὸν ἢ ὅλως φυσικόν*.

Since the Arabic exhibits infelicitous emendations afterwards made independently by nineteenth century scholars, it is not surprising to find it anticipate some of Lascaris's errors. An emendation by him which is perhaps universally accepted is in 1447 a 25 : *ἥ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι τὴν δύναμιν*, where he inserts *τοιαῦται* after *οὖσαι*.

Two difficulties strike the reader in connection with this: why would not *εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τοιαῦται* suffice ? And, why are these other arts not mentioned in the list of the

[1] 668 a–c. [2] [Plato], *Ion* 530 a.

first sentence? Further, why is the formula here *ἥ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστική* whereas the formula in the list is *τῆς αὐλητικῆς καὶ κιθαριστικῆς*, where the two arts are bracketed? The reply is the following. The art mentioned in the list is "instrumental music"; for which Greek had (apparently) no word, whence this compound "flute-and-harp-music" is employed, meaning "wind or stringed instrument music." What we have next to be told is that "flute" stands for "wind instrument," "harp" for stringed instrument; and this is effected by the formula in the passage which LASCARIS tried to emend. *τυγχάνειν* is the verb of actuality, opposed to *ὑπάρχειν* the verb. of general principles.[1] Hence the formula of the text means "flute-playing and harp-playing proper and any other virtual flute-playings and harp-playings"; the expression being similar to that in the Nicomachean Ethics[2] *ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους.* Just as there the word to be supplied is not *ἀρεταί* but *ἀνδρεῖαι*, so here it is *αὐλητικαὶ καὶ κιθαριστικαί*,[3] and, indeed, there seems to be a reference to this in the Topics.[4] The author's parsimony of words is no greater in these cases than in the Meteorology[5] *καὶ καρποὶ μόνον τῷ σχήματι, τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν οὐ φαίνονται, παλαιούμενοι σφόδρα.* So in the Problems[6] the Reed is grouped with the Flute, the Triangle with the Harp; and in the Onomasticon of Pollux it appears that each of the Reeds might be called *αὐλός*. The dynamis might be defined, as by HEGEL, "the

[1] Cf. Politics 1266 b 32, *ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός*, "this is what he actually says."

[2] 1116 a 16.

[3] Cf. *ibid.* 1141 b 31 *ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα φρόνησις · ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία κ.τ.λ.*

[4] 104 a 19 *αὐλητικὰς πλείους.*

[5] 390 a 23.

[6] 919 b.

power to produce melody by horizontal and vertical vibration of air respectively." But the dynamis in this case is not *similar* but the *same*. Then the sense of "such in their dynamis" is not clear; for we have not been told what the dynamis is, as we are *e.g.* in Problems 925 b 6 "the onion has dynamis of such a sort that . . ." The Arabic interpolation "if any others exist which in their dynamis are like these two" is better, but practically omits *τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι*. Nevertheless, it makes Aristotle guilty of omitting something in the first list, whereas the uninterpolated text does not admit that charge, since by the aid of the article he explains what he means by "Flute and Harp Music."

The fact, then, that the Arabic follows an interpolated text, or, which comes to the same, translates according to amateur theories of the meaning, constitutes a considerable danger to the person who solicits its aid.

General Principles of Criticism.—As we have seen, the text of the Poetics is on the whole faithfully preserved, and in the better MSS. with the exception of B there is no systematic attempt to correct even obvious errors. In the main the errors are confined to the occasional loss of a word, and substitution of vowels or of similar letters. The sentences being constructed with the greatest care and precision, any alteration at all has a tendency to occasion serious mischief, and before any can be accepted it should be submitted to the ruthless criticism taught in the Topics. Does it violate Greek usage? Does it disagree with the author's system? Does it make the author say or suggest anything which he wished to avoid? A few examples may be taken of "emendations" by

renaissance or modern critics which illustrate the danger of amateur alteration.

1451 b 30: *τῶν γὰρ γενομένων ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα ἂν εἰκὸς γενέσθαι καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι καθ' ὃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ποιητής ἐστιν.*

This sentence is difficult, but it is quite correct and cannot be altered. "There is nothing to prevent certain past events being such as potentialities would with moral certainty be, in the respect wherein the poet portrays the former." The field of poetry is the potential, as governed by moral certainty or laws of nature; in ordinary life the conditions are too complicated to permit us to trace the working of the laws; poetry isolates certain qualities, just as Mechanics isolates the laws of motion. Occasionally in real life the working of the law can be clearly seen, and then such a chapter of life will serve for a Tragedy; for the ideal story would probably be the same. A German editor ejects *καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι*; the syntax becomes solecistic, and the argument is ruined.

1450 a 17: *ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας· καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποιότης.*

"For Tragedy portrays not imaginary men, but an imaginary faring, mode of life, *i.e.* happiness; and misery is a faring, and the end a career, not a quality. Now people's quality is in their character, their happiness or unhappiness in what they go through; hence the *dramatis personae* do not go through experiences in order to exhibit character, but are invested with character because of their careers."

An illustration may make the argument clearer. A

man is told to bring a coin; he must bring one of gold, silver or copper, because the genus only exists in the species ;[1] in order to be a coin it must be of one of these metals. What is wanted is " a medium of exchange and measure of value "; the nature of the metal is secondary. So here what is to be portrayed is a career, and indeed a heroic career; but the genus takes precedence of the differentia; the career is the predominant element, the heroic qualities the second in importance. We want a gold *coin ;* one who brings a silver coin will come nearer the requirement than one who brings a gold bracelet. As we have seen (§§ 2, 3), Tragedy represents the functioning of heroes, which is equivalent to happiness; the test of the Topics makes us sure that the genus is " faring "; and the genus is the essence.[2]

A German emendation is to insert as follows : *εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ἡ δ'εὐδαιμονία καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία, κ.τ.λ.* Returning to our illustration we may interpret : " You are sending for gold and copper coins ; and both sovereigns and pence are coins." But the first proposition is false, for Tragedy does not portray " wretchedness "; it only portrays the heroic life. And the second is tautologous, for we have already assumed that happiness is faring; what is of importance is that the test of the genus should be satisfied. The emendation of Lascaris *εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία* is equally bad.

Hence the scholars who have taught us most Greek, such as Cobet, appear to have ordinarily kept their hands off Aristotle. Where the whole text is arranged with the care and ingenuity of a puzzle, any sort of rearrangement

[1] Physics 209 b 23; *de Generatione* 322 a 17; Topics 121 a 35.
[2] Topics 139 a 29, etc.

or displacement is likely to spread havoc far and wide. The plan whereon a Tragedy should be arranged, viz. absolute interdependence of all the parts, seems to have been followed by the philosopher in his treatise on Tragedy.

ARISTOTLE ON THE ART OF POETRY

§ 1. Our subjects are the Essence of Poetry and the special functions of its varieties: how a Story should be constructed, if it is to be poetically correct; the Members and Factors of each variety; with such other matters as belong to the same topic.

Let us, following the natural order, take our first start with genus and differentia.

The Essence of Poetry: the formula which, without containing the word itself, gives the self of the thing named (Metaphys. 1029 b 19). As we are dealing with both genus and species, the definition of the former gives the Essence (Topics 108 b 22). This essence is given in the first sentence of the text.

The special functions of its varieties: the explanation of this is given in the Politics (1276 b 21): each individual of the genus sailor has his own special function, *e.g.* rower, pilot, look-out man, etc. The function, therefore, corresponds with the species as the essence does with the genus, whence in certain contexts "function" and "species" can be substituted for each other.

If it is to be poetically correct: in § 25 it is observed that this is not dentical with moral correctness or correctness in the terms of any other science.

The Members and Factors: in the epilogue the expressions are somewhat different. Scientific knowledge is obtained by either analysis (into factors) or anatomy (into members), as we learn in the Metaphysics (1053 a 19). In the Poetics both divisions are employed in the case of Tragedy; only factorial analysis in the case of Epic.

Such other matters: *e.g.* the history of poetry, and the critique of the Homeric poems.

The natural order: a second start is made in § 4, dealing with the origin and evolution of Poetry. Since nature works on a plan, *i.e.* has the idea ready before she proceeds to realize it, it is natural to deal with the definition before dealing with the evolution.

Genus and differentia: Gl. The reference is to Metaphysics 1037 b 29

Romance, then, the Poetry of Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic Poetry, and (with few exceptions) Instrumental Music, wind or stringed, are all, in fact, *immaterial*

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and Posterior Analytics 97 b 3, where this sense of the word in the text (the first things) is explained. The genus of Art is "portrayal," literally "imitation"; the first differentia is that between creative portrayal and reproductive portrayal, portrayal of the imaginary or of the real.

Romance, etc.: in accordance with Posterior Analytics 97 a 8 the author takes all the styles to which the name Poiesis is commonly applied and finds their common feature. For the definition of "Romance" see Gl. and Introd. p. 68.

The Poetry of Tragedy: as distinct from the exhibition, for the actors are flesh and blood, and a play acted is therefore no more "immaterial" than a picture or statue.

As also Comedy: Aristotle does not in this treatise commit himself to the statement that it is poetry ("its so-called poets" 1449 b 3), and we learn from Horace that the ancients were in doubt as to the appropriateness of the name Poetry for it.

Instrumental Music: Introd. p. 119. The instrumental musician is called poet in Problems 919 a 20. *Ibid.* 918 a 31 it is asserted that at times the music of the flute portrays nothing, *i. e.* has no distinct theme.

Are all in fact: as we meet them in concrete and individual cases before we know the principle. And it is from these concrete and individual cases that the sciences take their definitions, when these are not hypotheses (Metaphys. 1064 a 8).

Immaterial Portrayals of the Imaginary: "immaterial" distinguishes them from the arts which employ matter, and therefore produce what is mortal; "of the imaginary" distinguishes poetry from history, which portrays the actual (§ 9). A more literal rendering would be "simulation throughout," where simulation would describe the function of all the fine arts, called by BERGSON "suggestion" ("every feeling will assume an aesthetic character provided it be suggested not caused," *Time and Free Will*, p. 17), by LANGE "illusion."

The Greek *poiesis*, then, means here the same as it means in the Metaphysics, viz. fabrication. The modern languages usually differ from Greek in confining it to language (so RÖTTEKEN, *Poetik*, at the beginning), or metrical language (so GUMMERE); few philosophers would (like SCHERER) extend it to the pantomime and ballet.

§ 1. 1447 a 14—16.

Portrayals of the Imaginary. They differ, however, from each other in three matters : the Clothing, which varies in category; the Theme, which varies in species; and the Treatment, which varies in mode. For as the reproductive Artist portrays with both Colour and Figure, portrays various subjects, and treats them ideally or realistically,

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They differ, however : there are three bases of classification, involving cross-division. They are arranged in order of importance.

The Clothing, which varies in category : clearly the same theme can be put into music, or into words, or into figures, and may be simultaneously danced and played, etc. But harmony, time and language appeal to different faculties (cf. *Parva Naturalia* 455 a 22), and therefore belong to different categories, or ultimate genera of things (Metaphys. 1016 b 33, 1024 b 13, Physics 227 b 4, etc.).

The Theme, which varies in species : i.e. where fully conscious beings are simulated there is a natural division into good, bad and average.

The Treatment, which varies in mode : narration and impersonation are both various modes of speech, whence this division comes after the division by quality.

As the reproductive Artist : the parallel between the two divisions of Art lies in the treble basis of classification. Figure, Colour, and Sound are stock examples of things categorically different (Metaphys. 1057 a 27, 1071 a 25, Post. Analytics 97 b 35, *Parva Naturalia*, l.c.); and the subjects portrayed can clearly vary in species.

The sentence is in part a polemic against Plato's identification of the two branches of Art. The word "reproductive" indicates that something actual is copied, whereas "poetry" creates, and generalizes. Although the figure and colour do not constitute a man or a building (an idea attributed to Democritus, and refuted *de Partibus Animalium*, 640 b 30), yet they are sufficient to counterfeit a man or a building.

Ideally or realistically : the interpretation of this is given in the Politics 1281 b 12 : the ideal or "artistic" portrait is one in which the beauties of different individuals are gathered into one; the typical case being that in which Zeuxis, in order to represent Helen, selected the traits of the five fairest women in Croton (Klein, *Geschichte der griechischen Kunst*, ii. 168). The familiar or realistic likeness is one in which the individual is portrayed as he is. The distinction can be exactly illustrated in our time by that between painting and photography, analysed by Dessoir (pp. 418–420) : "the photograph is as trustworthy as statistics, as analytical and impartial as science." It

§ 2. Inasmuch as those who portray persons—who must be relatively good or bad, since thus only can character regularly be classified, for the difference between *any* characters is relative badness and goodness—portray such as are better than, worse than, or on a level with *ourselves; e.g.* portrait-painters: for Polygnotus painted

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Illusions of Force, Space, Colour, etc. Dessoir's is obviously near Aristotle's; the classification by the latter of the Reproductive Arts is like that of the Creative according to Category, two sorts of Quality and Quantity; and the first two may be combined. The Reproductive Arts would have been distinguished by him from the Crafts as imitating in inappropriate matter; a real sword can only be made of a substance like steel; Art can imitate one in paint.

Those who portray persons, etc.: this paragraph is explained at length in the Introduction, but may be briefly analysed here. "Persons" form a genus, and cannot therefore be reproduced except with specific qualities; these specific qualities must be drawn from the differentia of the genus. A dramatis persona is a character; and the differentia of character is virtue (or, as the Greeks say, virtue and vice). The proof of this is that difference between any two characters is a difference in degree of goodness; if, *e. g.* Pompey and Cæsar differ in courage, the meaning is that one is less courageous than the other or more cowardly. Further, all virtue in our system is choosing a mean in accordance with "right reason"; courage of any other sort does not count. Hence any person can be ranged on a scale of virtue. There being, however, no objective poles, we have to make ourselves the standard, and range persons in three classes accordingly.

E.g. *Portrait-painters, etc.:* the subjects of Polygnotus were mainly gods and heroes; the other two painters are far less known. Klein (*Geschichte der griechischen Kunst*, ii. 187) suggests that Pauson was a *sign-painter;* but it seems more likely that he was a caricaturist. The precept in the Politics that the young should not study his works would in that case be intelligible. A pictorial puzzle is ascribed to him; and his Hermes, to which there is a reference in the Metaphysics, would appear to have been something of the kind. Dionysius (identified by Klein l.c. with Dionysius of Colophon) is "an obscure personage"; Plutarch asserts that his works showed signs of the labour expended on them. The division of painting into religious art, portrait and caricature, or at any rate by subject, is according to Dessoir (p. 411) by no means to be despised; and their functions seem

superior, Pauson inferior, and Dionysius average beings: it is clear that each also of the modes of portraying the imaginary enumerated will admit of subdivision on this principle, *i. e.* be capable of classification by the moral quality of what it portrays. For all three varieties can get into a Dance, a piece for the Flute or a piece for the Harp; or may belong to the authors of prose or unaccompanied verse, *e. g.* Homer portrayed imaginary heroes, Cleophon average men, Hegemon of Thasos, inventor of parody, and Nicochares, author of the Diliad, knaves; characters like ourselves might also be por-

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to be separated in quite the same way as those of the corresponding dramatists—of whom the intermediate class did not exist in Aristotle's time. As the difference is a moral difference, the commentary on these artists' works would probably have belonged to the discipline called "Physiognomy,"[22] to which there are references in the Natural History, and on which there is a treatise ascribed to Aristotle. The statement that every character has corresponding externals will meet us presently (§ 6); we must assume that in the works of Polygnotus the indications of virtue were exaggerated, just as in those of the caricaturist those of vice would be.

For all three varieties can get into a Dance, etc.: the intermediate no less than the poles. In the last section there is an allusion to a piece for the flute called the "Quoit," which would have no character; whence they are not necessarily found in it. The same section tells us that both ladies and low-class women were portrayed in dances; so, too, were gods and goddesses.

Or may belong to the authors of, etc.: here, too, the emphasis is on the word *all;* the author recognizes the romance of ordinary life, though he does not regard it as either Tragedy or Comedy.

The ascription of the difference to the authors anticipates what we are to learn in § 4, viz. that the artist chooses the type which suits his individual temperament.

Characters like ourselves, etc.: the reference proving that the Cyclops is "a character like ourselves"[23] is to Nic. Ethics 1180 a 27, where it is observed that in most of the cities each person lives as he likes, "in the style of a Cyclops, governing his wife and children."[23] The likeness between the Earth and ourselves probably lies in the

§ 2. 1448 a 5—12.

trayed by an author of Dithyrambs or Nomes, *e. g.* the Earths and Cyclopes of Timotheus and Philoxenus. Tragedy and Comedy are at the Poles : for the former means to portray a superior, the latter an inferior being to modern man.

§ 3. The third basis of classification is the Treatment. You can present the same fiction in the same clothes at one time as a narrative, either with change of rôle as Homer does, or in the same person throughout, at another

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former being in the middle (*de Caelo* 296 b 17). That both the poets mentioned composed pieces with the title " Cyclops " is known; whether the Earth figured in both as the Mother of the Cyclops, or otherwise, is not known; there appears to be no reason for questioning Aristotle's statement that she was presented. Representation of the Earth in the plastic art was not uncommon; she appears in a relief with the name *GE*, described by OVERBECK, *Geschichte der griechischen Plastik* (ii. 241).

You can present the same fiction, etc.: from § 6 we learn that the author recognizes only two styles, the narrative and the dramatic, not three, as Plato does; and indeed, the difference between *oratio recta* and *oratio obliqua* is obviously not deserving of more than an allusion. The important difference is that in the one case we have narration of the past, in the other realization of the present. This, we are reminded in § 26, is equally true of the written and of the acted tragedy; it is not what happened, but what happens. The phrase " becoming something else," instead of " becoming different persons," appears to be explained in § 24 (1460 a 11), where what Homer introduces is " some character," man or woman. " Assuming various characters " is then consistent with narration, just as retaining the same personality is consistent with it.

At another as being experienced and realized, etc., by all the fictitious persons : these are not the persons imitated, since we are expressly told that Tragedy is not an imitation of persons; but the simulators, pretenders, whether actors or *dramatis personæ*. This proposition becomes the foundation of the system. Tragedy is a fictitious realization of fully conscious life. There must then be more than one person involved, since man is a social animal. They are not casually brought together, but the individuals whose dynameis are by their association brought into energeia. Homer's merit was, as will be seen,

as being experienced and realized as their function by all the simulators [*i. e.* fictitious persons]. Portrayal of the imaginary, then, varies in these three ways, as we said at the start, directly; so that on one principle Sophocles's is identical with Homer's, for both portray heroes; on another with Aristophanes's, for both portray persons going through an experience, *i. e.* performing. This fact is said by some to have given the *Drama* [a Performance] its name; and in consequence both Tragedy and Comedy are claimed by the Dorians (the latter by the Megarians,

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that he made the "praxis" the basis of the epic, whereas from the nature of the case it must be the basis of the drama.

Varies in these three ways, etc., directly: i. e. they are not accidenta differentiæ, which form no true basis of classification (Topics 144 a 23). The test is whether he basis of classification could be withdrawn, and the work yet be carried on; thus, *e. g.* metre would not be a true basis, because the *mimesis* need not have metre. But if you portray conscious life, it must be of a certain quality; and it must be either in narrative or dramatic form. Hence these form cross-divisions.

This fact is said by some to have given the Drama its name: Aristotle does not endorse this opinion. The assertion that the verb *dran* is Doric, for which the Attic is *prattein*, is also not endorsed, and is indeed clearly erroneous, since the words are both Attic and mean different things; only a foreigner (like the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, xiv. 10) could ever confuse them.

The origin of all these names is obscure, and they varied greatly in different Greek states (Athenaeus xiv. 621 d sqq.). An attempt has been made by Thiele (*Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, 1902, i. 411) to throw light upon them, and he decides in favour of the etymology "revel-song" for Comedy. Other names of the same type, but not free from difficulty, were *Magœdos* and *Hilarœdos*. Aristotle's statement that the beginnings of Comedy were unnoticed makes it probable that nothing certain will ever be known on this subject.

The latter by the Megarians: the Megarian democracy is the subject of an allusion in the Politics (1304 b 35). A "Megarian jest" seems to have been a current phrase in Athens for a low jest, and the expression may have given rise to this theory. In the Ethics (1123 a 24) there is an allusion to the vulgarity of Megarian comedy.

§ 3. 1448 a 22—29.

and indeed both those of the mainland, who suppose it to have been invented during their democratic period, and those of Sicily, the home of the poet Epicharmus, who was considerably senior to Chionides and Magnes; while Tragedy is claimed by some of the Peloponnesian Dorians), on etymological grounds; for they assert that *Koma* is their word for village, whereas the Athenian is deme (Comedians according to this deriving their name not from *komazein* "to revel," but from their strolling from village to village, not being tolerated in town), and that *dran* is their word for "to do," whereas the Athenian is *prattein*. This is sufficient on the classification of the modes wherein the imaginary can be portrayed.

§ 4. Poetry is likely to owe its origin mainly to two

The poet Epicharmus: the word "poet" must have some special force in this passage, else it would be otiose. That force is perhaps rightly divined by THIELE (*Neue Jahrbücher*, 1902, i. 418), who shows that Sicilian comedy began as a puppet-show, to which afterwards a text was attached. That "poet" as applied to Comedy has some special sense is further indicated in § 5. We may also infer that the word *Comicus* was not in Sicily applied to Epicharmus.

Some of the Peloponnesian Dorians: said to mean "the obscure story of Epigenes of Sicyon." Bentley very rightly infers from this that there were no written texts of the pre-Aeschylean tragedies current in Aristotle's time; since the existence of such texts—which need not indeed have been written—would have settled this question; whereas the only arguments with which Aristotle credits the Dorians are etymological.

Poetry is likely, etc.: the second commencement is now made, in which the *historic* beginning of the thing, and not its *ideal commencement* is explained.

Its origin: the cause, which is called the "source of the commencement of the change" (Metaphys. 1013 a 30), was then nature, not mind, *i. e.* a deliberate inventor. This result is adopted by the majority of modern inquirers (enumerated up to 1906 by DESSOIR, p. 310, n. 5); the suggestion of M. TARDE (*Les Lois sociales*, 1898) that rhythm was an invention of certain talented persons, afterwards imitated by others

particular instincts. On the one hand, the power of

is met by DESSOIR with the assertion that in primitive communities the arbitrary power of the individual is insufficient to create the basis of a form of life; it can only make special alterations in its expression.

The question, like others dealing with "origins," is of great obscurity. Aristotle's statement is doubtless aimed at those who undertook to name the inventors of poetry; but, confining himself to a single nation, whereas modern science would extend the inquiry to all nations, he has confused two questions. It is clear that in certain cases poetry has been an introduction from one civilization to another, though something analogous to it may have preceded it. On the other hand, the actual beginnings of poetry must go back to a date so long before recorded history that nothing certain can be formulated; and indeed Aristotle rightly professes to give a conjecture only. His chief omission is the failure to connect the beginnings of poetry with *magic*, with which Mohammed in an oft-cited utterance shrewdly identified it.

The analysis of the origins of art given by HIRN is described as "most felicitous" by WALLASCHEK (*Anfänge*, p. 282), who reproduces it thus: in the first place the desire to objectivate a feeling, and by communicating it to others render it innocuous or increase its value. To this are added certain secondary sources, the desire to communicate events to contemporaries or posterity, to display personal gifts, to increase efficiency in various operations of importance for life, and to conjure up a conflation of the real and imaginary world.

This is certainly a good classification of the uses to which poetry has been or can be put; but it seems to give the final causes rather than the origins. For us the question would naturally take the form: What in normal cases was the earliest use to which rhythmic speech was put, and what was the supposed connection between it and the purpose which it was supposed to compass? And to the first of these questions Mohammed's answer is probably right: rhythmic speech is the language of gods and demons, which they speak and which they understand. And the plausibility of this doctrine lies in the speech being fairly intelligible, yet unlike ordinary speech, and containing an artifice which few can understand or reproduce. If we remember that the simple laws of the Greek Iambic were unknown to Bentley, the chief metrician of his age, and were rediscovered by Porson, after being forgotten for perhaps 2000 years, we shall not be bold in supposing that even simple artifices would be the secrets of the few who could converse with the gods. The Arabian theory is that their highly complicated technique was practised by persons who had no knowledge of the rules, but were inspired by demons.

§ 4. 1448 b 5.

mimicry is innate in infants, and one advantage which man has over the other animals is that he surpasses them therein, and by mimicry first makes things out; and equally innate is the power of enjoying mimicry by others. An indication of this is to be found in the case of works of art: for we enjoy contemplating the most exact likenesses of objects which we dislike looking at in the original, such as animals at the bottom of the scale of creation, and corpses. And this, too, is due to the fact that *to make a thing out* gives the keenest pleasure not

The power of mimicry is innate in infants: this subject is fully discussed by LIPPS (*Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, p. 118 foll.), who shows that the process is carried out before the imitator can have associated any special movement of the nerves with the corresponding outward effect. "There is, we must assert, an original psychic connection, which admits of no further explanation, between visual perceptions of movements in others and impulses to corresponding movements on one's own part, causing these motions to be produced, or rendering it possible to produce them when such visual perceptions take place."[22]

Over the other animals: in the Natural History various creatures are mentioned as imitators or mimics, *e. g.* the night-raven (597 b 24), the Anthos (609 b 16).

By mimicry first makes things out: in the Problems (956 a 14) this is suggested as one of the reasons why man should be trusted more than any other animal, but the reasoning is obscure. For the doctrine we may quote HIRN, *Origins of Art* (p. 77): "a difficult movement is fully understood only when it has been imitated either internally or in actual outward activity. By unconsciously and imperfectly copying in our own body the conduct of a man, we may learn to understand him." "It is to imitation," says GROOS (*Der ästhetische Genuss*, p. 201), "that it falls to mediate between instinct and reasoned action."

Works of art: the translation follows Physics 203 a 13.

Animals at the bottom of the scale: in Physics 261 a 17 and elsewhere animals are ranged in a scale of evolution, the more advanced being called those who have more attained their nature. In Metaphysics 1051 a 3 it is proved that "actuality" is more honourable than "potentiality." Examples of animals low in the scale are worms and beetles (Great Ethics 1205 a 30).

To make a thing out gives the keenest pleasure, etc.: hence most of the

§ 4. 1448 b 6—13.

only to the professional researcher, but to every one else in a like degree—only the others carry the process but a little way. For they enjoy looking at the likenesses because the process is accompanied by the solution of a problem, viz. the identification of the subjects. For if

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magazines publish puzzles, charades, etc., and the detective story is read by the whole world. In the Problems (956 a 17) it is pointed out that it would be equally pleasant to make out that all the angles of a triangle were equal to four as to two right angles.

For they enjoy looking at the likenesses because the process is accompanied by the solution of a problem: this, then, is an unhindered motion "according to nature" and therefore pleasurable (Nic. Ethics 1153 a 14, Physics 255 b 22, Rhetoric 1370 a 5). For the translation see Introd., p. 47. This theory must be supplemented from what is said in *de Partibus Animalium* (645 a 13), that part of the pleasure comes from admiration of the skill of the artist; but he is here trying to eliminate all elements but the actual counterfeiting. His explanation accounts for a fact which has often been discussed, viz. that in order to give aesthetic pleasure too much must not be reproduced; room must be left to the imagination and the reasoning faculty. Of modern authorities LIPPS seems to differ most from Aristotle, since he holds that whereas intellectual pleasure comes from connexion which is in accordance with experience, aesthetic pleasure is what is produced by the objects themselves.

WITASEK, who discusses this matter at length (*Grundzüge*, p. 286 sqq.), would go beyond the mere pleasure of identifying details, and include the power which the competent observer possesses of penetrating into the mind of the artist. LANGE (ch. XX.) applies to the explanation his formula of "conscious self-deception," *i. e.* the shifting between the illusion and the reality, which he regards as constituting the chief pleasure of art; a formula which Aristotle would have approved (*Parva Naturalia*, 450 b 30 sqq.). LANGE very rightly calls attention to the fact that much that causes us to dislike looking at the originals necessarily disappears in the work of art, *e. g.* evil smells, excruciating sounds, etc. And this, too, Aristotle appears to have remembered in the *de Anima* (427 b 21–24), though he does not notice it here.

Identification of the subjects: in the Rhetoric (1410 b 19) the pleasure of performing this operation speedily is described.

For if you happen not to have seen the original: it was considered bad art to label a picture (Topics 140 a 21). DESSOIR (p. 413) is probably

you happen not to have seen the original, any pleasure produced by the likeness will not be in its character of semblance, but due to the execution, the colouring, or some similar source.

Secondly, it being natural to us to mimic in harmony and rhythm (of which metre is obviously a variety),

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right in thinking that where the face is unknown, but the personality familiar, the spectator will come to the picture with an idea of the original in his mind; so one who saw the portrait of Carlyle by Whistler would say it must be like, because he would have formed from Carlyle's works a notion of what he must have looked like.

The execution: see the quotation from the *de Partibus Animalium* above.

The colouring: the contemplation of green gives pleasure to the eye (Problems 959 a 35).

Some similar source: the objective beauty of the person delineated (Politics 1340 a 25).

It being natural to us to mimic in harmony and rhythm: i.e. in tune and dance. The proof of this is not given here but in Problems 920 b 30 where it is shown that both harmony and rhythm come under the genus "order," and that order is "natural" is given as a principle in the Physics (252 a 12), where "order" is stated to be always a *logos*, i. e. "principle." The inductive proof of the proposition is given in the Problems, l.c.: viz. children all delight in harmony and rhythm, and orderly habits keep us in health. Darwin (quoted by Grosse, *Anfänge der Kunst*, p. 213) says: "the perception, if not the enjoyment, of musical cadences and of rhythm is probably common to all animals." Similarly Dessoir (p. 287): "delight in symmetry and rhythm seems to have existed from the beginning and to have exhibited itself in the artistic attempts of primitive peoples." Bücher in his remarkable work *Arbeit und Rhythmus* endeavoured to show that rhythmical speech was suggested by those operations in which the work is aided by regular movement, especially those in which united effort is required; Dessoir objects that primitive hunting and pastoral communities would scarcely have any such operations. Hirn (*Origins of Art*, p. 80) anticipates this objection by the suggestion that rhythm was required for the expression of common emotions and not necessarily common operations. Lange (p. 537) would apparently be ready to derive rhythm from the motions of the arms and legs, which in walking occupy the same times.

Of which metre is obviously a variety: i.e. it is not the metre that

§ 4. 1448 b 17—22.

those with most original talent for them by gradual improvement evolved poetry out of their rudimentary performances.

The cross-division which has been noticed was in accordance with individual temperament. The more serious took to mimicking fine doings (the doings of fine characters), the more frivolous the doings of the ignoble, beginning with the composition of lampoons, just as the

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is superimposed on the language, but the language which is superimposed on the metre; similarly in the account of the origin of Tragedy he asserts that "language came in," the original performance being music and dancing. BÜCHER's doctrine agrees well with this: "therefore every operation, work, play or dance, has its own song, such as is sung on no other occasion; among some primitive peoples every individual has his own song, over the possession of which he jealously watches." Of the three forms of clothing then two only are "natural"; the third, "language," is artificial.

Those with most original talent, etc.: it is remarkable that a theory associated with the name of DARWIN, which connects poetry with the sexual instinct, was not unknown to Aristotle, though he must have rejected it. "It is common to all animals," we read in the Natural History (488 b 1) "at mating time to sing and chatter most." The idea is worked out by G. NAUMANN (*Geschlecht und Kunst*) with many disagreeable details. It is submitted to searching criticism by DESSOIR (297–9), who rejects it as historically untrue, since primitive poetry is not usually erotic, and grounded on false assumptions, viz. that bird-music is music, and that birds only sing at this season.

Beginning with the composition of lampoons: this history of poetic origins agrees fairly well with *Arabic* phenomena. There the two divisions of poetry are encomium and satire, and it never got beyond them. What Aristotle naturally failed to see was that both were magical: this is best shown perhaps by GOLDZIHER, *Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie*, i. The man who possessed the power of uttering words which would bring down blessings or curses was an important asset to the tribe, and his services deserved remuneration on Balak's scale. Even in Pindar it is not forgotten that words are weapons; usually a weapon is for the purpose of injuring, and Balaam in the narrative of Numbers is called not to bless, but to curse; he blesses *per accidens*. There is a natural confusion of thought between words which

others composed hymns and panegyrics. We cannot name a pre-Homeric author for any poem of this type, though probably many uttered such; from Homer onwards we can, *e. g.* "Homer's Margites," etc. In this period an invective metre, too, appropriately came

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sting, and make the person against whom they are directed contemptible, and those which possess a more mysterious power to damage. The spell against a demon usually takes the form of violent abuse; in the travels of Apollonius of Tyana the party get rid of a vampire by insulting her. And indeed an insult is ordinarily the best means of making people go away. Similarly the thrilling effect of sublime poetry would be interpreted magically before it was interpreted psychologically.

The fact that poetry also represents the commencements of history and science is ignored, as that is not in accordance with the author's system, with its separation of the mental faculties. For his neglect (here, though not elsewhere) of the obvious fact that metre aids the memory and so enables literature to exist long before writing is invented, or cheap writing materials discovered, it is less easy to find a reason.

An invective metre, too, appropriately came in: as well as the hexameter, the appropriateness of which is emphasized in § 23, to which this passage refers. The Margites was in hexameters.

The suitability of the iambic is presently said to be due to its resemblance to the rhythm of conversation. According to Dessoir (p. 133) observations made on children show that the trochee is the earliest form of foot; and this is the rhythm of certain primitive dances (Wallaschek, *Anfänge*, p. 246). The anapaest, according to the former authority, has the unmistakable effect of an attack, and this might be shared in a minor degree by the iambus. According to Lipps (p. 307) in the iambic metre the character of a circumscribed unity is more apparent than in the trochee; where the first syllable is accented the speaker is uncertain what is to follow; where the last is accented he has already made up his mind as to the character of the series. Bücher (*Arbeit und Rhythmus*, p. 369) most interestingly assigns the metres to different forms of labour; the iambus and the trochee are stamping measures, representing one foot planted down vigorously and the other feebly; the spondee is a striking measure, representing the alternate strokes of two men: the dactyl and anapaest are hammer-measures, always heard at the village smithy. The Arabs also regard the iambic metre as the most conversational and the least poetic (Boucher, *Divan de Ferazdak*, i. 77).

§ 4. 1448 b 27—31.

in, called in these days " iambic " [invective], as having once been used for mutual abuse; and of the ancients some became fabricators of hexameters, others of lampoons. Homer, just as in the heroic style he was a fabricator [poet] in the full sense, for besides skilfully versifying, he and he alone composed fiction on the dramatic principle [unity of theme]; so he, too, suggested the Comic style, when he made the ludicrous in the abstract instead of a villainy the subject of a drama. For just as the Iliad and Odyssey are structurally analogous to the Tragedies, so is the Margites to the Comedies. And when Tragedy and Comedy had shown themselves [in the Homeric poems], those with an impulse towards either form of poetry in accordance with its evolution,

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Just as in the heroic style: the references are to § 8, where Homer's service is explained at length, and to § 23. He was a maker or creator in the full sense, because he made the praxis the unit, instead of the hero, and composed fiction instead of reproducing the actual past.

Are structurally analogous: the word " structurally " is supplied from the Arabic. The reference is to § 8, where this is particularly shown in the case of the Odyssey; the work is not a biography of Odysseus, but " the Return of Odysseus." The addition " structurally " is necessary because we are told in § 24 that the two epics also illustrate the four varieties of tragedy.

So is the Margites to the Comedies: this would be true even of such a play as the " Knights," or the " Clouds," in spite of the fact that Cleon and Socrates were historical personages; for in the plays they stand for types, and historical events are not reproduced in either play.

With an impulse towards either: i.e. with an excess of " black bile " in their natures, since only such persons become poets of eminence (Problems 953 a).

In accordance with its evolution: " the proper evolution " is what nature intended the thing to be, for that which is embryo or undeveloped has not yet got its " form " (Metaphys. 1050 a 6). So one in these days with an impulse towards publication according to its proper evolution gets his work printed; to have it engraved on a stone or copied by slaves.

became [in the Homeric sense] "comedians" instead of lampooners, "tragic dramatists" instead of hexameter-wrights, because the newer styles were fuller grown, *i. e.* more highly developed than the older.

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would be to go back to an embryo stage, which was not what nature intended.

Became "comedians" instead of lampooners: the words "comedian" and "tragic dramatist" are used here so as to include satire and epic, in accordance with the theory that the difference between Homer's works and the tragedies and comedies proper is accidental.

Were fuller-grown, i.e. *more highly developed:* things have a natural size as well as a natural shape, which as they are developed they acquire (Physics 261 a 35). Each succeeding figure includes the preceding (*de Anima* 414 b 29), as here Tragedy includes versification and portrayal of the noble. The phrase "more highly developed" literally means "more honourable"; actuality being "more honourable" than potentiality (Metaphys. 1051 a 3; cf. Physics 293 b 13, Topics 116 b 17).

With the doctrine in the text we may compare the view of HARTMANN (p. 38), that a figure which embodies a higher law of formation gives greater pleasure than a figure which embodies a lower one; and that of LANGE (p. 295), that the final cause of art lies in the desire to apprehend in the relatively shortest space of time the relatively greatest number of presentations without wearying.

It will be observed that the chronology in this and the following paragraph is so cautious that the only point which admits of contradiction is the attribution to Homer of "unity of theme," *i.e.* the portrayal of an imaginary *praxis* in place of the reproduction of actual performances by individuals. The desire to reproduce what people had done when coupled with rhythm or tune produced the two styles panegyric and lampoon; out of these, by the substitution of fiction for reality and unity of theme for unity of person, the tragic epic and the comic burlesque were evolved, by Homer's genius. This is the history of poetry *per se;* as a public performance it began as a representation by dancing and developed into classical Tragedy and Comedy.

Except, then, for the place which Aristotle assigns Homer, he does not differ from modern anthropology. "This historic order is Drama, Lyric, Epos," says WALLASCHEK (*Anfänge*, p. 257). GROSSE (p. 239 foll.) observes that in genuinely primitive poetry the Epos is not specially prominent, and it is almost impossible to distinguish between epic poetry and historical narratives. FOTH (*das Drama in seinem Gegensatz*

§ 4. 1449 a 4—6.

The question whether Tragedy at this stage has or has not all the requisite factors, is a distinct theme in the abstract from the same in relation to audiences.

Having then started rudimentarily, no less than Comedy —and indeed the former as the performing of *the Dithyramb*, the latter of the Phallic ceremony kept up still in

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zur Dichtkunst, 1902) endeavours to show that the different branches of poetry developed out of the mimetic dance by division of labour.

Having, then, started rudimentarily, etc.: the last sentence of the paragraph on the origin of poetry is resumed.

As the performing of the Dithyramb: it seems best to regard this word as a Christian interpolation similar to the alterations in the rest of the sentence recorded in the critical note. See also Introduction, p. 63. In the first place, it is not true that Tragedy started from the dithyramb, since the character of the music whence the two styles sprang is essentially different; "tragic" music is that of which the pitch is irregular, and so mimics the sounds of persons overwhelmed with some crisis or some sorrow; whereas dithyrambic music is "drunken" (Politics 1342 b 25). The rudiment in the one case is howling or wailing, the rudiment in the other the movements and exclamations of the intoxicated. The connexion of Tragedy with Dionysus appears to be wholly factitious, as Herodotus records. Moreover, the dithyramb is so far from being a rudiment that Aristotle regards it as a developed form of poetry. The performance mentioned in this place must, then, have had a name which Christians thought offensive, but could not alter so easily as they could "phallic."

The performance which best illustrates the origin of Tragedy is the Persian *ta'ziyeh*, or Passion-Play in memory of Husain. Since ten days have to be filled with such plays, not only the sufferings of Husain, but those of his relations, and, indeed, various Koranic and Old Persian myths are also performed. The "portrayal of heroism" is involved in such a performance.

The Phallic ceremony, etc.: this fact explains, what otherwise would be unintelligible, the obscenity of Attic Comedy. This, which originally constituted the whole of the performance, remained then as a rudiment in the finished product, when, like Tragedy, it had developed into a form of Art. "The Hos and Mundaris afford an example of sexual selection in its grossest form at their yearly festivals, during which excited dionysiac dances and obscene and blasphemous speeches are connected with wild promiscuous orgies" (Hirn, *Origins of Art*, p. 234). Murray,

§ 4. 1449 a 7—12.

many of the states—Tragedy [in the ordinary sense] was developed as it revealed itself, and went through many

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The Albany Review, ii. 201 (November 1907), makes the same suggestion as to the origin of Comedy. The study of G. THIELE (*Neue Jahrbücher*, 1902, i. 404–426) could perhaps be reconciled with it. In the *Politics* (1336 b 16) Aristotle admits the continuance of obscene rites in honour of certain gods, but confines their celebration to those who are of age.

These Phallic rites must have lasted to the end of Paganism: for Iamblichus *de Mysteriis* still defends them. His view of their purpose quite agrees with the above. "The chief performance is a type of the generative power, and we regard it as inviting to the continuation of the world. For this reason most of these ceremonies are performed in spring, when the whole world receives from the gods the renewal of creation. The foul language I regard as symbolizing the negation of beauty to be found in matter, and the original formlessness of what was afterwards to receive shape. These things, wanting order, desire it all the more that they condemn their own foulness. Realizing what is ugly from the ugly speeches, they pursue the opposite, the causes of the ideas and the beautiful; the act diverts them from what is ugly, but exhibiting the knowledge thereof in words, it turns their desires in the contrary direction" (ed. Parthey, p. 39). He then suggests a theory of a vent for the feelings.

In our time (1911) phallic rites are represented in India by the Holi festival, described in *Theists and Muslims of India* by J. C. OMAN, pp. 242–257.

In the essay of PREUSS quoted below an attempt is made to find a trace of the old animal dances in the comic choruses, which often assumed this form; and even the chorus of *Clouds*, he suggests, may go back to times when men pretended to be Clouds with the view of summoning them to the sky. The earliest of Aristophanes' Comedies were not, it would seem, of this sort.

Was developed, etc.: there is some difficulty about the expression, because the thought hovers between what happens in the case of a work of nature and in that of a product of art. In both cases the parts exist "potentially" in the embryo; but they make their appearance at different times; this is explained in the *de Generatione Animalium*, pp. 734 and 735. In the case, however, of a work of nature the thing, when it comes into being, increases or develops itself (735 a 14). This the work of Art cannot do; what comes to light is the part of its definition which reveals itself to the inventor, who then develops it accordingly.

And went through many transformations: the limit of change in the

§ 4. 1449 a 12—14.

transformations before it had attained its ultimate form and could stop.

The number of the actors was first raised from one to

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case of " growth " is perfection from imperfection (Physics 261 a 35), or greatness from littleness, illustrated by the plot and the language.

Before it had attained its ultimate form : the phrase is defined in the Physics 193 b 1 as " the form which is in accordance with the definition."

In the treatise of Foth, which has been quoted, the suggestion is made that the Arts developed out of the Drama (by division of labour), not the Drama out of the Arts. The Siberian bear-drama, described by Wesselowski, contains the nucleus of the Athenian drama ; it is partly song, in which the life of the bear is portrayed, partly dance, which is a mimetic reproduction of the contents of the songs. There are never more than three actors, always masked, and always men; they take special names for the occasion, and are allowed to " chaff " the spectators as much as they like. The occasion is a feast held to celebrate the slaughter of a bear, who has certain divine attributes.

" Among hunting tribes the drama is a musical pantomime, in which the habits of the most important beasts of the chase are reproduced without words " (Dessoir, p. 293) : " we have to familiarize ourselves with the supposition that the counterfeiting of a thing will influence it even from a great distance, and that the counterfeiting of the buffalo-dance will force the animal to come within the huntsmen's range " (p. 300).

Hirn, *The Origins of Art* (p. 173), observes that " in most cases there will always be a doubt whether the religious drama, poem, or design, was originally intended as a means of conveying knowledge of some real or legendary event, or whether the idea of these events was derived from a simple game, a propitiative poem, or a magical design."

The anthropologist Preuss, in the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, 1906, i. 160–193, partly on the ground of Mexican analogies traces Tragedy as well as Comedy to sympathetic magic. The original performance is a mode of conjuring up certain occurrences (chiefly rain and other matters connected with fertility) by pretending to be the animals with which either the seasons or the particular phenomena are connected. Apparently he holds that the time and leisure provided by the festival led to increasing fastidiousness in the taste of the audience; but while regarding this as the cause of progress from the magical dance to the drama, he admits that no other nation exhibits a development of it comparable to that of the Greeks.

§ 4. 1449 a 14—16.

two by Aeschylus, who also concentrated the interest on the discourse at the expense of the dance. A third actor with scenery was introduced by Sophocles. Further, its plot and diction, originally of "satyric" proportions, the one meagre, the other frivolous, acquired stateliness at a late date; and the iambic was substituted for the trochaic metre, at first employed because the poetry was "satyric," *i. e.* with the dance predominating; but when language came to be the clothing, instinct discovered which was the appropriate metre; for the iambic is the most conversational of metres, as is indicated by the fact that we frequently in ordinary dialogue drop into iambics, but into hexameters rarely and only when we depart from the vocabulary of conversation. The

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Because the poetry was "satyric," i. e. *with the dance predominating :* the trochaic rhythm is said to be best suited to the *kordax* or Comic Dance (Rhetoric 1408 b 36). "The Dances of the Kamchadals are pantomimic ; the song which accompanies them is sung with the expression of a constantly increasing emotion. The rhythm is a system of six trochees. The Fish-Tunguses have the same rhythm, but without termination or division into strophes" (Wallaschek, *Anfänge der Tonkunst*, p. 246). The chronology implied in this sentence agrees with Bücher's to a certain extent; the counterfeiting was originally done by dancing ; hence it got a rhythm suited to dancing ; when speech was introduced first in the form of a casual aid, it adapted itself to the dancing rhythm; when it became the main agent, a development which the author ascribes to Aeschylus, the speech fell into the metre suited to business, which is the iambic (Rhetoric, l.c.). It is noticeable that dancers are distinguished from actors, yet named among voice-artists (Problems 901 b 2). The difficulty with which the author has to deal is the employment of the iambic metre for (1) the ancient lampoons or philippics, (2) the portrayal of high-class matter on the stage. He seems to solve it by assuming a double origin for the metre. The obvious difference between the iambic of tragedy and that of comedy is not noticed, because (unfortunately) the metre of the old lampoons came nearer the tragic than the comic style.

When we depart from the vocabulary of conversation : see Introduc- § 4. 1449 a 16—26.

traditional list of improvements, multiplication of scenes and other details, may be regarded as included in the above; it would be too tedious to go through each detail separately.

§ 5. Comedy is, as we stated, the portrayal of an inferior class, yet not in all their inferiority, being the ludicrous side of ugliness abstracted. Ludicrousness is

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tion, p. 49. In the Rhetoric (1908 b 3) the language of iambics is said to be that of conversation "itself," whereas that of hexameters is partly the language of conversation, only needing "harmony"; this is afterwards explained as mixture with the unfamiliar.

Comedy is . . . the ludicrous side of ugliness abstracted : according to a rule of the Physics (193 a 31) the names for the arts can be used objectively and subjectively; art is both the artistic and the artist's power. Hence Comedy is both the comic and the comedian's capacity. The truth of Aristotle's observation can be seen in such cases as Micawber and Skimpole; the defrauding of tradesmen is common to both; in the one case its ludicrous side is abstracted, in the other the full hideousness is depicted.

Ludicrousness is . . . of the genus failing : pain, as we are told in the Problems (886 b), is sympathetic, whence a failing which gives pain, *e.g.* a racking cough, is not amusing. Nor should the failing be such as to "destroy the nature" of that in which it occurs; so a foreign accenti s ludicrous when it does not render the words unintelligible. Of vices drunkenness has most frequently been employed for comic effect on the same ground—as occasioning neither pain nor destruction; to a more sensitive age it occasions pain and suggests "destruction of the nature," whence it ceases to be ludicrous.

This is Aristotle's well-pondered analysis of the ludicrous; the best account of modern theories is to be found in the treatise of Th. Lipps, *Komik und Humor* (1898). He quotes a definition by Lilly, "an irrational negation, which arouses in the mind a rational affirmation"; one by Kräpelin, "an unexpected intellectual contrast, arousing in us a contest between aesthetic, ethical or logical feelings, with preponderance of pleasure"; one by Bain, "the occasion of Comedy is the degradation of some person or interest possessing dignity, in circumstances that excite no other strong emotion." His own theory is that Comedy arises when "in place of what is expected to be important or impressive, and under the presumption of the very connexion of

the painless and non-destructive variety of the species ugliness of the genus failing; thus, *e.g.* a ludicrous countenance is ugly and distorted, but not painful. Whereas the transitions of Tragedy and their intermediaries have attracted attention, those of Comedy from the commencement attracted none, owing to its being no reputable concern; until a Comic troupe was ultimately provided by the Athenian magistrate, they were unpaid. Its form had become more or less fixed by the time when its so-called "poets" come to be

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ideas which causes it to be expected, something arises that is less impressive for us, our feeling, our view, our immediate understanding." Finally, M. BERGSON, in a remarkable treatise, would find the secret of Comedy in the introduction of the mechanical into life.

None of these definitions possess either the lucidity or the guardedness of Aristotle's. The observation of KANT (quoted by LIPPS, p. 24) that the "Comic must always contain something which could for a moment deceive" is contained in Aristotle's word for "failing," which includes mistakes. But the objective sense "defect" would bring witticisms within it; for since clearness is a "virtue" of speech (§ 22) ambiguity is a defect; but when such ambiguity neither hurts nor harms, it is witty: as in the example quoted (p. 82), when a poet declined to write about the king on the ground that the "king was no subject." It is not witty when it leads to serious misunderstanding.

Owing to want of sympathy the same thing may be amusing to the spectator and painful to the person who experiences it; hence the performances of the blind Samson, whose blindness and consequent impotence were defects, could amuse the barbarous Philistines, but would horrify a civilized audience.

They were unpaid: the word here rendered "unpaid" was used in Thebes for "comic actor." There can scarcely be a reference to this here (THIELE, l.c. p. 410), as Aristotle is speaking of the Chorus. This apparently was provided by private guilds of "pleasure-seeking youths," such as are described in the oration of Demosthenes against Conon (THIELE, l.c. p. 408).

When its so-called "poets" come to be recorded: Aristotle, as has been seen, declines to give the comic author the name poet, perhaps because his function is not the same as that of Homer. THIELE

recorded. Of the mask, the prologue and the caste the contributors are unknown. The story was contributed by Epicharmus and Phormis (this, then, was originally a Silician invention); among Attic authors Crates was the first to drop personalities in favour of the abstract disquisitions which we call fiction.

To a great extent only did Romance coincide with

(l.c. p. 418) supposes that the "poets" were Epicharmus and others, who finding the popular farce or puppet-show of the *deikelistae* developed into a caricature of civic life, introduced travesty of the Greek mythology. Aristotle evidently draws from the earliest comedies to which he had access—whether in writing or otherwise—that the art must have gone through many transitions before it reached such elaboration as they displayed. THIELE seems right in holding that there was a non-religious as well as a religious element; the puppet-show, naturally exhibited at a feast, amalgamated with it. The chorus, which appears to have no organic connexion with the puppet-show, is found in some of the Sicilian Comedies; but there is no reason why the development in Sicily should have been identical with that in Athens.

Of the mask, the prologue and the caste: in the puppet-show naturally all the speaking is done by one person. This person was the "amateur" in Theban nomenclature. The mask appears to go back to the early history of the performance, being a mode of rendering the actor ridiculous, compared by THIELE with other disfigurements of which vase-paintings furnish evidence. The mask, it may be added, often figures in mimetic dances; "among the Fan, who are cannibals, the dancers dress up in all sorts of ways: a man by the aid of cloths and mats transforms himself into wild animals of all kinds; such disguises, which are to be found on all the continents, are the origin of the masks (especially masks of beasts) which are much liked by savages, and are to be found in highly characteristic execution" (WALLASCHEK, *Anfänge der Tonkunst*, p. 244).

To a great extent only: Introduction, p. 86. The numbers, etc., are carefully chosen here, to prevent the application to Romance generally of statements which refer to Epic Poetry only. It is true of all Romance that there is no time-limit; but it is not true that it only portrays heroes, or that its metre is simple or that it is in narrative style; these peculiarities belong not to Romance, but to the special branch which portrays heroes, *i. e.* Epic Poetry.

§ 5. 1449 b 5—11.

Tragedy in being a portrayal of imaginary heroism; they differ, however, in that this form of Romance has its metre simple and is narrative : and, moreover, in length : Tragedy trying to keep within, or nearly within, a revolution of the sun, whereas there is no time-limit for Romance : though the tragic practice in this matter was at first similar to the romantic. Tragedy has some peculiar factors, but the factors are otherwise the same. Hence the critique of Tragedy includes that of Romance;

Within, or nearly within, a revolution of the sun : LANGE (p. 85) finds that " time-illusion," *i. e.* the crowding of events into a short time comparable with the space-illusion of painting, is one of the chief charms of Poetry, whence the idea current in France in the seventeenth century that the difference between real time and ideal time should be so far as possible reduced to a minimum is to be condemned as " dull naturalism." The aesthetic writer CARRIÈRE (*Die Poesie*, p. 459), after quoting Corneille's suggestion of a maximum of thirty hours to be reproduced in three, offers as a substitute for the Unity of Time " steadiness of internal development, or continuity in the formation of resolves, deeds and feelings." Of modern writers on the theory of the drama PRÖLSS (*Katechismus der Dramaturgie*, 1899, p. 217) admits that the " unity of time " has certain advantages, but he does not state what they are; G. FREYTAG does not even discuss the subject as one that can concern the modern dramatist, but supposes the unities of time and place to have been an innovation of Sophocles, due to his introduction of scene-painting, and to the technical difficulties of scene-shifting on so gigantic a scale as the Attic theatre required. This explanation seems to suit the account given by Aristotle exceedingly well, and since Aristotle quotes nothing from Attic tragedians earlier than Aeschylus, it is probable that he had no access to their works, which had not continued to be taught to reciters. It seems clear that the longer the period taken up by the " action," the less would be the probability of the same scenery serving (see *Technik des Dramas*, p. 27).

There is no time-limit for Romance : BAUMGART (*Poetik*, p. 340) shows that this, as well as all other differences between Epic and Drama, is traceable to the difference of " Treatment."

The critique of Tragedy includes that of Romance : a Tragedy is judged by its *eide*, which give it its quality; the same holds good in both cases of Plot, Character, Reasoning and Diction; " externals " and

for Tragedy has all that Romance has, but Romance has not all that Tragedy has.

§ 6. Leaving the portrayal of the imaginary in hexameters and Comedy until later, let us now speak of Tragedy, first gathering out of what has preceded the definition of its essence which results. A Tragedy is, then, the portrayal of an imaginary chapter of heroic life, complete and of some length, in language sweetened in different parts in all known ways, in dramatic, not narrative form, indirectly through pity and terror righting mental disorders of this type.

"music" are wanting in the case of Epic. "Homer," like the minstrels, would assuredly have regarded music as an integral part of his performance.

Gathering, etc.: see Introduction, p. 28.

The definition: we may compare CLAYTON HAMILTON'S of a Play: "a Play is a story devised to be presented by actors on a stage before an audience."

Sweetened in different parts in all known ways: the reference is to the Rhetoric (1408 b 27, 1409 a 31, b 4, and, further, 1414 a 25). We there learn that language can be sweetened in two ways: by limitation, *i. e.* the introduction of periodical recurrence, or rhythm and period; and by the mixture of the familiar with the foreign, which is here termed "harmony." The third mode, the employment of tune, does not belong to the Rhetoric, but that it is a "sweetening" is known from the Politics (1340 a 4). LANGE and others point out that these "sweetenings," besides tickling the ear, have the object of taking the hearer out of the real world, and so making him conscious of the illusion.

Indirectly: glossed in the Physics 197 b 26.

Righting mental disorders of this type: i. e. such as are occasioned by chilling of the black bile. See Introduction, p. 57. The homœopathic cure restores the due proportion of heat indirectly, by the contrariety between the external and the internal chill, unlike the allopathic treatment, which would be by introducing hellebore, which contains an excess of heat (Problems 864 a 4). GUSTAV FREYTAG'S account of what is meant by "katharsis" is interesting: "the spectator's tears flow more easily and his mouth twitches more readily than in ordinary life; yet this pain is accompanied with a vigorous sense of pleasure;—

§§ 5, 6. 1449 b 19—27.

By "sweetened language" I mean that which has Rhythm, mixture with the unfamiliar, and Tune; by "in different parts in all known ways" that only certain parts are restrained by metres and others again by tune.

Since the *dramatis personae* go through their parts themselves, one factor of a Tragedy must necessarily be presentation, another musical composition, and a third language; for these are the clothing of the fiction.

By language I mean the material of the versification, by musical composition a thing whose whole force is on the surface.

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after the fall of the curtain, in spite of the effort of attending for hours, he feels an intensification of vital power, his eye sparkles, his step is elastic, every movement is firm and free. His agitation has been succeeded by a feeling of joyful safety."

That only certain parts are restrained, etc.: the mixture of the familiar with the unfamiliar which is here called "harmony" is found in the language of tragedy throughout; but the restraining principles of metre and tune are not employed coincidently. The difference between these two methods of restraint is explained in the Metaphysics (1087 b 35, 6): it is that the unit of measurement in the one case is the syllable, in the other the semitone. "The rhythm and measure, by making us foresee the movements of the dance, make us believe we now control them" Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, p. 12).

A thing whose whole force is on the surface: if the text is right, and the Eastern tradition agrees with the Western, the meaning of this definition must be that whereas in the case of verbal poetry the meaning is not all on the surface, *i. e.* it admits of interpretation, and appreciation of it varies with the knowledge of the hearer, in the case of music the appeal is direct. This is the view of Music eloquently expressed by Schopenhauer (*Philosophie der Kunst*, i. 159): "music is in the highest degree a universal language; it stands to the generality of concepts somewhat as they stand to the individual objects. Yet its generality is by no means that empty generality of abstraction, but of a quite different sort, and coupled with clear definition throughout. It resembles geometrical figures and numbers, which are *a priori* applicable to all possible objects of experience, as general forms, yet are visible (*anschaulich*), and thoroughly definite."

§ 6. 1449 b 27—35.

Since it is an imaginary experience, lived by individuals of the genus "conscious and responsible beings," whose specific qualities must be those of character and intellect, because conduct [the manifestation of responsible consciousness] in our system derives its qualities from those two : we get two causes, character and intellect, for the fictitious conduct, and in that conduct every *dramatis persona* is hitting or missing an imaginary mark.

The fictitious chapter of Life is the Story; for by Story here I mean the group of occurrences, while by the Character [or Psychology] I mean the traits in virtue of which the fictitious personages have qualities ascribed to them, and by the Intelligence the passages in which they verbally demonstrate propositions or formulate opinions.

A Tragedy must thus have six Factors, analytically speaking: Story, Psychology, Diction, Intelligence, Presentation, Music. Two Factors go to the Clothing, one to the Treatment, three to the Theme. There is no other. These Factors are, roughly speaking, embodied by

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Because conduct in our system derives its qualities from those two : the reference is to Nic. Ethics 1139 a 34, "well-doing or the contrary in conduct is not without intellect and character." The argument is, then, that, since a genus cannot be separated from all species, the behavers must behave in a particular way; but to behave in a particular way is to display moral and intellectual qualities; hence the stage personages have qualities of the heart and of the head. In what follows the intellect is confined to what is displayed in words; whereas character is exhibited in both speech and action. The reason for this does not appear to be explained ; but popular usage agrees with Aristotle in speaking of the stage "characters."

These Factors are, roughly speaking, embodied by not a few : Gl. The correction of the passage from the Arabic renders it intelligible. When we speak of the six factors of a Tragedy we do not mean anything uniform, but something that varies with each figure or class of figures

not a few of the *dramatis personae;* for every character has its own externals, story, diction, melody, and intellect to correspond.

The most important of these is the group of occurrences; for Tragedy portrays not imaginary human beings, but an experience, a condition of life, *i.e.* happiness; and wretchedness is an experience, and the end a career,

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on the stage; thus if you have on the stage a king, a princess, a slave, the dress of each, the story of each, the diction of each, and the music corresponding with the character of each will be different. Since it has been shown that the main differentia of the stage figure is character (Gl.), the other five elements vary with that. And indeed we know from the Physiognomy that looks and configuration vary with character; from the Rhetoric (1405 a 14) that dresses vary with age; from the Politics (1340 a 19) that the music varies with moods; from the Rhetoric (1404 b 16) that the language of a child or a slave must be plainer than that of a higher-class personage; and from the Physics (197 a 7) that the purpose (or principle of conduct), which is indicated by the Psychology, is "not without reasoning"; *i.e.* the reasoning varies with the character. That the story and speech vary with the character is also stated in § 9, where we are told that the problem to be solved by the poet is what such and such a character would do or say under definite conditions. Hence the elements of a Tragedy are not six multiplied by one, but six multiplied by *n*, *i.e.* nearly the number of characters on the stage. The cautious phrase "*not a few, roughly speaking*," is adopted because some stage figures are mute, and some act in groups, *e.g.* the Chorus. At times, too, a character of the play never appears on the stage.

The variation of the music with the character is dwelt on by the author, especially in the Problems (922 b), and that treatise contains some important supplements to what is said here; *e.g.* that the harmonies called hypodoristi and hypophrygisti were used in stage music but not in orchestral music, because they were "imitative," and "practical." He adds that in Phrynichus' time there was more music in the play than metre. Carrière (*Poesie*, p. 436) says felicitously with regard to stage songs, "each individual figure becomes a lyric poet, in order to express itself and show the world the mirror of its soul."

Wretchedness is an experience: to test whether the genus has been rightly given, you should see whether it holds good of the contrary

§ 6. 1450 a 13—18.

not a quality. Now people are qualified [as good or bad] according to their character, as happy or wretched according to what they go through. The *dramatis personae* do not therefore "go through" [*i.e.* undergo experiences] in order to exhibit their characters, but it is because of what they are to go through that they are invested with characters. The events, therefore, *i.e.* the Story, constitute the ultimate factor in a Tragedy, to which the

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(Topics 124 a 5). The genus being the essence, this assures us that we have got the essence correctly.

And the end a career, not a quality: happiness (the virtuous or heroic life) is not led for any purpose save for itself (Metaphys. 1050 b 1); hence the final cause is *faring*, not a subjective quality. For men are not happy in order to be virtuous, but virtuous in order to be happy.

It is because of what they are to go through that they are invested with characters: as has been seen, the genus cannot be presented without the species; and the species of "farers" is determined by character. Since the dramatist presents a "farer," he has to give him a character.

The priority of the "experiences" is thus demonstrated from the axioms; the dramatic personages live only for the time that the play lasts; whence the subject is not a person or persons, but a chapter of life of a certain order; as life is doing, not quality, the former is the essence of the drama, the latter accident, though inseparable accident.

The dramatic critics CARRIÈRE and FREYTAG observe that the evolution of the action from the idiosyncrasies of the personages is much more noticeable on the modern than on the ancient stage, though the latter (*Technik des Dramas*, p. 39) regards Sophocles as improving on Aeschylus and Euripides on Sophocles. GEORGY (*das Tragische als Gesetz des Weltorganismus*, p. 24) says, from his standpoint, much the same as Aristotle: "the artist, having to speak to men and work upon men, must evolve mental states and facts of consciousness, but only in order to solve the world-riddle." GROSSE (*Anfänge der Kunst*, p. 245) observes that whereas in the modern romance the only purpose of the action is to develop the characters, in primitive narratives the characters serve only to carry the action; consequently they are nowhere depicted, merely designated, and indeed in the most superficial and scantiest fashion. In the stories of the Esquimos we are told nothing more about a man than that he is "good" or "bad."

§ 6. 1450 a 19—24.

others must be subordinate. Further, there could not be a Tragedy without a career, but there might be without characters. For the Tragedies of most modern playwrights are unpsychological, and in general there are many poets who resemble Zeuxis in his relation to Polygnotus as a painter; for the latter is a skilful delineator of character, whereas the work of Zeuxis is destitute of psychology. Further, if you merely arrange a series of exquisite psychological orations, phrases and reasonings, you will fail to produce the tragic effect, whereas a Tragedy worse off in these respects, yet with a group of incidents forming a story, will succeed better. In addition to this,

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There could not be a Tragedy without a career, but there might be without characters: G. FREYTAG (p. 218) maintains that the Romance dramatists attach more importance to the action, the Teutonic to the psychology. The plural in the Greek (characters) renders this sentence defensible; for some sort of character, we have been told, the personages must have. "The Greeks of Racine," says MACAULAY, "are mere names, mere words printed in capitals at the head of paragraphs of declamation."

The Tragedies of most modern playwrights: at a still later time those of Seneca, with which Racine's correspond, illustrate the style to which Aristotle refers.

In general: i. e. outside the limits of Tragedy.

Zeuxis in his relation to Polygnotus as a painter: his art, as we are presently told, was idealistic. The plan illustrated by the story of his Helen would (LANGE observes, p. 465) prevent an organic whole being realized, as there would be no guarantee that the attractions to be found in the separate beauties would suit one character.

Further, if you merely arrange, etc.: the text must not be altered, since we are told in the Rhetoric that the same discourse is not both psychological and "reasoning."

Fail to produce the tragic effect: i. e. fail to draw tears or horrify. School Speech-days, when Demosthenes, Cicero and Burke are declaimed, give evidence of this; of the converse proposition an example may be found in some plays which draw tears, though there are practically no harangues.

§ 6. 1450 a 24—33.

Tragedy's chief fascinations, the Irony of Fate and the Disclosure of Mistaken Identity, are parts of the Story. A further indication is that beginners can sooner master diction and psychology than plot-construction, as was the case with * * * and nearly all the first poets.

The Story, then, is the heart and soul, so to speak, of the Tragedy, and the Psychology only second in importance. The case with the pictorial art is similar: a random smear of gorgeous pigments would give less pleasure than an actual figure drawn in chalk. And Tragedy is the portrayal of an imaginary state of life, and mainly for its sake of those who experience it. Third in order comes the Intelligence. This is the faculty of telling

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Beginners can sooner master diction, etc.: it might be fancied that this was not a matter of practice, but one in which natural talent came in. NIETZSCHE asserted that patience was the most important quality for the novelist, but this view is not generally held.

A random smear of gorgeous pigments, etc.: some good authorities have maintained what might seem to be the contrary. "Botticelli is said to have boldly asserted that there was no occasion to study landscapes, a sponge, saturated with colour, and flung against the wall, would give a sufficient landscape; and Whistler looked forward to a happy time when the public would no longer require objects, but would be satisfied with combinations of colour" (DESSOIR, p. 410). What these artists would point out is that the smear must not be *random;* the colours would require artistic selection.

An actual figure drawn in chalk: the pleasure of "recognition," as an intellectual pleasure, is greater than that of the sense (cf. Metaphys. 1072 b 24).

Mainly for its sake: just as one who wishes to reproduce a figure has to give it a colour (*Parva Naturalia* 437 a 8).

The faculty of telling what is within and suits a case: this definition is applicable to all cases in which the intelligence has to be exercised. "What is within" applies equally to what is within the power of the individual or what underlies the problem before him; and the suitability admits of the same subjective and objective interpretation.

§ 6. 1450 a 33—1450 b 4.

what is within and suits a case; which in the case of utterances belongs to that science of human nature [or Ethics] which forms part of Rhetoric: for the older dramatists made their characters speak naturally, the modern dramatists like persons with rhetorical training. Psychology in the sense of "an index to the quality of the purpose" has for its sphere places where the ulterior purpose of an immediate resolve (positive or negative) is naturally obscure; whence those discourses do not admit

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In the case of utterances: here it is clear that both the subjective and objective interpretations are required, and indeed the Rhetoric insists on both.

To that the science of human nature [or Ethics]: the word *politikê* in Aristotle means "Ethics" (Rhetoric 1356 b 27), and Rhetoric is according to him a parasite of Ethics and even masquerades as that science. For according to his theory what the orator must know is how to persuade; and for this purpose he must familiarize himself with human foibles of various sorts.

Made their characters speak naturally: i.e. like persons without rhetorical training but with average ability.

Psychology in the sense of "an index to the quality of the purpose": formerly now "Psychology" (*êthos*) has been used for the character of the personages; it is now used in the sense of something belonging to utterances or conduct (§ 15), and the author quotes his definition of it in the Rhetoric (1395 a 15), with an allusion to Eudemian Ethics 1227 b 37.

Has for its sphere, etc.: the word "purpose" as explained in the Eudemian Ethics has a double sense; an action is constituted by immediate purpose, but qualified by ulterior purpose; *e.g.* one who fires a pistol accidentally without purpose or intention of firing it has not done an *action;* but if he fire it intentionally, it is the ulterior purpose (*e.g.* burglary or self-defence) which will qualify it as a right action or a wrong action. In the case of intentional acts, then, of which the ulterior purpose is not clear there is room for "psychology" in the sense of traits which will indicate that ulterior purpose.

Whence those discourses do not admit of psychology, etc.: as in the case of demonstrations of natural laws, Rhetoric 1418 a 15.

"The important thing," says Dessoir (p. 259), "is the whole character of which only fragmentary manifestations are before us; it is

§ 6. 1450 b 5—10.

of psychology in which the speaker has *no* purpose, positive or negative; Intelligence has for its sphere passages where the characters prove, disprove, or generalize.

The fourth of the coefficients is the Diction, this meaning, as was said before, Interpretation by nomenclature, which is as effective in verse as in prose; of the remainder, Music is the greatest of the sweetenings, whereas the Presentation, though fascinating, is least amenable to scientific treatment, and least connected with Poetry; for as a function of Tragedy it does not imply a stage

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to be divined, as DILTHEY and LIPPS have demonstrated, out of single expressions in virtue of the context in which they stand."

CLAYTON HAMILTON (*The Theory of the Drama*, p. 24) insists that the one standard method of conveying the sense of character in the drama must be the exhibition of objective *acts;* and this is equivalent to Aristotle's doctrine here that the only place for *êthos* or psychology in the harangues is where the motive would not otherwise be clear.

The fourth of the coefficients: as opposed to the intensifiers (1462 a 16). The word rendered "coefficient" (*logos*) is here used in its metaphysical sense of "essence," or part thereof according to Metaphys. 1034 a 20, where the question is discussed how far the *logos* of the portions enters into the *logos* of the whole; just, then, as *eidos* (which is synonymous with *logos*) is used for "part according to the *eidos*," so here *logos* is used for part contained in the *logos*. Hence no numbers are assigned to the intensifiers (music and exhibition), because Tragedy does its work without them.

Is the greatest: the proof of the agreeableness of music is given in the Politics (1339 b).

Presentation, etc.: it is least scientific, because the dressing must be local and historical, and these things belong to the region of the particular, not of the universal. On the other hand, so far as physiognomy enters, *i. e.* so far as appearance is associated with character, it is scientific, but not connected with Poetry.

As a function of Tragedy: a Tragedy is so composed as to admit of being exhibited, which is not the case with Epic. Since, however, a Tragedy can be read and perform its function in that way, whereas, on the other hand, the dressing will not be done by the poet, it is a negligible factor, and so is not assigned a number.

§ 6. 1450 b 10—18.

with actors, and the costumier has more to do with the success of the actual presentation than the Poet.

§ 7. After these definitions we come to the qualities which should be displayed by the grouping of the occurrences, since this is the first and most important factor in Tragedy. It has been laid down that Tragedy portrays a complete, *i. e.* whole, chapter of life, of some magnitude (for there is a thing which, though complete, has no magnitude). That magnitude is a whole, which has beginning, middle and end: a Beginning is that which follows nothing by a law of nature, but which by the plan of nature is or is to be followed by something else;

Complete, i. e. *whole*: Physics 207 a 13. The words are said to be almost synonymous.

A thing which, though complete, has no magnitude: the reference is to the "first motor," or primary cause of motion, which, on the one hand, has no magnitude (Physics, last sentence), on the other hand is complete (Metaphys. 1073 a 1).

That magnitude is a whole, which has beginning, middle and end: from Metaphys. 1024 a 1, where it is shown that these belong to magnitude, and that where the order matters the word "whole" is applied, but not where it does not matter.

A Beginning is that which follows nothing, etc.: the question is how to find in the stream of events a point which will serve for the commencement of a story; and the answer is the point whence the plot begins to work out by laws of nature or moral certainty. So in the Oedipus Tyrannus the point whence the discovery is set in motion is the plague in Thebes; in the Antigone the exposure of the corpse starts the series of events in the play. Given the circumstances, there might not have been a plague at Thebes, and Creon might not have exposed the corpse; when once these things had taken place, the natural causes began to work.

But which by the plan of nature, etc.: the plan of nature is seen in what happens when there is nothing to prevent. A seed is meant by nature to develop into a plant; but it may be prevented (*de Generatione* 337 b 6). This is why "law of nature" is not used in this part of the sentence.

Is or is to be followed: in the deductive sciences the consequences are simultaneous with the beginnings, *e. g.* the equality of the square of

an End, on the contrary, is what by the plan of nature invariably or normally follows something else, but is followed by nothing else; a Middle is what on the same principle both follows and precedes. A well-constructed story must, then, neither begin nor end at a fortuitous point, but should embody the above formulae. Further, since any composite object, image or other, to be beautiful, must not only have its components in their proper order, but be planned on no fortuitous scale; for the beautiful

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the hypotenuse to the squares of the sides is simultaneous with the principles whence it is deduced. Where the beginning is in time they are not simultaneous.

Invariably or normally, etc.: the end, then, like the beginning, is the point at which the laws of nature and moral certainty cease to work with regard to the sequel.

The subtlety of distinguishing the prospective reasoning as based on the necessary or normal, whereas the retrospective reasoning is based on the necessary only, is evidently intended.

For the beautiful is a size and an arrangement: "beauty is to be found in a great body; the small may be trim and symmetrical, but they are not beautiful" (Nic. Ethics 1123 b 7). The size must, however, be limited, else the animal, plant or machine will not be able to perform its function (Politics 1326 a 37). Hence size is less important than arrangement, symmetry and limitation (Metaphys. 1078 b 1). Symmetry is what constitutes unity (Problems 916 a 1). The argument that follows here is, then, that the size must not be such as to interfere with the unity of the object; which is constituted by the symmetry of its parts, while its integrity (wholeness) is constituted by the arrangement of its parts (Metaphys. 1042 a 2). Consistently, then, with the whole being taken in at a glance, the larger the parts are the more will their symmetry and arrangement appear; but the relative size of these is fixed by the nature of the whole, whence there is no possibility of compensation.

This ingenious argument involves, then, premises scattered over many treatises. An object is "blurred" if its parts are not distinct; and if that happen, two constituents of beauty, order and symmetry, are lost; if, on the other hand, the unity and integrity be lost, the symmetry and order are also lost.

§ 7. 1450 b 28—36.

is a size and an arrangement, whence there could not be a beautiful animalcule, for here the duration of the visual impression is so near the [actually] imperceptible that it is blurred; nor a beautiful monster, for in such a case the visual impression is not simultaneous, and the spectator's mental synthesis loses unity and completeness (as would happen with an animal a thousand miles long). Just, then, as the beautiful in the plastic art must, like the beautiful in the case of the original creatures, have some size, yet not more than the eye can take in, so in the case of stories the beautiful must have some length, but not more than the memory can retain. A limit for

The duration of the visual impression, etc.: there is a point at which a thing ceases to be actually perceptible, except in conjunction with another; by itself it is only potentially perceptible (*Parva Naturalia*, pp. 440 and 446).

The visual impression is not simultaneous, and the spectator's mental synthesis loses unity and completeness: numerical unity is judged by the outward vision, specific unity (*i. e.* as *a* lion, *a* house) by the inward sense (*ibid.* 447 b 25).

The study of DESSOIR on this subject is of great interest (pp. 141–151). The size of pictures must bear some proportion to the importance of the objects which they represent, though it is not a case of direct variation. It has been noticed that reduction and magnification by photography produce great variation in the effect. Small sizes are not suitable for subjects of overwhelming importance; on the other hand, to paint a lemon the size of a beer barrel would be ridiculous. FECHNER appears to have the merit of first throwing light on this subject. DESSOIR calls attention to the fact that in the Sixtine Madonna the Child is unnaturally magnified for the sake of the proper effect.

LIPPS (p. 64), in agreement with Aristotle, observes that the nature of the soul requires "not only concentration of activity but breadth of activity; not only points of altitude and unity, but width, wealth and copiousness."[2]

A limit for the duration of a performance in the concrete: this cannot be fixed by science, because too many subjective considerations enter. FREYTAG (*Technik*, p. 309), who gives some interesting statistics suggests three hours.

§ 7. 1450 b 36—1451 a 6.

the duration of a performance in the concrete is not to be fixed by science; had the practice been to let a hundred tragedies be performed [at a session], "the performance would have had to be regulated by chronometer," as they say was done on a certain other occasion. With regard to the quantitative compass in the abstract, the greater the finer, so long as it is all in focus: an adequate quantitative compass (with the proviso *bare*) is such a quantity of natural or normal sequences as gives room for good fortune to turn into bad fortune or bad fortune into good fortune.

§ 8. A story has unity, not, as some fancy, if it revolve round a single personage; the genus has any number of

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As they say was done on a certain other occasion: viz. by the hetaera "*Chronometer*" (Clepsydra), who entertained her lovers on this principle, and formed the subject of a comedy by Eubulus (Athenaeus, p. 567 d).

With regard to the quantitative compass in the abstract: i. e. the amount of incident got into the drama, without reference to the number of words in which it is expressed. For the word rendered "compass" see Gl. We learn from the Physics that the "form" of a thing is constituted by its "limit," which regulates its size (p. 209 b), and the same doctrine is found in the *de Generatione* (335 a 21); hence "compass" and "size" become interchangeable, as they are used here.

This definition follows from the words "complete chapter of life" in the definition of Tragedy. For a complete *praxis* is a complete "motion," which by the doctrine of the Physics is between Poles; the Poles of "faring" are good and bad fortune.

The genus has any number of accidents, some of which, etc.: see Introd., p. 83. The species is a unity (Physics 190 b 28), whereas the genus is not (*ibid.* 249 a 21); some particular differentia turns the genus into a species, but others do not (Topics 143 b 6). "The same thing may be a man, white, and a myriad other things; but if you are asked whether this is a man or not, you should reply what signifies one thing, and not add 'white' or 'great'; for the number of accidents is infinite, whence it is impossible to go through them" (Metaphys. 1007 a 14).

accidents, some of which do not make of it a species; and so an individual has a number of experiences which do not together constitute a career. The poets who have composed *a* Heracleid, *a* Theseid, and similar works are likely, therefore, to be in error; for they fancy that since Heracles was a unity therefore his story should be all one. Homer, pre-eminent elsewhere, is likely to have clearly seen this too, and he must have perceived it either by knowledge of principles or by instinct; for his plan of an Odyssey was not a chronicle of all the events in Odysseus's life, *e. g.* his being wounded on Parnassus, then feigning to go mad on the Trysting-day, events of which the latter followed the former neither by law of nature nor moral certainty; no, he constructed the Odyssey, and likewise the Iliad, all round one single experience, such as we mean. Just, then, as in other forms of portraiture one subject is presented in one piece, so, too, the story, as the portrayal of an imaginary experience, should portray one experience and the whole of it; the component parts thereof being so arranged that the displacement or removal of any should shatter and disconcert the whole. For that is no member of the whole which could be detached without any one being the wiser.

§ 9. It is plain also from what has been said that it is

"Two-footed terrestrial animal" will make one thing, but the other "accidents" will not.

An individual has a number of experiences, etc.: a chapter of his life is made up of certain imperfect praxeis only. It would seem, however, that the author regularly thinks of the tragic "chapter of life" as being shared by a number of individuals.

It is plain also from what has been said: viz. from the definition of Poetry as "portrayal of the Imaginary," and the doctrine deduced §§ 8, 9. 1451 a 16—35.

not the poet's business to treat the actual, but the *typical*, *i.e.* the Potential as regulated by moral certainty or laws of nature. For the difference between the historian and the poet is not that the one speaks prose, the other verse—as the Chronicle of Herodotus might be versified, and it would remain a history, with a metre no less than without a verse; but (this is the point) that the poet deals with types and the historian with facts, whence poetry is the

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from the theory of dramatic treatment that the existence of the characters is bounded by the beginning and end of the play. The first, however, seems to be the real source of this paragraph. Hence in what follows (§ 14) the dramatist is told to invent himself, and only adhere to the most important features of the tradition.

The Potential as regulated by moral certainty or laws of nature: this is a definition of the sense of the potential mood, as the apodosis of a hypothetical sentence. The rendering "moral certainty" is from the Rhetoric, see Gl.] The word "would," as the text states, means something different in the phrase "if a man were injured, he would avenge himself," and the phrase "if $a + b$ were multiplied by $a + b$, the result would be $a^2 + 2ab + b^2$"; in the first case the result generally occurs, in the second it invariably occurs. The rendering "probability" is unsatisfactory, because "probability" is reducible to rule, whereas the "would" of the text is something which is not reducible to rule; for even a vindictive man *may* in some particular case decline to avenge himself. Poetry (or rather fiction), then, deals with the consequences of assumptions; the assumptions being in the main the characters of the personages: the results which follow from these assumptions will in part follow moral certainty, *e. g.* an Oedipus will charge Creon with having suborned Tiresias, blind himself, etc.; in part follow laws of nature, *e. g.* Zeus having established a law of retaliation, Agamemnon will be slaughtered as he slaughtered his daughter, etc. The chief discussion of this subject is Metaphys. 1047 b, where the theory of the potentially necessary is explained as above.

Poetry is the more scientific and the higher class: in the Posterior Analytics (88 a 6) we are told that the universal is honourable, because it explains the cause; and that whereas the *case* is learned by sense-perception, the principle can only be made out by the understanding. This is repeated in the *de Anima* (417 b 22). The researcher is superior to the orator on the same ground (Problems 956 b 6). Science and

more scientific and the higher class; for it generalizes rather, whereas history particularizes. What sort of utterances or experiences go with what sort of qualities is a general question, which poetry tries algebraically to solve; what did Alcibiades ? or, what was done to him ?

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politics are the two possible occupations of a gentleman (Politics 1255 b 37). The difference, then, between the two may be illustrated by comparing a tradesman's account book with a treatise on algebra. The former "registers cases," *e. g.* A bought so much, B sold so much; the latter "formulates principles," *e. g.* given a series, how would it be summed ? Fiction, in which the real formulae are made up of characters, *i. e.* combinations of qualities and circumstances, stands to history in the relation which algebra bears to book-keeping.

For it generalizes rather, whereas history particularizes: compare MACAULAY, *Essay on History* (in the Miscellaneous Writings): "In fiction the principles are given, to find the facts; in history the facts are given, to find the principles." The main differences between history and fiction are well analysed by DINGER (ii. 126-136) as elimination, combination and aesthetic complement: the last being a principle explained by FECHNER (*Vorschule* i. 51), by which two or more attractions combined give greater pleasure than the separate values; *e. g.* the aesthetic value of a statue in alabaster is greater than that of the work of art and of the alabaster separately; $(a + b)$ is greater in this case than $a + b$. The first two principles are illustrated by those romances in which the characters admit of identification. Only certain features of the original are reproduced, and they are ordinarily combined with characteristics taken from other persons.

The connexion of this chapter with Aristotle's doctrine that the pleasure of a counterfeit is constituted by recognition is explained by WITASEK'S analysis of *the Characteristic* (*Grundzüge*, p. 260 sqq.). "An object is characteristic when the characteristic marks of the species and variety to which it belongs are distinctly expressed therein. In this case it is called a type of its species. The characteristic offers the subject [*i. e.* the spectator] specially favourable conditions for recognition. Therein in part lies its importance as a source of pleasure. For to make out and to recognize is to judge. If the judgment takes place with special ease, precision and certainty, the act is accompanied by pleasure, supposing always that such a judgment is not too commonplace or trivial."

§ 9. 1451 b 6—12 f.

is a question of detail. In Comedy this is already clear; the dramatists wait till they have constructed a probable story, and only then put casual names into the argument; unlike the lampooners who used the names of individuals.

In the case of Tragedy they adhere to historical *names*, and the reason is that the potential is a matter of faith.

In Comedy : M. Bergson (*Le Rire*, p. 16) calls attention to the fact that Comedies are more often called by epithets (e. g. *l'Avare, le Joueur*) than Tragedies; his theory being that in the case of Tragedy the qualities are forgotten in the person who embodies them, whereas in Comedy the vice which is ridiculed remains the central personage, invisible and present, *auquel les personnages de chair et d'os sont suspendus sur la scène.* The Comedian Antiphanes (Athenaeus, vi. init.) calls attention to much the same phenomenon.

Casual names : this surprises us, for ordinarily the names have a sort of appropriateness, and indeed in the New Comedy there were stock names, which were employed long after. Probably this would have been compared by Aristotle to the incompetent painter's practice of labelling his pictures, because they would not otherwise be identified.

In the case of Tragedy, etc. : the reason alleged by Viehoff (*Poetik*, p. 521) is that the general acquaintance of the public with the characters may be assumed, and they require no introduction. He quotes from Jean Paul: "a Socrates or Caesar, when the poet summons him, comes forward like a prince, and takes his *cognito* for granted. Such a name implies a crowd of situations."

Avonianus (*Dramatische Handwerkslehre*, p. 13) asserts that no subjects are so dangerous for incipient dramatists as historical subjects. "He will always be tempted to deal most fully with that which is indifferent to the spectator. The spectator always wants to see on the stage his like ; personages who, whether they wear sandals or boots, lived before or after A.D. 1, get involved in the same embarrassments as he himself has to face."

Clayton Hamilton (p. 129) makes an interesting distinction between Tragedy and Melodrama somewhat similar to Aristotle's account of the former. "All that we ask of the author of Melodrama is momentary plausibility. But of the author of Tragedy we demand an unquestionable inevitability; nothing may happen in his play which is not a logical result of the nature of his characters."

The potential is a matter of faith : the field of poetry is, as has been seen, the potential or possible, and what one man thinks possible another

§ 9. 1451 b 11—17.

Now when a thing has never occurred we do not yet believe in its possibility; but when it has occurred it must clearly be possible, since, had it been impossible, it had not occurred. In some Tragedies, nevertheless, only one or two familiar names occur, the rest being invented, while in some there is not one, *e.g.* the Antheus of Agathon, in which names and events are equally fictitious, but are none the less entertaining. You should not study, therefore, to adhere at all costs to the traditional *stories* round which the Tragedies centre; such research would be absurd, since even the familiar is known scientifically by few only but entertains all.

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may think impossible ; but in the case of what has actually happened this doubt cannot arise, whence, *e.g.* "the handwriting on the wall" will not be ridiculed if the subject be Belshazzar, but would be in an original play. The subject is further discussed in Problems 917 b 8–16. We attend more, we are there told, to what is known, and the definite is better known than the indefinite; whence a story about a single thing is more agreeable than one about many things. Further, the most agreeable stories are about what is neither extremely ancient nor quite modern; in the former case the thing is so far off that we disbelieve, and we find no pleasure in what we do not believe; on the other hand, the quite modern is still almost within perception, whence we take no pleasure in hearing about it. The true rendering of this passage is suggested by the reading of MS. D (see critical note); the matter of faith is what constitutes the province of the Orator (Rhetoric 1355 b 27), who deals with opinion, not with knowledge. *A priori* we might suppose that no mother would, merely to spite her husband, kill her children; but when we are familiar with the tale of Medea, her name may be used in a plot wherein this occurs; attributed to a fictitious name, it might seem too improbable. But the names are the chief thing which the author of fiction borrows from history.

Even the familiar is known scientifically by few only : the purpose of Tragedy is not knowledge but pleasure ; it is taking unnecessary trouble to be scrupulously accurate in matters of detail, for even in the case of familiar stories few *know* them at all accurately, *i.e.* could give dates and authorities for them; the number of persons who could give a scientific history of Oedipus is a very small fraction of those whom the story

§ 9. 1451 b 17—27.

It is plain from this that the poet should be the novelist rather than the versifier, inasmuch as imagination constitutes him poet, and they are imaginary chapters of life that he portrays. If, indeed, he accidentally portray past events he is none the less a novelist; for there is nothing to prevent certain past events being, in the respect wherein he portrays them, like what potential events would be morally certain to be.

Of simple stories (experiences) the disjointed are the worst. Such are dramatized by poor poets on their own account, by good ones for the sake of the actors; composing declamations, and overstraining the capacity of the story,

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interests. Provided, then—as is afterwards observed—the salient features of the story are not violated, liberties in matters of detail will not be resented.

Of simple stories, etc.: it is the author's practice to begin with the worst variety, and practically to exclude it from the list; so in the list of § 14 (1453 b 36), where the plan of making the crime to be consciously projected and not perpetrated is mentioned, but excluded from the reckoning. Here the story which is simple, but disjointed, is treated in the same way; it is put outside the real list, which begins with the Story that is Simple, but continuous; the occurrence of the last word in the next paragraph as a reference to this shows that the sentences cannot be inverted, and that the anticipation of the definition of simple (like that of *peripeteia*) is only a characteristic of the esoteric style. The proof is next given that a story which involves the Irony of Fate is better than one without it; the best sort is then shown to be that in which recognition or disclosure of mistaken identity is accompanied by the Irony of Fate.

Composing declamations and overstraining, etc.: the reference is to the Rhetoric (1413 b 10), where we are told that the poets look out for the actors who look out for plays that are "agonistic." The account which follows shows that this word corresponds with our *declamation*, as it represents a style which is unsuitable for writing, but suitable for public orations. Repetition of the same thought with change of expression characterizes it; and it can be sentimental or ratiocinative. An actor, then, does not get a fair chance unless he has something to declaim; and the poet has to furnish the opportunity for declamations, else he

they are often compelled to wrest apart what should be contiguous.

Since the portrayal is not only of an imaginary experience, but of imaginary atrocities and woes, and these either culminate or are intensified when the atrocity is the unforeseen outcome of the woe, or the woe of the atrocity; for it will be more marvellous so than if they were spontaneous, *i.e.* accidental retribution; since even of accidental retribution those cases are most marvellous

is unable to get the best actors to perform in his plays. CLAYTON HAMILTON (*Theory of the Theatre*, p. 86) says similarly, "The actor of the 'old school' in England was fond of the long speeches of the Drama of Rhetoric, and the brilliant lines of the Drama of Conversation. It may be remembered that the old actor in *Trelawny of the Wells* condemned a new-style play because it did not contain 'what you could really call a speech.' He wanted what the French term a *tirade*."

The unforeseen outcome, etc.: in the Trachiniae Deianira's murder of Heracles is the atrocity which is the unforeseen outcome of a suffering; in the Oedipus Tyrannus the woes of Oedipus are the unforeseen outcome of his parricide, and that atrocity itself the unforeseen outcome of his suffering. The cautious phrase "culminate or are intensified" is to take account of the varying degrees which belong to different situations. That pity and fear are correlative and ordinarily connected with the same event is noticed in the Rhetoric.

For it will be more marvellous so: intensity is the occasion of wonder, Eudemian Ethics 1239 a 26.

Spontaneous, i.e. *accidental retribution:* the meaning of the terms used in the text is analysed with great care in the Physics 197 b. The second of the words is restricted to cases in which a result which might have been purposed is achieved without any such purpose. A case of chance is not in itself wonderful; but a case of chance retribution is: and the author argues that the more clearly the working of providence can be traced the more wonderful it becomes, provided that the working is unforeseen. The state subsists by "correspondence" (Nic. Ethics 1132 b 34); and the court of justice is established in order to set right losses and gains. If, therefore, that correspondence happens by chance which might well be effected by design, it is a proper cause for wonder (§ 23, 1460 a 13).

§ 9. 1452 a 2—7.

which seem providential, as when the murderer of Mitys was killed by Mitys's statue falling upon him, as he contemplated it in Argos—because such a chance seems no blind chance—stories of this kind will therefore be preferable.

§ 10. Stories are some simple, others complex; for such are the real experiences, of which they are the imaginary counterpart, known to be. By a simple career I mean one continuous unit of the sort described, in which the transition proceeds without the Irony of Fate or Disclosure of Mistaken Identity; by a complex course one in which the transition is the resultant of the original motion together with a Disclosure, the Irony of Fate, or both. These, however, ought to be deduced from the original structure of the story so that their occurrence comes about from the antecedents by law of nature or moral certainty; for there is a vast difference between sequel and consequence.

§ 11. The Irony of Fate is the transformation of an

Such are the real experiences, etc.: as "motions" they may be simple or mixed (*de Caelo* 302 a 6). The simple motion is in a straight line, the mixed motion a mixture of straight and circular (268 b 30). The motion of the compound object is mixed (*ibid.*). The words "simple" and "complex" are logical, meaning "admitting of no variety" and "admitting of variety" (*de Partibus Animalium* 643 b 31). An experience or course must be in the direction of either good or bad; the possibility of mixture lies in the fact that the subject may be deceived about it; think the direction towards good, when it is really towards evil.

The transformation of an experience, etc.: an admirable example of the Irony of Fate is given in the Natural History (vii. 2, 590 b 14). "The Polypus devours the Karabos, the Karabos the Conger, and the Conger the Polypus." The experience of the Polypus, pursuit and eating, is by law of nature transformed into the contrary, being pursued and being eaten; for the Karabos which he pursues would have saved

experience into its contrary, according to what has been said; only, as we are saying, in accordance with moral certainty or law of nature, as when in the Oedipus a messenger who was to have gratified Oedipus and relieved him of his anxiety about his mother, by revealing his origin, produces the contrary result; or where in the Lynceus the hero is led away to execution followed by Danaus as executioner, but as the effect of the antecedents Danaus is executed and Lynceus escapes. Disclosure of Mistaken Identity, as the name implies, is the transformation of the doomed or elect of the play from being strangers into acquaintances, *i.e.* connexions or foemen. The finest form of Disclosure of Mistaken Identity is one accompanied by the Irony of Fate, as above in the Oedipus; there are, indeed, other forms, for it may be some inanimate or casual object which is "transformed from a stranger into an acquaintance," and it may be disclosed that some one is or is not the author of a deed; but that which has been described belongs most to the story, *i.e.* to the career; for such a combination between Disclosure and Irony of Fate will be either piteous or terrible, and it is an imaginary experience of this kind which Tragedy, as

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him from the Conger which confronts him. We could not get better cases than those which follow as illustrations from the Drama.

The transformation of the doomed or elect, etc. : transformation, as we learn from the Physics, is always between Poles, but not necessarily from Pole to Pole, as was the case with the Irony of Fate. A person who stood in no definite relation is, therefore, by the disclosure of his Identity, transformed into some one in a definite relation.

Belongs most to the story: the story will be more seriously affected by the disclosure of the identity of the main characters than by any other sort. The disclosure that Oedipus had murdered Laius would have been unimportant as compared with the disclosure of their relationship.

§ 11. 1452 a 23—1452 b 2.

has been laid down, portrays; besides, misfortune or good fortune will in such cases be an accompaniment.

Since identification involves parties, some disclosures are of one party only to the other, the other being known; but at times both have to have their identity disclosed, as where Iphigeneia's was disclosed to Orestes by the dispatch of the letter, but he had to disclose his identity to Iphigeneia in some other way.

Two parts of the story, then, hinge on the same pivot: the Irony of Fate, and Disclosure; a third part is the Catastrophe. Irony and Disclosure have been described; a Catastrophe is an experience involving destruction or pain, *e.g.* physical death, a broken heart, mutilation, etc.

§ 12. The factors of a Tragedy, which it should embody as abstractions, have already been enumerated; its anatomical divisions (separable members) are the following: Prologue, Scene, Finale, Chorus; of which the last is partly Introit, and partly Stationary. These are to be found in all types, whereas the stage-song and the lamentation are peculiar to certain types. The Prologue is an entire section of a Tragedy—all that comes before the Introit of the Chorus; a Scene is similarly an entire section —all that comes between two entire choric odes; the Finale likewise an entire section—that which is followed by no choric ode. The Introit is the first deliverance of the

The Catastrophe: the usage of this word in this subject is, then, somewhat different from its ordinary usage (see the Glossary).

Physical death: VOLKELT points out that in a great number of cases what befalls the hero is not physical but moral death, disgrace or some calamity which renders life no longer worth living (*Ästhetik des Tragischen*, ch. vii.). The first case provided for in the enumeration of Catastrophes is naturally that in which physical death takes place. The rendering death on the stage suggests that it often took place there, whereas it scarcely ever did (see the Glossary).

whole chorus, the Stationary is a choric ode not in Anapaests or Trochees, and the Lamentation is a plaintive song in which both actors on the stage and chorus take part. The factorial analysis has been given above, these are its anatomical divisions.

13. It is our next business to state the things at which the novelist should take aim, the things which he should avoid, and whence the tragic effect will come. Since the structure of the ideal tragedy should be not plain, but complex, and it should portray the terrible and piteous, for being the peculiarity of this kind of fiction: in the first place it is evident that the virtuous ought not to be

for is being the peculiarity: the "peculiarity" forms the subject of the Topics, bk. v. It should be something which does not include the essence, yet it is interchangeable with the subject. Every Tragedy must counterfeit the terrible and the piteous; and nothing but Tragedy need do so.

it is evident that the virtuous ought not, etc.: many endeavours have been made to refute what Aristotle says here, but they have been unsuccessful. DINGER (i. 193) has a long discussion on the subject; he observes that WAGNER commenced a tragedy of which the hero was to be absolutely faultless, but it was never finished; and that the comparative faultlessness of Socrates is probably what has prevented him from being made the hero of a tragedy. DINGER complains that Aristotle's canon would exclude the thorough villain from artistic work altogether; but all that Aristotle says is that such a man's fate would neither thrill nor draw tears, which appears to be true. The tragic pleasure is produced by the disproportion between cause and effect. Where the two are proportionate, the result is only what is expected. Where there is no cause, the spectator cannot identify, *i. e.* apply his theory of the government of the world to explain the phenomena, so that he has only an unsolved riddle before him. But where the cause is trivial, and the effect stupendous, the tragic pleasure is realized; but where the cause is stupendous and the effect trivial, comedy results. That Tragedy is concerned with high life results from the consideration that a fall must be from a height.

LANGE (p. 596) asserts that countless heroes are innocent; a proposition for which some evidence should have been adduced. LIEBMANN

represented in transition from good to ill fortune, for this is neither fearful, nor piteous, but shocking, nor the wicked in transition from ill fortune to good—which is the least tragic of conceptions : for it has no quality that it should, neither edification, nor piteousness, nor fearfulness—nor should the thoroughly wicked, either, fall from good to ill fortune : for though such a plot would be edifying, yet it would be neither piteous nor fearful; for pity is concerned with unmerited ill-fortune, fear with what happens to one's like; whence the result will be neither piteous nor fearful. There remains, then, the mean between the two characters. Such is a person who is neither a paragon of virtue or integrity, nor one who falls into misfortune owing to moral depravity, but does so owing to a mistake, of the kind committed by men of high rank and fortune, *e.g.* Oedipus, Thyestes, and the like famous princes. A well-constructed story, then, must be single rather than double (as some maintain), its transition not from ill to good fortune, but, on the contrary, from good to ill, and occasioned not by wickedness, but by some serious error, and the hero of the sort described, or, if anything, rather better. The truth of this is indicated by what actually occurs; originally the dramatists reeled off any legend; but of late the good dramas hinge on a few families, those

(*Gedanken und Tatsachen*, p. 338) defends Aristotle on the ground that the Greek word ("error") does not necessarily imply moral guilt. The context, however, seems to leave no doubt about this.

Fear with what happens to one's like: in the Rhetoric (1383 a 10) we are told that if we wish to frighten people, we should show them that others like themselves have suffered the same things as we expect. It is not quite easy to reconcile this with the assumption that the Tragic hero is necessarily on a different plane from the audience.

Rather than double: i. e. with contrary fates for the virtuous and the wicked.

§ 13. 1452 b 33—1453 a 19.

of Alcmeon, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, and a few others, in which crimes have come to be undergone or perpetrated. The best Tragedy technically is, then, one so constructed. Hence the critics are under the same misapprehension when they attack Euripides for doing this—making many of his plays end unhappily. He is, as has been said, quite right; and a clear indication of it is that such plays, when actually put on the stage, if they meet with approval, prove most effective, and Euripides, though otherwise his management may be imperfect, yet draws more tears and terrifies more than all the rest.

The second variety (according to some authorities the first) is one, like the Odyssey, with elements belonging to two classes, heroes and villains, and contrary endings for them respectively; it can only be regarded as the first owing to the weakmindedness of the spectators whom the

Under the same misapprehension: as those who thought a play should be double, *i. e.* have a double set of characters, rewarded according to their deserts.

If they meet with approval: the audience, it would seem, was apt to shout down a play, if anything which it contained occasioned displeasure; we shall see that a slight theological error caused a play of Carcinus to come to an abrupt conclusion. Seneca tells a story of a play of Euripides being stopped, because gold was praised in a way which seemed immoral; the poet had to implore the audience to wait out the result. Demosthenes, in a familiar passage, speaks of hissing as the privilege of the spectator, while to be shouted down was the fate of the actor.

With elements belonging to two classes, heroes and villains, and contrary endings for them respectively: that this is not the best type follows from the definition of Tragedy, as a chapter out of the life of heroes; properly, then, there is no place in it for villains.

The weakmindedness of the spectators: i. e. those who are incapable of aesthetic exertion (*ästhetisch minder leistungsfähig*), as Witasek, who has a subtle analysis of this phenomenon (p. 228), expresses it. According to his theory assumptions underlie both games and spectacles; and

§ 13. 1453 a 19—33.

playwrights try to gratify. But this is not a gratification which should be sought from Tragedy, as it belongs rather to Comedy, where the deadliest foemen, like Orestes and Aegisthus, make friends before the piece is over, and no one kills any one else.

§ 14. Alarm and tears may be evoked by the exhibition, but they can also be by the story, and this is most natural and more artistic. The plot should be so constructed that one who merely hears the course of events should shudder and shed tears at the result, as one who heard the tale of Oedipus well might do. It is less scientific, and decidedly

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in the case of the spectacle the aesthetic enjoyment consists in a sort of introspection—watching the production of fictitious sentiments by fictitious events.

The weaker-minded are unable to keep the fictitious feeling apart from the real feeling, and so are dissatisfied when the play or novel ends badly. This analysis seems to be correct, but the weak-minded spectator could urge that what pained him was the recognition that such endings were true to life.

No one kills any one else: WALLASCHEK (*Anfänge der Tonkunst*, p. 245) quotes an example of a pantomime of the Dayaks in Borneo: "it represents a sham fight, in which a warrior receives a mortal wound. Too late the victor discovers that he has killed a friend, and bursts into loud lamentations. At the conclusion, however, the dead man arose and commenced a fanatical dance. Even at this stage of civilization the need for a happy ending appears to be felt."

"The practice of the greatest dramatists goes to show that such a violation of the strict logic of art (as to force a happy ending to the action) is justifiable in comedy but not in the serious drama" (CLAYTON HAMILTON, p. 171). This author argues that the spectator is in the position of one watching a match, and is displeased if it be not fought out fairly.

It is less scientific, etc.: HARTMANN (p. 97) makes a division between the internal conflict, the external conflict, and the combination of the two. In Tragedy the two should be simultaneous; the employment of the external without the internal is to be found only in debased forms of art, *e. g.* the pantomime, the backstairs novel, the historical ballet, etc.

§§ 13, 14. 1453 a 34—1453 b 9.

expensive, to produce this effect by properties. Those who by the employment of them produce not the terrible but the monstrous, have nothing in common with Tragedy, for not every gratification should be sought from Tragedy, but that which belongs to it. Since, then, the dramatist ought to produce the gratification which comes from the portrayal of imaginary woes and terrors, he ought to introduce them into the experiences.

Let us make out what sort of coincidences look terrible

The gratification which comes from the portrayal of imaginary woes and terrors: both pity and fear are defined as forms of pain; although, as LANGE has shown, the counterfeiting screens off much that is painful, it does not remove all; and Aristotle, both in the *de Anima* (427 b 23) and in the Problems (886 b 33), calls attention to the fact that we feel pain when we witness painful sights, or see pictures of what is pitiful or horrible, but that this sympathetic pain is less than real pain, and that to hear gives less pain than to see. He therefore anticipated the modern doctrine of the *pleasure of pain*, a subject which forms ch. v. of HIRN'S *Origins of Art*, where the literature of the subject is dealt with. "The delight in witnessing the performance of a Tragedy involves the enjoyment of a borrowed pain, which by unconscious sympathetic imitation we make partially our own" (p. 59). His explanation of the phenomenon comes to little more than the desire for the sensational or for excitement, but he quotes some remarkable cases of the employment of pain for relief, and the old and barbarous methods of expressing sorrow at once occur to the reader. Mr. WALKLEY, in *Frames of Mind*, defended the theory that the pleasure produced by the piteous and terrible is the malevolent one of conscious superiority; and the connexion of Tragedy with "high life" shows that this analysis is not altogether erroneous. This, however, is only one of many elements in a highly complicated phenomenon.

What sort of coincidences look terrible, etc.: the tragic crime is one for which one pities the author, whence the second alternative is preferred. The doctrine here is similar to that in the Politics (1262 a 28), where it is pointed out that such occurrences (there enumerated as outrage, murder and manslaughter, strife and abuse) are not serious when they take place among strangers, and, if the relationship be known, can be "cancelled" (by religious ceremonies). In the Rhetoric (1385 b 15, etc.) a man's relatives are included with himself in piteous matters.

§ 14. 1453 b 9—15.

or what sort look piteous. Such experiences must be shared by connexions, enemies or neutrals. If a man perpetrates or projects the murder, etc., of an enemy, he earns no tears either by design or perpetration, unless it be for having an enemy; nor if the parties be neutrals; but when the catastrophes occur between persons who belong to each other, *e.g.* brothers, son and father or mother, or mother and son, etc., these aspects should be sought for. You may not violate traditional narratives, *e.g.* the murder of Clytaemnestra by Orestes or Eriphyle by Alcmeon; only you should invent yourself, and make skilful use of the tradition.

He earns no tears either, etc.: the enmity and anger of those who have some power is fearful (Rhetoric 1382 a 33), and therefore piteous (*ibid.* 1386 a 27), whence a man is to be pitied for having an enemy; but he earns no pity by killing that enemy, nor by killing a neutral. But one of his relations counts as identical with himself (1386 a 18); if, therefore, he kills one of them, he is pitiable. And the tragic crime is one of which one pities the perpetrator.

You may not violate, etc.: GOETHE held that no person was historical for the poet who chooses to present his moral world, and for that purpose does certain historical characters the honour of lending their names to his creations (cited by DESSOIR, p. 378). DESSOIR agrees with Aristotle; alteration of a vital part in a familiar narrative will be resented by the spectator.

Similarly FECHNER (*Vorschule*, ii. 47) says that in reading an historical novel we are apt to be disturbed by a feeling of uncertainty as to how much of it is true; and that we must have often put aside historical novels when they presented the appearance of wishing to deceive us. His remark that this interest in the exact reproduction of the truth increases the nearer it concerns ourselves seems a good supplement to what Aristotle says. For a certain amount of licence in expurgating was surely allowed themselves by the tragedians. If a poet might make out that Iphigeneia had not after all been sacrificed, it is not obvious why some similar improvement of the story of Orestes would have been intolerable. See in general MURRAY'S *Rise of the Greek Epic.*

You should invent yourself: "complete retirement of the personality of the artist behind the personages whom he depicts, though

Let us elucidate the word "skilful." The crime may come about in the style favoured by the early dramatists, who made their characters commit them consciously, *i.e.* with knowledge of the facts; as Euripides, too, makes Medea slay her children. Or they may go through it, but go through the horror unconsciously, and afterwards discover the relationship, like the Oedipus of Sophocles (in his case in the background of the drama, whereas cases within the drama are those of the Alcmeon of Astydamas and Telegonus in the Wounded Odysseus). The remaining alternative is where the unconscious projector of an atrocity discovers the truth in time. These are the only real alternatives; for they must either perpetrate it or not, and consciously or not, and of these conscious projection without perpetration is so bad—for it shocks without drawing tears or terrifying, since it is without catastrophe—that it is rarely if ever presented (*e.g.* by Haemon with regard to Creon in the Antigone). Next worst comes conscious projection with perpetration;

often demanded by Aesthetic, cannot be regarded as the ideal of the aesthetic effect" (LANGE, p. 352). The personality of the artist ought to appear, and indeed IBSEN is quoted by the same writer for the assertion that in order that any of his plays should be understood all ought to be read.

The word "skilful": the record ordinarily allows the romancer considerable scope, as in the degree of intention involved in the deed.

These are the only real alternatives: according to the Greek text there is a double division, doing or not, and with knowledge or not. The Arabic makes the last a little clearer by adding "yet destined to know," but its further addition, "and the victim may be conscious or not," only confuses the text. The latter seems quite sound; to know and not do is the worst, and so rare that it was not mentioned in the preliminary list. To know and do comes next; not to know and do next; whereas not to know and not do is the best. The Arabic addition, "yet destined to know," is obviously implied in the third and fourth cases, whether it be part of the original text or not.

§ 14. 1453 b 25—1454 a 2.

still better is unconscious projection, with perpetration followed by disclosure; for the shocking element is absent, and the disclosure is thrilling. But the best is the last, viz. such a case as that in the Cresphontes, where Merope, meaning to kill her son, discovers his identity in time, or in the Iphigeneia, where the heroine identifies her brother, or in the Helle, where a son recognizes his mother when on the point of giving her up. Hence, as was stated above, the Tragedies hover round a few families. The playwrights, seeking to furnish such situations in their plots, discovered not the rule for their production, but that certain plots somehow contained them; they have ever since in consequence been compelled to resort to the families in which such catastrophes came about.

A sufficient account has now been given of the grouping of events and the proper character of the plot.

§ 15. With regard to the delineation of character (or psychology) four things should be aimed at. The first and most important is that the characters should be good.

The playwrights, seeking, etc.: the Greek here is very much compressed. The meaning, however, is clearly what is given above. Experience showed that certain stories "brought down the house"; to these stories, therefore, the playwrights adhered. Had they gone to science, and discovered the rule for the production of the effect, they might have had a larger selection. The complaint of the unscientific character of artists is often heard; an attempt at turning the tables on the science of Aesthetic is made by JULIUS HART in his *Revolution der Ästhetik* (Berlin, 1910), with what success we do not yet know.

That the characters should be good: CARRIÈRE (*Poesie*, p. 456) rightly finds the reason for this precept in the fact that we require in the drama persons with whom we sympathize, and where such are wanting the dramatist will scarcely be able either to arouse or gratify our interest. According to Aristotle there should, then, be no villain in the piece, whence the compound transition is to be condemned. And indeed the villain of the piece has a tendency to become a comic character.

Speech or Conduct will be psychological, if, as has been said, it reveal any intention with which [a course is adopted or rejected], and the character delineated will be good if the intention be so. This is relative to the divisions of humanity; for there are good women and good slaves, and yet women are perhaps inferior beings and slaves generally base. The second point is that it should be appropriate; for it is possible for the person to be of brave character, yet for the species of courage to be unsuitable, if the person be a woman. The third is that it should be like; for this is different from making it good and appro-

Women are perhaps inferior: the male is braver and juster than the female (Physiognomonics 814 a 9).

And slaves generally base: in the Politics (1260 a 35) we are told that he should have just enough virtue not to do his work badly out of intemperance or cowardice.

It is possible for the person to be of brave character, etc.: in the Politics (1260 a 22) the question is discussed of the gradations of virtue to be found in different members of the community, and we are told that the chastity, courage and justice of a woman are different from those of a man, being in the man's case such as the ruler should have, in the woman's case such as the subject should have. The assertion with which some translators credit Aristotle here, "that it is unsuitable for a woman to be courageous," contradicts his own doctrine, besides being evidently untrue; the other assertion, "that it is unsuitable for a woman to be unscrupulously clever," is even more untenable. The stage view of the matter is expressed by Suzanne in *Le Demi-monde* of Alexandre Dumas fils: *la femme la plus niaise est cent fois plus rusée que l'homme le plus spirituel.*

It should be like: i. e. the historical character portrayed must not be seriously altered in the reproduction. Achilles must not be made cowardly or Odysseus brainless. VIEHOFF (*Poetik*, p. 520) assigns some limits to this rule, doubtless in the spirit of Aristotle: "it is not the purpose of the dramatist to obtain the greatest possible likeness between the original and the fictitious character, but to produce a figure which will arouse in the spectator the strongest and noblest aesthetic emotion. To please the spectator he will frequently depart from the original; the extent to which he may do so depends on the public whom he serves

§ 15. 1454 a 17—24.

priate, as has been said. The fourth point is equability; even if the character portrayed be fitful, and such a character be the theme, it ought to be uniformly fitful.

An example of immoral psychology is any unnecessary [case of knavery], *e.g.* Menelaus in the Orestes; the lament of Odysseus in the Scylla and the harangue of Melanippe are examples of the unseemly and unsuitable; and of the fitful, the Iphigeneia in Aulis, where the heroine on her knees is unlike her later self.

In the character, as in the grouping of the incidents, you should always study laws of nature and moral certainty, so that it should become either necessary or morally

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and the celebrity of the character to be represented. Thus Schiller could be far bolder in his treatment of Don Carlos than in his treatment of Wallenstein, his public being German, and the Spanish hero being a person of no tremendous historical importance. If the dramatist alters a leading trait in the character of some hero of world-wide celebrity, the spectator is puzzled."[33]

Immoral psychology is any unnecessary case, etc.: the passage is explained below, § 25 end. A poet can only be charged with immorality when he introduces a knave without anything making such introduction necessary; for the knavery may belong to the part, either because it is inherent in the class, *e. g.* women and slaves, or because the contrast renders the play more effective (*e. g.* the case of Aegisthus in the Agamemnon). But badness of character on the poet's part is when he makes his characters bad without any such justification.

The lament of Odysseus in the Scylla: see BYWATER'S note. The passage which he quotes shows that this is the example of the unlike, *i. e.* making Odysseus unlike what we most of us suppose Odysseus to have been.

The harangue of Melanippe: the "wise Melanippe" in Euripides's play of that name delivered a harangue disproving the existence of monsters, and otherwise trying to save her children, who were supposed to have been the offspring of cattle. It was regarded as unsuitable to put into her mouth the philosophy of Anaxagoras. In any case the proposition here can be defended from Politics 1260 a 30, where the principle that a woman should be silent is urged.

§ 15. 1454 a 24—34.

certain for the kind of character to say or do the kind of thing, and in the particular order.

It is then evident that the evolution of the story should come about from the characters themselves, and not by a *deus ex machina* as in the Medea, or the Departure of the Fleet in the Iliad;[1] the *deus ex machina* may, however, be employed for events in the background of the drama, either primeval mysteries unknowable by man, or futurity, which requires revelation and foreknowledge; for the gods are supposed to see everything.

In the proceedings themselves there should be nothing

From the characters themselves: the reading of the Arabic is here adopted, because it might be difficult to decide what was or was not part of the plot; if *e. g.* Aegeus figures in the Medea, he forms part of the story, no less than the others. But the criticism which Aristotle passes on the introduction of Aegeus into the story is that there is no necessity for him; and indeed if Medea can use magic powers in order to get away from Corinth at all, there is no special reason why Aegeus should promise her a refuge.

A deus ex machina: lit. "from a machine," and apparently the metaphorical sense of *deus ex machina* is what is intended; for in the case of the scene in the Iliad there could be no question of a real machine. That in the case of the Medea we are to think of Aegeus as the *deus ex machina*, and not of Medea's Chariot, is told us below.

The deus ex machina: RÖTTEKEN (*Poetik*, p. 149) suggests that the supernatural may be employed when the situation has in itself nothing that is fabulous or unnatural, and is only brought in in a manner that is in appearance unnatural; where it is used to bring about what might well have happened without its employment. FREYTAG (*Technik des Dramas*, ch. v.) estimates the suitability of the employment of the supernatural by the ideas current in the dramatist's time; to Shakespeare's audience the ghosts, witches, etc., were less incongruous with a "chapter out of life" than they would be to one of to-day. Aristotle's formula, then, corresponds fairly well with RÖTTEKEN's; for the hearer could in any case find out from some source or other the antecedents and the destiny of the characters; only it is easiest to put these details into the mouth of a deity.

[1] ii. 166.

§ 15. 1454 a 34—1454 b 6.

unaccountable; if there is, it should be in the background of the play, as in the Oedipus of Sophocles. And since Tragedy is the portrayal of a superior or ideal class it should imitate good portrait-painters; for they too, while reproducing the peculiar features, without impairing the likeness, improve upon it; so the poet, when portraying people who are irascible, slothful or with similar failings in their characters, should represent them as such, yet virtuous withal; even as Homer made his Achilles a model of hardness, yet a hero. While observing these rules, he should also be careful of the impressions only indirectly connected with his own art; for here, too, mistakes can often be made. Enough, however, has been said about them in the published works.

§ 16. Disclosure of Mistaken Identity has been defined above : as for its varieties, the first is the least scientific,

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In the background : Clayton Hamilton (p. 38) asserts that a *crowd* will accept without demur any condition precedent to the story of a play, however impossible it might seem to the mind of the individual.

He should also be careful of the impressions only indirectly connected with his own art : a hint as to the meaning of this is given in § 16, where Carcinus is said to have wounded the religious sentiments of the audience. A tragedy must have psychology, and the characters, if they are to win sympathy, must be good ; it need not trench on religion or politics, but, if it does so, the prejudices of the audience should not be hurt. Similarly Clayton Hamilton (p. 28) illustrates the dependence of the dramatist on his audience by the fact that many important plays have become ineffective for later generations solely because they were founded on principles whereon later generations have ceased to believe.

The first is the least scientific : the word " scientific " is explained in *Sophistici Elenchi*, last paragraph, and in the Rhetoric (1355 b 36). The scientific is that which belongs to whole classes of cases, whereas the unscientific is what belongs to the special case. Hence the production of a contract, etc., is an unscientific plea, whereas what is based on the laws of human nature is a scientific plea. Similarly in the present

though most frequently employed, through incompetence, viz. by tokens. Such are either congenital, *e. g.* "the spear-head which the earth-born wear," or bright spots like those employed by Carcinus in the Thyestes; or they may be acquired, and these again physical, *e. g.* a scar; or external, *e. g.* a necklace, and the disclosure in the Tyro by means of the Ark. Such tokens can be employed with different degrees of dexterity; thus Odysseus's identity was disclosed by the scar to the Nurse and to the Swineherds, but not equally well; for the production of a mark in proof of an assertion, etc., is less scientific, whereas one which reveals the identity contrary to what is intended (as that in the Bath-scene) is preferable.

The second sort are proofs of identity fabricated [not by the costumier, but] by the poet, and therefore unscientific; such is Orestes's demonstration in the Iphigeneia that he is Orestes; for she discloses hers by her letter, whereas he has himself to say what is wanted—by the poet,

series of examples we proceed from the most casual to the most universal. It would be natural for any woman in Iphigeneia's circumstances to wish to communicate with her brother, and her disclosure of her identity is therefore scientific; but the scar of Odysseus belongs to the individual, and is therefore unscientific.

Tokens: the author has in mind his account of signs transmitted by heredity, in the *de Generatione Animalium* (721 b 30). According to Plutarch, the "spear-head" which the earth-clod, acting as the Mother of Cadmus's Sparti, impressed on her offspring was occasionally found even in his time (*de Sera Numinis vindicta*, § 21). The descendants of Pelops had a "bright spot" on their shoulders, commemorative of their ancestor's ivory shoulder. Similarly the Prophet Mohammed had on his shoulder a "seal of prophecy," which according to some was of sparkling brightness.

In the Tyro by means of the Ark: a play of Sophocles of which several fragments have been collected. It is not clear whether the ark whereby the sons of Tyro, who had been exposed in it, were identified had been preserved or was merely described by the shepherd.

§ 16. 1454 b 21—33.

but not by the story; wherefore it comes near the error that has been noted; for Iphigeneia might have had a notion of his appearance in her mind. So, too, in the Tereus of Sophocles is the Voice of the Shuttle.

The third process is effected by a mention or a sight which agitates the hero; as in the Cyprians of Dicaeogenes, where the sight of the picture makes him weep, and that in the Discourse before Alcinous,[1] where the minstrel's lay, rousing memories, draws his tears, and leads to disclosure.

The fourth process starts from observation of coincidence, as in the Choephoroe "Some one like me has come, there is no one like me save Orestes; clearly, then, Orestes has come." Or Polyidus the Sophist's suggestion for Iphigeneia: for Orestes would be likely to notice the coincidence that both his sister and he had been doomed to be sacrificed. So, too, in the Tydeus of Theodectes: "coming to find his son he is lost himself." Also that in the Phinidae: when the women saw the place, they noticed the fatality, that they were to be executed in the very place where they had also been exposed. There is another process compounded out of this and misleading the audience, as in Odysseus the False Messenger;[2] that Odysseus and no one else could string the bow is

Misleading of the audience: the misleading of the audience is a common device of novelists; AVONIANIUS says (*Dramatische Handwerkslehre*, p. 55), "if you would introduce a surprise, it should only be in the form of a disappointed expectation. The spectator had made up his mind that something definite was going to happen, and suddenly it all changes, and fresh and promising complications present themselves to his gaze." In a recent controversy on the probable end of *Edwin Drood* it was pointed out that the obvious clues were probably intended to mislead.

[1] Odyssey, viii. 533. [2] *Ibid.* xix. 586.

assumed in the fiction by Homer, though Penelope *thinks* "Odysseus will know the bow which this beggar has not seen;" to produce the disclosure by the *knowing*, when it was to have been by the *stringing*, is a case of misleading.

The best Disclosure of Mistaken Identity is that which proceeds without violation of probability from the actual composition of the story; such is the Disclosure in the Oedipus of Sophocles, and that in the Iphigeneia; for Iphigeneia might well want to dispatch a letter. Only this sort can dispense with fictitious evidence of identity and "necklaces." The next best are those which are due to the observation of coincidence.

§ 17. While composing the story, and helping it out with the diction, you should, so far as possible, *visualize* it; the poet will thus be, as it were, an eyewitness of the events, most likely to discover what is appropriate and

Only this sort can dispense with, etc.: in this sort there is no need for either what the author calls "necklaces," *i. e.* accidental tokens, or for special fictions. Where the natural construction of the events causes the person whose identity is mistaken to disclose it or get it disclosed, no adventitious fiction is required. In the two forms of the Iphigeneia it is clear that the heroine and hero are put into situations where they naturally disclose their identity; how Iphigeneia would have proved hers in Polyidus's scheme is unknown. For several of the cases of Observation of Coincidence laws have to be assumed, *e. g.* in that of the Choephoroe, the similarity of footprints, which may be regarded as a fiction. The objections that have been found to this sentence are obscure.

Visualize it: i. e. in your mind's eye (Gl.). Wallaschek (*Psychologie und Pathologie der Vorstellung*, p. 38) makes a similar observation: "the author of a spoken drama should be advised to settle the action of the piece as a pantomime in pictures, and not to rest until it is intelligible through these and these alone. The drama is no linguistic art, it is a scenic art, the art of representing in living pictures, helped by language, but not to be produced by language. The dramatist must be a sculptor, perhaps even a painter, but on no account a talker." Later on (§ 19) we are told that the language is used to make the action "agreeable."

alive to inconsistency. An indication of this is to be found in the inconsistency of which Carcinus was charged: the resurrection of his Amphiaraus out of a temple, which might well have escaped the thinker who failed to visualize, when on the stage shocked the spectators and wrecked the piece.

You should also, while composing, assist the work by your gestures so far as possible; for a fictitious emotion emanating from a reality of the same kind is most realistic; he who is feeling distress or anger can also counterfeit it

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The resurrection of his Amphiaraus out of a temple: according to Pausanias the people of Oropus were the first to regard Amphiaraus as a god, but were afterwards followed by others (i. 34 § 2); a god has indeed a temple, but comes *down*, not up: for "the heavens and the upper region were assigned by the ancients to the gods" (*de Caelo* 284 a 12); a ghost comes *up*, but out of a tomb. "The same things do not suit men and gods, tombs and temples" (Nic. Ethics 1123 a 10); whence the poet should have made up his mind which of the former Amphiaraus was to be.

Assist the work by your gestures, etc.: "it has always been a rule of the stage that gesture precedes utterance; to speak more precisely, gesture is the preparation for utterance" (WINDS, *Technik der Schauspielkunst*, p. 5). DESSOIR observes (p. 256) that many artists confess that they are automatically driven to mimetic or other expression of feelings which they would portray, *e. g.* the thought of a hero's anger makes them clench their fists. "The mental emotions of the poet arise through reaction upon the experienced symbols."

A fictitious emotion emanating from a reality of the same kind is most realistic: this is denied by many modern authorities: HARTMANN (p. 16) asserts that neither actor nor poet could carry out their function properly under the influence of emotion; the emotion must have cooled down and only the image remain in the recollection. DESSOIR's view in the above passage is nearly the same. LANGE (p. 180) says the actor by autosuggestion puts himself into such a feeling as, *e. g.* jealousy, but treats his body objectively rather than subjectively.

He who is feeling, etc.: in the analysis of LANGE it is shown that the artist has too many things to think of to be able to feel the emotions seriously when he is feigning them.

§ 17. 1455 a 27—33.

best. Hence poetry is the work of the finely constituted or the hysterical; for the hysterical are impressionable, whereas the finely constituted are liable to outbursts.

The argument, equally whether it has already been

Hence poetry is the work of the finely constituted or the hysterical; for the hysterical are impressionable, etc.: "the finely constituted" are to be told by the delicacy of their sense of touch (*de Anima* 421 a 24). That they are passionate is asserted in the Great Ethics (1203 b 1 compared with Nic. Ethics 1151 a 1). That the hysterical are readily impressionable is stated in the *Parva Naturalia* (464 b 2), where they are said to pass rapidly from one impression on to the next. The meaning of this is explained by M. NORDAU (*Degeneration*, 1895, p. 25): "The leading characteristic of the hysterical is the disproportionate impressionability of their psychic centres. They are, above all things, impressionable. From this primary peculiarity proceeds a second quite as important—the exceeding ease with which they can be made to yield to suggestion. The earlier observers always mentioned the boundless mendacity of the hysterical. They were mistaken; the hysterical subject does not consciously lie. He believes in the truth of his craziest inventions. The morbid mobility of his mind, the excessive excitability of his imagination, conveys to his consciousness all sorts of queer and senseless ideas. A result of the susceptibility of the hysterical subject to suggestion is his irresistible passion for imitation, and the eagerness with which he yields to all the suggestions of writers and artists. When he sees a picture he wants to become like it in attitude and dress," etc.

With regard to the proposition in the text it may be observed that the physiologist MÖBIUS (*Kunst und Künstler*, p. 95) merely confirms the fact that most artists are irritable and passionate. WALLASCHEK (*Psychologie*, p. 250 *sqq.*) deals with it experimentally and statistically. He calls attention to the fact that whereas the artist controls his frenzy, the madman is controlled by his; that under the word "madness" heterogeneous diseases are included by those who would prove genius to be a form of madness; and that the number of the geniuses in a country bears no proportion whatever to that of the inmates of asylums. WALLASCHEK'S distinction is somewhat neglected by Th. ACHELIS in his interesting monograph on ecstasy (*die Ekstase*, Berlin, 1902). DESSOIR (p. 263) says "if we mean by normal teleologically important, even we regard the man of genius as normal, however sickly or eccentric he may be."[23]

The argument, etc.: the phrases used here are technicalities of

§ 17. 1455 a 33—1455 b 1.

treated or whether you are treating it yourself for the first time, should be first stated in the abstract, then filled in with scenes to the requisite length. The argument, *e.g.* of the Iphigeneia could thus be presented to the imagination. A girl, supposed to be sacrificed, is mysteriously rescued from her butchers, and wafted to a land where it is customary to sacrifice strangers to the goddess of the place. This duty becomes hers as priestess, and after a time it comes to pass that her brother arrives (the fact that his coming was in obedience to an oracle, demanded for some reason which does not belong to the argument, and the object of his coming, are in the background of the story). Arriving, then, having been bound and being about to be slaughtered, he reveals his identity, whether by Euripides's device, or as Polyidus treated it, who makes him say, as he well might, "not only my sister, then, but I, too, was doomed to be sacrificed," which leads to his deliverance.

The names may now be inserted and the scenes composed; they should, however, be germane, *e.g.* in the case of "Orestes," the mad fit which led to his seizure and his

Logic, as will be seen from the Glossary. We have been told that it is the Poet's business to deal with principles; therefore, whether the story be an oft-handled theme, or one of his own composition, he ought first to make out clearly what principles he wishes to illustrate, and this applies to the dialogue as well as to the plot. So in the Bacchae we can imagine the poet thinking out the religious theory involved—that it is not for man to judge whether a cult is immoral or not, but to pay the gods their honours in all cases, and also thinking out the case of the man who resolves to defy an immoral god, and the fate which he must meet.

In the case of "Orestes" : i. e. in the Iphigeneia, analysed above. Plato (*Cratylus*, 394 e) calls attention to the suitability of this name to his wild and savage character. A mad fit is suitable for a person whose name signifies "rager."

§ 17. 1455 b 1—15.

rescue by virtue of the purification. In a play the scenes are concise, in a Romance they are spun out. Thus the main story of the Odyssey is of no great length. A man who has been long in exile, alone and dogged by the sea-god, whilst in the meantime his estate at home is wasted by suitors and there is a conspiracy against his son, finally arrives shipwrecked. He then reveals his identity to some persons, aided by three of them attacks and destroys his enemies, and survives himself. This is the main story, all the rest interlude.

§ 18. In every Tragedy one part is the tying, the other the loosing. The tying is constituted frequently by the background with some of the events in the foreground, while the remainder constitutes the loosing. A real tying, I hold, is one which stretches from the commencement to the exact point at which the change of fortune (in either direction) commences, while a real loosing is one that occupies the space from the transition-point to the end. Thus in the Lynceus of Theodectes the tying is constituted by the previous history, the seizure of the child, and subsequently of himself, whilst the loosing is from the murder-charge to the end.

There are four varieties of Tragedy, as there are four

By virtue of the purification: the word used in the text for "purification" also signifies "curing madness" (Introd. p. 59). Hence there was a peculiar appropriateness in the rescue of Orestes by this process, though the "cleansing" was not of the temperature, but of a statue.

There are four varieties: Introduction, p. 104. The author has enumerated four "coefficients" or essential factors of Tragedy (§ 6); by the theory of mixture the predominant element will give its name to the whole (*de Generatione* 321 a 35). Hence we may have a Plot Tragedy, a Psychological Tragedy, an Emotional Tragedy (it being the function of the Intelligence to produce emotion, § 19), or a Tragedy of appropriate expression. This last is explained in the Rhetoric (1408

factors. There is the Plot Tragedy, wherein the interest turns on the Irony of Fate and the Disclosure of Mistaken Identity; the Emotional Tragedy, of which those dealing with Ajax and Ixion are examples; the Psychological Tragedy, illustrated by the Phthiotides and Peleus; while the fourth is the Tragedy of appropriate expression, illustrated by the Phorcides, Prometheus, and those of which the scene is laid in the lower world.

You should try, if you can, to combine the beauties of all four, but if that be impossible, as many as possible of the most effective; especially as in these days an unfair demand is made upon the poet: for whereas there have been masters in each style, the modern dramatist is expected to excel each master in his own original

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a 10–31). The illustrations adduced have perished except the Prometheus: that has little of a plot, is more philosophical than psychological, and the characters are too far removed from us to arouse much sympathy; the success of the poet lies, then, in this—that he has made them speak in language worthy of gods and the like. "If the gods and heroes did speak, they would use Aeschylus's language."

This is the solution of the passage offered by cod. D. Cod. E offers "equable," which might perhaps agree with the word "simple," substituted for the fourth variety in § 24; but it is clear that this solution is excluded by what follows, where we are told that the best Tragedy should have all. That "simple" can be substituted must be due to the fourth factor being the vehicle for the other ingredients.

The treble classification is arrived at by Victor Hugo on another principle; he divided the audiences "into three classes—the thinkers who demand characterization, the women who demand passion, and the mob who demand action; and insists that every great play must appeal to all three classes at once" (Clayton Hamilton, p. 52). Another classification is attempted by Volkelt (*Ästhetik des Tragischen*): the Tragedy of external and that of internal conflict; the Tragedy of crime; and the tragedy of liberating and oppressing types. One far more detailed is offered by Prölss (*Katechismus der Dramaturgie*).

18. 1455 b 36—1456 a 8.

field. Nothing should decide the identity of Tragedies equally with the Story; the identity of Stories is decided by the matter which can be identically tied and loosed. Many can succeed with the tying, but fail with the loosing; both have to be mastered. It cannot be too often repeated that a Tragedy must not be turned into a Romance, *i.e.* a piece with endless interludes, such as the Iliad would make if dramatized as a whole. In the Iliad, where brevity is no object, each interlude can be treated at due length, but in a Tragedy—you never know what will happen. Thus the playwrights who have handled the Fall of Troy as a whole, instead of treating it in a series of plays like Euripides, or the Fortunes of Niobe, otherwise than as Aeschylus treated them, have either been hissed off the stage or met with a chill reception; for this only was the occasion of Agathon's failure. But when these dramatists handle the Irony of Fate or "simple stories" they compass their end excellently; for the same thing is tragic and edifying, and this takes place when a Sisyphus, wise, but wicked, is outwitted,

Nothing should decide, etc.: the introduction of the same characters does not render tragedies identical, but only employment of the same story; and the identity of stories is determined by such matter as admits of being "tied and loosed" identically. Thus, *e.g.*, the stories of Joseph and Hippolytus correspond with respect to the tying—*i.e.* the false accusation brought by a disappointed woman; but the loosing is quite different. If, however, the loosing had been the same, the difference of names and nationalities would not have prevented our calling the stories the same.

For the same thing is tragic and edifying: this rule has been anticipated above, where edification is co-ordinated with pity and fear as a proper effect of tragedy. It is, of course, true that tears are more easily drawn by the portrayal of generous conduct than by anything else. "If a man's character be virtuous, good will is felt towards him" (Great Ethics 1212 a 11).

§ 18. 1456 a 8—22.

and one who is brave, but in the wrong, defeated. And there is a probability about such a result, for, as Agathon says, the improbable has a tendency to occur.

The Chorus should regard itself as one of the actors and a member of the entirety, and should participate in the performance as Sophocles rather than as Euripides makes it. With most authors the Choric songs have no more to do with the story of one Tragedy than of another; whence some actually transfer songs from one piece to another, a practice which Agathon introduced. It would be as reasonable to transfer from one play to another a speech or a scene.

§ 19. Every factor has now been discussed except Diction or Intelligence. What concerns the latter should be looked for in the Rhetoric, to the topic of which it more properly belongs. To the province of Intelligence belong all the operations of which Speech is the instrument, of which the divisions are demonstration and refutation, the arousing of emotions, such as pity, fear, anger, etc., exaggeration and depreciation.

It is clear that in the action resort must be had to the same patterns, when situations that are terrible, piteous, grand or plausible have to be produced: the only difference being that the situations should manifest

As Sophocles rather than as Euripides: NIETZSCHE, *Geburt der Tragödie* (p. 100) points out that even Sophocles no longer ventures to assign the Chorus the chief share in the action, but confines the range of its activity so that it is almost co-ordinated with the spectators. HIRN (*Origins of Art*, p. 95) has the interesting observation that the Chorus has the important function of starting an emotion among the spectators. In any crowd the sympathy felt by a part is likely to spread among the whole; the chorus, therefore, in virtue of "the psychology of crowds, influences the spectators in the direction which the poet desires."[13]

§§ 18, 19. 1456 a 23—1456 b 5.

these qualities without interpretation, whereas in the declamation they should be produced by the speaker and be the effect of his style. For what would be the speaker's difficulty if the matter were going to prove charming without being rendered so by his expression of it?

Of the studies grouped round Language one is the Classification of Sentences, knowledge of which belongs to the science of Elocution or some similar discipline; which explains the difference between Command, Prayer, Narrative, Menace, Question, Reply, etc. No serious censure can fall on Poetry for ignorance of these matters. For wherein could one suppose the error to lie which is censured by Protagoras, viz. that Homer, under the impression that he is praying, is really commanding when he says, "Sing, goddess, the wrath"; "for to order some one to do or not to do is a command." This subject may then be left as unconnected with Poetry and belonging to another discipline.

§ 20. Of Speech in general the following are the parts:

What would be the speaker's difficulty, etc.: the meaning of this is explained in Rhetoric 1356 a 9, where the phrase here employed is shown to mean "by the mode of stating" as opposed to "by the matter of the speech" (*ibid.* 19). The other references are to the Eudemian Ethics (1241 b 8), where the word rendered "difficulty" is explained, and to the Metaphysics (1019 a 25), where it is pointed out that such a word as "speaker" can mean competent or skilful speaker. LANGE holds that the versification has the effect of rendering things tolerable which would be intolerable in prose. It is also obvious that if the mode of stating made no difference, there would be no occasion to study it; just as no study is required for the use of a musical box; but if the same matter stated one way will prove unattractive, whereas another mode of statement will render it attractive, the mode of stating requires study.

The Parts of Speech: the division begins with the least and proceeds to the most complicated utterance; and also from the least to the most

Letter, Combination, Conjunction (Separative), Noun, Verb, Inflexion, Statement. A *Letter* is a voice-unit, yet only such as is intended by nature to enter into intelligible utterance; for the lower animals have voice-units, which I do not call letters. A Letter may be Vocal, Semi-vocal or Mute. A Vowel is pronounced without collision and audible; a Semi-vowel is pronounced with collision and audible; a Mute is pronounced with collision, is by itself inaudible, but becomes audible with vowel or semi-vowel, *e.g.* G, D. They differ in the shape assumed by the mouth and the place whence they are produced, in breathing (hard or soft), in length (long or short), and intonation (acute, grave, intermediate); all these differences should be studied in the Prosody.

A *Combination* is an unmeaning utterance made up of a Mute and a Semi-vowel or Vowel; thus GR no less than GRA counts as a combination. The varieties of these, too, are for Prosody to study.

A *Conjunction* is a meaningless utterance, which ought

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significant. A letter is unmeaning, but goes to make a word; a conjunction is unmeaning, but goes to make a compound statement. The noun is fully significant, and the verb is so, too, but adds the notion of time. Finally, the statement consists of significant elements. The noun would further be divided by the ten Categories, which give the ultimate genera of things; whence "white" would be noun of the Category Quality, "he was white" verb of the same; "killing," noun of the Category Doing, "he killed" verb, etc.

A Combination: this rendering has been preferred to syllable, because of the illustration GR to which we should not give that name. The genuineness of the illustration GR is rendered certain by Metaphysics 1093 a 22, where it is argued that if any inference can be drawn from the combinations Z (= DS), X (= KS), and *Psī*, the same must apply to GR, which might be represented equally by a single sign.

A Conjunction: this can be defined either negatively or positively. "But," "and," etc., by themselves convey no meaning, and convey

not to be put at the beginning of a statement by itself, *e.g.* "indeed," "either," "but," or "a meaningless utterance, intended to make one intelligible utterance out of a number of intelligible utterances."

A *Separative* is a meaningless utterance, which indicates the beginning, end or limitation of a statement, *e.g.*—; or "a meaningless utterance neither preventing nor constituting a single significant utterance out of several, capable of being placed at the beginning, middle or end."

A *Noun* is a significant group of sounds in themselves meaningless, destitute of the notion of time; in compound nouns the elements are treated as meaningless of themselves, *e.g.* in the name Theodore the element *Dore*.

A *Verb* is a group of sounds in themselves meaningless, as in the case of nouns, associated with the notion of time: for whereas "man" or "white" does not indicate when, "walks" or "walked" conveys the additional notion of present or past.

An *Inflexion* of noun or verb signifies either case

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none in an isolated sentence; the positive definition is that they serve to unify separate utterances, whence the twenty-four books of the Iliad become one statement by their aid, while they also can couple utterances that are not statements, *e.g.* nouns and verbs.

A Separative: this has the same character as the Conjunction in that it hovers somewhere between being significant and the opposite, but differs in that it can be put at the beginning, middle or end of a sentence. The illustrations are written in the MSS. as abbreviations; and the definition bears some resemblance to those of the "prooem" and "period" in the Rhetoric, bk. iii. There is nothing surprising about the use of the word "joint" or "limb" (*colon*) in the sense of "indication of the beginning or end of a joint, *i.e.* clause"; nor would it be difficult to produce parallels from other languages to the employment of particles which merely indicate the beginning of a sentence, and perhaps the end; only it does not appear that the Greek language uses them.

§ 20. 1457 a 3—18.

(*e. g.* "his," "him"), or *number* ("man," "men"), or *mood*, such as interrogative or imperative; "walked" or "was walking" is a verbal inflexion of this style.

A *Statement* is a group of significant sounds, one of which is the equivalent of a substantive in the nominative case; it is not necessarily made up of nouns and verbs, *e. g.* the definition of Man [biped land animal]; but [though there can be a statement without a verb], it must always have the equivalent of a substantive in the nominative case, *e. g.* in "cleon is walking," "Cleon."

A statement is *one* in two senses: either [analytically] as signifying one thing, or [synthetically] as the colligation

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One of which is the equivalent, etc.: a statement can be either the substitute for a name, or it can be an assertion. The question to what extent things other than substantives admit of definition is discussed in the Metaphysics (1030 a), and the results there reached are assumed here. Anything with which the word "is" can be associated admits of definition; primarily, however, only the substantive can be defined.

As in cleon is walking, etc.: in the verbal sentence there must always be a substantival subject, for otherwise the sentence would give no meaning. The prefixing of the article in Greek signifies this "substantivity," as is pointed out in Metaphys. 1030 a 26; an attempt has been made to represent the difference above by the use of the capital and the small letter.

Either as signifying one thing: the references are to Metaph. 1046 a 12, 1006 a 31, and Post. Analytics 93 b 36. The question which occupies a considerable part of the former treatise is what gives unity to *e. g.* "man," why is he not many, animal + biped + etc. The reply is that these are not co-ordinate, but stand to each other in the relation of matter and form respectively; a single statement, then, is, "what states one thing of one object not accidentally." Hence the rendering "a statement is one either analytically or synthetically" would be correct; in either case we mean that it is capable of being labelled by one name (Metaphys. 1030 a 15); but in the former it is the connotation of the name, in the latter its material content. The illustration of "meaning one" given in the second passage quoted is "say 'man' means biped animal, then if there exist such a thing as a man, 'biped animal' will

of several statements; thus the Iliad is one statement in the latter sense, whereas the definition of "Man" is so in the former sense.

§ 21. A Noun may be either *simple*, *i.e.* not composed of significant elements, *e.g.* "earth"; or *double*, and this again may be made up of either a significant and a non-significant element, only not treated as significant in the noun, or of significant elements (in the same sense). Cases might occur of triple, quadruple, and multiple nouns, *e.g.* most of the hotch-potch words, "Hermus-Caicus-Xanthus-[watered]."

A noun is either an ordinary appellation, or a dialectic name, or a metaphorical appellation, or a euphemism

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constitute its essence." The single statement, then, is an analysis of the notions which go to constitute a single notion.

Hotch-potch words : literally "words of the *megalleion* type." *Megalleion* was the name of a perfume which was supposed to contain more ingredients than any other (Theophrastus, *de Odoribus*, §§ 29, 30, 35). Dioscorides (*ob.* 100 A.D. ?) says it was no more made in his time. But it seems as though a vestige of the true interpretation of this word were to be found in the reading of MS. D *galiôtôn*, with reference to the Arabian perfume called *ghâliah* (mosca galiata), a mixture of musk, ambergris and oil of ben. See DUCANGE, *s.v.*

A metaphorical appellation : the subject of Metaphor is dealt with at length by A. BIESE in *Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen in Grundlinien dargestellt*, 1893. The references to the subject in classical authors are put together by GERBER, *Die Sprache als Kunst* (ii. 72, foll., 1885), where various modes of classifying metaphors are given. LANGE (p. 292) brings the pleasure derived from metaphors under his formula of conscious self-deception, *i.e.* identifying and failing to identify at the same time. Probably the pleasure is similar to that found by Aristotle in paintings, *i.e.* partly that of identifying, partly admiration for the skill of the artist. FECHNER, who discusses this subject (*Vorschule*, i. 221), says that similes please (1) in proportion to the facility with which the combination can be understood, (2) the greater the apparent incongruity between the things compared, (3) the more unusual and surprising the mode of combination. He adds with justice that the

(either a coined word, or a lengthened, contracted or altered appellation).

An ordinary appellation is what is used by a particular community, a dialectic name what is used by another community of the same race; whence clearly the same appellation may be both ordinary and dialectic, though not with the same community; so *sigynon* is ordinary with the Cyprians, dialectic with us; and *dory* conversely.

Metaphor is the application of a strange name, either from the genus to a species, or from a species to the genus, or from one species to another, or by analogy.

An example of transference from a genus to a species is "Here stands my bark"; [1] for "standing" is a genus of

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nature of the associations evoked by the image is also of great importance. The observation in the Rhetoric that images which suggest motion are more effective than those which are without it seems true. The "cup of Ares" is ineffective, because the use of the cup is absolutely different from that of the shield; but "the scythe or sickle of death" is effective.

Euphemism: Aristotle's theory that the poetical language is wilful alteration of ordinary language, and not necessarily archaism (or preservation of older strata of the language), receives curious confirmation from the facts adduced by BÜCHER (*Arbeit und Rhythmus*, p. 353) in confirmation of his theory that the rhythm was furnished by the nature of the labour which the song first accompanied, to which the language had to be adapted with some violence. "To suit the rhythm the people of the Andaman islands alter and shorten the words of their language, so that they may be said to have a poetical language of their own. It is not unusual for the author of a new poem to begin by instructing both the singers and the public in its meaning in ordinary language." The collections made by the Arabs of the licences of their own poets are very similar to those which Aristotle collects here; a treatise on the former subject has been translated by the present writer (*Letters of Abu'l-'Ala*, No. xxviii.). Additional examples of the practice of employing unintelligible or only partly intelligible words in early poetry are furnished by WALLASCHEK, *Anfänge*, p. 196.

[1] Odyssey i. 185.

§ 21. 1457 b 2—10.

which being moored is a species; from a species to a genus "Verily a *myriad* boons hath Odysseus wrought"; [1] for "myriad" is a species of multitude; from one species to another "after he had drawn the life-blood with the bronze, and had cut it with the sharp-edged bronze," where by "draw" he means "cut," and by "cut" "draw"; both of these being species of the genus "remove."

By Analogy I mean the case in which B is to A as D to C; when D may be used for B or B for D; and at times the poet mentions A or C as the case may be. Thus the Cup (B) is to Dionysus (A) as is the Shield (D) to Ares (C); the poet may then call the cup "Dionysus's Shield" and the Shield "Ares's Cup." [2] Or, Old Age (B) is to Life (A) as Evening (D) to Day (C); Evening may then be called (as by Empedocles) Day's old age, and old age Life's eventide, or sunset. In certain cases one or other of the four has no name in the language, but the figure may still be employed; thus the discharging of [the stone] by the date is called "sowing," whereas discharging the flame

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After he had drawn the life-blood with the bronze, and had cut it, etc.: these half-lines apparently come from a medical poem, and refer, the first to the use of the knife, the second to that of the cup; the knife used in surgery was of bronze (Problems 863 a 25), and the cup for bleeding was of the same material (*infra*). The medical poet (probably Empedocles) then spoke of drawing blood with the knife, and cutting with the cup, when the reverse was true. The word "cutting" in a medical context, *i. e.* removing superfluous humour with the knife, is used of an operation on the dropsical in *de Generatione Animalium* 789 b 15. Here it refers to the incisions made with the lancet before applying the cup.

The discharging of [*the stone*] *by the date:* the reference is to the Meteorology, where the origin of the meteoric flame is said to be by "squeezing out," and is compared to the process whereby a date

[1] Iliad ii. 272.

[2] Timotheus in Bergk's *Lyrici Graeci* iii. 625.

from the sun has no name; still the "sowing" is to the date as the nameless act is to the sun; whence the poet may say "sowing the god-created flame." There is yet another way in which this form of Metaphor may be employed, viz. to substitute the improper appellation, but with a negation of one of the properties associated with the object; so you might call the Shield the Wineless instead of Ares's Cup.

A coined word is one not actually used by any community, and invented by the poet; there appear to be cases of this sort, *e.g. erinyges* for "horns," *prayer* for "priest." A lengthened word is one which has either a long vowel substituted for a short, or a syllable inserted, as *polēos, Pelēiadeo;* a contracted word one of which a part is suppressed, *e.g. krī* for *krīthē*, *dō* for *dōma*, and "one out of both becomes the si(ght)." [1]

A word is *protracted*, when, leaving part of the original, the poet remodels the rest, *e.g.* "the righter breast" for "the *right* breast."

Nouns themselves are masculine, feminine, or neuter; masculine such as terminate in N, R, S, or compounds of S (PS, X); feminine such as terminate in the long vowels (Ē, Ō), and among such as admit of lengthening A; whence there are the same number of masculine as of feminine terminations (for the compounds of S do not

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discharges its stone; "some [flaming bodies] are cast by being squeezed out, like the stones out of dates, so that they are seen falling on land and sea both at night-time and in the daytime in a clear sky" (342 a 10); and the same comparison recurs in 369 a 22. He uses the same word as is here rendered "sowing," only in the compound διασπείρειν of this process in reference to the meteors (369 a 35; cp. 341 b 33).

[1] Fragment of Empedocles.

21. 1457 b 28—1458 a 14.

count as separate letters). No noun ends in a mute or in an invariably short vowel. Three end in I, five in U. Neuters in these (*i.e.* vowels which admit of lengthening), N, S.

§ 22. The excellence of Diction is to be clear and not common. The clearest is that in which ordinary appellations only are employed, but it is common; the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus illustrates this. The diction which embodies extraordinary appellations is stately and above the common pitch. By "extraordinary" I mean dialectic names, metaphors, protractions, and everything that is not ordinary. Only if you make all your phrases of this sort, the result will be either a riddle or gibberish, a riddle if you make them out of metaphors, gibberish if out of dialectic names.

For the formula for a riddle is "to state an impossibility, meaning a reality" (which cannot be done according to the original intention of the words but can be done metaphorically, *e.g.* "I saw a man who to a man did glue bronze with fire"), while the same sort of sentence made

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The formula for a riddle: this definition would apply to the Pythian oracles, *e.g.* "when a mule shall reign over the Persians," where the reigning of a mule is impossible, but mule is used metaphorically for one whose mother is nobler than his father. The definition somewhat limits the scope of the "riddle," of which a classification is attempted by Gerber, *Die Sprache als Kunst*, ii. 384.

Which cannot be done according to the original intention of the words: *i.e.* the purpose for which the names were made up of letters. In the Rhetoric (1405 b 1), where this riddle is again quoted, it is observed that the process of attaching the cup to the skin is "nameless," whence another species of "attaching," viz. glueing, is used instead. The rest of the riddle is preserved by Athenaeus (p. 320), who gives a long account of Greek riddles (*griphi*).

The same sort of sentence made up of dialectic words: the poem of Lycophron would have come under this description.

§§ 21, 22. 1458 a 15—30.

up of dialectic words is gibberish. It should, then, be a sort of mixture of the two; for the one element will produce choiceness and refinement, viz. dialectic forms, metaphor, euphemism, and the other varieties enumerated; while the normal appellation will produce clearness. The clearness and choiceness are greatly assisted by the lengthenings, dockings, and alterations of the nouns; for such words, by the fact that they differ from the normal and so are unusual, will produce choiceness, whilst the clearness will remain owing to their having something in common with the usual appellation. Hence those critics are in the wrong who censure this style of language, and ridicule Homer, like the older Eucleides, who, to show that versification would be easy if he were permitted to lengthen any vowel that he liked, composed a hexametric lampoon in the vernacular—

I saw Ēpichārēs walking tō Mārāthon,

and

You would not [get] such digestible hellebore as his.

To employ these licences to a noticeable extent is indeed

A hexametric lampoon: the use of the word Iambus in this sense is got from the statements in § 4, where we are told that the Lampoon was a pre-Homeric style, and that the invention of the iambic metre was post-Homeric. Clearly then, if the Lampoon was metrical, as it "naturally" was, its original metre was the hexameter.

In the vernacular: i. e. "without 'harmony,' or mixture with the unfamiliar," such as the hexameter requires (Rhetoric 1408 b 33).

You would not [get] such digestible hellebore, etc.: the word for "digestible" is used frequently by Theophrastus, and appears to be purely prosaic. The line would seem to be recommendation of an alienist to some one charged with madness, on the ground that this particular alienist's hellebore was excellent. According to Aristotle hellebore could not in any case be digested, as no drug could be.

§ 22. 458 a 31—b 11.

ridiculous; but moderation is equally necessary in all varieties, for you would produce the same result by infelicitous and intentionally ludicrous employment of metaphors, dialectic names, and the other varieties. The superiority of the suitable had best be studied in the case of the hexameters by putting the nouns into the centre; and in the case of dialectic words, metaphors, and the other varieties too, by substitution of normal appellations you would see that what we say is true. Thus the alteration of a single word by Euripides in a line composed by Aeschylus, consisting in the substitution of a dialectic name for an ordinary appellation, made it seem fine instead of commonplace—

Aeschylus's line in the Philoctetes is:

The gangrene which this foot doth eat;

Euripides substituted "feasting on this foot."

So in the line [1]

Now he a craven, caitiff and unsightly,

if any one recites it with substitution of common words:

Now he a small man, weakly and ungainly,

and for

In the case of the hexameters: for it is only this metre that requires a special vocabulary, or alteration in the quantities of words.

Putting the nouns into the centre: the centre is "the beginning, middle, and end of the size" (Physics 265 b 5), in the case of the circle, of whose motion recurrence is an imitation (*de Generatione* 338 b 11 and 337 a 7). "Putting the nouns into the centre" means, then, making them the fixed element to which the metre must be accommodated, instead of accommodating them to the metre. Suppose, then, that instead of making the hexameter commence with a dactyl, and so altering *ōlŏmĕnēn* to *oulŏmĕnēn*, we permit the hexameter to commence with a tribrachys, we shall then see that the altered form has a beauty of its own apart from the fact that it is required for the metre.

[1] Odyssey ix. 515.

Setting a formless chair and table weak,[1]
Setting a wretched chair and table small,

or "the beach shrieks" for "the beach thunders."[2] Ariphrades, too, used wrongly to ridicule the Tragedians for using expressions which no one would employ in conversation, such as "the house away from" rather than "away from the house," "thine" [for "yours"], "him I," "Achilles about" rather than "about Achilles," etc.; for through not being found in ordinary diction all such variations produce the effect of choiceness; of which the critic was unaware. Important, however, as it is to make suitable employment of each of the licences enumerated, of compounds and of dialectic words, it is still more important that the poet should have the gift of original metaphor. For this only cannot be borrowed from any one else, and is a sign of talent. For to coin metaphors with skill means ability to see the likeness in things.

Of appellations compounds are most suitable for dithyrambs, dialectic words for hexameters, metaphors for iambics. In hexameters, indeed, all the sorts enumerated may be employed; in iambics, owing to the fact that ordinary conversation is closely imitated, such appellations are suitable as might be used in prose. These are ordinary appellations, metaphor and euphemism.

This must be sufficient on the subject of Tragedy in the sense of histrionic fiction.

§ 23. With regard to that form of fiction which is narrative and in hexameters, it is clear that the story should be so constructed as to be "dramatic," *i.e.*

[1] Odyssey xx. 259. [2] Iliad xvii. 265.

embracing one whole and complete chapter of life, with beginning, middle, and end, that like one complete figure it may produce the gratification for which it is designed; and that they should not be monotonous chronicles of the familiar kind, wherein the author must of necessity treat not one chapter of life, but all the events happening within one period in connexion with one or more personages, however casual the relation between those events may have been. For just as the sea-fight of Salamis and the battle of the Carthaginians in Sicily took place simultaneously, without being directed towards the same end, so there may be combination of events in succession, which do not produce one result. Now practically the bulk of the poets commit this mistake. For this reason, as we have already observed, Homer might seem specially inspired, in that he did not attempt to make a poem out of the War as a whole, although it had a beginning and

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Monotonous chronicles of the familiar kind: "Life itself presents a continuous sequence of causation stretching on, and nature abhors an ending as it abhors a vacuum. Any end, therefore, to a novel or a play must be in the nature of an artifice; and an ending must be planned, not in accordance with life, which is lawless and illogical, but in accordance with art, whose soul is harmony" (CLAYTON HAMILTON, p. 170). This passage well interprets Aristotle's doctrine, though it is unlikely that Mr. HAMILTON was thinking of the Poetics. Aristotle, however, extends this proposition only to the ordinary chronicles, since it is clear that such an event as the Trojan War is a natural unity, and the same would be the case with the Indian Mutiny and many other chapters of history; but ordinarily the *praxis* cannot be the unit.

There may be combination of events in succession: combination in simultaneity might be represented by being on the same plane; combination in succession by being on the same line. The juxtaposed events in time may be steps towards a result, *e. g.* loading a pistol and firing it; but they may lead to nothing, *e. g.* loading a pistol and unloading it.

§ 23. 1459 a 20—32.

an end, since the story would have been incomprehensibly lengthy, or to portray it at moderate length, but overcrowded with incident. Instead, having selected a chapter out of it, he has employed many of the chapters as episodes, *e.g.* the Catalogue of the Ships, and otherwise relieves the fiction with episodes. The others, such as the author of the Cypria or the Little Iliad, group their matter round a single personage, or a single period, or if they take a single chapter, it is one with many sections. Hence the Iliad and Odyssey each furnish material for one Tragedy apiece, or, at most, two, while the Cypria has provided themes for many, and the Little Iliad for more than eight —the Award of the Arms, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus, Eurypylus, the Mendicant, the Spartan Women, the Storming of Troy, the Departure of the Ships, Sinon, the Trojan Women.

§ 24. Further, Epic should have the same varieties as Tragedy, *i.e.* should be Simple, or Complex, or Psychological, or Emotional ; and its factors, with the exception of Music and Presentation, are the same; for the Irony of Fate, Disclosure of Mistaken Identity, and Catastrophe are required ; further, the Intelligence and the Diction should be of good quality. All these are adequately embodied by their originator, Homer. For each of the two poems is constructed in the same way as a Tragedy, the Iliad so as to be Simple and Emotional, the Odyssey Complex (for there is Disclosure of Identity throughout) and Psychological. Besides this, he has excelled every one in diction and thought.

The Epic differs from Tragedy both in the length to which it may run and in the metre. For the length, the limit that has been suggested will suffice; viz. it should be

possible to embrace beginning and end in one view. For this purpose the pieces would have to be shorter than the classic epics, but might extend to the length of the number of tragedies produced at a single entertainment.

There is one feature peculiar to the Epic which permits of its length being greatly increased. Whereas in Tragedy several portions of the story cannot be presented simultaneously, but only that on which the actors are actually engaged : in an Epic the narrative form permits of the simultaneous enactment of many portions, whereby, without irrelevancy, the bulk of the poem is swelled. This conduces to stateliness, to the diversion of the hearer, and variation of the character of the scenes; for it is the want of variety which, by causing satiety, brings tragedies to grief.

The suitability of the heroic metre to the Epic has been proved by experience. If you were to try narrative fiction in any other metre or metres, it would not suit : of all metres the heroic is the most sedate, and yet the most ambitious, whence it most readily admits dialectic names, metaphors and every other ornament ; for the narrative imagery is also superior to other sorts. Iambics and trochaics go with motion, the latter that of the Dance, the former that of active life. [It would be absurd to

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For the narrative imagery is also superior to other sorts : of imagery. This clause is inserted to reconcile the statement in the text with that above and that of Rhetoric 1406 b 3, where it is asserted that metaphors best suit iambics. It is, of course, true that the lengthy simile is better suited to Epic than to Drama. In the account of the simile in the Rhetoric it is said to belong to the genus Metaphor (1406 b 20); and in the Topics it is said to be produced by imitation (140 a 14, with reference to images in general). This is the only place in the Poetics where the word *mimesis* is used for imagery.

§ 24. 1459 b 20—1460 a 1.

employ either of these for the sedate style] and still more, like Chaeremon, to mingle them. No one, therefore, has ever succeeded in composing a lengthy piece of narrative fiction except in heroic metre; as we said, instinct guides the poet to the selection of the metre which is suitable for each purpose.

Besides his other merits, Homer has that of being the only poet who recognizes what part he should take himself. He ought, of course, to say as little as possible in his own person, since he is not *feigning* therein; whereas, then, the others rarely and only for a time impersonate, and ordinarily declaim, he, after a brief introduction, brings on the stage a man or woman, or some other *character*, none characterless, but each with a personality of his or her own.

While the marvellous should, as has been seen, be introduced into a Tragedy, that intensifier of the marvellous, "poetic justice," can be more easily introduced

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That intensifier of the marvellous, "poetic justice": with reference to § 9, where it is explained that "poetic justice" produces marvel, and indeed this is true of "correspondence" generally when it comes about naturally. At the funeral of Augustus people "vainly marvelled that his death-day and accession-day were the same; that he had died in the same room as his father," etc. (Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 9). The correspondence in the case of Hector is that just as he had spared the rest of the Danaans and attacked Patroclus only (Iliad xvi. 731), so the rest of the Danaans refrain from attacking him, and leave him to Achilles (xxii. 205). An excellent case of poetic justice, but, as Aristotle observes, difficult to manage, because the Danaans will scarcely refrain of themselves, and if Achilles prevents them, he will have to *nod to them with the back of his head;* whence this feature is in § 25 described as an impossibility. The emendation of VICTORIUS (or his friend FR. MEDICI), *the unnatural* for "correspondence," cannot easily be defended; for we know from § 25 that the details of the Pursuit of Hector were criticized not as unnatural, but as impossible; and it does not appear to have been Aristotle's opinion that the

into an Epic, because the author's eyes are not fixed upon the performer. For, indeed, the "Pursuit of Hector" would look ridiculous on the stage, Achilles [who is running] nodding back to the Danaans, who are standing still and not pursuing;[1] but in the narrative this escapes notice. Now the marvellous is appetizing, as may be seen from the fact that the recounter always adds something, by way of being agreeable.

Homer has also been the great teacher to his fellows of the way to romance. The process is illusion. When the

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unnatural was the best producer of wonder; where (*de Caelo* 269 a 7) he speaks of a theory as involving what is marvellous and wholly unnatural, he is not thinking of the wonder which delights. Moreover, we are to learn in this section that the "unnatural" has the same sphere in Romance as in Tragedy, viz. it must be in the background, if at all.

The marvellous is appetizing: according to Rhetoric 1371 a 31 marvelling produces the desire to make a thing out, and in making it out there is restoration to one's natural condition, which constitutes pleasure.

Adds something: the form of addition meant is "the picturesque detail," and the rest of the sentence occurs in the Rhetoric (1417 a 10), where it is stated that when we are repeating a story about a matter of which we know nothing at first hand, still we take a definite view of the situation. Among Homer's merits, then, is the discovery of the value attaching to the picturesque detail. VICTORIUS'S emendation quite mars the connexion of the sentence here.

The process is illusion: the matter is also explained in Rhetoric 1417 a 6, where the reference is given more precisely to the verse "the old woman held her face with her hands [and shed hot tears]" (Odyssey xix. 361, 2); "for those who begin crying put their hands on their eyes." The process is now called "attention to detail." What people know is neither that Euryclea shed tears nor that she put her hands to her face; what they do know is that shedding tears is accompanied by putting the hands to the face. What is true is consistent; thence people wrongly infer that what is consistent is true. The practice, therefore, of adding picturesque details is recommended to the orator who is stating what is false: "for these are plausible, and these things

[1] Iliad xxii. 205.

existence or occurrence of one thing is regularly attended by the existence or occurrence of another, people, if the second be there, suppose that the first, too, is real or actual; which is a fallacy. If, therefore, the first be a fiction, but were it real, something else would by law of nature exist or occur, append that other thing; for the mind, knowing that law of nature to be true, falsely supposes that the statement is true. (Example: that in the "Bath-scene.")

You should prefer a plausible impossibility to an unconvincing possibility; and the account should not be made up out of unaccountable elements; it had best contain none, but if it contain any, it should keep them in the background, as does the Oedipus Oedipus's ignorance of the mode in which Laius met his death, rather than like the report of the Pythian Games in the Electra,[1] where it

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which they know [*i. e.* that A accompanies B] become evidence of what they do not know [the truth of A or of B]."[2] The ordinary cross-examination implies, of course, the recognition of this principle.

A plausible impossibility: in the *Poetik* of RÖTTEKEN (pp. 141 foll.) an attempt is made to classify and estimate the violations of possibility which may be introduced. He rightly assigns great importance to the subjective element; if one have been brought into a proper condition of creepiness, one will not be greatly surprised by the appearance of a ghost. Both metre and music lull the critical power.

The account should not be made up, etc.: the unnatural, *i. e.* what violates natural or ordinary causation, ought not to be an integral part of the story. RÖTTEKEN gives the rule (p. 146) that, if the poet decides to employ the unnatural, instead of trying to keep it in the background, he had better emphasize it and thoroughly prepare the hearer for it.

The report of the Pythian Games in the Electra: the Pythian contest first included chariot-racing in the year 582, according to Pausanias (X. vii. § 3). Sophocles, then, by introducing it in the days of Orestes was committing an anachronism which most of his hearers would be able

[1] Sophocles, Electra 680–760.

§ 24. 1460 a 21—31.

is in the foreground, or in the Mysians the man's coming without speaking from Tegea to Mysia. It is ridiculous to urge that the story would come to grief [without such unaccountable features]; the story should not have required them from the start. If, however, the poet introduce one, and the possibility of more intelligible procedure be obvious, it is preposterous also: thus the unnatural features in the Disembarking of Odysseus in the Odyssey [1] would, if portrayed by an inferior poet, be unbearable; as it is, the absurdity is concealed by the poet's other fascinations.

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to detect; for the institution was comparatively modern; and the public games were the chief topic of fashionable conversation in Athens (Aristophanes, *Vespae* 1190). Where the anachronism is not glaring, Aristotle would probably have regarded it as unobjectionable, whence he does not complain of Iphigeneia sending a letter, though throughout his works he is most careful himself about the use of the word "write."

In the Mysians: a play of this name by Aeschylus is sometimes cited. A man with blood upon his hands could (apparently) address no one else (cf. Herodotus i. 35); and that Telephus was in this condition is implied by the poet Amphis in Athenaeus 224 e. The question is where the difficulty lay in a man getting from Tegea to Mysia without speaking. A suggestion for the answer to this is given by Herodotus, who takes care to observe that the Phrygian ceremonial in the matter of the bloodguilty was the same as that of the Greeks; but according to Aristotle the execution of human beings was thought nothing of by barbarians (Natural History 673 a 25), whence the barbarians are not likely to have known the "customary modes of expiation" understood by the Greeks (Politics 1262 a 31). Hence the "unnatural element" lay in making barbarians understand a Greek rite which could mean nothing to them. See in general Frazer's account of the mark set on Cain in the volume of essays on Anthropology dedicated to Tylor.

The unnatural features in the Disembarking of Odysseus: viz. in the first place, that the ship should run aground "to about half its length, being vigorously driven," without waking Odysseus, especially as he was anxious to see smoke ascending from his country (i. 58). This

[1] Odyssey xiii. 119.

Special care should be taken with the diction in the "flat" passages, *i.e.* where there is neither psychology nor reasoning; for, conversely, over-brilliant diction obscures both the psychology and the reasoning.

§ 25. The following mode of consideration will make it clear how many formulæ there are of critical questions and solutions and what their character is. Since the poet is a portrayer, no less than a painter or other maker of figures, he must always be portraying one of the three following types : the real (past or present), the traditional (or conventional), or the ideal. These are set forth in ordinary language, or in dialectic words and metaphors. Ordinary words are subjected to various treatment, for "such licence is permitted poets." Further, moral

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"appetite" should have been sufficient to move him (*de Motu Animalium* 701 a 35).

Over-brilliant diction obscures, etc. : the principle here adumbrated is that called by FECHNER (*Vorschule*, ii. 263) the economical employment of means, or the smallest exertion. This principle seemed to some philosophers sufficiently important to be made the fundamental doctrine of Aesthetic. The observation has already been quoted from the Rhetoric that the diction must be accommodated to the character; grandiloquence is unsuited to the humbler characters in the play.

The real . . . the conventional, or the ideal : this is introducing a wholly different system of division from that which preceded. The meaning of Idealism is discussed at length in the second volume of FECHNER'S *Vorschule der Aesthetik*, esp. pp. 105 foll. This author advises that the real be only departed from when the advantages of doing so outweigh the disadvantages; interesting cases which he discusses are whether a statue of Napoleon should be nude, or whether a modern emperor should be represented dressed as a Roman Emperor. His analysis of the concept of idealizing distinguishes the cases in which the individual is idealized and that in which the type is idealized. With Aristotle, who regards the individual of poetry as the type, this analysis would have little or no meaning.

Such licence is permitted poets : quotation from Isocrates, *Euagoras*, p. 190.

§§ 24, 25. 1460 b 3—12.

correctness and poetical correctness are not the same, nor is correctness according to any other science identical with poetical correctness. Poetical incorrectness can be of two kinds, direct and indirect. Inability on the artist's part to portray a theme in the manner which he has elected is one error; another is wrong election (*e.g.* to portray a horse with both his off-legs thrown forward), or violation of any science, medical or other, only not poetry, according to which the fiction is impossible. From these points of view we may find the solutions to the objections raised by critics.

First, " the impossible, even as fiction, has been represented " : we admit the incorrectness, but there is no harm if the fiction attains its end (stated above, viz. making the particular passage or some other more marvellous); *e.g.* the Pursuit of Hector. If, however, accuracy according to the rules of the science involved would not have interfered with the realization of the end in some degree, there is harm ; for, if possible, there should be no incorrectness anywhere.

Next, to which side does the error belong—to what concerns the art immediately or to something indirectly connected with it ? For it is a lighter error for the painter not to know that a hind is hornless than to paint it so as not to resemble a hind.

Moral correctness and poetical correctness are not the same : a reply to the criticisms in Plato's Republic on the morality of the Homeric poems. The dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles may be poetical, though it would be highly improper in actual warfare.

Medical : with reference to Plato's criticism on a Homeric prescription. For the horse see *de progressu Animal.* 712 b.

Its end (stated above) : in § 24, where we were told what the impossibility was, and that it produced that " correspondence " which is the source of the marvellous.

§ 25. 1460 b 13—31.

Next, if the criticism is that the thing is untrue, perhaps the solution should be in the style of Sophocles's observation that his own characters were ideal, whereas those of Euripides were realistic. If neither of these solutions will serve, perhaps we may reply that it is traditional; *e.g.* the [Homeric] theology, for perhaps it is neither edifying nor true, but it may be as Xenophanes describes it: "however, that is the tradition." In other cases the reply may be that though unedifying it represents the facts; thus the line which describes the spears as stuck erect on their *ferules* [1] may be defended on the ground that this was the practice of the time, as it is even now that of the Illyrians.

Where the question concerns the propriety of an utterance or performance, it must be judged not only on its abstract merits, but in relation to subject, object, occasion, beneficiary and purpose, *e.g.* advantage to be secured or detriment to be averted.

In some cases the objection may be answered by an examination of the expression, *e.g.* reference to dialectic usage, in the case of "first he struck the *urees*," [2] where the word may perhaps signify not "mules," but "guards"; or in that of Dolon, "who was ill-shapen," [3] which may mean not "misshapen," but "ill-favoured," since the Cretans apply the term well-shapen to the well-favoured in countenance; or that of "mix it livelier," [4] which may mean not "stronger," as for fuddlers, but "quicker."

Erect on their ferules: according to the Platonic dialogue Ion, strategy was a necessary part of the equipment of the Homeric critic. The objection in this case is not clear.

[1] Iliad x. 152. [2] *Ibid.* i. 50. [3] *Ibid.* x. 316. [4] *Ibid.* ix. 902.

§ 25. 1460 b 31—1461 a 16.

Other [difficult] phrases are cases of transference, *e.g.* "The other gods and horse-armed men were sleeping all the night," simultaneously with "whenever he turned his gaze to the Trojan plain, the din of pipes and reeds . . ."; for "all" is used for "many" by transference [of species to genus], since "all" is a case of "much"; just as "she alone has no share [in Ocean flood]" is by transference [of genus to species], since the best known [the standard or type] is unique [or a unit].

Cases of solution by (1) change of intonation are Hippias the Thasian's interpretation of "and grant him," [1] and

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Cases of transference: the two which are selected, and illustrate the metaphorical use of common words, imply that Homer was acquainted with Aristotle's metaphysical system. "All" (*i. e.* a whole without arrangement) is a case of "much," because "much" means a quantity in excess of some other quantity (Metaphys. 1057 a 13). An "all" is greater than its parts, as we know from geometry; hence an "all" is invariably a "much." On the other hand, the unit is in the case of every genus the commencement of the knowable, for that whereby we first know a thing is the first measure in all cases (Metaphys. 1016 b 20); since, then, the standard or type is a species of unit, if we use unit for type it is a case of substituting genus for species. If I find out a man's income, I can only do so by knowing what relation it bears to some unit, *e. g.* pound or shilling; similarly a man's courage, intellect, firmness, etc., can only be scientifically described in relation to some unit or standard. When, then, Homer says (Iliad xviii. 489) that the Wain is the only constellation which sinks not into the ocean, he means that it is the type of a constellation that does not sink. The ancients pointed out that the same was true of all the Northern constellations. The puzzle connected with "all" does not appear in our texts of the Iliad; apparently Aristotle read in x. 1 the same line as ii. 1, with "the other" for "other"; "the other" is the equivalent of "all."

And grant him: the reference is to an old reading, which has disappeared from the texts. By "to give" for "we give" the interpreter hoped to clear Zeus of having uttered a false promise.

[1] Iliad ii. 15.

"that is not rotted by the rain." [1] Others can be solved by (2) distinguishing, as Empedocles explained "suddenly they grew mortal, which before were used to be immortal, and things raw before" (they had been sorted) "[unmixed]"; others (3) by pointing to an ambiguity, *e. g.* "night, full two parts, is gone, and a third remains"; for the Greek for "more than" may

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That is not rotted by the rain: apparently it was held that a pine stump would be more likely to be rotted than one of oak; see Introd. p. 52.

By distinguishing: the nature of the method is explained in *Sophistici Elenchi*, § 20. The example there given might be rendered, "Did you see the man beaten with your eye?" where the answerer should find out with which verb the instrumental is to be taken before replying.

And things raw, before (they had been sorted): the verse of Empedocles (see p. 98, n 3) continued "formerly [grew] unmixed, having parted their ways." The reference is to the *de Generatione* 339 b 12. The four elements of Empedocles existed before the two forces "Love" and "Strife," which combined and separated—both functions expressed by compounds of the verb κρίνειν. "Things formerly raw grew unmixed" can, if we employ the process called distinguishing, be shown to be no contradiction; for "raw" means not "unmixed with each other," but "unaffected by love or strife." The word rendered "raw" (ζωρά) when applied to liquor naturally means "undiluted"; but "raw" water means undistilled water, and raw material material which has not been worked. Whereas, then, "raw spirit" is the opposite of mixed spirit, "raw water" is the opposite of pure water; since the operation which fits a thing for use in the one case is that of mixing, in the other that of unmixing.

Aristotle's explanation appears to be quite satisfactory. Athenaeus (424 a) informs us that Theophrastus rendered the word "raw" in this line by "mixed," and Plutarch records the same of a comic poet Sosicles. In applying the word in this sense to liquor, they were certainly mistaken; Sosicles was probably jesting; Theophrastus most likely has been misrepresented.

The Greek for "more than," etc.: the three solutions of which this is the second are collected in *Sophistici Elenchi* 162 a 6, where we learn

[1] Iliad xxiii. 328.

§ 25. 1461 a 23—26.

also be rendered "they being full." Others by (4) familiar usage: men call a dilution wine, whence we get "greaves of new-wrought tin,"[1] and iron-workers braziers, whence Ganymede is said to wine-pour to Zeus,[2] although the gods drink not wine. This last, however, may be by transference.

Whenever a phrase presents an appearance of inconsistency, you should consider (5) how many senses it could bear in the passage, *e. g.* in how many senses the

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that the word in the text may refer either to grammatical ambiguity or to verbal ambiguity. Here the fact is that πλέων may be regarded as either the comparative of πολύς, in the nominative singular, agreeing with νύξ, or as the genitive plural feminine of πλέος, agreeing with μοιράων; according to the latter view the words will be construed "two of the three parts being accomplished"; and since the latter use of the word is quite in accordance with usage, there is no *obvious* objection to Aristotle's explanation.

Men call a dilution wine, etc.: see Introd. p. 25.

Although the gods drink not wine: but nectar, Metaphys. 1000 a 12. In the Great Ethics 1205 b 15 the error of those who do not know this s criticized. On the same principle, then, those who did not know of iron (Herodotus i. 68) called an iron-worker "coppersmith." It seems more likely that the mention of "iron" was avoided owing to the ill luck supposed to attach to that metal. Numerous superstitions connected with iron are collected by Doutté, *Magie et Religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (1909), p. 41; he refers further to Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, II. xiii.

This last: "to wine-pour" may be regarded as a species of "decanting." But to a mixture of tin and copper, which is "virtually" the former, the doctrine of metaphor will not apply.

How many senses, etc.: the passage apparently suggests that the spear penetrated two layers of copper, and was then stopped by a layer of gold, behind which were two of tin. The ancient critics thought the gold layer would most naturally come outside. To "stay" or "hold" is said to mean to prevent a thing moving according to its natural impulse (Metaphys. 1023 a 18), and the explanation of the difficulty is evidently to be got from the various modes in which this can be effected.

[1] Iliad xxi. 592. [2] *Ibid.* xx. 234.

§ 25. 1461 a 26—33.

expression " there the brazen spear stayed " [1] can signify that it was prevented by it : Is it most natural to understand it thus or thus ?—the opposite principle to that stated by Glaucon—that critics in some cases assume an unnatural interpretation, argue on a gratuitous verdict, and criticize the poet for having said what they suppose him to have said, if it be inconsistent with some fancy of their own. This is the case with the Icarius controversy. The objectors suppose him to have been a Laconian, how absurd then, they say, that Telemachus should not meet him on his visit to Lacedaemon ! But it may be as the Cephallenians say, viz. that Odysseus took a wife from them, whose father was Icadius, not Icarius; whence the objection is probably a mere mistake.

In general a case of impossibility should be referred to poetic plausibility or poetic idealism; for a plausible impossibility is preferable poetically to an unconvincing possibility, and though certain types may be impossible (as were the figures of Zeuxis), yet they may be ideal [and so poetical], which, as the *type*, should excel the real; while the unnatural may be referred to popular assertion, and occasionally defended on the ground that the thing is not unnatural; for " the improbable has a tendency to occur."

Passages which, taken literally, are inconsistent, should be examined as the dialectical tests examine them; *i. e.* is it the same thing, in the same reference and in the same sense, in which case it is the poet himself [who is inconsistent]; or is it the same only in reference to the critic's assertions or some reasonable supposition of the latter ?

The censorious terms " unnatural " and " immoral " are

[1] Iliad xx. 272.

§ 25. 1461 a 33—1461 b 19.

justly employed when what is unnatural is introduced on *no* ground of necessity, as Aegeus by Euripides, or depravity, as in the case of Menelaus in the Orestes.

Critical objections are, then, taken out of five formulae; a thing may be denounced as impossible, unnatural, immoral, inconsistent or inartistic. The number of the solutions is to be made out [by the student] from the figures given above: it comes to twelve.

§ 26. The question suggests itself: Which is the better form of fiction, the Epic or the Tragic? If the less vulgar be the better, and the better means that which is addressed to the better wits, it is evident that the pantomimic style is vulgar; for it implies that its audience

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The number of the solutions, etc. . . . it comes to twelve: the numbers that have been given are three (1460 b 10), three (*ibid.* 11), "many," afterwards specified as four, one (difference between poetic and other correctness), and one (difference between essential and accidental correctness). In detail, a thing may be defended as realistic, conventional or idealistic; or as a case in which poetry conflicts with another science; or as an incidental, not essential, error; or as a foreign word; or as a metaphor; or as a familiar usage; or as a word of which the sense (where it is in ordinary language ambiguous) has been mistaken, wrongly intoned, wrongly distinguished, or wrongly applied.

The pantomimic style, etc.: this matter is discussed by Foth (*Das Drama in seinem Gegensatz zur Dichtkunst*, p. 110), who decides that the "composite arts" are not to be regarded merely as palliatives for the collapse of the fancy, as crutches for a lame imagination, but as possessing educational value, in that they guide the reproductive fancy—which would otherwise go astray—into the path followed by the poet, and offer a substitute where the fancy absolutely fails. The opposite view to Aristotle's, viz. that the Drama is inferior to the Epic, is maintained at length by J. von Kirchmann (*Ästhetik auf realistischer Grundlage*, ii. 248-252). In the combination of arts represented by a stage performance, each art suffers; so the poetry is confined to speeches, and may not concern itself with scenes; and the lyric passages have to be unduly abbreviated, because only a limited time can be allowed for the performance; on the other hand, "the plastic art"

will not perceive unless the reciter adds what will rouse them violently, as does the inferior flute-player when he whirls himself about when playing "the Quoit," or grabs at the director if he be playing "Scylla." Tragedy is then as a style to Epic as the later school of actors is to the earlier, in the opinion of the latter; for Mynniscus used to call Callippides an ape for overdoing his part, and such was Areus's view of *our* acting too. Epic, then, they maintain, is addressed to a refined audience, who do not require figures; whereas Tragedy is addressed to poor creatures. If, then, it be vulgar, clearly it is the worse.

To this we may reply in the first place that the brunt of the accusation falls not on the poet, but on the actor; for over-gesticulation may be committed by a reciter (the style of Sosistratus), or a part-singer, *e. g.* Mnasitheus of Opus. Secondly, all forms of motion are not discreditable, as this would involve the condemnation of all dancing: whereas it is only that of inferior artists (as indeed Callippides in his time and now certain other actors are termed) which is censured for its unladylike figures. Thirdly, Tragedy no less than Romance can

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(here meaning the portraying of emotions by gestures) cannot get fair play, because the attention of the spectator is distracted, and the particular mental activities which are counterfeited by the drama are not suitable for plastic representation.

The later school of actors: the matter to which reference is made is discussed in the Rhetoric (p. 1403), where we learn that there was as yet no treatise on histrionic, though in the author's time the actor was becoming a more important person than the poet.

Call Callippides an ape: according to KIRCHMANN (l.c. 249) only the best actors can minimize the tendency to overdo gesture by idealization, but even they cannot quite overcome it.

Unladylike figures: that dancing is in the main a feminine pastime is maintained by WALLASCHEK (*Anfänge*, p. 235, etc.),on the ground that

achieve its end without any motion: it can be interpreted by mere perusal. If therefore Tragedy be otherwise superior, this fault, if it be one, need not belong to it. Further, because it has everything that Romance has (for this can be exactly calculated), and in addition—no small assets—music and exhibition, whereby the gratification of each factor is intensified: further, is sharply focused, whether read or acted: further, the purpose of the fiction is realized in a shorter length of time—for the compressed product gives more pleasure than one with a large dilution of time, as might be seen if any one were to expand the Oedipus of Sophocles into as many books as the Iliad. Further, the romancer's fiction has less unity (as is shown by the fact that any romance makes several tragedies; so that if the romancer treats a single story, either it must be set forth briefly, and give the appearance of a torso, or be accommodated to the length

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it is a means of disposing of superfluous energy, such as in the case of the male is utilized in active life. There are indeed a few tribes in which men only dance, but even in such cases it sometimes occurs that there is an underlying theory which contradicts the practice, a man being supposed to represent a woman. He gives details of the practice throughout the world (*ibid.* 236–240).

It can be interpreted by mere perusal: this assertion appears to have been the subject of violent discussion recently in Germany (see Foth, l.c. p. 70). Aristotle's opinion is clearly that the tragic effect, so far as it coincides with the Epic effect, can be produced by perusal; but that it can be accomplished better by a performance.

The compressed product gives more pleasure than one with, etc.: this phenomenon is explained in Problems 873 a 30, the reason there alleged being that (in the case of wine) the wine and water are separately tasted, whereas in the less diluted liquor the water is concealed by the wine. (This is also explained in the *de Generatione*, bk. i.)

Accommodated to the length of time allotted: i. e. to that occupied by the Tragedies exhibited at one sitting, § 24.

26. 1462 a 13—1462 b 6.

of time allotted and seem diffuse); I mean as when it is composed of several life-chapters, as indeed both the Iliad and the Odyssey contain many such portions, and these of sufficient size to stand alone; yet these poems are not only constructed in the best possible way, but are severally in the highest degree portrayals of a single life-chapter. If, therefore, Tragedy be superior in all these respects, and in addition in discharging the function of the art—for they should not furnish *any* gratification, but only what has been stated—it is clear that Tragedy, as realizing its purpose better, is a nobler form of art than Romance.

Thus ends our analysis, anatomy and critique of Tragedy and Romance, and our account of objections and rejoinders.

I mean as when, etc.: explanation of the aspect in which the Romance has less unity.

§ 26. 1462 b 6—19.

GREEK AND LATIN TEXTS, WITH CRITICAL NOTES

SYMBOLS

In the Latin Text.

Numerals in) indicate that the Arabic has two or more synonymous renderings of the same word.

* indicates that the preceding word follows an amended reading of the Arabic.

Italics indicate that the Arabic has been supplemented.

SMALL CAPITALS indicate that a rendering of the underlying Syriac has been substituted for the Arabic.

In the Critical Notes.

( ) enclosing the sign for a MS. indicate that its reading is for some reason uncertain.

* signifies the Arabic version.

Uniform orthography has been adopted, and purely orthographica variants have been recorded only when they have some interest or importance.

The last lines of B are wanting in the facsimile used by the writer.

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ

1447 a Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἥν τινα 1
δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει, καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους
10 εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἕξειν ἡ ποίησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων
ἐστὶ μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς
ἐστι μεθόδου, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ
τῶν πρώτων.

ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἔτι δὲ κω-
15 μῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη
καὶ κιθαριστικῆς, πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύν-
ολον, διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν, ἢ γὰρ τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις
μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνταί τινες
20 ἀπεικάζοντες, οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας, ἕτεροι
δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις. ἅπασαι
μὲν οὖν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ,
τούτοις δ' ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις· οἷον ἁρμονίᾳ μὲν καὶ
ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἥ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ
25 κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον
ἡ τῶν συρίγγων· αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς
ἁρμονίας οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζο-
μένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις· ἡ
δὲ ἐποποιία μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις, καὶ
τούτοις εἴτε μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων εἴθ' ἑνί τινι γένει χρωμένη

12 λέγωμεν CE*: λέγομεν AD*. 16 μιμήσεις AC: μίμησις DE. 21 ἐν C: om. ADE. 22 οὖν D: om. ACE. 24 μόνον ACE: μόναι μόνον D. 25 τυγχάνουσιν L S pr. m.: τυγχάνωσιν ACDE. οὖσαι ACDE: οὖσαι τ αὗται Lasc.* (p. 119).

LIBER ARISTOTELIS DE POETIS. VERSIO ABI BASHAR MATTHAEI JONAE F., KONNAENSIS, EX SYRIACO IN ARABICUM.

Dixit Aristoteles : Nos loquimur nunc de arte poeta- 1447 a
rum et speciebus eius, et nuntiamus quae vis unicui-
que earum sit, et quo modo deceat constare mythos [et
poemata], si poesis destinat ire rem suam cursum boni- 10
tatis; item ex quot partibus illa constet, et quaenam
sint partes eius, et pariter loquemur super quot extant
quae ad eandem pertineant. Et loquemur et loquimur
de hoc omni, incipientes principio a rebus primis. Jam
omni poemate et omni recitatione poetica intendimus
sive tragoediam sive comoediam sive dithyrambopoeticum
et circa plurimum auletices et quodcunque intrat in
imitationem (2) artis citharisticae et alia. Genera vero 15
eius tria sunt; aut enim per res alias imitatur (2), aut
contraria huic est sc. res alias imitatur (2), aut it rationibus
diversis, non una et eadem. Et sicut homines aliquando
imitantur (2) per colores et formas multa, quatenus alii
imitantur (2) artibus, alii vero consuetudinibus, at alii
eorum vocibus, sic artes quas descripsimus et omnes faciunt 20
imitationem (2) rhythmo et sermone et harmonia, idque fit
sive separatim sive mixtim; exemplum illius auletice et
citharistice, ambae enim utuntur rhythmo et compositione
tantummodo ; et si existunt artes aliae vi sua similes 25
harum, quemadmodum ars sibilandi utitur rhythmo uno
atque eodem sine compositione, et ars instrumenti salta-
tionis item; nam hae per rhythmos figuratos imitantur
(2) consuetudines et passiones item, et actiones item, alia
quidem sermone pedestri mero, plus quam metris, imita-

1447 b τῶν μέτρων τυγχάνουσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους, οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν· πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποί γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς, τοὺς δὲ ἑποποιοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν οὐχ ὡς τὴν κατὰ μίμησιν ποιητάς, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἰατρικὸν ἢ μουσικόν τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν. ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τις ἅπαντα τὰ μέτρα μιγνύων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν, καθάπερ Χαιρήμων ἐποίησε Κένταυρον μικτὴν ῥαψῳδίαν, ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· εἰσὶ δέ τινες αἳ πᾶσι χρῶνται τοῖς εἰρημένοις, λέγω δὲ οἷον ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἥ τε τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποίησις καὶ ἡ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἥ τε τραγῳδία καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία· διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν, ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράτ- 1448 a τοντας (ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι, τὰ γὰρ ἤθη σχεδὸν ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις, κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες) ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' 2

1447 b 8 ἂν om. E. 9 τοὺς AC: τοῦ DE*. 10 τριμέτρων ACE*: μέτρων D. 11 τινῶν ACE*: om. D. 14 τὴν κατὰ ADE (like Great Ethics 1209 a 36 οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνην γε τὴν φιλίαν φίλος, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, Physics 261 a 24 κινεῖ κυρίως τὴν κατὰ τόπον): τὴν expunged in C: om. F (with *caret* before and after κατὰ) K. 15 μουσικόν ACDE: φυσικόν* (p. 117). τι ACE: om. D. τῶν μέτρων ACE: τὸ μέτρον D. 20 κένταυρον AC*: ἐπίταυρον DE. 23 αἱ Italus: οἱ ACDE*. 24 διθυραμβικῶν ACDE: διθυράμβων F. 26 πᾶσιν AC: πᾶσαι DE. 27 οὖν C(E)*: οὐ A: οὖν οὐ D. οἷς Italus: αἷς ACDE*. 28 πράττοντες*. 1448 a 2 κακίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ CE: κακία καὶ ἀρετὴ AD. 3 ἤτοι AC: ἤτι E: εἴτε D.

turque ea haec sive miscens sive utendo genere uno et metris; quae est sine nomine adhuc* : neque enim habemus nominare quidnam commune sit imitationibus (2) poetae Sophronis* et Xenarchi et sermonibus ascriptis Socrati, at neque si facit quis imitationem (2) suam trimetris vel his quae vocantur elegia, vel una ex his reliquis rebus quas imitatur (2) hoc modo; nisi quod homines dum conjungunt metrum artis poeticae faciunt metra, nominantque hunc quidem ab elegia, alium vero in reliquis, et quibus est initium et finis. Neque ut qui faciunt poema quod fit imitatione (2) sed quos (?) nominant *sunt* socii in metris suis. Nam si fecerint aliquid ex rebus medicis vel rebus physicis per metra sic solent nominare : neque ullam rem communem habent Homerus et Empedocles praeter metrum; quare illum quidem decet vocare poetam, hunc vero disputatorem de physicis potius quam poetam. Pariter si facit quis imitationem (2) miscendo omnia metra, ut agebat Chaeremon, imitabatur enim Centaurum saltantem choream ex omnibus metris, *tamen* oportet nominare eum poetam. Et super his quidem definitum est hoc modo. Et existunt homines qui utuntur omnibus iis quae descripta sunt, v.c. in rhythmo et sono dulci et metris, quemadmodum ars poetica dithyrambi et nomi et tragoedia etiam et comoedia; differunt vero quatenus nonnullae vero per partem. Has ergo dico esse species artium quibus faciunt imitationem (2). 1447 b 8 10 15 20 25

Et quoniam ii qui imitantur hoc faciunt agendo actum voluntarium, oportet necessario esse hos aut praestantes aut viles; nam consuetudines (2) exempli gratia sequuntur haec duo tantummodo : nam consuetudines (2) omnium tantum differunt vilitate et praestantia. Faciuntque imitationem (2) aut praestantiores nobis aut viliores aut quorum condicio in hoc 1448 a.

1448 a ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους. ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν· δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἑκάστη μιμήσεων ἔξει ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ ἔσται ἑτέρα τῷ ἕτερα μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι πάσας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας· καὶ †τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον Ὅμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος ὁ τὰς παρῳδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δειλιάδα χείρους· ὁμοίους δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς διθυράμβους καὶ περὶ τοὺς νόμους (ὥσπερ Γᾶς, Κύκλωπας Τιμόθεος καὶ Φιλόξενος) μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις· ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ [καὶ] ἡ τραγῳδία πρὸς τὴν κωμῳδίαν διέστηκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους, ἡ δὲ βελτίους μιμεῖσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα, ἢ ἕτερόν τι γινόμενον, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν, ὡς εἴπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, †ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ὥς. ὥστε τῇ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη μιμητὴς Ὁμήρῳ Σοφοκλῆς, μιμοῦνται γὰρ ἄμφω σπουδαίους, τῇ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει, πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται καὶ δρῶντας ἄμφω. B begins ὅθεν καὶ δράματα καλεῖσθαι τινες αὐτά φασιν, ὅτι μιμοῦν- 3

6 δὴ *: δὲ ACDE. 8 τῷ C: τὸ ADE. 9 πάσας C: ταύτας ADE.* 10 τὸ ACDE: om. Lasc. : read τῶν (as in *Soph. El.* 173 a 23 οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους). 12 ὁ τὰς Lasc. : om. ὁ ACDE. 13 δειλιάδα A pr. m. E pr. m. : δηλιάδα CD*. ὁμοίους U : ὁμοίως ACDE*. 14 γᾶς κύκλωπας CE (γᾶς is accus. plural, Fragm. 615 note, of γαῖ, Problems 934 b 9) : γᾶς κυκλω πᾶς AD : *sic* of * indicates inability to read the word : πέρσας καὶ Fr. Medici. γὰρ for γᾶς X pr. m. 16 καὶ om. * 20. ὁτὲ μὲν . . . ἢ : the proper sequence δὲ is altered in accordance with the rule Rhet. 1407 a 23, because of the length of the sentence. 24 ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ὥς ACDE: the whole om. S : καὶ ἃ ins. before καὶ Lasc. (after Phys. 249 a 5 διαφοράν, μήτε ὃ μήτε ἐν ᾧ) : ἀναγκαίως * (a word signifying "primarily" is wanted).

est; sicut imitantur (2) pictores in artibus suis optimi ex 1448 a
iis optimos et pessimi pessimos : quemadmodum Pauson
quidem imitatus est (2) pejores, Dionysius vero similem.
Liquet (2) ergo futuras esse unicuique imitationi (2) ex
iis quae descriptae sunt et unicuique actui voluntario
has differentias, imitabitur (2) que una alteram hoc
modo. Nam in saltatione et fistulatione et arte lyrarum
licet his esse dissimilibus et circa sermonem et metrum
solutum : quemadmodum Homerus meliora Cleophon
vero res similes, Hegemon autem ascriptus Thasiae, qui
primus fecit tragoediam, et Nicochares ascriptus ostentui,
qui imitabatur pejus. Item et circa dithyrambum et
nomos sicut imitatur (2) quis sic Cyclopas Timotheus
et Philoxenus; et in eadem discrepantia est differentia
tragoediae cum comoedia. Scilicet illa quidem pejores,
haec vero imitatur (2) meliores.

Etiam tertia quae est harum discrepantiarum et ex
iis ea est ut imiteris unumquodque horum. Nam in his
etiam imitationibus (2) ipsis (2) interdum quidem dum
pollicentur imitationem sive re alia fit, quemadmodum
agebat Homerus, vel si fuit similis ei in quo est nulla
differentia. Et omnes qui agunt (2) qui imitantur (2)
faciunt imitationem (2) suam quemadmodum diximus
ab initio, his tribus differentiis et his necessario. Eo
usque ut sit ille quidem imitator (2) idem (2) Homeri
quidem Sophocles, nam uterque imitatur (2) meliores;
hunc vero imitentur (2) secta Aristophanis, quatenus
tamquam agunt (2) ambo. Et hinc dixere quidam haec

1448 a τι δρῶντας. διὸ καὶ ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τε τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς κωμῳδίας οἱ Δωριεῖς (τῆς μὲν κωμῳδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς
30 οἵ τε ἐνταῦθα ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας γενομένης, καὶ οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας, ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητὴς πολλῷ πρότερος ὢν Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος, καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔνιοι τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ) ποιούμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα σημεῖον· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περιοικίδας καλεῖν
35 φασιν, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δήμους (ὡς κωμῳδοὺς οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν λεχθέντας ἀλλὰ τῇ κατὰ κώμας πλάνῃ ἀτιμαζομένους
1448 b ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως), καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοὶ μὲν δρᾶν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ πράττειν προσαγορεύειν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ πόσαι καὶ τίνες τῆς 4
μιμήσεως εἰρήσθω ταῦτα. ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν
5 ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ
10 τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ
15 γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος. ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ

29 τῆς μὲν B *: τῆς μὲν γὰρ A C D E. 32 Χιωνίδου MADIUS *: χωνίδου A B C E: χονύδου D. 34 αὐτοὶ SPENGEL: οὗτοι MSS. 35 Ἀθηναίους SPENGEL. 1448 b 2 προσαγορεύειν A B C E: προσαγορευομένους D. 5 αὗται U pr. m. LASC.: αὐταὶ A B C D E. τε om. B. 7 διαφέρει B: διαφέρουσι A C D E*. 10 αὐτὰ A C D E: αὐτῶν B*? 12 τούτου C*: τούτων om. καὶ B: τοῦτο A D E. 14 ὁμοίως A C D E: ὅτι B. 17 οὐχ ᾗ HERMANN: οὐχὶ A B C D E*.

appellari etiam dramata, propterea quod imitentur eos 1448 a
qui faciunt; et idcirco sibi vindicant Dores tragoediam
et comoediam; comoediam quidem secundum id quod
putatur hi qui sunt hic tamquam ubi fuit apud eos
democratia; quod vero qui sunt e Sicilia dicunt est eam
inventam quemadmodum faciebat Epicharmus poeta, qui
fuit antiquior multo Chionide et Magnete, quatenus
dabant ii duo indicia, dum utebantur confirmatione ex
nominibus tragoediae quae sunt in Peloponneso; nam illi
quidem appellabant vicos comos, sed demosos appellabant
Athenienses satira lacessitos propterea quod contem-
nerentur (2) ab incolis vicorum. Differentiae quidem 1448 b 2
imitationis (2) et species et quantitas et quae sint hae sunt
quae dictae.

Et verosimile est esse causas genetrices poetices quae
sunt natura duas. Et imitatio (2) res est quae crescit
cum hominibus ex initio cum sunt infantes, et hoc est ex
iis quibus discrepant homines ab animalibus reliquis,
quatenus homo imitatur (2) magis, disciplinam (2) que
facit imitando (2) res primas (2). Omnes enim delectantur
(2) imitando (2). Indiciumque est eius hoc quod accidit
in operibus quoque; quae enim videmus, quorumque est
visus tristis, tamen gaudemus eorum forma et imaginibus,
cum quidem videmus ea ut quae sint accuratissima, v.c.
formas (2) animalium contemptorum mortuorum. Causa-
que eius haec est, sc. quod doctrina non modo grata est
philosopho soli, sed his reliquis itidem : nisi quod partici-
pant in ea parum. Ob hanc ergo causam gaudent cum
vident imagines (2); propterea quod accidit iis ut videant
et discant; idque est ratiocinatio ab eo quod est unicuique,
v.c. ecce hoc est illud; propterea quod si non antea

1448 b τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν. κατὰ φύ-
20 σιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι †καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ
ῥυθμοῦ (τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστι φα-
νερόν) ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς αὐτὰ μάλιστα κατὰ
μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχε-
διασμάτων. διεσπάσθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη ἡ ποίησις·
25 οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς
τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον
ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια. τῶν
μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὁμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτον ποίημα,
εἰκὸς δὲ † εἶναι πολλούς, ἀπὸ δὲ Ὁμήρου ἀρξαμένοις ἔστιν,
30 οἷον ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐν οἷς κατὰ τὸ ἁρ-
μόττον καὶ τὸ ἰαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον· διὸ καὶ ἰαμβεῖον καλεῖται
νῦν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ τούτῳ ἰάμβιζον ἀλλήλους· καὶ ἐγένοντο
τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἡρωικῶν, οἱ δὲ ἰάμβων ποιηταί. ὥσπερ δὲ
καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος ἦν (μόνος γὰρ
35 οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὕτω
καὶ τὸ τῆς κωμῳδίας σχῆμα πρῶτος ὑπέδειξεν, οὐ ψόγον
ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας· ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον
1449 a ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιὰς . . . καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας,
οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμῳδίας. παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς
τραγῳδίας καὶ κωμῳδίας οἱ ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν ὁρ-
μῶντες κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ τῶν ἰάμβων κωμῳ-

20 καὶ τῆς A B C D E: διὰ τῆς * rightly. 21 τῶν ῥυθμῶν A B C D: τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ E. 22 οἱ πεφυκότες πρὸς B *: πεφυκότες καὶ A C D E. 26 τῶν τοιούτων A C E: om. τῶν B D. εὐτελέστεροι A C E: εὐτελέστερον B: ἐντελέστεροι D. 27 ψόγους A B C D: ψόγον E. ποιοῦντες A C D E: ποιοῦνται B. ἕτεροι SPENGEL: ἔτεροι MSS. (cf. Nic. Ethics 1151 a 3). 28 πρὸ A B C D: πρὸς E. 29 εἶναι A C D E: εἰδέναι B: perhaps εἶναι (see Gl.). 31 καὶ τὸ ἰ. B: ἰαμβεῖον A C D E. 35 ἀλλὰ καὶ B *: ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ (cf. Eudemian Ethics 1229 a 15) A C D E. δραματικὰς A B D E: δραματικῶς C. 36 τὸ-σχῆμα B: τὰ-σχήματα A C D E. ὑπέδειξεν A D E: ἀπέδειξεν B: ὑπῆρξεν C. 37 ὁ γὰρ B LASC.: τὸ γὰρ A C D E. 1449 a 1 supply κατὰ τὴν σύστασιν *. ἡ A B*: om. C D E.

viderit, non faciet iis quod simulat, sed propter actionem 1448 b
et passionem aut locis aut propter causam aliquam simi- 20
lem. Et natura quidem habemus ut imitemur composi-
tione et rhythmis, sc. quod quidem metra similia sunt
rhythmis liquet iis qui creati sunt ad hoc ab initio et
praesertim quod generaverunt poeticam dum afferunt
illud et suppeditant paullisper, generaveruntque eam ab
iis qui composuere eam statim ex tempore. Vulsaque
est secundum consuetudinem suam propriam, dico Poeti-
cam, nam nonnulli poetarum, et eorum castiores imitantur 25
actiones pulcras et in eo quod simile est illi *versantur;*
alii autem qui quidem turpiores fuerant, lacessendo
primum malos faciebant postea laudem et encomia aliorum
malorum. Nisi quod non habemus dicere de homine ante
Homerum eum fecisse talem artem, ex arte poetica,
quamquam fuere fortasse poetae alii multi, nisi quod ab
Homero est initium; v.c. eius est libido et adulterium et 30
similia. Et haec quae sunt sic sunt quae advexit metrum,
quemadmodum advexit iambum, quare similia huius
metri appellata sunt iambi, et hoc metro contemnebant
alius alium. Et fiebant ex antiquis alii poetae in genere
iambi, et genere appellato heroico, quemadmodum poeta
in rebus seriis praesertim tantum fuit Homerus solus 35
modo nam hic solus tantum non modo fecit res optimas
in eo, sed fecit imitationes appellatas dramaticas. Et sic
hic primus monstravit formam artis satiricae, cui inest
non satira tantum, sed in genere irrisionis et ludificationis
nam fecit in ea poema appellatum Graece dramata.
Nam Ecce Libidinis ratio analoga est, et qualis est Ilias
ad compositionem* et dicta Odyssea ad tragoedias, tale est 1449 a
hoc ad genera comoediae. Quum apparuissent methodus
tragoediae et methodus comoediae, qui conabantur eo,
arte poetica, utramque harum, secundum proprietatem
naturae alii faciebant vice generis poetici dicti iambi

δοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγῳδοδιδάσκαλοι διὰ
1449 a τὸ μείζω καὶ ἐντιμότερα τὰ σχήματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων.

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἆρ' ἔχει ἤδη ἡ τραγῳδία τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἱκανῶς, ἢ οὔ, αὐτό τε καθ' αὑτὸ κρίνεται εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα ἄλλος λόγος. γενομένη δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικὰ ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα, κατὰ μικρὸν ηὐξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίνετο φανερὸν αὐτῆς, καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν, τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων, καὶ λέξεως γελοίας διὰ τὸ ἐκ σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν ὀψὲ ἀπεσεμνύνθη. τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον ἐγένετο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὗρε· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου, πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἑξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη, καὶ τὰ ἄλλ' ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται ἔστω ἡμῖν εἰρημένα· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἔργον εἴη διεξιέναι καθ' ἕκαστον.

5 τραγῳδοδιδάσκαλοι A C D E : τραγοδιδάσκαλοι B. 6 μείζω BD : μείζονα C : μεῖζον A E. εἶναι τ. ἐ. A C D E : τ. ἐ. εἶναι B. 7 ἆρ' B (ἄρ') : παρέχει A C D E (πότερον commenced by mistake) : ἀρχὴ *. 8 εἴδεσιν A C D E : ἡδέσιν B. εἶναι B C E : ἢ ναί A D (see p. 72). 9 γενομένη RT : γενομένης A B C D E. δ' οὖν B : οὖν A C D E. 11 φαλλικὰ Lasc. : φαυλικὰ A B E * (euphemism) : φαῦλλικὰ C D (from Aristophanes, *Vespae* 1206 ?). 12 διαμένει S Lasc. : διαμένειν A B C D E : om. F H K. 16 χοροῦ A B D E : χρόνου C (cf. 1449 b 16). 19 σατυρικοῦ B C D E : σατυριακοῦ A. 24 μέτρων A B C D : ἀμέτρων E. 27 τὰ ἄλλ' ὡς B : τὰ ἄλλως A C E : τὰ ἄλλα (ὰ added in red) D.

genera comoediae, alii faciebant vice horum quae sunt
dicti epus genera tragoediae. Factique sunt doctores 1449 a
ideirco, propterea quod haec erat grandior multo et altior
in forma huius. Nam ut VISAMUS hoc est initium artis
tragoediae et speciebus satis, illudque est sive ut fiat te
scientiente hanc, sive sit apud ambas ratione alia; ergo
quum orta est ab initio et crevit subito illa et comoedia
etiam, illa quidem incipiendo a causis primis generis
appellati dithyrambi, haec vero prava estque quae restat
in multis urbibus usque adhuc, cepit progressum et
auctum paullisper, quatenus antiqua erat quemadmodum
apparuit etiam haec quae est nunc, et mutata mutationi-
bus multis, cessavit tum demum ars tragoediae propterea
quod fuit natura quae ad eam pertinet. Illa vero auxit
hypocritas (2) ab uno ad duos, et primus introduxit
genera quae sunt chori, (2) isque etiam primus paravit
genus certaminum, et item primus monstravit hos modos
ludi et ioci Sophocles et item is primus monstravit ex
fabulis parvis magnitudinem sermonis et clamorem et
tumultum in sermone et orationes quae intrant in genus
irrisionis et ludibrii : fecitque illud mutando aliquid de
forma generis dicti satyricae. Et ad ultimum et cum
nova adhibuere castitatem, et hoc metrum e tetrametris
quae sunt iambi, nam ab initio adhibebant tetrametrum
propter saltationem dictam satyricam, ut similius eius
fieret carmen. Et ubi oriebatur sermo et oratio, natura
ipsa veniebat metrum suum, quum praesertim metrum
faceret partes—nam colloquimur inter nos alloquio et
non ratione; indicium huius est genus dictum iambi ex
aeterno, metrum varo rarius, et digrediendo a composi-
tione disputatoria. Atque etiam plurimum sermonis et
alloquium extollens. Et haec singula reliqua tantum

ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μέν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον· τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ δι' ὧν ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν· καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδῶν ὀψέ ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν· ἤδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἐχούσης οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ μνημονεύονται. τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἠγνόηται. τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις· τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἦρξεν ἀφέμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μύθους.

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου μίμησις εἶναι σπουδαίων ἠκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἁπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι ταύτην, διαφέρουσιν· ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει. καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τοῦτο ἐποίουν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταὐτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς τραγῳδίας. διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγῳδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὕτη, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ.

30 φαυλοτέρων A B C D E: φαυλοτέρου μὲν Lasc. * (cf. φαυλοτέρων οὐ μὲν with οὐ erased U). 31–32 ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον μόνον ins.*. 1449 b 6–7 τὸ μὲν οὖν Lasc. : om. οὖν A B C D E (cf. 1453 b 31). 9 καὶ μύθους A B C : ἢ μύθους D E. 10–11 μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου A C D E : μέτρου μέτα λόγου B : μέτρου μετὰ λόγου Lasc. *. 11 τῷ δὲ A B D : τὸ δὲ C E. 12 ταύτην E* : ταύτῃ A B C D. 13 μὲν γὰρ C* : μὲν A B D E. 16 ὁμοίως A C D E : ὁμοίως ὅτι B. 17 ταὐτὰ Ald. : ταῦτα A B C D E*. τῆς τραγῳδίας E. 20 αὕτη* : αὐτὴ A B C D E.

dicuntur propter adornationem et decus in narrando unumquodque. Comoedia autem est ut diximus imitatio 1449 a
pravioris, at non in omni vitio sed tantum est res ridenda in genere eius quod est foedum, estque pars et ridenda. Scilicet irrisio est error quis et turpitudo expers difficultatis, neque corrumpens, v.c. facies irrisoris continuo est foeda et tamen odiosa sine difficultate. Et TRANSITIONES quidem artis tragicae et unde ortae sint et venerint—non puto historiam earum ignorari in eo aut neglegi : comoedia vero, quoniam parum curabatur, oblivionem traxit ab 1449 b
initio, nam agmina saltantium ab hominibus comoediae *erant*, quatenus illud permisit magistratus Athenarum postremum, nisi quod agere illud remissum erat voluntati eorum. Quatenus habebant quodammodo aliquam formam ut enumerarent unde fuisset qui eam recitasset, memorabanturque. Et partem facierum qui dederunt sive traditionem prologi, vel de multitudine hypocritarum —omnes qui fuerunt huiusmodi ignoti sunt. Et facere narrationes est ut afferamus omnem sermonem qui est breviter. Et ex antiquo tempore item dum vectum est e Sicilia, fuitque primus qui crearet eam Athenis Crates; hic enim reliquit speciem dictam iambicam, incepitque facere sermonem et narrationes. Imitatio autem praestantium haerebat arti poeticae dictae epe in arte tragoediae ad modum* quendam de metro cum sermone et esse metrum simplex, et ut sint pollicitationes hae; distat item in longitudine; illa enim vult praesertim fieri sub una revolutione solari aut ut mutetur paullum tantum, epopoeia vero infinita est tempore et per hoc differt quamquam principio faciebant hoc in tragoediis itidem et in omnibus epesi. Quoad partes quaedam sunt hae, quaedam vero propriae tragoediarum. Quare uicumque scit de tragoedia illam quae est seria et illam quae est prava scit de omnibus his parvis quid ex iis conveniat epopoeiae in tragoedia; quae vero conveniunt huic non omnia conveniunt epopoeiae.

1449 b περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ κωμῳδίας 6
ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τραγῳδίας λέγωμεν, ἀπολαβόντες
αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας. ἔστιν
οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος
25 ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς
μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου
περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. λέγω δὲ
ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ
μέλος, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον
30 περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τῇν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μόριον τραγῳδίας ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος,
εἶτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὴν μί-
μησιν. λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσιν,
35 μελοποιίαν δὲ ὃ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ἔχει πᾶσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ
πράξεως ἐστὶ μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων,
οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διά-
1450 a νοιαν (διὰ γὰρ τούτω καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιάς
τινας) πέφυκεν αἴτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, διάνοια καὶ
ἦθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι
πάντες. ἔστι δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις· λέγω
5 γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἤθη,
καθ' ὃ ποιούς τινας εἶναί φαμεν τοὺς πράττοντας· διά-
νοιαν δέ, ἐν ὅσοις λέγοντες ἀποδεικνύασί τινα καὶ ἀποφαίνονται
γνώμην. ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ'
ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἤθη

21 μὲν B(D)E: om. AC. τῆς ἐν ABCD: ἐν τοῖς E. 24 σπουδαίας ACDE: om. B. 25 ἑκάστῳ (ἑκάστων E) Tyrwhitt: ἑκάστου ABCD*. 27 παθημάτων B*: μαθημάτων ACDE. δὲ ABCD: δὴ E. 31 λέγω — αὐτὴν repeated in B after μίμησιν from 33. 34 λέγω — αὐτὴν om. E. 35 πᾶσαν ABCDE*: πᾶσιν Madius. 1450 a 1 τούτων ABCDE. 2 διάνοια BD: διάνοιαν ACE. 3 ταύτας ACDE: ταῦτα B om. καὶ. 4 ἡ om. B 6 καθ' ὃ ABCDE: καθ' ἃ H. διάνοιαν BCDE: διάνοια A. 7 ἀποδεικνύασι AC: ἀποδεικνύουσί BDE. τινα B: τι ἢ ACDE. 8 πάσης ACDE: πάσης τῆς B.

Et de imitatione quae fit hexametris nos dicemus postremo, item de comoedia colligentes illud ex eo quod dictum est definitionem quae indicat essentiam. 1449 b

Est ergo Tragoedia imitatio (2) operis voluntarii studiosi, et perfecti, habens magnitudinem (2) in sermone utili, praeter unamquamque speciem quae est faciens in partibus non per pollicitationes et aequat passiones (2) per misericordiam et metum et purgat (2) illos qui patiuntur*; facitque hoc quidem sermo utilis habens rhythmum et species et melodiam*; quod autem facio perfici partes sine speciebus quae sunt propter metra et rursus dum repetunt alia quae sunt melodia*, faciunt imitationem (2) rerum. Sit ergo necessario pars quaedam ex Tragoedia in descriptione decoris et pulcritudinis faciei, et rursus in his opus melodiae*, et dictio, nam his duobus faciunt imitationem (2); et significo dictione compositionem metrorum, ipsam, opus vero melodiae (2) *vult* vim manifestam quam habet integram; propterea quod est imitatio (2) operis, eiusque praesentatio est ab hominibus praesentantibus, quos cogit necessitas quales sint in consuetudinibus et creditis suis, nam his dicimus fieri sermones et quot et quales sint, et causae narrationum (2) duae, eaeque consuetudines et opiniones, et propter has fiunt narrationes (2) quatenus rectae fiunt omnes his duobus et cadunt iis. Et fictio narrationis (2) est imitatio (2); significo autem fictione et imitatione narrationis compositionem rerum; consuetudines vero secundum id super quo dicuntur narrantes (2) qui opinantur quomodo sint vel quales sint in opinionibus suis, monstrant quales sint in probationibus suis. Oportet necessario esse omnes partes tragoedias sex, secundum quid est

καὶ διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ λέξις καὶ μελοποιία. οἷς μὲν γὰρ μιμοῦνται δύο μέρη ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ μιμοῦνται ἕν, ἃ δὲ μιμοῦνται τρία, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. τούτοις μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν κέχρηνται τοῖς εἴδεσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὄψεις ἔχει πᾶν [καὶ] ἦθος καὶ μῦθον καὶ λέξιν καὶ μέλος καὶ διάνοιαν ὡσαύτως.

μέγιστον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις· ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ εὐδαιμονίας, καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης· εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον. οὔκουν ὅπως τὰ ἤθη μιμήσωνται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συμπαραλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς πράξεις· ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἠθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγῳδίαι εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος. ἔτι ἐάν τις ἐφεξῆς θῇ ῥήσεις ἠθικὰς καὶ λέξεις καὶ διανοίας εὖ πεποιημένας, οὐ ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ καταδεεστέροις τούτοις κεχρημένη τραγῳδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγῳδία, τοῦ μύθου μέρη ἐστίν, αἵ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις. ἔτι σημεῖον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν πρότερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν ἢ

10 καὶ διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ λέξις καὶ μελοποιία. οἷς μὲν γὰρ
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25 νοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἠθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγῳδίαι εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος. ἔτι ἐάν τις ἐφεξῆς θῇ ῥήσεις
30 ἠθικὰς καὶ λέξεις καὶ διανοίας εὖ πεποιημένας, οὐ ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ καταδεεστέροις τούτοις κεχρημένη τραγῳδία, ἔχουσα δὲ μῦθον καὶ σύστασιν πραγμάτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγῳδία, τοῦ μύθου μέρη ἐστίν, αἵ τε περι-
35 πέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις. ἔτι σημεῖον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγχειροῦντες ποιεῖν πρότερον δύνανται τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν ἢ

14 ὄψεις C: ὄψις A B D: ὄψιν (for ὄψειν) E. καὶ om.*: cf. Cobet, *Variae Lectiones*, p. 145. 18 εὐδ. καὶ ἡ κακ. A C D E: εὐδαιμονία καὶ κακοδαιμονία B. 22 συμπαραλαμβάνουσι E: συμπεριλαμβάνουσι A B C D. 27 πολύγνωτον B d pr. m.: πολύγνωστον A C D E. 28 γὰρ B *: γὰρ πολύγνωτος d sec. m.: γὰρ πολύγνωστος A C D E. ἀγαθὸς A B C D: ἀγαθῶν E *. 30 οὐ B*: om. A C D E. 31 ἡ Paccius: ἢ A B C D E.

haec tragoedia, haeque partes sunt hae: narrationes, 1450 a
consuetudines, dictio, creditum, aspectus, melodia.
Hae vero partes hae sunt: fabulae et consuetudines 10
et eloquium et creditum et contemplatio et melodia.
Et partes quibus imitantur duae, et quo imitantur unum et
quod imitantur tres et ab. Et haec quae usurpat usurpat
species horum quomodocunque eunt res; nam—omnis
consuetudinem et fabulam et eloquium et melos et visum
hac ratione. Et maior *his* est constitutio rerum. Nam
ars tragoediae imitatio est non hominum sed operum et 15
vitae, *vita* vero est in opere estque negotium quod est
perfectio quis et opus quod. Iique secundum consuetu-
dines quidem imitantur quomodo sint, secundum opera
vero felices vel contrario. Et tantummodo agunt ut 20
imitentur consuetudines eorum, quamquam consuetudines
repraesentant propter opera eorum eo usque ut fiant
et res et fabulae finis artis tragoediae, et perfectio ipsa
est maxima eorum omnium. Atque etiam sine opere non
fit tragoedia, sine consuetudine vero fit interdum: prop- 25
terea quod tragoediae iuniorum plurimae sine consue-
tudine sunt, et omnino reliqui poetae tales sunt qualis
erat condicio de Zeuxide scriptore apud id quod composuit
ad Polygnotum; nam ille fuit homo qui scribebat con-
suetudines bonas, illud vero quod composuit Zeuxis caret
consuetudine.

Item si facit quis sermonem quem in credito et eloquio
et ingenio et eiusmodi cuius compositio bona est, non 30
consequetur omnino ut faciat id quod fuit antiquitus
opus tragoediae, sed erit compositio quae affertur in hoc
tempore minor compositione quae fiebat tunc multo et
sic erat usus tragoediae. Dico quod habebat fabulam
et constitutionem rerum fuitque cum his duobus illi ex iis
quod fuit magnificum consolatio quaedam et roboratio
animae nisi quod partes fabulae sunt circumvolutio et
recognitio. Item indicium quod ii qui faciunt opere prius 35
valent accurationem adhibere in opere magis quam con-
stitutionem rerum quemadmodum poetae priores exempli

1450 a τὰ πράγματα συνίστασθαι, οἷον . . . καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ποιηταὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες.

ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη. παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
1450 b γραφικῆς· εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειε καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα. ἔστι τε μίμησις πράξεως καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ λέγειν
5 δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μέν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ᾗ προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει· διόπερ οὐκ
10 ἔχουσιν ἦθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων· διάνοια δέ, ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν μὲν λόγων ἡ λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
15 ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μέν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς· ὡς γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν
20 τῶν ὄψεων ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστιν.

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα ποίαν τινὰ 7
δεῖ τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον τῆς τραγῳδίας ἐστίν. κεῖται δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν

1450 b 1 ἐναλείψειε ACD: ἐναλείψει BE. 9 ᾗ προαιρεῖται: ἢ πρ. ABCDE (cf. 1454 a 18). ἢ φεύγει — ὁ λέγων C: the same with ὅ τις A: with ὅστις E: ending with λόγων D: διόπερ — φεύγει om. B. 16 ἡ μελοποιος. μέγιστον B: πέντε ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον ACDE: for πέντε πέμπτον ITALUS. ἡ δὲ ὄψις ACDE: αἱ δὲ ὄψεις B. 18 ὡς γὰρ ACE: ἡ γὰρ BD*. 21–23 διωρισμένων — ἐστίν om. E. 22 τὴν ACD: om. B. 23 δὴ BYWATER: δὲ B: δ' ACD.

gratia, initium et indicium iis de illo quod est in animo 1450 a
sunt fabula quae est in tragoedia et secundae consuetu-
dines. Scilicet paene sic est id quod est in delineationibus 1450 b
et figura; nam si leverit quis colores bonos qui parantur
ad pingendum linendo sine cura, non placebit decore
imaginum et figurarum quae efficient quemadmodum
placebit simulatio operis cuius causa monstrant agentes
omnes historias et res. Et tertium est creditum. Idque
est vis narrandi quaecumque sunt inventa et idonea
quemadmodum est opus politicae et rhetoricae——.
priores faciebant dum dicebant ad modum politicae, qui
sunt in hoc tempore ad modum rhetoricae. Et consuetudo
talis est, quae indicat voluntatem qualis sit; neque enim
est ex consuetudine eorum illud in sermone quo nuntiat
homo quid et elegit item aut defugit is qui loquitur.
Creditum *est* quo ostendunt aut esse quomodo est aut non
est et uti ostendunt. Quartum est quod sermo est
dictus, voloque illo quod dictum est prius et alloquium
quae est per appellationem interpretatio sermonis emmetri
et metro carentis cuius vis una est. Et quod est horum
reliquorum nempe opus soni maximum est omnium
commodorum, visus vero consolatur animum, quamquam
expers est artis neque ullo modo pertinet ad artem poeta-
rum propterea quod ars tragoediae et sine certamine et
est ab hypocritis, et etiam perfectio operis artis instru-
mentorum aptior est ad efficiendum in visu quam ars
poetarum.

Et quoniam definitae sunt hae res, dicamus post eas
qualis sit constitutio rerum quum hoc sit primarium
majusque sit arte tragoediae; et posuimus artem tragoe-

1450 b τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος· ἔστι γὰρ ὅλον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος. ὅλον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ' ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ' ἐκεῖνο δ' ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι, τελευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν, μέσον δὲ ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον. δεῖ ἄρα τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους μήθ' ὁπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἄρχεσθαι μήθ' ὅποι ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἰδέαις. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, διὸ οὔτε πάμμικρον ἄν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῷον, συγχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη, οὔτε 1451 a παμμέγεθες, οὐ γὰρ ἅμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας, οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῷον· ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ μήκους ὅρος μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἂν ἠγωνίζοντο, ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ φασιν· ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι

26 *μέσον* ABC: *μέσην* DE. 28 *γίνεσθαι* ACD: *γενέσθαι* B. 28–29 *ἢ γίνεσθαι — εἶναι* om. E. 30 *καὶ αὐτὸ* ACDE: *αὐτὸ καὶ* B pr. m. 31 *εὖ* ABC: om. D. *εὐμύθους* E: *εὐθύμους* *. 32 *ὅποι* B: *ὅπου* ACDE. 37–39 *πάμμικρον* and *παμμέγεθες* Paccius: *πᾶν μικρὸν* and *πᾶν μέγεθος* ABCDE: *πάνυ μικρὸν* and *πάνυ μέγα* T. 38 *ἀναισθήτου* ACDE: *αἰσθητοῦ* B. 6 *τοῦ δὲ μήκους* BC: *τοὺ μήκους τοῦ δὲ μήκους* E: om. *δὲ* AD. *μὲν πρὸς* ABCDE: *πρὸς μὲν* Lasc. 7 *τέχνης* ABCD: *τύχης* E. *ἔδει* ABCD: om. E. 9 *ἀ. τ. φ. τ. π.* ACDE: *αὐτὴν τοῦ π. φ.* B.

diae esse consummationem et finem totius operis et 1450 b
imitationem et habere magnitudinem aliquam, estque tota
etiamsi nullam magnitudinem habet. Totum est autem
cui est initium et medium et finem. Initium autem est
quod ipsum quidem non necessario est cum alio, aliud
vero debet esse cum hoc, finis vero contrario scilicet ipse
debet esse cum alio necessario vel plerumque, post illud
autem nihil est aliud, medium vero cum alio est, sequi-
turque id aliud etiam. Et hinc qui constant sunt fortes,
unde incipitur invenitur, neque ubi ponat finem rei
invenit, sed utuntur formis (2) quae dictae sunt. Atque
etiam super animali bono et omni re quae non componitur
quicquam non modo decet esse haec ordinata tantum,
sed decet esse magnitudinem non quaecunque acciderit,
quandoquidem bonitas tantum fit magnitudine et ordi-
natione. Et idcirco nullum parvum animal est bonum, nam
visus compositus est propter propinquitatem temporis
insensibilis, quia fit non omnino grande, nam visus non
est unâ, sed condicio eius est quae facit tuentes unum et 1451 a
totum. Idque ex visu exempli gratia est tamquam sit
animal ad distantiam decem millium stadiorum eo usque
ut sit quemadmodum decet corpora et animal habere
magnitudinem quam, hocque ipsum esse facile aspectu,
et hoc ipso est in fabula item longitudo, estque servata in
memoria. Longitudo vero ipsa—terminus eius versus
certamen et sensum qui est artis : si enim unusquisque
hominum deberet certare tragoedia, tres horas aquae,
uteretur certamen clepsydra, sicut solemus dicere aliquo
tempore. At ubi (2) est ad naturam rerum, putatur

1451a καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς δὲ ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γινομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγέθους.

15 μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς οὐχ, ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται, ἐὰν περὶ 8
ἕνα ᾖ· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ γένει συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕν· οὕτως δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἑνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις. διὸ πάντες ἐοίκασιν ἁμαρτάνειν ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακληίδα Θησηίδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
20 ποιήματα πεποιήκασιν· οἴονται γάρ, ἐπεὶ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἕνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι προσήκειν. ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καλῶς ἰδεῖν ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μα-
25 νῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ, ὧν οὐδὲν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν οἵαν λέγομεν τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν συνέστησεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἡ μία μίμησις ἑνός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν
30 μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησίς ἐστι, μιᾶς τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως, ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον· ὃ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ἐστίν.

25 φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γινό- 9
μενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο

11 διορίσαντας A C D E: διορισάντα B. 13 εἰς εὐτυχίαν μεταβάλλειν only E. 14 ὅρος A B C D: om. E. 16 τῷ γένει A C D E: τῷ ἑνὶ B*. 19 καὶ θησηίδα B. 23 διὰ om. D. 25 ἀγερμῷ A B D: ἀγερμανῷ C E and many others. 26 ἦν ἢ B C: ἢ om. A D E. θάτερον θάτερον B. 27 περὶ μὲν B. λέγομεν B D: λέγοιμεν A C E. 28 ὁμοίως ὅτι B. 30 εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, om. all between E. 32 μετατιθεμένου A B C D: μεταθεμένου E. 33–34 ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον A B: ποιεῖ, ἐπίδηλον ὡς C E: ποιεῖ μηδὲν ἐπίδηλον D. 35 οὐ τὸ B C D E*: οὕτω A.

terminari eo usque ut appareat hoc est ex praestantiori 1451 a
in magnitudine. Et quemadmodum terminaverunt absolute et dixerunt in quanta magnitudine probabiliter vel necesssario, dum fit in his quae sunt necessario unum post alterum, evadit in prosperitatem quae fit post infelicitatem vel mutatur infelicitas in successum, erit magnitudinis terminus sufficiens.

Fabula vero non est quemadmodum putavere nonnulli si est ad unum. Nam multae res sine fine accidunt uni, suntque nonnullorum et individuorum neque sunt res una; atque item fiunt opera multa unius, at haec non sunt. ac ne unum quidem ex iis, opus unum. Quare videntur peccasse omnes poetae Heraclidae et dicti Theseda et qui fecere similia his poematis; nam credunt si fuerit Heracles unus, fuisse fabulam unam; Homerus vero, quemamodum est inter eum et illos differentia in rebus aliis, etiam hoc videtur bene vidisse: sive propter artem, sive ob naturam; nam quum componeret historiam Odysseos non posuit quodcunque acciderat Odyssei, v.c. verberationem et haec et mala et vices que fuerunt in Parnasso, et iram quam irati sunt super eo in bello quod erat apud Agermum neque etiam unumquodque ex rebus quae acciderunt quales iubebat necessitas poni in exemplo, sed composuit eam tendendo versus actionem unam quae est quae appellatur Odyssea ascripta Odyssei itidemque fecit in historia Iliadis quam composuit. Quocirca decet *in* reliquis imitationibus esse imitationem unam unius et item fabula in opere est imitatio una unius et huius totius, partes quoque constituunt res sic ut si transtulerit quis partem quam aut amoverit corrumpatur et confundatur et conturbetur totum omnino. Nam quod propinquum sit an non propinquum nihil efficit, efficitque ut fiat totum ad nihil, est pars totius ipsius.

Et liquet ex iis quae dicta sunt quae fuerunt exempli gratia non esse operis poetae, sed illud tantum esse circum qualia occurrant sive possibile ex iis probabiliter,

καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα διαφέρουσιν, εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων, ἀλλὰ (τοῦτο διαφέρει) τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει. ἔστι δὲ καθόλου μὲν τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς κωμῳδίας ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον γέγονεν· συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων, οὕτω τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα ὑποτιθέασι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἰαμβοποιοὶ περὶ τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ποιοῦσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι τὸ δυνατόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γενόμενα οὔπω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ γενόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι δυνατά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐν ἐνίαις μὲν ἓν ἢ δύο τῶν γνωρίμων ἐστὶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πεποιημένα, ἐν ἐνίαις δὲ οὐδέν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀγάθωνος Ἀνθεῖ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τά τε πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πεποίηται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον εὐφραίνει· ὥστ' οὐ πάντως εἶναι ζητητέον τῶν παραδεδομένων μύθων, περὶ οὓς αἱ τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν, ἀντέχεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖον τοῦτο ζητεῖν,

1451 b 3 γὰρ A C D E: om. B. τεθῆναι A B C: τιθέναι D E. καὶ οὐδὲν A C D E: οὐδὲν δ' B. 5 τοῦτο A D E*: τούτῳ B C. γενόμενα A B C D: γινόμενα E. 7 ἱστορίας — ποίησις om. D. 8 τὸ καθόλου B. 9 ἢ πράττειν A B C E: ἢ πράγματα D. 11 τὸ δὲ B C: τὴν δὲ D: τὸν δὲ A: perhaps τῶν δὲ. 12 οὖν om. D E. 14 τυχόντα A C D E: τιθέντα B. ὑποτιθέασι A C D E: τιθέασι B. 15 περὶ τὸν A E: περὶ τῶν B C: πρὸς τὸν D. 16 πιθανὸν B C: πειθανόν A E: πειθόμενον D. 18 φανερὰν E. 20 ἐν ἐνίαις B C: ἐν om. A D E. 21 οὐδέν B D: οὐθέν A C E. 22 Ἀνθεῖ Welcker: ἄνθει A B C E: blank in D. ὁμοίως ὅτι B. 23 ὡς τοῦ παντὸς E. 24 τῶν om. D E.

sive quae iubet necessitas. Nam auctor historiarum et 1451 b
poeta etiam, etiamsi loquuntur sic metro et sine metro
differunt nam Herodotus potest esse metro, neque erit
id quod componit cum metro vel sine metro minus, sed
(haec est differentia) quatenus ille dicit quae dicuntur,
hic vero qualia fiant. Quare fit poesis magis philosophica
et magis seria historia rerum quatenus poesis universa
magis et historia quidem tantum dicit et enarrat particu-
laria, illa vero universalia. Et quae sunt in universali
sunt qualitas et qualificata sunt omnia quae quasi occurrit
ut dicantur vel fiant sive quae probabiliter, sive quae sunt
necessaria; ut coniectura quae fit in arte poetica dum ars
poetica ipsa imponit nomina. At singularia et particularia
v.c. sunt ut dicatur quidnam fecerit Alcibiades sive quid
passus sit. Et in iis quae dicuntur in comoedia apparuit
hoc; nam cum composuerint fabulam per necessaria
nequaquam quaelibet nomina ponunt, neque quemad-
modum faciunt in singularibus et particularibus quod est
in iambo. Nam in tragoedia haerebant nominibus quae
fuere. Causa autem est quod status possibilis persuasivus
est; eum vero qui adhuc non fuit non credimus posse
fieri : quae vero iam inventa sunt, si sunt inventa non
possunt non fieri. Neque est hoc nisi in tragoediis
singulis et iis in quarum una sunt duo ex iis quae sunt
eorum qui sunt noti, id huic quae fecit rebus aliis nomen
unum, et in singulis nullum omnino, quemadmodum qui
statuit bonum esse unum. Nam in illo opus et nomen
facta sunt ambo vel fecerunt *pariter*, *neque est* voluptas
in utroque minor. Ut non deceat quaerere sine dubio
traditorem fabularum circa quas sunt tragoediae ut iis
haereatur. Nam postulatio huius ex ridiculis est, quando-

1451 b ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γνώριμα ὀλίγοις γνώριμά ἐστιν ἀλλ' ὅμως εὐφραίνει πάντας. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσῳ ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησίν ἐστιν, μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις. κἂν ἄρα
30 συμβῇ γενόμενα ποιεῖν, οὐδὲν ἧττον ποιητής ἐστι· τῶν γὰρ γενομένων ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα ἂν εἰκὸς γενέσθαι καὶ δυνατὰ γενέσθαι, καθ' ὃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ποιητής ἐστιν.

τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις
35 εἰσὶ χείρισται. λέγω δ' ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπεισόδια μετ' ἄλληλα οὔτ' εἰκὸς οὔτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τοιαῦται δὲ ποιοῦνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν φαύλων ποιητῶν δι' αὐτούς, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς· ἀγωνίσματα γὰρ ποιοῦν-
1452 a τες καὶ παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείνοντες τὸν μῦθον πολλάκις διαστρέφειν ἀναγκάζονται τὸ ἐφεξῆς.

ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἡ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα
5 καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα· τὸ γὰρ θαυμαστὸν οὕτως ἕξει μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης ταῦτα θαυμασιώτατα δοκεῖ, ὅσα ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες φαίνεται γεγονέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος ἐν Ἄργει ἀπέκτεινε τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ
10 θανάτου τῷ Μίτυι, θεωροῦντι ἐμπεσών· ἔοικε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰκῇ γίνεσθαι. ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοὺς τοιούτους εἶναι καλλίους μύθους.

26 *ὀλίγοις γνώριμα* om. D *. 29 *τὴν* om. B. 30 *γενόμενα* A B C D : *γινόμενα* E. *ἐστι* : perhaps *ἔσται*. 31 *γενέσθαι* A B C D : *γίνεσθαι* E. 32 *γενέσθαι* A B C D E : *γινέσθαι* (sic) U ; perhaps *γίνεσθαι*. 34 *ἐπεισοδιώδεις* A C D E : *ἐπιδόσεις* B. *τά* A C D E : *καὶ* B. 37 *ὑποκριτάς* A B D E : *κριτάς* C. 1452 a 1 *παρατείνοντες* B T : *παρατείναντες* A C D E. *τὸν* B : om. A C D E. *μῦθον* A B C D E : om. T. 4 *καὶ μάλιστα* A C D E : om. *καὶ* B (cf. Post. Anal. 76 a 1 *καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ μάλιστα*). 6 *οὕτως* A C D E : *οὔτε* B. 7 all between two *τύχης* om. E. *τῶν* A C D : om. B. *τύχης* A D : *τῆς τύχης* B C. 8 *ὅσα ὥσπερ* A B D E : *ὅσαπερ* C. *ὡς* A C D E : *ὥσπερ* B. 11 *γίνεσθαι* B (as in *Mir. Ausc.* 846 a 22) : *γενέσθαι* A C D : *γενῆσθαι* E.

quidem celebrata existunt, tamen delectant omnes. Et 1451 b
liquet hinc poetam proprie esse poetam fabularum et
metrorum in quantum poeta est per imitationem, imi-
taturque opera. Quodsi accidit ut faciat rem in iis quae
iam accidere, non est in eo poeta minus, nam ex iis quae 30
fierunt sunt quae nihil impediat quin sit condicio eorum
quae tamquam illa quae constat fieri ut condicio eius cuius
est poeta. Et fabulae quidem introductae et opera
voluntaria item introducta; dico autem fabulam intro-
ductam illam ubi introducti necessario unum post alterum 35
eum est necessarium neque probabile. Et tale quid fit
a poetis quidem pravis propter eos, a poetis vero bonis
propter hypocritas, et dum faciunt certamina, non protra-
hunt fabulam praeter vim, et aliquando et saepe coguntur
mutare (2) fabulam quae restat. Propterea quod imitatio 1425 a
modo est operis perfecti tantum, sed rerum terribilium
et rerum tristium, et haec sunt praesertim magis quam
quod fit a gloria, et inter se; nam quae sunt mira sic esto
status eorum proprie magis quam illa quae sunt automata
et casualia, nam quae sunt casualia ex iis putantur ea 5
esse mirabiliora quotquot videntur esse consilio; qualis
fuit casus Andreae filii Mityos, nam hic occiderat in
Argei illum qui fuit causa mortis Mityae, dum videt eum
eum cecidisset; nam videtur in rebus quae sic eunt non
esse frustra nec nequicquam. Ut sequatur necessario
his quae sic eunt esse bonas fabulas. Et sunt compositae. 10
Nam opera sunt imitationes operum per medium fabula-

1452 a εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων οἱ μὲν ἁπλοῖ οἱ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι. 10
καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις, ὧν μιμήσεις οἱ μῦθοί εἰσιν, ὑπάρχου-
15 σιν εὐθὺς οὖσαι τοιαῦται. λέγω δὲ ἁπλῆν μὲν πρᾶξιν, ἧς
γινομένης ὥσπερ ὥρισται συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς ἄνευ περιπετείας
ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἡ μετάβασις γίνεται, πεπλεγμένην δὲ ἐξ
ἧς μετὰ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ ἢ περιπετείας ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἡ μετάβασίς
ἐστιν. ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ
20 μύθου, ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι ταῦτα· διαφέρει γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίνε-
σθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε.

ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττο- 11
μένων μεταβολή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὥσπερ λέγο-
25 μεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον· οἷον ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἐλθὼν
ὡς εὐφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπουν καὶ ἀπαλλάξων τοῦ πρὸς τὴν
μητέρα φόβου, δηλώσας ὃς ἦν, τοὐναντίον ἐποίησεν· καὶ
ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀγόμενος ὡς ἀποθανούμενος, ὁ δὲ
Δαναὸς ἀκολουθῶν ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, τὸν μὲν συνέβη ἐκ τῶν
30 πεπραγμένων ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι. ἀναγνώρισις δὲ,
ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μετα-
βολὴ [ἢ] εἰς φιλίαν ἢ ἔχθραν τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυ-
στυχίαν ὡρισμένων. καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις, ὅταν ἅμα
περιπέτεια γένηται, οἷον ἔχει ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι. εἰσὶ μὲν
35 οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναγνωρίσεις· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ
τυχόντα ἔστιν ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνειν, καὶ εἰ πέπραγέ τις

13 πεπλεγμένοι ACE: πεπλασμένοι B. 13–14 οἱ μὲν — αἱ om. D: εἰσὶ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι only R*. 17–18 all between two ἀναγνωρισμοῦ om. E. πεπλεγμένην δὲ B: πεπλεγμένη δὲ ACD. ἐξ ἧς B Lasc.: λέξις ACD: πρᾶξις FIK: πεπλεγμένη δὲ λέγεται ἐν ᾗ ?* 18 ἢ ἀμφοῖν ACD: om. ἢ B. 23 πραττομένων ACDE: πραττόντων B. 25 οἷον B: ὥσπερ ACDE. 26 ἀπαλλάξων AC: ἀπαλλάξας D: ἀπαλάξας E: ἀπαλάττων B. 28 λυγκεῖ AC: γλυκεῖ B: μιμεῖσθαι DE: κλίνῃ *. 29 ἀκολουθῶν om. C. 32 ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ACDE: ἢ om. B: perhaps καὶ ἐ. φ. ἢ ἔχθραν E: ἢ εἰς ἐ. ABCD. 33–34 καλλίστη — γένηται B*: κ. δ. ἀ. ὅταν ἅμα περιπέτειαι γίνωνται ACDE. 34 ἔχει ἐν B: ἔχει ἡ ἐν AC: with ἢ erased E: οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὀ ἔχει d: read ἐκεῖ. 35 καὶ — ἀναγνωρίσαι om. B. 36 συμβαίνειν FHI: συμβαίνει ACDE.

rum significo opere simplici illud quod dum fit ea quemad- 1452a
modum definita est una continua, fit transitio sine peri-
phereia et ratiocinatione. Et composita numeratur illa
in qua fit transitio cum ratiocinatione vel circumvolutione,
aut cum ambabus. Dicimusque has fieri ab ipsa consti-
tutione fabulae, eo usque ut *accidant* ex rebus quae ante
fuerunt, idque sive necessario sive probabiliter; et inter
esse haec propter haec et esse post haec differentia est
magna.

Et circumvolutio est mutatio in contrarium rerum
quas faciunt quemadmodum diximus et probabiliter et
necessario quemadmodum quum venisset ad Oedipum
idcirco ut delectaret Oedipum et liberaret a metu matris
attulit poema in contrarium eius quod voluit; nam cum
ducebatur in lectica propterea quod moriturus erat,
Danaus quum sequebatur ut eum occideret, huic quidem
secundum id quod memoratum est eo quod scripsit ex
illo accidit ut moreretur illi vero accidit ut fugeret.
Ratiocinatio quemadmodum significat nomen ipsum est
transitio ab inscientia ad scientiam quae est circa res quae
definiuntur successu vel infelicitate et inimicitia. Et
ratiocinatio pulcra est ubi est circumvolutio simul quem-
admodum invenitur in historia Odysseos : et inveniun-
tur ratiocinationis genera alia nam invenitur apud inan-
ima et si fecerit quis quid et si non fecerit accidit ei
ratiocinatio in utroque casu; sed haec ab ipsa fabula

ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἔστιν ἀναγνωρίσαι· ἀλλ' ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη
1452 b ἀναγνώρισις καὶ περιπέτεια ἢ ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον, οἷων πράξεων ἡ τραγῳδία μίμησις ὑπόκειται· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων συμβήσεται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστιν ἀναγνώρισις, αἱ μέν εἰσι θατέρου πρὸς τὸν
5 ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ᾖ δῆλος ἄτερος τίς ἐστιν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ ἀναγνωρίσαι, οἷον ἡ μὲν Ἰφιγένεια τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἀνεγνωρίσθη ἐκ τῆς πέμψεως τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκείνῳ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰφιγένειαν ἄλλης ἔδει ἀναγνωρίσεως.

δύο μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου μέρη περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί, περιπέτεια
10 καὶ ἀναγνώρισις, τρίτον δὲ πάθος. τούτων δέ περιπέτεια μὲν καὶ ἀναγνώρισις εἴρηται, πάθος δέ ἐστι πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά, οἷον οἵ τε ἐν τῷ φανερῷ θάνατοι καὶ αἱ περιωδυνίαι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οἷς μὲν ὡς εἴδεσι δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρό- 12
15 τερον εἴπομεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα τάδε ἐστίν, πρόλογος ἐπεισόδιον ἔξοδος χορικόν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πάροδος τὸ δὲ στάσιμον· κοιναὶ μὲν ἁπάντων ταῦτα, ἴδια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ κόμμοι. ἔστι δὲ πρόλογος μὲν μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ πρὸ χοροῦ παρόδου, ἐπει-
20 σόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν, ἔξοδος δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστι χοροῦ

37 ἢ μὴ DE: εἰ μὴ AC. 1452 b 1 οἷων πράξεων B: οἷον πράξεων ACE*: οἷον πράξεως D. 3 εὐτυχεῖν ABDE: ἢ εὐτυχεῖν C. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ G corr. (δὲ): ἐπειδὴ ἡ ACDE: ἔτι δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεις (om. τινῶν ἐστιν ἀ.) B Lasc. marg. (ἀναγνωρίσειε). 4 εἰσι B Lasc.: om. ACDE. 5 δῆλος ABCE: δῆμος D. ἄτερος B Lasc.: ἕτερος ACDE. 8 ἔδει ACDE: ἔφη B. 9 περὶ ταύτ' G (cf. Nicom. Eth. 1116 a 4): περὶ ταῦτ' ACDE: om. περὶ B. περιπέτεια μὲν B. 11 καὶ om. E. εἴρηται: read εἴρηνται. 12 οἵ τε BCDE: ὅ τε A. 14 μὲν εἴδεσι δεῖσθαι E. 16 ἔξοδος ACDE: ἐξόδειν B. 17 τούτου ACDE: τοῦτο B. 18 ἀπὸ ACDE: ὑπὸ B. κόμμοι ABCE: κῶμοι D. 19 παρόδου ACDE: γὰρ ὁδοῦ B. 19–20 μέρος ὅλον (ι) — ἔξοδος δὲ, om. CDE, cf. *. 21 μεθ' ὃ ABCE: καθ' ὃ B.

est propria et haec est propria operis significo quod dictum est. Nam cum tali ratiocinatione et circumvolutione 1452 b erit aut misericordia aut timor quemadmodum positum est opus tragicum esse imitationem, atque etiam felicitas et infelicitas in *tali* accident. Quia ratiocinatio quorumdem est ratiocinatio ab homine aliquo ad socium suum idque fit cum scit illam rem is solus at ubi oportet ambos ratiocinari et invicem agnoscere est quemadmodum ratiocinata est et cognovit femina dicta Iphigenia Orestem a missione epistolae eius, ille vero egebat ratiocinationis et recognitionis alterius scil. in re Iphigeniae. Et hae quas memoravimus sunt duae partes fabulae scil. ratiocinatio et circumvolutio; et tertia pars est passio : passio vero est actio corrumpens vel angens ad instar illorum quos consequuntur casus mortis et poenae et miseriae et similia horum.

Et Partes tragoediae *quod attinet*, decet usurpare aliquot quemadmodum usurpamus species quomodo vero *id fiat* memoravimus in eo quod antecessit; secundum quantitatem vero et in quas res dividatur, nos memoramus nunc. Hae partes sunt prologus introductio exitus saltationis quae est chori et huius ipsius transitus et etiam statio; et haec omnia sunt communia tragoediae, et quae sunt a scena et species et transitus chori et introductio etiam est pars universalis tragoediae, estque medium melodiae totius chori, et exitus etiam est pars universalis

μέλος. χορικοῦ δὲ πάροδος μὲν ἡ πρώτη λέξις ὅλη χοροῦ, στάσιμον δὲ μέλος χοροῦ τὸ ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου· κόμμος δὲ θρῆνος κοινὸς χοροῦ καὶ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς. μέρη δὲ τραγῳδίας οἷς μὲν δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρότερον εἴπαμεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

ὧν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι συνιστάντας τοὺς μύθους καὶ πόθεν ἔσται τὸ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις. ἐπειδὴ οὖν δεῖ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγῳδίας μὴ ἁπλῆν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην καὶ ταύτην φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικήν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμήσεώς ἐστιν, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον, ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας δεῖ μεταβάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν· οὐ γὰρ φοβερὸν οὐδὲ ἐλεεινὸν τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μιαρόν ἐστιν· οὔτε τοὺς μοχθηροὺς ἐξ ἀτυχίας εἰς εὐτυχίαν· ἀτραγῳδότατον γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πάντων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δεῖ, οὔτε γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερόν ἐστιν· οὐδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον ἔχοι ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστι δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, [ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον,] ὥστε οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἔσται τὸ συμβαῖνον. ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τούτων λοιπός. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ, μήτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν τινά, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ,

13

22 μέλος ACDE: μέρος B. 23 στάσιμον ACDE: στάσιμος B. 26 κεχωρισμένα ταῦτ' ACDE: τ. χ. B. 27 ὧν Lasc.: ὡς ABCDE. 31 εἶναι ABCE: εἶναι καὶ D. 31 πεπλεγμένην ACDE: πεπλασμένην B. 34–36 for οὐ γὰρ — εὐτυχίαν B has τοὺς ἐν ἀρετῇ. 35 μιαρὸν ABCE: μικρὸν D. 1453 a 1 τὸν σφόδρα B Lasc.: τὸ σφόδρα ACDE. 5—6 ἔλεος — ὅμοιον ACE: om. B: περὶ τὸ ἀνάξιον and τὸ ὅμοιον D. 9 καὶ μοχθηρίαν ABDE*: om. C.

tragoediae estque ea post quam non est choro sonus; 1452b
transitus vero chori est prima oratio totius chori, statio
autem est pars chori quae est sine metro anapaestico et
trochaico, naenia vero est lamentatio communis chori
qui *est* a scena. Partes vero tragoediae quibus decet uti
memoravimus antea, et quae sunt secundum mensuram
et in quot partes oporteat dividi compendium haec sunt.

Et haec sunt de quorum nonnullis putamus putando,
aliis vero cavemus in compositione fabularum; at unde
inveniatur opus tragoediae nos memoramus in eo quod
sequitur, adjiciemusque illud ei quod ante dictum est.
Et quoniam compositio tragoediae debet esse non simplex
sed compositum, et hoc fieri ex rebus terribilibus tristibus,
et esse imitator horum, quoniam hoc est proprium
imitationis talium, liquet primum quod non facile est at
ne fortibus quidem hominibus ut appareant semper in
mutatione ab felicitate ad infelicitatem, quia non est
illud terribile neque difficile, sed horum quae——, neque
autem videantur laboriosi ab infelicitate ad felicitatem,
nam haec tota intragica est, neque enim habet unum ex
iis quae decet neque quae sunt philanthropiae, neque 1453a
quae sunt luctus neque quae sunt terribilia, neque quae
sunt eorum qui valde improbi sunt ab felicitate in infeli-
citatem ut cadant; nam quod est philanthropiae habet
constitutio talis neque etiam dolorem neque etiam timo-
rem; ille quidem est ad eum qui non meretur dum non
succedit, hic autem ad eum cui similis est alius, hic quidem
ad eum qui non meretur, timor vero ad [ab] similem,
quare quod accidit neque timoris est neque misericordiae.
Restat ergo medius inter haec duo, scil. in quo non est
differentia neque virtute et iustitia neque etiam declinat
ad infelicitatem propter fraudem et laborem sed propter
errorem aliquem, eumque eorum qui sunt in gloria magna

1453a οἷον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον ἁπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, καὶ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, μὴ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλλὰ δι' ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἢ οἷου εἴρηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον· πρὸ τοῦ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους ἀπηρίθμουν, νῦν δὲ περὶ ὀλίγας οἰκίας αἱ κάλλισται τραγῳδίαι συντίθενται, οἷον περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ Οἰδίπουν καὶ Ὀρέστην καὶ Μελέαγρον καὶ Θυέστην καὶ Τήλεφον καὶ ὅσοις ἄλλοις συμβέβηκεν ἢ παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι.

ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεώς ἐστιν. διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδῃ ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτι τοῦτο δρᾷ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις καὶ πολλαὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ εἴρηται ὀρθόν. σημεῖον δὲ μέγιστον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικώταται αἱ τοιαῦται φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται. δευτέρα δ' ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπό τινων ἐστι σύστασις ἡ διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα, καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, καὶ τελευτῶσα εἰς τοὐναντίον τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν· ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ' εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἔστι δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἂν οἱ ἔχθιστοι ὦσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον

11 οἷον: perhaps οἷοι. οἰδίπους BCDE: δίπους A. 12 ἄρα ABCD: γὰρ ἄρα E. 15 μοχθηρίαν ACDE: μοχθηρίας B. 16 οἷου ACDE: οἵου ὡς B. μᾶλλον ἢ χ. ABCE: ἢ μᾶλλον χ. D. 17 πρὸ τοῦ B: πρῶτον ACDE*. 19 ἀλκμαίωνα MSS.: the correct spelling introduced by BYWATER. 22 κατὰ τέχνην B: κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ACDE. 24 δρᾷ ABC: δρᾶν DE. 25 αὐτοῦ ABCDE: read αὐτῶν. 28 ἄλλα ABCD: μάλιστα E pr. m. 31 διπλῆν τε τὴν ABCD: διπλῆν τε E. καὶ om. B. 32 εἰς τοὐναντίον B: ἐξ ἐναντίας ACDE. 33 τῶν ACDE: om. B.

et felicitate, ad instar Oedipi et Thyestis et horum qui 1453 a
sunt ab his familiis et insignes. Et fabula quae it optime
non potest non esse quemadmodum dixere quidam simplex
aut composita, et mutari non ab infelicitate in felicitatem,
sed contrarie dico a felicitate in infelicitatem, non propter
laborem sed propter errorem et illum magnum aut ad
instar illorum qui dicti sunt meliores praesertim potius
quam viliores. Indiciumque eius est quod fit : et prius
numerabant fabulas qui inveniuntur ut succederent, nunc
vero componuntur tragoediae paullum apud domus ad
instar eius quod fuit de Alcmaeone, et Oedipode, et Oreste,
et Meleagro et Thyeste et Telepho et caeteris hominibus
reliquis quot transiere adversitates et consecuta sunt
infortunia ut paterentur et facerent res asperas. Et
pulchra quidem tragoedia quae fit arte est haec compo-
sitio : quare errant qui dant Euripidi culpae quod fecit
tragoedias suas ad hoc exemplum; nam multa *sunt* ex iis
quae deducunt rem ad infelicitatem (2). Illud autem
quemadmodum diximus rectum est : et maximum indi-
cium eius est quod hae res quae fiunt ex certaminibus et
a scaena apparent in hoc statu quamquam hi corrigunt
errorem. Et si Euripides administravit has res bene,
tamen videtur esse magis tragicus quam poetae reliqui.
Constitutio vero secunda—dicunt eam nonnulli homines
esse primam. Estque duplex in constitutione sua, ad
instar Odysseae, et cum desinit contrario creditur esse
praestantibus valde et vilibus. Et prima propter in-
firmitatem dicti theatri et poetae dum faciunt eam specta-
toribus loco voti. Non autem est haec voluptas a
tragoedia, sed aptior comoediae; nam illic etiam hostes

Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἴγισθος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται
1453 b καὶ ἀποθνήσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ' οὐδενός.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως 14
γίνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων,
ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ἀμείνονος. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ
5 τοῦ ὁρᾶν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον, ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα
τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμ-
βαινόντων· ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν Οἰδίπου μῦ-
θον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον
καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς
10 ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατῶδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τρα-
γῳδίᾳ κοινωνοῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ
τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου
διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν, φανε-
ρὸν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον. ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ
15 ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν συμπιπτόντων, λάβωμεν. ἀνάγκη
δὴ ἢ φίλων εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις ἢ
ἐχθρῶν ἢ μηδετέρων. ἂν μεν οὖν ἐχθρὸς ἐχθρόν, οὐδὲν ἐλεεινὸν
οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε μέλλων, πλὴν κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος· οὐδ' ἂν
μηδετέρως ἔχοντες· ὅταν δ' ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ἐγγένηται τὰ πάθη,
20 οἷον ἢ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ υἱὸς πατέρα ἢ μήτηρ υἱὸν ἢ υἱὸς μητέρα
ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ μέλλῃ ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον δρᾷ, ταῦτα ζητητέον. τοὺς
μὲν οὖν παρειλημμένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν, λέγω δὲ οἷον
τὴν Κλυταιμνήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν
Ἐριφύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέωνος, αὐτὸν δὲ εὑρίσκειν δεῖ καὶ
25 τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆσθαι καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλῶς τί λέγομεν,

1453 b 2 μὲν οὖν A B C D E: μόνον *. 4 καὶ πρότερον B. 5 οὕτω συνεστάναι A C D E: τοῦ συνιστάναι B. 7 ἅπερ ἂν καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστι καὶ πάθος B. τὸν οἰδίπου B: τὸν τοῦ οἰδίπου A C E: τὸν τοῦ οἰδίποδος D. ἀκούων placed after μῦθον in B. 16 δὴ SPENGEL: δὲ A B C D E. 18 κατ' αὐτὸ A B C D: κατὰ ταὐτὸ E: perhaps κατὰ τοῦτο. 19 ἐγγένηται A C D E: ἐγγίγνεται B. 21 ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ μέλλῃ B C D: ἀποκτείνει ἢ μέλλει A E. δρᾷ C: δρᾶν A B D E. 23 ἀποθανοῦσαν A B C D E: om. F H. 24 ἐριφύλην A B C D: ἐριφέλην E.

et inimici sunt qui inveniuntur in fabula, ad instar Orestis et Aegisthi, qui cum facti sunt amici in fine rei exeunt, et consequitur in iis in naenia negotium mortis neminem a collega eius (2).

Et existentia quidem timoris et doloris tantum 1453 b
gignitur a visu, sed aliquando invenitur aliquid a compositione rerum, quod est ab antiquo tempore et est poetae ingeniosi; et decet componi fabulam hoc modo sine visu
ut audiens res contremiscat (2) et consequatur eum dolor dum audit fabulam Euripidis ex infortuniis quae patitur quis; et si poeta ille tantum parasset hoc per visum, quamquam est sine arte et res indigens materiae. Nonnulli vero parant per visum non quae sunt timoris sed quae sunt admirationis tantum, non participantes tragoediae ullo modo, neque enim decet petere a tragoedia omnem
voluptatem, sed aptam* tantum. Et in illis quidem quae parat poeta per imitationem quae est propter voluptatem sine dolore et timore notum est compotem huius rei debere facere eam in negotio. Eaque est ut capiamus
quae res sint haud asperae ex infortuniis quae consequuntur et quae videantur esse faciles. Nam oportet necessario esse talia opera vel amicorum inter se, vel hostium vel neutrorum. Et si hostis tantum hostem-sepraestet hosti, nihil est in hoc statu quod angat dum facit neque dum facturus est; nisi quod in passione ipsa non est status eorum etiam; neque si fuerit condicio eorum item condicio contrarietatis; ubi vero eveniunt passiones in amicabus et amicis v.c. ut occidat frater fratrem vel
filius patrem vel mater filium suum vel filius matrem suam vel facturus sit rem aliam huiusmodi, indiget in tali huius rei. Scil. ut fabulae quae iam captae sunt ad haec non solvantur, scil. v.c. nemini licet solvere de historia mulieris dictae Clytemestrae quin consecuta sit eam mors ab Oreste, neque dictae Eriphylae ab Alcmaeone; ipse vero debet invenire* res quae traditae sunt esse bene

εἴπωμεν σαφέστερον. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐποίουν εἰδότας καὶ γιγνώσκοντας, καθάπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐποίησεν ἀποκτείνουσαν τοὺς παῖδας τὴν Μήδειαν. ἔστι δὲ πρᾶξαι μέν, ἀγνοοῦντας δὲ πρᾶξαι τὸ δεινόν, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδίπους· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, οἷον ὁ Ἀλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος ἢ ὁ Τηλέγονος ὁ ἐν τῷ τραυματίᾳ Ὀδυσσεῖ. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ μέλλοντά τι ποιεῖν τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀναγνωρίσαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως. ἢ γὰρ πρᾶξαι ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ καὶ εἰδότας ἢ μὴ εἰδότας. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν γινώσκοντα μελλῆσαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι χείριστον. τό τε γὰρ μιαρὸν ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικόν· ἀπαθὲς γάρ. διόπερ οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ, ὅτι μὴ ὀλιγάκις, οἷον ἐν Ἀντιγόνῃ τὸν Κρέοντα ὁ Αἵμων. τὸ δὲ πρᾶξαι δεύτερον. βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν πρᾶξαι, πράξαντα δὲ ἀναγνωρίσαι· τό τε γὰρ μιαρὸν οὐ πρόσεστι καὶ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις ἐκπληκτικόν. κράτιστον δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον, λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἡ ἀδελφὴ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἕλλῃ ὁ υἱὸς τὴν μητέρα ἐκδιδόναι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὅπερ πάλαι εἴρηται, οὐ περὶ πολλὰ γένη αἱ τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν. ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης εὗρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις. ἀναγκά-

1453 b 26 εἴπωμεν CD: εἴπομεν ABE. 28 ἀποκτείνουσαν ABCD: ἀποκτείνασαν D. τὴν om. D. 30 ὁ om. E. 31 τοῦτο ABCD: τοιοῦτο E. 32 Ἀλκμέων ὁ Ἀστυδάμαντος: Ἀλκμαίων Ἀστυδάμαντος ITALUS: ὁ add VICTORIUS: ἀλκμαίωνος ἀστυδάμαντος ABCDE. 33 τὸ τρίτον B. 34 τι ποιεῖν B: ποιεῖν τι ACDE. τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ACDE: δι' ἀνηκέστων B. 36 ἀνάγκη ABCE: ἀνήκει D. ἢ μή ACDE: ἢ οὔκ B. 38 διόπερ ABCD: ὅτι E. 1454 a 1 ὅτι: ὁμοίως εἰ ACDE: ὁμοίως B = ὅτι as often, and this is preserved in E, see last note. 2 δὲ πρᾶξαι ABC: γὰρ πρᾶξαι DE. 2-3 βέλτιον—πρᾶξαι om. B. 5 κρεσφόντῃ ABC: κρεσφῶντι E: κρεοφόντει D. 6 ἀνεγνώρισεν ACD: ἐγνώρισε B. ἀλλ' — τὸν ἀδελφόν om. E. 7 καὶ ἐν τῇ (1) — ἀνεγνώρισεν om. C. 9 ὅπερ ACDE: ὡς B.

usurpatae. Et memoremus vim eius quod dicimus ‘ di- 1453 b
cere bene ’ clarius (2). Ergo operis est status hic quem-
admodum faciebant antiqui et sciebant notos; quem-
admodum faciebat Euripides in occidere mulierem
dictam Medeam filios suos : vis vero eius ut non faciat
voluntario dum sciant, et ut faciant non scientes tum 30
sciant amicitiam (2) postremo* est status malus, ut status
Sophoclis et Oedipi, et hoc extra poema ipsum, at quod
est in tragoedia est sicut Alcmaeon et Astydamantos vel
Telegon circa vulnus Odyssei. Atque etiam tertia quae
est huiusmodi : eaque est negotium illius qui facturus 35
erat rem ex iis quae insanabilia sunt, nam recognoscit
ante quam faciat propter inscitiam (2). Nihil autem
extra haec it omnino. Nam debet necessario aut facere
aut non facere, et si faciat, aut facere sciens aut facere
inscius, sed sciturus, atque etiam scientibus aut insciis.
Et quicunque ex his scit restatque neque facit, pessimus
est : nam poema eius tunc est turpe (2) neque tragicum,
nam caverat. Quare nemo facit ambigue nisi raro, quem-
admodum in Antigona Creonti Haemon. Facere autem 1454 a
est secundum. Optimum autem ei qui scit se facere ut
ubi fecerit recognoscat, nam turpitudo (2) non adest, et
recognitio (2) est mirabilior [et melior]. Et quam bonum
(2) est ultimum, sc. in loco dicto Asclephonte a muliere 5
dicta Meroe cum pararet occidere unum ex filiis suis, nisi
quod non occidit, sed agnovit, in loco dicto Iphigenia
soror fratrem et recognovit in loco dicto Hella filius
matrem suam et recognovit eam cum vellet TRADERE
(2); quocirca secundum quod dixi de iis sc. de tragoediis
ab antiquo tempore non sunt de generibus multis. Et
scrutatus est de iis non ab arte sed quocunque modo ex 10
eo quod invenerunt et paraverunt in fabulis, et coguntur

1454 a ζονται οὖν ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς οἰκίας ἁπαντᾶν, ὅσαις τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβέβηκε πάθη.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσεως καὶ ποίους 15
τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους, εἴρηται ἱκανῶς. περὶ δὲ τὰ ἤθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ᾖ. ἔξει δὲ ἦθος μέν, ἐὰν ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῇ φανερὸν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προαίρεσίν τινα ᾖ, χρηστὸν δέ, ἐὰν χρηστήν. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει· καὶ γὰρ γυνή ἐστι χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, καίτοι γε ἴσως τούτων τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ὅλως φαῦλόν ἐστιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἁρμόττοντα· ἔστι γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τὸ ἦθος ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁρμόττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶδει εἶναι. τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ χρηστὸν τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἁρμόττον ποιῆσαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν. κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ᾖ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτεθῇ, ὅμως ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαῖον οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ, τοῦ δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἁρμόττοντος ὅ τε θρῆνος Ὀδυσσέως ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ καὶ ἡ τῆς Μελανίππης ῥῆσις, τοῦ δὲ ἀνωμάλου ἡ ἐν Αὐλίδι Ἰφιγένεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ ἱκετεύουσα τῇ ὑστέρᾳ. χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ [καὶ] ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν [ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός,] καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός.

17 ἤθος om. E. φανερὸν ABCDE: φανερὰν? 18 τινα ἢ ABCD: τινα ἢ E: cf. 1450 b 10. 21 ὅλως om. C. τὸ B: τὰ ACDE. 22–23 τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶδει (after Politics 1277 b 19): τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἤδη E: οὐ τῷ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν B: τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν CD; τῷ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν A. 26 ὑποτεθῇ B*: ὑποτιθεῖς ACDE. ὁμαλῶς ABC: om. D: ὁμαλὸς ἀνώμαλος δὲ E. 28 μὴ ἀναγκαῖον οἷον ABC: μὴ ἀναγκαῖον suprascr. ου E: μὴ ἀναγκαίου d. 31 ἡ ἐν ABCD: om. ἡ E. 32 ὑστέρᾳ ABCE: ὑστεραίᾳ D. ὁμοίως ὅτι B*: om. ACDE. 34 ὥστε — εἰκός (2) AC: ὥστε — εἰκός (1) only B: om. DE.

transferre haec in talibus passionibus (2) quales accidunt 1454 a
iis secundum proprietates. Et de constitutione rerum et
quomodo deceat esse qui componunt fabulas dictum est
satis.

Et de consuetudinibus loquamur nunc, dicamusque
esse consuetudines unde cognoscatur (2) veritas quattuor.
Prima earum est ut sint consuetudines bonae, eritque CON-
SUETUDO quidem si sermo rei qui est notior affecerit per
actionem in credito quid et sit condicio uniuscuiusque
consuetudinum haec condicio, et bona si sit inventa, est
inventa bona in unoquoque genere. Nam invenitur
femina bona et SERVUS bonus, quamquam fortasse hic
quidem eorum malus est, hic vero pravus. Et secundum
est illud quod convenit. Nam consuetudo quae est
virorum invenitur, tamen non convenit mulieri, ne ut
appareat quidem in ea omnino. Tertium vero est simile
illius, nam qui habet hanc consuetudinem alius est quam
ille qui habet bonam consuetudinem, quoniam convenie-
bat ut faceret etiam quemadmodum ante dictum est.
Quartum vero est aequabile. Nam si fuerit quis ex eo
quod affert imitationem (2) aequabilis, positusque fuerit
talis mos sic aequabiliter, debet fieri inaequabilis. Item
exemplum pravitatis consuetudinis non est necessarium,
idque quemadmodum fuit misericordia Oresti, et dolor
super eum, et inconveniens est id quod *non* aptum et
idoneum erat, ad instar naeniae Odyssei super dicta
Scylla marina neque etiam ORATIO (2) dictae Mela-
nippes; inaequabilis [gen.] vero ut status Iphigeniae in
monasterio dicto Canum Aureorum; neque enim similis
erat illa quae supplicabatur illi postremae. Decet autem
petere semper cursum similitudinis, quemadmodum peti-
mus illum in constitutione rerum item sive probabiliter
sive necessario sive similiter: et apud haec erit con-
suetudo necessaria vel similis. Apparet ergo fines

1454 b φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ† αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ μύθου συμβαίνειν καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Μηδείᾳ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀπόπλουν· ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος, ἢ ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν ἃ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνθρωπον εἰδέναι, ἢ ὅσα ὕστερον ἃ δεῖται προαγορεύσεως καὶ ἀγγελίας· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἀποδίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὁρᾶν. ἄλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους. ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιόνων ἢ ἡμεῖς, δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογράφους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφὴν ὁμοίους ποιοῦντες καλλίους γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενον καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ῥᾳθύμους καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν, τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπιεικεῖς ποιεῖν· παράδειγμα σκληρότητος οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα μὲν ἀγαθὸν [καὶ] Ὅμηρος. ταῦτα δὴ δεῖ διατηρεῖν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ἔστιν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλάκις, εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς.

ἀναγνώρισις δὲ τί μέν ἐστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον· εἴδη δὲ 16
ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρώτη μὲν ἡ ἀτεχνοτάτη καὶ ᾗ πλείστῃ χρῶνται δι' ἀπορίαν, ἡ διὰ τῶν σημείων. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν σύμφυτα, οἷον "λόγχην ἣν φοροῦσι Γηγενεῖς" ἢ ἀστέρας οἷους ἐν τῷ Θυέστῃ Καρκίνος, τὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητα, καὶ τούτων τὰ

37–1454 b 1 αὐτοῦ — τοῦ μύθου ABCDE: read αὐτῶν τῶν ἠθῶν*. 2 ἀπόπλουν E: ἀπλοῦν ABCD: ἀνάπλουν* Lasc.: τὰ περὶ τὸν πλοῦν T. 3 ἐπὶ τὰ B*: ἐπεὶ τὰ C: ἔπειτα ADE. 4 ἃ οὐχ ACDE: ἢ ὅσα οὐχ B*. 7 τὸ ἐν ACD: τῷ ἐν E: τὸν ἐν B. 9 ἢ ἡμεῖς B: ἡμᾶς ACDE. καὶ: perhaps καθάπερ*. 11–12 τὸν ποιητὴν — ῥᾳθύμους καὶ om. E. 13 τοιαῦτα ACDE: τοιαῦτα ἤθη B. 14 μὲν ἀγαθὸν καὶ Ὅ. B: ἀγαθὸν κ. Ὅ. CDE: Ἀγάθων κ. Ὅ. Lasc.: ἀγαθῶν κ. Ὅ. A: (the order "Agathon and Homer" seems impossible). καὶ om.*: perhaps τὸν Ἀχιλλέα μέν, ἀγαθὸν δ' Ὅμηρος. 15 δεῖ διατηρεῖν D: δὲ δεῖ τηρεῖν B: δὴ διατηρεῖν A: δὴ διατηρεῖ CE. τὰς παρὰ τὰς ACE: τὰς πάντας B: τὰς παρὰ τὰ D. 16–17 κατ' αὐτὰς ACDE: κατὰ ταῦτα B. 22 ἀστέρας ABCDE. 23 καρκῖνος ABCE: blank in D.

fabularum tantum oportere accidere iis et consequi eas
a consuetudine ipsa, neque ut status in eo quod fuit a 1454 b
machina in Medea, et quemadmodum fuit ex eo quod fuit
ad Iliadem a conversione navium non ad immersionem;
sed tantum oportet usurpari circa extraneum poematis
et finem eius machinam, sive quot sustinuerunt hi memo-
rati, sive quot non potest homo nosse (2), vel quot egent
postea in alloquio vel sermone, nam omnem rem concedi-
mus diis videre (2). Et quod est irrationale, non oportet 5
esse in rebus, sin minus, sit haec notio extra tragoedias,
v. c. quae attulit Oedipus ab imitatione Sophoclis. *Item*
imitatio (2) est tragoedia rerum quae sunt in summa
virtutis aut quemadmodum decet imitari pictores sollertes
homos: nam hi omnes dum afferunt picturas suas et 10
formam suam imitando afferunt delineationes bonas;
pariter poeta etiam dum imitatur iracundos et ignavos
afferet has reliquas res quae inveniuntur illis in consue-
tudinibus suis et secundum hoc decet peritos afferre ex-
emplum asperitatis instar eius quod bene fecit Homerus
ex historia Achillei. Et haec decet observari, et cum his 15
item sensūs qui sequuntur eos in arte poetica necessario,
nam plerumque fit in his error et peccatum, et dictum est
de iis satis in sermonibus qui allati sunt.

Et dictum est etiam de recognitione; et species
recognitionum quod attinet, ex iis primum est ea quae 20
sine arte est, eaque est qua utuntur multi propter dubita-
tionem, per medium signorum. Quae sunt ex iis parata
sunt ut hasta quam prensabant dicti Gegenes, vel stellae

1454 b μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷον οὐλαί, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, οἷον τὰ περιδέ-
25 ραια καὶ ἡ ἐν τῇ Τυροῖ διὰ τῆς σκάφης. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτοις
χρῆσθαι ἢ βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, οἷον Ὀδυσσεὺς διὰ τῆς οὐλῆς
ἄλλως ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ καὶ ἄλλως ὑπὸ τῶν συ-
βοτῶν· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πίστεως ἕνεκα ἀτεχνότεραι, καὶ αἱ
τοιαῦται πᾶσαι, αἱ δὲ ἐκ περιπετείας, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Νί-
30 πτροις, βελτίους. δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ πεποιημέναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ,
διὸ ἄτεχνοι, οἷον Ὀρέστης ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι
Ὀρέστης· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ αὐτὸς
λέγει ἃ βουλεται ὁ ποιητὴς ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μῦθος· διὸ ἐγγὺς
τῆς εἰρημένης ἁμαρτίας ἐστίν· ἐξῆν γὰρ ἂν ἔννοιαν † ἐνεγκεῖν.
35 καὶ ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Τηρεῖ ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή. ἡ τρίτη
1455 a διὰ μνήμης τῷ αἰσθέσθαι ἢ ἰδόντα, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Κυπρίοις
τοῖς Δικαιογένους, ἰδὼν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν ἔκλαυσεν, καὶ ἡ
ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ, ἀκούων γὰρ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ μνη-
σθεὶς ἐδάκρυσεν, ὅθεν ἀνεγνωρίσθησαν. τετάρτη δὲ ἡ ἐκ συλ-
5 λογισμοῦ, οἷον ἐν Χοηφόροις, ὅτι ὅμοιός τις ἐλήλυθεν, ὅμοιος
δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀλλ' ἢ ὁ Ὀρέστης, οὗτος ἄρα ἐλήλυθεν· καὶ ἡ Πολυ-
ίδου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περὶ τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν Ὀρέ-
στην συλλογίσασθαι, ὅτι ᾗ τ' ἀδελφὴ ἐτύθη καὶ αὐτῷ συμ-
βαίνει θύεσθαι. καὶ ἐν τῷ Θεοδέκτου Τυδεῖ, ὅτι ἐλθὼν ὡς
10 εὑρήσων υἱὸν αὐτὸς ἀπόλλυται. καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς Φινείδαις·
ἰδοῦσαι γὰρ τὸν τόπον συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ὅτι ἐν

24–25 οἷον τὰ περιδέραια B: τὰ περιδέρρεα A C D E. 25 ἡ E corr. for οἱ apparently: οἱ A D: οἷα B: οἷον C. τυροῖ A B C D: τυρῷ E *. 29 ἐκ δὲ ἐκ E. ἡ ἐν A C: οἱ ἐν B D E. 31 οἷον: perhaps οἷαν. Ὀρέστης om. B. 33 διὸ Lasc. *: διότι A B C D E. 34 γὰρ ἂν A C D: om. ἂν B. ἔννοιαν D *: ἔνοιαν O: ἔνια A B C E. καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν A B C E: om. καὶ D: read ἐνέχειν, see p. 103. 35 ἡ τρίτη *: ἤτοι τῇ A B C D: ἤτοι τὸ E P. 1455 a 1 διὰ μνήμης: συμβαίνειν *. τῷ αἴσθεσθαι A B C: τὸ αἴσθεσθαι E: τῷ ἔσεσθαι D. ἢ εἰδόντα B: τι ἰδόντα A C D E *: perhaps ἢ τῷ α. τ. ἰ. ὥσπερ A C D E: om. B. τοῖς (abbrev.) E G corr.: τῆς A B C D. 3 ἀπολόγῳ B: ἀπὸ λόγων A C D E. 5 χοηφόροις B: χλοηφόροις A C D E. All between two ἐλήλυθεν om. C. 6–7 πολυίδου Paccius: πολυείδους A B C D E. 7 γὰρ A C D E: γὰρ ἔφη B. 10 τοῖς Φινείδαις Reiz: τοῖς φινίδαις A B: τοῖς φοινίδες D: ταῖς φ. E.

ut illae quae in Thyeste similes Cancro : alia acquisita, 1454 b
ut quae prensantur manu, et imponuntur corpori, ut
torques in TYRO, et PER ensem. Et possunt usurpari haec
sive melioribus eorum sive peioribus; quemadmodum
cognitus est Odysseus per cicatricem quae fuit in pede suo
a nutrice sua aliter, et a SYBOTIS aliter; nam ex iis quod
in re fidei est magis artificiale est et haec omnia quae sunt
similia iis; et ex iis in quibus invenitur circumvolutio (2)
magis v.c. haec quae sunt in Lavatione sunt meliora.
Secundae autem quas *facit* poeta; idcirco sine arte sunt
v.c. apud dictam Iphigeniam, estque quo arguit Iphigenia
esse Orestem; nam illa quidem per epistolam ad illum,
hic vero memorat id quod vult poeta non fabula (2).
Quocirca fit hoc propinquum ab errore qui memoratus
est. Et existunt alia quae ex tempore dicantur secun-
dum hanc opinionem. Et haec sunt in eo quod dixit
Sophocles se audiisse vocem poetae contempti. Tertium
est ut consequatur hominem ut sentiat dum videt, quem-
admodum in eo quod fuit de populo Dicaeogenis in
Cypro, dixit enim eum cum videret scripturas flesse, et 1455a
itidem res populi Alcinoi, ex sermone : nam cum audiret
citharoedum et meminisset, flevit, et hinc agnoverunt
inter se. Quarta vero est quae succurrit menti, v.c.
'venit qui similis est pollinctoribus hominis'; neque
venit quisquam similis praeter Orestem : hic ergo est qui
venit. Sophisticus autem dum videt in rebus multum
apud Iphigeniam probabiliter putavit de Oreste quod ipse
cogitavit sororem suam esse mactatam, et accidisse quod
tantum modo mactata esset illi. Dixit etiam Theodectes
quod dum . . . . . Phaenidis cum venisset
et vidisset locum, cogitavit de classe fati, venitque in

1455 a τούτῳ εἵμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν αὐταῖς, καὶ γὰρ ἐξετέθησαν ἐνταῦθα. ἔστι δε τις καὶ συνθετὴ ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τῷ ψευδαγγέλῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τόξον ἐντείνειν, 15 ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα, πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, καὶ εἴγε τὸ τόξον ἔφη γνώσεσθαι ὃ οὐχ ἑωράκοι, τὸ δὲ ὡς δι ἐκείνου ἀναγνωριοῦντος διὰ τούτου ποιῆσαι, παραλογισμός. πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς πλέξεως γινομένη δι' εἰκότων, οἷον ἐν τῷ Σοφοκλέους Οἰδί- 20 ποδι καὶ τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ· εἰκὸς γὰρ βούλεσθαι ἐπιθεῖναι γράμματα. αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται μόναι ἄνευ τῶν πεποιημένων σημείων καὶ περιδεραίων. δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ.

δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει ἀπεργάζε- 17
σθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν 25 ἐναργέστατα ὁ . . . ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γινόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι τὰ ὑπεναντία· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὃ ἐπετιμᾶτο Καρκίνῳ· ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνῄει, ὃ μὴ ὁρῶντα τὸν θεαν τὴν ἐλάνθανεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσε δυσχερανάντων 30 τοῦτο τῶν θεατῶν. ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι συναπεργαζόμενον. πιθανώτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσίν εἰσι καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος καί χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινώτατα. διὸ εὐφυοῦς ἡ ποιητικὴ ἐστιν ἢ μανικοῦ· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὔπλαστοι οἱ δὲ ἐκστατικοί εἰσιν.

12 εἵμαρτο ABC: τὸ ἦμαρ DE. 14 ἐντείνειν — τόξον B*: om. ACDE: read τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸν μὲν, and ἐντείνειν δύνασθαι.* 16 γνώσεσθαι ACDE: ἐντείνειν B. ἑωράκοι B: ἑωράκει ACDE. 17 παραλογισμός B: παραλογισμόν ACDE. 19 πλέξεως: πλήξεως ABCDE: ἐκπλήξεως Lasc.: πράξεως.* γινομένη E*: γινομένης ABCD. εἰκότων BCE: εἰκόντων A: ἡκόντων D: εἰκόνων*. ἐν τῷ B: ὃ ἐν τῷ ACDE. 22 περιδεραίων B*: δέρεων ACE; blank in D. 23 ἀπεργάζεσθαι (with συν apparently expunged) A: συναπεργάζεσθαι BCDE. 24 ἂν om. BC. 25 ἐναργέστατα BCE: ἐνεργέστατα AD. Supply ποιητὴς.* 26 λανθάνοι LP: λανθάνει E: λανθάνοιτο BCD: λανθάνοι τὸ A. 27 ἐπετιμᾶτο Italus* (ἐπιτιμᾶτο sic): ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ABCDE. 28 ἀνῄει B*: ἂν εἴη ACDE. 31–32 οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν om. D. 34 εὔπλαστοι ABCDE: ἁπλοῖ.* ἐκστατικοὶ B*: ἐξεταστικοί ACDE.

mentem ei omnibus illis [fem.] in hoc decretum esse 1455 a
mori, rem enim aversantur. Invenitur forma alia etiam
composita, sumpta ab errore analogiae, quae est theatri,
v.c. in eo quod scriptum est ex historia Odyssei euangelis-
tae illius sancti : nam ARCUM QUIDEM dixit quod non posset
quisquam alius; et dixerat illud poeta; inque narratione
etiam quae venerat de illo narratum est de re arcus quod
certo sciturus erat quod non vidisset : et in locutione
' quod per medium illius scienda esset ' fuit error analogiae. 15
Quamquam recognitio optima omnium est desumpta a
rebus actionis; quare instar huius monstravit Sophocles
in Oedipo et in Iphigenia etiam; nam voluit probabiliter
conscribere de eo sermonem. Hae enim res sunt solae
tantum sine rebus factis et sine rebus in collo. Secunda
autem ab analogia. Et decet constituere fabulas et 20
perficere eloquio dum res ponuntur coram oculis valde;
nam hoc modo, dum respicit poeta ad ea quae sunt in
rebus factis ipsis, et dum fit illuc, invenit rem aptissi-
mam (2) et pulcherrimam, neque latebit eum omnino
contrarium horum. Indicium huius quod objiciebatur 25
Carcino : nam ille ascendit in eo quod dicebatur ad illud,
quasi ascenderet ab Hiero, h.e. a templo; unde non vide-
retur, et lateret spectatorem. Ceciditque in scaena,
dum offendunt auditores in hoc. Quot poterat faciebat
cum formis secundum viam obedientiae (2), nam qui sunt
in passionibus sunt in natura eadem; etiamsi is qui in 30
quassationibus est torquetur et versatur, et is qui irascitur
vere indignatur. Quare est ars poetica ingeniosi magis
quam dementium : ex his enim sunt quidam simplices,
mirabiles dico, in sermonibus et fabulis, quae factae sunt;
et debet ipse etiam dum facit ponere ea universe, et
postea incipere* introducere rem et componere. Signi-

1455 b τούς τε λόγους καὶ τοὺς πεποιημένους δεῖ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιοῦντα ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν. λέγω δὲ οὕτως ἂν θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ καθόλου οἷον τῆς Ἰφιγενείας· τυθείσης τινὸς κόρης καὶ ἀφανισθείσης ἀδήλως τοῖς θύουσιν, ἱδρυνθείσης δὲ εἰς ἄλλην χώραν, ἐν ᾗ νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους θύειν τῇ θεῷ, ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν ἱερωσύνην. χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνέβη ἐλθεῖν τῆς ἱερείας (τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς διά τινα αἰτίαν ἔξω τοῦ καθόλου ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐφ' ὅ τι δέ, ἔξω τοῦ μύθου), ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ ληφθεὶς θύεσθαι μέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν, εἶθ' ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἶθ' ὡς Πολύιδος ἐποίησεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἰπών, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδει τυθῆναι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιοῦν, ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκεῖα τὰ ἐπεισόδια, οἷον τοῦ Ὀρέστου ἡ μανία δι' ἣς ἐλήφθη καὶ ἡ σωτηρία διὰ τῆς καθάρσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δράμασι τὰ ἐπεισόδια σύντομα, ἡ δ' ἐποποιία τούτοις μηκύνεται. τῆς γὰρ Ὀδυσσείας . . . ὁ λόγος μακρός ἐστιν· ἀποδημοῦντός τινος ἔτη πολλὰ καὶ παραφυλαττομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ μόνου ὄντος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν οἴκοι οὕτως ἐχόντων ὥστε τὰ χρήματα ὑπὸ μνηστήρων ἀναλίσκεσθαι καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὴ ἀφικνεῖται χειμασθείς, καὶ ἀναγνωρίσας τινὰς . . . αὐτὸς ἐπιθέμενος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσώθη, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς διέφθειρε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον τοῦτο, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπεισόδια.

1455 b 1 *τούς τε* B: *τούτους τε* A C D E. 2 *ἐπεισοδιοῦν* B C: *ἐπεισοδίου* A D E. 3 *παρατείνειν* B: *περιτείνειν* A C D E. 5 *θύουσιν* D*: *θύσασιν* A B D E. 8 *τὸ δὲ* A B C E: *τό τε* D. *τινὰ* A B C E: *τὴν* D. 11 *πολύιδος* edd: *πολύειδος* MSS. 15 *τοῦ Ὀρέστου* *: *ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ* MSS. 16 *οὖν* om. D. *δράμασι* B: *ἅρμασι* A C D E: *ᾄσμασι* T.* 18 *μακρὸς ὁ λόγος μακρὸς* E: *ὁ λ. μακρὸς* A B C: *μικρὸς* D: *οὐ μακρός* *: perhaps *ἠρέμα ὁ λ. μακρός ἐστιν*, the corruption being like *τὸ ἦμαρ*, 1455 a 12. 19 *παραφυλαττόμενος* E. *ἔτι* (underlies *πολλὰ* of B, from *ἔτη πολλὰ* above) Paccii Appendix: *ἐπεὶ* A C D E. 21 *δὴ*: *δὲ* A B C D E. 22 *ἀναγνωρίσας τινὰς* A C D E: *ἀναγνωρισθεὶς* B. *αὐτὸς* A D E: expunged in C: om. B: perhaps a numeral δ' = *τέταρτος* has fallen out before it, cf. Cobet, *Var. Lect.*, 123. 23–24 *τὸ οὖν* D.

fico autem verbo meo esse notionem universi huiusmodi, 1455 b
ut est status in re Iphigeniae. Cum mactata esset puella
quaedam, et celata ne appareret, surrexit inter mactatos
et posita est in oppido alio. Super advenam fuerat lex
in illo oppido sacrificari eos Deo sacrificia, obtinueratque
ea hoc SACERDOTIUM. Tempore quodam postremo accidit
ut accederet frater eius, venitque propterea quod prae-
fectus peccaverat quandoquidem causa illic est extra
sensum totius, inque oppido etiam ubi facta sunt haec et
quid ? extra fabulam ex eo quod memorabitur. Dixit
aliquis* ' Jam veni ' et cum* captus esset et accessisset
ut mactaretur,* agnovit sororem suam; nam quod facit
Euripides poema probabiliter multae formae; quia dixit
non sororem suam ergo debere mactari, sed in se ipso
debere hoc continuari. Et hinc fit liberatio. Et deinde
introducet nomina posita et a ponendis quibus iam
cessatum est, eruntque nomina introducta idonea, sicut
Orestis, cuius consilium erat liberatio per purificationem;
nisi in poematis introducta sunt moderata, ars vero
specierum in his protrahit. Nam Odysseae sermo non
est longus; sc. dum abest homo, et exulat annos multos
sectante eum Posidone, et est solus, et status eius dome-
sticorum sic est ut res cum iis sit ut perierint omnes
possessiones eius a* procis [et recitationibus], et insidi-
entur ei et temptent eum,—ipse quidem postquam vagatus
erat multum, et cum agnovisset quosdam, ipse graviter
laboravit et salvus evasit, hostes autem suos perdidit.
Et haec sunt propria huius, reliquae autem res adven-
ticiae,

ἔστι δὲ πάσης τραγῳδίας τὸ μὲν δέσις τὸ δὲ λύσις, τὰ 18
μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἔσωθεν πολλάκις ἡ δέσις, τὸ δὲ
λοιπὸν ἡ λύσις. λέγω δὲ δέσιν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς
μέχρι τούτου τοῦ μέρους, ὃ ἔσχατόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ μεταβαίνει
εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ ἀτυχίαν, λύσιν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς
μεταβάσεως μέχρι τέλους· ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Λυγκεῖ τῷ Θεοδέκτου
δέσις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λῆψις καὶ
πάλιν ἡ αὐτῶν δέ . . . ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιάσεως τοῦ θανάτου μέχρι
τοῦ τέλους.

τραγῳδίας δὲ εἴδη εἰσὶ τέσσαρα, τοσαῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ
μέρη ἐλέχθη, ἡ μὲν πεπλεγμένη, ἧς τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶ περιπέτεια
καὶ ἀναγνώρισις, ἡ δὲ παθητική, οἷον οἵ τε Αἴαντες καὶ οἱ
Ἰξίονες, ἡ δὲ ἠθική, οἷον αἱ Φθιώτιδες καὶ ὁ Πηλεύς· τὸ δὲ
τέταρτον οἰκεῖον, αἵ τε Φορκίδες καὶ Προμηθεὺς καὶ ὅσα
ἐν ᾅδου. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν, εἰ
δὲ μή, τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλεῖστα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὡς νῦν συκο-
φαντοῦσι τοὺς ποιητάς· γεγονότων γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος
ἀγαθῶν ποιητῶν, ἕκαστον τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιοῦσι τὸν ἕνα
ὑπερβάλλειν. δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἄλλην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν
λέγειν οὐδὲν ἴσως τῷ μύθῳ, τοῦτο δέ, ὧν ἡ αὐτὴ πλοκὴ
καὶ λύσις. πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὖ λύουσι κακῶς· δεῖ δὲ
ἀμφότερα † ἀντικροτεῖσθαι. χρὴ δὲ ὅπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις με-
μνῆσθαι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἐποποικὸν σύστημα τραγῳδίαν. ἐπο-
ποικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ πολύμυθον, οἷον εἴ τις τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος

27 λέγω ABCE: ἐγὼ D. εἶναι expunged in A. 28 μεταβαίνει Paccii Appendix*: μεταβαίνειν MSS. 29 ἢ ἀτυχίαν B*: om. ACDE. 30 λυγκεῖ Lasc.: λυκεῖ ACDE: γλυκεῖ B. 32 πάλιν ἡ αὐτῶν δὴ ABCD: om. ἡ E: δέ*: apparently λύσις δὲ τὰ have fallen out.* perhaps αὐτοῦ. 32 αἰτιάσεως ACDE*: αἰτήσεως B. 1456 a 3 οἰκεῖον D*: δὴς οἷον AB: οἷον ὁ blank οἷον C: ὁμαλὸν E. ὅσα ABCDE: ὡς ἃ*. 4 ἐν ᾅδου AB: αἰδ C: αἰδῶ DE. καὶ μάλιστα E. 5 ἄλλως τε D: ἄλλως γε ABCE. 7 ἕκαστον ABCDE: ἑκάστου Lasc. τοῦ ἰδίου ACDE: τοῦ οἰκείου B. 8 δίκαιον δ' οὔ, G corr. cf.*. 9 τοῦτο ACDE: τούτων B: perhaps τοῦτον. 11 ἀμφότερα ἀντικροτεῖσθαι B: ἀντικρατεῖσθαι*: ἄμφω ἀεὶ κροτεῖσθαι ACDE: perhaps ἀμφότερα ταῦτα κρατεῖσθαι (Politics 1331 b 38). 13 λέγω BC: λέγω δὲ ADE.

Et omnis tragoediae pars est solutio et pars quaedam 1455 b
ligatio. Res quidem quae sunt ab extero, et individua ab 25
intra aliquando, et ligationes quae sunt ab initio ad hanc
partem illam sc. quae meta* est, et unde fit transitio sive
ad fortunam (2) sive ad infortunium (2); solutio autem
est ab initio transitionis ad finem, ut status ligationis
Theodectae in Lyceu*; ligatio quidem erat quae antea 30
scripserant et captio infantis et rursus et quae super
ea [vel iis] solutio vero est illud quod erat a criminatione
ad mortem et ad finem. Et species tragoediarum sunt
quattuor species, et hoc totum dictum est esse partes
etiam; et unum eorum est compositum (2) et partes
circumvolutio (2) quae est in toto et recognitio, et altera 1456 a
est passiva ut Phthiotides et Peleus item; quarta autem
res Phorcidas et Prometheus et quod dictum est iis, scil.
quae sunt in Tartaro esse temptata (2) in omni re, et si
non fuerint sic, sunt sine dubio res* ingentes et magnae,
et suspicantur et defraudant poetas alia ratione sicut 5
nunc; nam cum fuerint in unaquaque parte poetae boni
periti dignum credunt unumquemque bono suo proprio,
et non debebant dignum credere unumquemque bono suo
proprio. Et oportebat dici neque tragoediam aliam neque 10
hanc, fabulam; et hoc ubi existit, compositio eius et solutio
eaedem sunt. Et multi cum composuerint (2), solvunt
bene, sive male si prensata sunt ambo permutatione. Et
debemus recordari eius quod saepe dictum est, neque
facere compositionem tragoediae dictam epopoeicum.
Dico autem epopoeicum metrum abundans fabulis ut
si quis faciat fabulam quae est ab Iliade totam. Nam

1456 a ὅλον ποιοίη μῦθον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μῆκος λαμβάνει τὰ
15 μέρη τὸ πρέπον μέγεθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δράμασι πολὺ παρὰ τὴν
ὑπόληψιν ἀποβαίνει. σημεῖον δέ· ὅσοι πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὅλην
ἐποίησαν καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, Νιόβην καὶ
μὴ ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος, ἢ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἢ κακῶς ἀγωνίζονται·
ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέπεσεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ· ἐν δὲ ταῖς περι-
20 πετείαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς πράγμασι στοχάζονται ὧν βούλονται
θαυμαστῶς· τραγικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ἔστι δὲ
τοῦτο, ὅταν [ὁ] σοφὸς μὲν μετὰ πονηρίας ἐξαπατηθῇ, ὥσπερ
Σίσυφος, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος μὲν ἄδικος δὲ ἡττηθῇ· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
καὶ εἰκὸς ὥσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει· εἰκὸς γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ
25 παρὰ τὸ εἰκός.

καὶ τὸν χορὸν δὲ ἕνα δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν τῶν ὑποκριτῶν καὶ
μόριον εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου καὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐρι-
πίδῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τὰ ᾀδόμενα
. . . μᾶλλον τοῦ μύθου ἢ ἄλλης τραγῳδίας ἐστίν· διὸ ἐμβόλιμα
30 ᾄδουσι πρώτου ἄρξαντος Ἀγάθωνος τοῦ τοιούτου. καίτοι
τί διαφέρει ἢ ἐμβόλιμα ᾄδειν ἢ εἰ ῥῆσιν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο
ἁρμόττοι ἢ ἐπεισόδιον ὅλον;

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ 19
λέξεως ἢ διανοίας εἰπεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
35 ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκεί-
νης τῆς μεθόδου. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ
τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀπο-

14 ποιοῖ AC: ποιεῖ BE: ὅλον — μῦθον om. D. 15 δράμασι ABCD: γράμμασι E. 16 ὅλην ACD*: πόλιν B: om. E. 17 καὶ μὴ ABCE: καὶ τὰ μὴ D. 19 ἐπεὶ ACDE: ἐπὶ B. ἀγάθων BC: ἀγαθῶν AE. 21 τοῦτο: perhaps ταὐτὸ. ὁ σοφὸς ACDE: σαφὲς B. μὲν: perhaps τις. 22 ὥσπερ ACDE: ὥσπερ γὰρ B. 24 καὶ εἰκός B: καὶ om. ACDE. 26 χορὸν ACDE: χρόνον B. ὑπολαμβάνειν B: ὑπολαβεῖν ACDE. 27-28 εὐριπίδῃ — σοφοκλεῖ ABCE: εὐριπίδης — σοφοκλῆς D. 28 λοιποῖς ABCDE: πολλοῖς *. ᾀδόμενα * (Maggi): διδόμενα ABCD: γινόμενα E. 29 οὐδὲν μᾶλλον * (Vahlen). ἢ ἄλλης τραγῳδίας ACDE: ἢ ἄλλως τραγῳδία B. 30 ἀγ. τοῦ τοιούτου ACDE: τοῦ τοιούτου ἀγ. B. 31 εἰ ACDE: εἰς B. 33 εἰδῶν B*: ἤδη CD: ἠδ' AC. 34 ἢ διανοίας ABCDE: καὶ δ.* 37 τοῦ om. D.

partes illic capiunt propter longitudinem magnitudinem 1456 a
decentem (2); in poematis autem est expectatum extra
rem saepe. Et indicium est hoc, scil. quot perditionem*
Ilii fecerunt universam, neque per partes ut fecit Euri-
pides, Niobem et non sicut Aeschylus, quod vel cadunt
vel certant male, quandoquidem hoc ex bonis cecidit in
circumvolutionibus.* Et in rebus simplicibus agnoscunt*
veritatem huius quod volunt* per indicationem; quia hoc
est tragicum et philanthropicum. Et hoc existit quoties
decipitur sapiens ut Sisyphus cum turpitudine, et super-
atur fortis ab injusto. Et hoc est probabile etiam ut
dicit in bono etiam probabiliter fiunt multa extra pro-
babilitatem. Et choro qui est in Tartaro ex his hypocritis
erit portio sermonis, et certare una, non ut cum Euripide,
sed ut militet cum Sophocle. Nam multis quae canuntur
inest nihil aliud plus quam fabula vel quam tragoedia,
quare tantum canuntur adventicia, et primus incepit hoc
Agathon poeta, quamquam nihil interest utrum canantur
adventicia an aptetur sermo ab alia in aliam.

Et de reliquis speciebus iam diximus, et nunc nos decet
dicere de eloquio et consilio. Et posuimus quae pertinet
ad consilium (2) in Libro Rhetorices, nam hoc est ex
negotio illius artis, et eius proprium; et res quae sunt in
ingenio debent ordinari et parari sub sermone, partesque
harum sunt ut demonstret et se paret ad passionem, v.c.

δεικνύναι καί τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, οἷον
1456 b ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, ὅταν ἢ ἐλεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ
5 μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φανοῖτο ἡδέα καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ
10 σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἃ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ
15 ἄξιον σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά," τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν. διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

20 τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἁπάσης τάδ' ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη, στοιχεῖον συλ- 20
λαβὴ σύνδεσμος ὄνομα ῥῆμα ἄρθρον πτῶσις λόγος. στοιχεῖον μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ ἀδιαίρετος, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνετὴ γίγνεσθαι φωνή (καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν ἀδιαίρετοι φωναί, ὧν οὐδεμίαν λέγω στοιχεῖον), ταύ-
25 της δὲ μέρη τό τε φωνῆεν καὶ τὸ ἡμίφωνον καὶ ἄφωνον. ἔστι δὲ φωνῆεν μὲν ἄνευ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν,

1456 b 2 μικρότητας MSS. : σμικρότητα Lasc.* 3 ἰδεῶν CE: εἰδεῶν AB. δεῖ om. D. 4 δέῃ Lasc.: δεῖ B: δ' ᾖ AE: γ' ᾖ C: ᾖ D. 6 παρὰ ACDE: περὶ B. 7 φανοῖτο ACDE: φαίνοιτο B. μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον ABCE: τὰ διὰ τοῦ λόγου D. 16 ὅτι ABCE: ὅτε D. εὔχεσθαι ABDE: οὐκ εὔχεσθαι C cf. *. 21 ἄρθρον BCDE: ἄθρον A (should come before ὄνομα*). 22 πᾶσα ABC: πᾶσαι DE. 23 θηρίων ACDE: θεωριῶν B. 26 ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα B. μὲν om. E. προσβολῆς ACD: προβολῆς BE. ἀκουστήν ABCD: ἀκουστικήν E.

dolorem vel timorem vel iram vel similia horum, et etiam magnitudinem et exiguitatem. Liquetque in rebus etiam ex his formis et figura decere uti ubi fuerint sive dolores 1456 b sive horrenda* sive ingentia et parari ad ea quae sunt probabilia : nisi quod modus differentiae in hoc est quod quaedam ex iis apparent semper sine doctrina,* quaedam vero parat is qui loquitur et dicit, suntque extra sermonem. Alioqui quid opus eius qui vel loquitur vel apparent in eo voluptates neque causa sermonis ? Et species speculationis eorum quae sunt circa eloquium species una est, ex. gr. formae eloquii, et haec apparent hypocritis, et ei qui habet instar huius* aedificationis et artis standi super ea, v.c., quid est imperium ? et quid preces ? vel narratio. vel MINAE vel quaestio, vel responsum, et si fuerit res alia similis harum; neque enim est quicquam extra scientiam harum et inscitiam quo vituperium affertur in arte poetica quod mereatur studium. Alioquin quid habet quis quod suspicetur cecidisse errorem in iis quae vituperabat Protagoras, scil. quod imperabat ratus [aliud quam quod rebatur] se precari, dicebatque Memora O dea de ira,* nam aiebat notionem imperandi ut faceret rem vel non faceret esse imperativum. Quare permittatur illud arti non tamquam esset e re artis poeticae, dicamusque putata (?) eloquii omnis et partes elementorum sunt hae : syllaba, coniunctio, separativa, nomen, verbum, casus, sermo. Et elementum quidem est indivisibile, non autem totum, sed ex quanto eius soni compositi est componi et fieri, nam voces animalium sunt inarticulatae, neque tamen est quicquam earum vox composita, neque est ulla pars vocum quam dicam esse elementorum. Et huius vocis compositae partes sunt duae, dico vocalem, et non-vocalem, et semi-vocalem; quamquam sonus qui fit sine collisione quae fit apud labra

1456 b ἡμίφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, οἷον τὸ Σ καὶ τὸ Ρ, ἄφωνον δὲ τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχον φωνήν, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνὴν γινόμενον ἀκουστόν, οἷον τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Δ. ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασί τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις καὶ δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι, ἔτι δὲ ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ· περὶ ὧν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν. συλλαβὴ δέ ἐστι φωνὴ ἄσημος συνθετὴ ἐξ ἀφώνου καὶ φωνὴν ἔχοντος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α συλλαβὴ καὶ μετὰ τοῦ Α, οἷον ΓΡΑ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων θεωρῆσαι τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς μετρικῆς ἐστιν. σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι
1457 a φωνὴ ἄσημος [ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου], ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ' αὑτόν, οἷον μεν ητοι δε· ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν, [μιᾶς] σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκε μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν. ἄρθρον δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ, οἷον τὸ φμι καὶ τὸ περι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἣ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν, πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. ὄνομα δέ ἐστι φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἄνευ χρόνου ἧς μέρος οὐδέν ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ σημαντικόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώ-

27 ἡμίφωνον — ἀκουστήν om. BC. 28 καὶ τὸ ρ ACDE: καὶ τὸ β B. τὸ μετὰ ABCE: τὸ om. D. προσβολῆς ACDE: προβολῆς B. 32 ψιλότητι ACD: ψιλότησι B. ψιλότητι—ὀξύτητι καὶ om. E. μήκει ACD: μεγέθει μήκει B. 34 συνθετή ABCE: σύνθετος d. 36 γρα B: τὸ γρα ACDE. 37–1487 a 10, B omits all after τοῦ μέσου (a 3): it is evident that the definitions of ἄρθρον and σύνδεσμος have been mixed. 1457 a 3 ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττει ADE: ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττῃ C. 5 μιᾶς σημαντικῶν Robortello: μιᾶς σημαντικὸν δὲ ACE: μία blank σημαντικὴν δὲ D. 8 φμι καὶ τὸ περι ADE: blank between οἷον and ἢ φων', in C: * read μὴ and περί: from Rhetoric 1414 b 19 and 1409 a 35, it would seem that these were abbreviations of φροίμιον and περίοδος. 11 συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ACDE: σημαντικὴ σημαντικὴ B.

et dentes est sonus inarticulatus, et semi-vocalis est qui 1456 b
fit cum collisione neque habet separatim sonum auditum,
ubi movetur, v.c. S et R; non-vocalis autem est qui cum
collisione separatim quidem nullum habet sonum com-
positum auditum, sed cum iis qui habent sonum com-
positum fit audiendus, v.c. G et D. Et hoc idem variat 30
secundum formas oris et locorum et coniunctione et
absoluto et longitudine et correptione atque etiam acu-
mine et gravitate, et iis quae posita sunt in medio, singula
in omnibus metris, et decet nos accedere ad ea. Et
syllaba quidem est sonus compositus SIGNIFICANS, com- 35
positus ex elemento vocali et non-vocali nam G et R sine
A non sunt syllaba, quippe quum tantum fiant syllaba
cum A; sed GRA est syllaba; quamquam decet nos
inspicere in variationem horum sc. horum metricorum.
Coniunctio vero est sonus compositus non significans v.c.
quidem et nonne, nam quod auditum est ab iis non signi-
ficans compositum est e sonis multis, indicantque sonum
[vocem] unum compositum non significantem. Et separa-
tiva quidem sonus est compositus non significans, sive 1457 a 5
initium sermonis sive finem vel terminum significans, v.c.
et, atque, propter vel autem, et dicitur sonus compositus
non significans qui non prohibet neque facit sonum unum
indicantem cuius est componi ex sonis pluribus, et ad
capita et ad medium. Et nomen est sonus compositus 10
indicans expers temporis nulla ex cuius partibus significat
separatim, neque ursurpantur nomina composita sic ut

1457 a μεθ᾽ ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ σημαῖνον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Θεοδώρῳ τὸ δῶρον οὐ σημαίνει. ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ μετὰ χρόνου ἧς οὐδὲν μέρος σημαίνει καθ᾽ αὑτό, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἢ λευκόν οὐ σημαίνει τὸ πότε, τὸ δὲ βαδίζει ἢ βεβάδικεν προσσημαίνει τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα χρόνον τὸ δὲ τὸν παρεληλυθότα. πτῶσις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἢ ῥήματος ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ τούτου ἢ τούτῳ σημαῖνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἑνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς, οἷον ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἷον κατ᾽ ἐρώτησιν ἢ ἐπίταξιν· τὸ γὰρ ἐβάδισεν ἢ ἐβάδιζε πτῶσις ῥήματος κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν. λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ᾽ αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι· οὐ γὰρ ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον, οἷον ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός, μέρος μέντοι ἀεί τι σημαῖνον ἕξει, οἷον ἐν τῷ βαδίζει Κλέων ὁ Κλέων. εἷς δέ ἐστι λόγος διχῶς, ἢ γὰρ ὁ ἓν σημαίνων, ἢ ὁ ἐκ πλειόνων συνδέσμῳ, οἷον ἡ Ἰλιὰς μὲν συνδέσμῳ εἷς, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῷ ἓν σημαίνειν.

ὀνόματος δὲ εἴδη τὸ μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ἁπλοῦν δὲ λέγω ὃ 21
μὴ ἐκ σημαινόντων σύγκειται, οἷον γῆ, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι ὡς σημαίνοντος καὶ ἀσήμου, τὸ δὲ ἐκ σημαινόντων σύγκειται. εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ τετραπλοῦν ὄνομα καὶ

13 αὐτὸ — σημαῖνον : perhaps καὶ should be omitted and αὐτῷ — σημαίνοντι. 17 βαδίζει* Lasc. : βαδίζειν A B C D E. προσσημαίνει Lasc. : προσημαίνει A B C D E. 18 ἐστὶ om. B. πτώσεως D. 19 κατὰ τὸ τούτου Paccius : τὸ κατὰ τούτου A B C D E. σημαῖνον A B D E : σημαίνουσα C. 21 ἡ δὲ A C D E : ἢ B. 22 ἢ ἐπίταξιν B : om. ἢ A C D E. ἐβάδισεν ; ἢ βάδιζε Paccius : * confirms MSS. 27 ἀεί τι A C D E : τι om. B. βαδίζει Lasc. : βαδίζειν MSS. κλέων ὁ κλέων A C D E : κλαίων ὁ κλέων B. 28 εἷς A C D E : ἑξῆς B. σημαίνων A C D : σημαῖνον B E. 29 συνδέσμῳ Paccius : συνδέσμων A B C D E*. 30 τῷ C : τὸ A B D E. σημαίνειν A B C : σημαίνει D E. 34 ὀνόματι ὡς* : ὀνόματος A : ὀνόματο B. πλὴν — ἀσήμου om. all MSS. except A B T (of those collated throughout). 35 B puts ὄνομα after πολλαπλοῦν.

una ex partibus eorum significet separatim, nam Dorus 1457 a
ex THEODORUS nihil significat. Et verbum est sonus significans cum eo quod significat tempus ex cuius partibus nulla significat separatim, quemadmodum ne nominum quidem significat ulla pars separatim, nam quod dicimus homo vel albus non significant tempus, sed quod dicimus ambulat vel ambulavit significant tempus, illud quidem tempus praesens, hoc vero tempus praeteritum. Casus vero est nominis vel verbi, illius quidem quia huic et hoc et similium nonnulla significant unum vel plura v.c. homines vel homo, illius autem *casus significat* haec quae sunt in sententiis, v.c. quod est in quaestione et in mandato; nam quod dicimus ambulavit vel ambulabit non significamus eo tempus futurum sunt casus verbi et haec sunt species eius etiam. Et sententia est sonus significans compositus cuius singulae partes significant separatim, neque est omnis sententia composita e verbo v.c. definitio hominis, sed potest esse sententia *sine* verbis: pars sententiae significans id quod est res *debebit* esse ei, v.c. Cleonos in eo quod dicimus Cleonos ambulat. Et sententia est una bifariam nam aut est sententia una significando unum, aut est una coniunctionibus multis, v.c. quod dicimus Liber Homeri sc. dictus Ilias est unus, cum hic est unus coniunctione, sed quod dicimus homo ambulat unum est quia significat unum.

Et species nominis sunt duae, quarum una est nomen simplex, dico autem simplex quod non est compositum partibus quae significant v.c. terra; altera duplex, et huius est compositum e significante et non-significante, quamquam non ut significante in nomine, et est compositum ex significantibus, quoniam nomen est interdum simplex et multiplex sicut multa de Massiliotis Hermocai-

πολλαπλοῦν, οἷον τὰ πολλὰ τῶν μεγαλλειωτῶν, οἷον Ἑρμο-
1457 b καϊκοξανθο . . . ς. ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα
ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ
ὑφῃρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ᾧ χρῶν-
ται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ᾧ ἕτεροι, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ
γλῶτταν καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατὸν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς
5 δέ· τὸ γὰρ σίγυνον Κυπρίοις μὲν κύριον, ἡμῖν δὲ γλῶττα. . . .
μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ
γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ εἴδους
ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. λέγω δὲ ἀπὸ γένους μὲν
10 ἐπὶ εἶδος, οἷον "νηῦς δέ μοι ἥδ' ἕστηκεν·" τὸ γὰρ ὁρμεῖν
ἐστιν ἑστάναι τι. ἀπ' εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος, "ἦ δὴ μυρί'
Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν·" τὰ γὰρ μυρία πολλά ἐστιν, ᾧ
νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται. ἀπ' εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος, οἷον
"χαλκῷ ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας κε . . . ταμὼν ταναηκέι χαλκῷ."
15 ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ταμεῖν, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ἀρύσαι
εἴρηκεν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τί ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω,
ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχῃ τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον

36 μεγαλλειωτῶν (orthography after Athenaeus 690 f.): μεγαλιωτῶν A B C E : γαλιωτῶν τῶν D (meaning the same, see comm.). ἑρμοκαικόξανθος B : ἑρμοκαί · κόξανθος A C : ἑρμης καὶ κόξανθος E (the * probably retains a lost element such as διοχέτευτος). 1457 b 3 ὑφῃρημένον A B C D E : read ἀφῃρημένον (Spengel). ἐξηλλαγμένον A C D E : ἐξεληλαγμένον B. 4 ὅτι om. C. 5 καὶ δυνατὸν E. 6 σίγυνον A C D : σύγινον E : σίγυλλον B. Some words are lost after γλῶττα through homœoteleuton, to be supplied from *. 7 ἀπὸ τοῦ A C D E : κατὰ τοῦ B. 8 ἐπὶ εἶδος A B : ἐπὶ εἴδους C : ἢ ἐπὶ εἶδος E, omitting ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδους ἐπὶ εἶδος : ἐπιφορὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος only D : ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος A : ἀπὸ τ · ε · ἐπὶ γένος C : κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ γένος B : ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ A C : ἢ ἀπὸ τ. ε. ἐπὶ τὸ εἶδος om. ἢ B : Paccius omitted all articles. 10–13 all between two εἶδος om. B. 10 νηῦς A C E : νῦν δὲ μου D. ὁρμεῖν A C E : blank in D. 11 γένος A C E : γένους D. 12 τὰ—μυρία πολλὰ D : τὸ—μυρίον πολύ A C E. 13 πολλοῦ A C D E : perhaps πολλὰ. 14 ἀρύσας (ἀερύσας with ε crossed out) G (perhaps from Robortello) : ἐρύσας B E* : ἀερύσας (ἐρύσας with ἀ superscript) A C : αἰρύσας O : ἀερείσας D. κε τεμὼν A B C : μετ' ἐμῶν D E : ταμὼν Bekker. ταναηκέι : τανακεῖ B* (= γυναῖκα) : ἀτειρεῖ A C D E. 17 ὁμοίως A C D E : ὁμοίως ὅτι B. καὶ om. B. τὸ τέταρτον : τὸ om. E.

coxanthus qui supplicabatur Jovem. Et omne nomen est aut proprium aut glossa aut translatum aut orna- 1457 b
mentum aut factum aut actum aut separatum aut mutatum. Dico autem proprium quo utitur unusquisque, et dico glossam ut quod sit hominibus aliis, ut sit sensus glossae et proprii in vi sua idem, nisi quod illud sit hominibus iisdem; nam Sigunon Cypriis est proprium, nobis vero glossa, Doru vero nobis quidem proprium, populo vero—glossa. Et transferentia nominis est translatio nominis alieni sive a genere ad genus aliquod magis, sive a specie magis quae est secundum analogiam quam dicimus a genere. Genus quidem in speciem ut quod dicitur ' Vis quae mihi est haec est ' qua——, a specie vero ad genus instar dicti ' Odysseus faciebat myriadas beneficiorum,' nam ' myriada ' usurpavit vice ' multorum '; a specie vero ad— instar dicti ' evulsit animam suam aere ' cum scinderet uxorem suam aere acuto, nam verbum scinderet hic usurpavit et posuit loco verbi occideret, quia utrumque verbum positum est in morte.

Et status secundi apud primum analogus est et similiter quarti apud tertium, sc. ut dicat loco tertii quartum potius quam loco secundi et quidam addidere

πρὸς τὸ τρίτον· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασιν ἀνθ' οὗ λέγει πρὸς ὅ ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οἷον ὁμοίως ἔχει φιάλη πρὸς Διόνυσον καὶ ἀσπὶς πρὸς Ἄρη· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν φιάλην ἀσπίδα Διονύσου καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην Ἄρεως. ἢ ὁ γῆρας πρὸς βίον, καὶ ἑσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἐρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν ἑσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἑσπέραν βίου, ἢ δυσμὰς βίου. ἐνίοις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα κείμενον τῶν ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁμοίως λεχθήσεται· οἷον τὸ τὸν καρπὸν μὲν ἀφιέναι σπείρειν, τὸ δὲ τὴν φλόγα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνώνυμον· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὸ σπείρειν πρὸς τὸν καρπόν, διὸ εἴρηται "σπείρων θεοκτίσταν φλόγα." ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύοντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην μὴ Ἄρεως ἀλλ' ἄοινον. πεποιημένον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινῶν αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής, δοκεῖ γὰρ ἔνια εἶναι τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὰ κέρατα ἐρνύγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητῆρα. ἐπεκτεταμένον δέ ἐστιν ἢ ἀφῃρημένον τὸ μὲν ἐὰν φωνήεντι μακροτέρῳ κεχρημένον ᾖ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῇ ἐμβεβλημένῃ, τὸ δὲ ἂν ἀφῃρημένον τι ᾖ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἷον τὸ [πόλεως] πόληος καὶ τὸ [Πηλέος] Πηληιάδεω, ἀφῃρημένον δὲ οἷον τὸ κρῖ καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ "μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ" ἐξηλλαγμένον δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ ὀνομαζομένου τὸ μὲν καταλείπῃ τὸ δὲ ποιῇ, οἷον τὸ "δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν"

19 προστιθέασι ACD. 20 ὁμοίως ACDE: ὅτι B. 21 ἄρῃ ACD: ἄρην BE. 23 ἑσπέρα AB: ἡ ἑσπέρα CE. 24 ὥσπερ: ἢ ὥσπερ MSS. 25 ἐνίοις ACDE: ἐνίων B. 26 ὁμοίως ACDE: ὅτι B. 27 τὴν φλόγα MSS.: τὸν δαλὸν *. 31 προσαγορεύοντα D: προσαγορεύσαντα ABCE. 33 ἀλλ' ἄοινον VICTORIUS: ἀλλὰ οἴνου MSS. *. 35 ἐρνύγας ACDE: ἐρινύγας B (perhaps deriving it from νύσσειν). 1458 a 1–3 all between the two ἀφῃρημένον om. B. 3 ἀφῃρημένον τι ᾖ ABD: ἀφῃρημένον ὄντι ᾖ CE. 4 πηλέος ACE: πηλέως BD. 6 ὄψ VICTORIUS: ὀης ABDE: o blank C. ἐξηλλαγμένον ACDE: ἐξηλαγμένον B. 7 supply βεβλήκει *.

vice verbi ‘dicit’ verbum suum cum definitione qua 1457 b
pateat existentia eius. Significo illo quod status poculi
ad Dionysum similis est statui *clipei* ad Area; idque
est ut appellet poculum Dionysi clipeum Dionysi, et
appellet clipeum poculum Areos.

Ut senectus ad vitam; et nominabit vesperem senectutem diei, quemadmodum appellat Empedocles senectutem quoque vesperem vitae vel occasum aetatis. Et in his non est nomen positum eorum quae sunt in analogia, tamen nequaquam dicetur minus, v.c. dalus pomorum abjicit, dali vero exundatio a sole sine nomine est, nisi quod status eius ad nominationem similis est sationi apud pomum, quare dicitur etiam continentes flammam quae descendit a Deo. Possumus etiam usurpare modum huius translationis *alia* via, cum appellatum fuerit alienum faciendo apophasin ab eo quod est ei, quasi dicat quis poculum non esse Areos, sed vini.

Et nomen factum est nomen quod ponit poeta, cum non appellet id classis hominum universa, et putantur esse huius modi quaedam nomina, v.c. quod appellat cornua crescentia, et quod appellat sacerdotem sacrificum. Et nomen productum et separatum illud quidem est quod 1458 a
utitur elementis vocalibus estque longum vel cum syllaba adventicia, hoc autem moderatum, separatum, productum v.c. cum sumimus loco litterae longae litteram brevem. Variatum autem est ubi quod appellatur linquit partem eius et facit, v.c. quod dicit se illum verberasse in mamilla eius dextrali, loco verbi mamilla dextra.

Et nominum ipsorum dimidium masculina, et quaedam

1458 a ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιόν. αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα τὰ δὲ θήλεα τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, ἄρρενα μὲν ὅσα τελευτᾷ εἰς τὸ *N* καὶ
10 *P* . . καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τούτου σύγκειται, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ δύο, *Ψ* καὶ *Ξ*, θήλεα δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν φωνηέντων εἴς τε τὰ ἀεὶ μακρά, οἷον εἰς *H* καὶ *Ω*, καὶ τῶν ἐπεκτεινομένων εἰς *A*· ὥστε ἴσα συμβαίνει πλήθει εἰς ὅσα τὰ ἄρρενα καὶ τὰ θήλεα. τὸ γὰρ *Ψ* καὶ τὸ *Ξ* ταὐτά ἐστιν. εἰς δὲ ἄφωνον οὐδὲν ὄνομα τελευτᾷ, οὐδὲ εἰς φω-
15 νῆεν βραχύ. εἰς δὲ τὸ *I* τρία μόνον, μέλι κόμμι πέπερι. εἰς δὲ τὸ *Y* πέντε, τὸ πῶυ τὸ νᾶπυ τὸ γόνυ τὸ δόρυ τὸ ἄστυ. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ εἰς ταῦτα καὶ *N* καὶ *Σ*.

λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σαφε- 22
στάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ τα-
20 πεινή. παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ *Κλεοφῶντος* ποίησις καὶ ἡ *Σθενέλου*. σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἡ τοῖς ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη. ξενικὸν δὲ λέγω γλῶτταν καὶ μεταφορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον. ἀλλ' ἂν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἢ αἴνιγμα ἔσται ἢ βαρβαρισμός· ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μετα-
25 φορῶν, αἴνιγμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός· αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι· κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορὰν ἐνδέχεται, οἷον "ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα"· τὰ
30 δὲ ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός. δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαί πως τούτοις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει μηδὲ ταπεινόν, οἷον

8 αὐτῶν—ἄρρενα om. E. 10 καὶ Σ supplied by * and ITALUS. 11 $\overline{\psi}$ καὶ $\overline{\xi}$ ABCE: $\overline{\tau}$ καὶ ζ D. 13 πλήθει BC: πλήθη ADE. 14 ταῦτα ABCDE: read σύνθετα *. 16 τὸ πῶυ—ἄστυ EP *: om. ABCD. 18 μὴ om. DE *. 19 οὖν om. B. 21 ἐξαλάττουσα B. τῷ ἰδιωτικῷ ἢ τῷ ξενικῷ B. 23 ἄν τις ἅπαντα BCD: ἄν τις ἂν ἅπαντα AE. 24 ποιήσῃ C: ποιήσαι ABE: ποιῇ D. 26 τὰ ὑπάρχοντα B: om. τὰ ACE: all between two βαρβαρισμός om. D. 28 δὲ om. B. ἄνδρ' ACE: ἄνδρες B. εἶδοι B: ἴδον ACE. 29 πυρίχαλκον MSS. (corrected by ROBORTELLO). 29–30. τὰ δὲ ἐκ B: om. τὰ δὲ ACE: βαρβαρός B. 30 ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαι B *: ἄρα κεκρίσθαι AC: ἀνακεκρίσθαι DE. 31 τὸ μὲν ACDE: τό γε μὲν B. τὸ μὴ B: om. τὸ ACDE.

feminina et quaedam media inter masculinum et femini- 1458a
num. Et masculina eorum desinunt in NUM, RO et SIGMA,
secundum Ionicum, et quaecunque componuntur ex his
et haec sunt CSI et PSI, et feminina sunt quaecunque desi- 10
nunt ex litteris vocalibus in litteras longas, sc. ETA et O
ultimum productum, eaque sunt ALPHA et IOTA, ut con-
veniant masculina et feminina in numerum parem,
quatenus CSI et PSI composita sunt. Non est nomen quod
terminetur (2) littera quiescente, neque vocali correpta;
per IOTA vero tria tantum sc. MELI et KOMMI et PEPERI, 15
per VAV autem quinque, sc. DORU, POU, NAPU, GONU,
ASTU. Nomina autem quae sunt in medio desinunt in
NU et SIGMA, v.c. DENDRON per NU, GENOS autem per
SIGMA.

Virtus vero eloquii est ut sit celebre, mancum. Quam-
quam celebre quidem est quod paratur a nominibus pro-
priis et memoratur ex his. Exemplumque illius est sicut
Cleophontis poesis et Stheneli poesis, at casta et variata 20
quia dicitur pauper variatur et utitur nominibus alienis
et splendidis. Dico autem aliena glossam et transla-
tionem (2) ab alio ad aliud et productionem ab exiguis in
grandia, et quodcunque est ex proprio, quamquam si
quis ponit omnia haec quae sunt talia, erit compositio
eius hoc modo aenigmata (2) vel barbarismus; si fuerit a 25
translatione (2), aenigmata (3), si vero a glossa, barbaris-
mus. Et forma aenigmatis est ut dicatur quae existunt
non posse eum coniungere. Et secundum reliqua nomina
non potest facere hoc, secundum vero translationem
potest, v.c. aptavit evidenter aes igni et aes ipsum
homini, et similia, quae sunt a glossa. Barbarismus vero 30
si miscentur haec, nam ut non faciat nomen mancum

ἡ γλῶττα καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τἆλλα τὰ εἰρημένα εἴδη, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ
1458 b μέρος συμβάλλονται εἰς τὸ σαφὲς τῆς λέξεως καὶ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν αἱ ἐπεκτάσεις καὶ ἀποκοπαὶ καὶ ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς λεγόμενον, τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσει, διὰ δὲ τὸ κοι-
5 νωνεῖν τοῦ εἰωθότος τὸ σαφὲς ἔσται. ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγουσιν οἱ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ διακωμῳδοῦντες τὸν ποιητήν, οἷον Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος, ὡς ῥᾴδιον ὂν ποιεῖν, εἴ τις δώσει ἐκτείνειν ἐφ' ὁπόσον βούλεται, ἰαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει "Ἐπιχάρην εἶδον Μαρα-
10 θῶνάδε βαδίζοντα," καὶ "οὐκ ἂν †γεράμενος τὸν ἐκείνου ἐλλέβορον." τὸ μὲν οὖν φαίνεσθαί πως χρώμενον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ γελοῖον· τὸ δὲ μέτρον κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ γὰρ μεταφοραῖς καὶ γλώτταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσι χρώμενος ἁπρεπῶς καὶ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα τὸ αὐτὸ
15 ἂν ἀπεργάσαιτο· τὸ δὲ ἁρμόττον ὅσον διαφέρει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπῶν θεωρείσθω ἐντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ κεντρον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν μετατιθεὶς ἄν τις τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα κατίδοι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγομεν· οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσαντος ἰαμβεῖον Αἰσχύλου καὶ
20 Εὐριπίδου, ἓν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα μεταθέντος, ἀντὶ κυρίου εἰωθότος γλῶτταν, τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτελές. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ ἐποίησε

1458 b 1 συμβάλλονται C: συμβάλλεται A B D E. μὴ om. D. 2 αἱ ἀποκοπαὶ B om. καὶ. 4 λεγόμενον C E: γινόμενον A B D. 8 ὂν B: om. A C D E. δώσει A B C E: δώσειεν D. 9 ἢ ἐπιχάρην B: ἤτει χάριν A: ἤ ἲ χάριν C: εἴ τι χάριν E: εἴ τι χαρίεν D. εἶδον B D: ἴδον A C E. 10 βαδίζοντα A B D E καθίζοντα C. γεράμενος A D: γε ἀράμενος B: γ' ἐράμενος C: γέραμνος E (and perhaps γέρανος*): οὐκ αὖ*. Perhaps οὐκ ἂν τεράμον' ὡς τ. ἐ. ἐ. τὸν A B D E: τῶν C. 11 ἐλλέβορον A B C D: ἐλέβορον E: ἔλλε = εἶλε*. 15 τὸ δὲ ἁρμόττον δ. C: τὸ δὲ ἁρμόττον παρ' ὅσον B: τὸ δὲ ἁρμόττοντος ὅσον A D E. ἐπῶν A C D*: ἐτῶν B: διαφέρειε τῶν ἐπῶν E. 16 κέντρον E: μέτρον A B C D: see the commentary. 17 καὶ (1) om. B. 18 εἰδέων D E: εἰδεῶν A B: ἰδεῶν C. 19 αἰσχύλου καὶ MSS.: Αἰσχύλῳ Essen. 20 μεταθέντος B: μετατιθέντος A C D E.

neque pauper, illud est instar glossae et translationis (2) et ornamenti et harum rerum reliquarum quae positae sunt; neque inserunt in luciditate eloquii partem exiguam 1458 b tantum hae res, sc. utrum nomen aliquod sit cum omissionibus et concisionibus et permutationibus nominum; nam quia alius est status eorum aut eo quod est proprium extra quod consuevit fieri, sequetur ut non faciat mancum, et quia participat consueto erit celebre. Unde sequitur ut vituperium (2) quod fit in hoc genus litigationis non 5 fiat recte, et dum irrident poetam, v.c. Euclides ille antiquus tamquam facile foret ei facere si dedisset quis; sic producebat quod volebat (2) producere et corripiebat ubi volebat; et pangere poema dictum Iambum hac voce, sc. dicto eius quo aiebat 'Vidi Marathon ambulantem 10 cum favore et non etiam gallina cepit illud.' Ut quidem videatur quocunque modo usus hac ratione ridiculum est: sed modus (2) communis est omnibus partibus, nam cum uteretur translationibus (2) et glossis et speciebus secundum id quod *non* convenit et in genere recognitionis in rebus ridiculis faciebat hoc idem opus. Et conveniens 15 quidem omnibus iis quae differunt, hoc cernitur *in* epe ubi ponuntur nomina in metro (2) et in translationibus et in speciebus reliquis. Nam si mutaverit nomina propria, intelliget quod diximus de eo esse verum; v.c. Aeschylus et Euripides dum faciunt carmen dictum 20 Iambum, fecerunt hoc idem opus, nisi quod ubi transfertur loco proprii propterea quod usitatum est in lingua, hoc quidem videtur bonum (2), illud vero videtur con-

1458 b φαγέδαιναν ἥ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,
ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐσθίει τὸ θοινᾶται μετέθηκεν. καὶ
νῦν δέ μ' ἐών ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικής,
εἴ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μεταθείς
νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδής, καὶ
δίφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθεὶς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν,
δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεὶς μικράν τε τράπεζαν,
καὶ τὸ "ἠιόνες βοόωσιν" ἠιόνες κράζουσιν. ἔτι δὲ Ἀριφράδης τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς ἐκώμῳδει, ὅτι ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τούτοις χρῶνται, οἷον τὸ δωμάτων ἄπο ἀλλὰ μὴ
1459 a ἀπὸ δωμάτων καὶ τὸ σέθεν καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ δέ νιν καὶ τὸ Ἀχιλλέως πέρι ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις ποιεῖ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ἐν τῇ λέξει ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦτο ἠγνόει. ἔστι δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόντως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυίας τε σημεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλᾶ μάλιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις, αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς, αἱ δὲ μεταφοραὶ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις. καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς ἅπαντα χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἁρμόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσαιτο. ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος.

23 φαγέδαιναν B: φαγάδενα A C D E. 25 ὀλίγος τε A C D E: ὀλιγοστός τε B. 26 λέγοι A C D E: λέγει B. μεταθείς B: μετατιθείς A C D E. 28 ἀεικέλλιον B: τε ἀεικέλιον A C D: τε ἀεικέλλιον E. 30 ἠιόνες bis B: ἴωνες — ἠ ἴωνες A C D E*. 31 τραγῳδοὺς A C D E: κραγωδοὺς B. εἴποι ἐν D E: εἴπειεν B: εἴπῃ ἐν A C. 33 δωμάτων A C D E: δομάτων B. 1459 a 5 τὸ B C D: τῷ A E. πρεπόντως A C D: πρέποντος E: πρεπόντων B. 6 αὐτὸν εἶναι D. 12 τὰ χρήσιμα B. 14 κἂν B: καὶ A C D E. ἐν λόγοις Lasc.: εὐλόγως B: ἐν ὅσοις λόγοις A C D E: perhaps κἂν τοῖς λόγοις εὐλόγως. τις B: τι A C D E. χρήσαιτο A B C E: χρήσεται D.

temptum (2). Et Aeschylus fecit carmen in Philoctete 1458 b
in quo dixit ' Leaena comedit carnem meam et exsuxit
pedem meum,' et in hoc sermone usurpavit et posuit
verbum exsuxit loco verbi—' nunc quidem ego ut sum
in humilitate et exiguitate ' ut non verum sit, dicat quis,
dum *ponit* in eo propria ' nunc quidem super me ut eram
parvus et similis invalido et sine conspectu' hunc ser-
monem 'et posuit cathedram semper KALION ' et quod
dixit se posuisse in manum meam miseri mensam par-
vam, cum uteretur voce ' nuntiaverunt Iones mensam
parvam ' loco ' appellant Iones mensam parvam.' Item
appellabat veri interpretes tragicos quatenus *ridebat* eos
et dicebat eos ita esse quum usurparent res quas nemo
dialecticorum dixisset in litigatione v.c. ' loca quod est
e regione ' non ' e locis ' et v.c. vox dicentis ' ex te ipso '
et ' ego quoque fui aliquid ' et v.c. vox dicentis ' Achillem 1459 a
propter ' non ' propter Achillem ' et multas res huiusmodi
quot sunt. Quia enim hae res sunt in proprio, idcirco
facta est compositio cuius status in vocabulo non est infra
illud cuius hic status. Ille vero nihil de hoc sciebat.
Magnum vero est ut usurpetur unumquodque eorum
quae descripta sunt in modum aptissimum (2) et ut usur-
pentur nomina duplicia et glossae, et ut sit illud quod
transferatur (2) ingens (2). Quamquam hoc non sumitur
ab alio, quoniam indicium est peritiae (2). Nam ut sit
translatio bona ad id quod est simile est ut sciat bene.
Et ex nominibus ipsis sunt duplicia, et haec conveniunt
metro poetico dicto Dithyrambo, glossae autem conve-
niunt metris dictis Heroico (h.e. recitatio), et quae trans-
feruntur (2) convenient metris carminis dicti Iambi. Et
haec conveniunt (2) in Heroico (h.e. Recitatione) magis
omnibus quae descripta sunt : in Iambo vero, quoniam
imitatur dictionem, etiam haec nomina conveniunt (2)
quotquot usurpat quis in via et haec sunt proprium trans-
latum et dictum Syriace Ornamentale sumptum a per-
fectione et cura.

De arte tragoediae quidem et imitatione et fabula in

περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως ἔστω ἡμῖν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα· περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις συνεστάναι δραματικοὺς καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν, ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἵν' ὥσπερ ζῷον ἓν ὅλον ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δῆλον· καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστorias τὰς συνήθεις εἶναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι δήλωσιν ἀλλ' ἑνὸς χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα ἢ πλείους, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. ὥσπερ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἥ τ' ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ἐγένετο ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καρχηδονίων μάχη οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θατέρου, ἐξ ὧν ἓν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο δρῶσι. διό, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν ἤδη, καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον (λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι ὁ μῦθος), ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα καταπεπλεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ. νῦν δ' ἓν μέρος ἀπολαβὼν ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίοις, οἷς διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποίησιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ ἕνα ποιοῦσι καὶ περὶ ἕνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα. τοιγαροῦν ἐκ μὲν Ἰλιάδος

23

18 ἐν μέτρῳ AC: ἐμμέτρου BDE. 19 συνεστάναι CHRIST: συνιστάναι MSS. 20 μέσα ABC: μέσην DE. 21 ποιῇ BC: ποιεῖ ADE. 22 ὁμοίας ABCD: ὁμοίους E. ἱστορίας ACDE: ἱστορίαις B. τὰς συνήθεις ACE: τὰ συνήθη D: τὰς συνθήσεις B*. 23 ποιεῖ E. 24 ἢ περὶ ἕνα B. 25 ἔχει MSS.: perhaps εἶχε *. 26 ναυμαχία BCDE: ναύμαχος A. 27 συντείνουσαι ABDE: τείνουσαι C. οὕτω ACE: οὔτε B: all between two τέλος om. D. 29 θατέρου ABCE: θάτερον LASC. 30 ἤδη ABCD: εἴδη E. 31 τῷ PACCIUS: τὸ MSS. 33 ἂν AC: αὖ BD. 34 ὁ μῦθος B*: om. ACDE. 36 ἄλλοις ACDE: ἄλλως B. οἷς PACCIUS: δὶς A pr. m. CDE: om. A corr. BG corr. 1459 b 2 κυπριακὰ (κὰ above line) EG: κυπρικὰ ABCD. 3 μικρὰν ABCE: μακρὰν D.

iis quae diximus sufficientia est. Et quod attinet narra- 1459 a
tivum et metrum imitans liquet nos *debere* memorare de
eo per fabulas (2) sicut in tragoediis, et *debere* constare
cantatores et carmina circa opus unum perfectum totum,
sc. quod habet initium et medium et finem, estque id
quod sicut animal facit voluptatem propriam quae sunt 20
similes. Suntque eae ratiocinatio, non est operis unius,
sed temporis unius, quot occurrunt in hoc circum unum
vel plures, et quomodo unumquodque eorum pro sua
parte pertinuerit ad socium suum. Quemadmodum fuit
in ipsis *tempo*ribus in Salamine quidem bellum navale, 25
et in Sicilia bellum Carchedoniorum, neque sunt haec
ambo res una, nisi quod perveniunt ad fines singulos, item
in temporibus quae *eunt* postea in aevo post aevum est
unum quod non habet rem aliam quae sit finis (2). Et
multi poetae faciunt hoc prope. Quare, quemadmodum 30
diximus et desiimus dicere antea, videatur Homerus in
hoc assecla legis et juris religionis ab hoc aspectu etiam
videtur Homerus secutus legem et adhaerens recto et justo
magis his reliquis, qui fecit bellum,* quod habebat initium
et finem, quatenus decrevit afferre illud totum; hoc,
quamquam fuit magnum admodum, neque facile conspectu
neque vero destinabat explicare in fabula sua hunc statum,
quoniam cum componeretur et coniungeretur, erat exigua
magnitudine. Et nunc in his introductionibus quae com- 35
prehendunt partem aliquam, illudque est quod separat
poema.* Hi reliqui vero narrant * circa singulos de
singulis temporibus fabulas multarum partium ut ille 1459 b
qui fecit quae dicuntur Cypria, et reddidit Iliadem parvam.
Quare fecerunt Ilias et Odyssea utraque tragoediam unam,

1459 b καὶ Ὀδυσσείας μία τραγῳδία ποιεῖται ἑκατέρας ἢ δύο μόλις,
ἐκ δὲ Κυπρίων πολλαὶ καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς Ἰλιάδος πλέον ἢ ὀκτώ,
οἷον Ὅπλων κρίσις, Φιλοκτήτης, Νεοπτόλεμος, Εὐρύπυλος,
Πτωχεία, Λάκαιναι, Ἰλίου πέρσις καὶ Ἀπόπλους καὶ Σίνων
καὶ Τρῳάδες. ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἴδη ταὐτὰ δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν
τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἢ γὰρ ἁπλῆν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ
παθητικήν . . . καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὄψεως ταὐτά·
καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων, 24
ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. οἷς ἅπασιν
Ὅμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ τῶν
ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον . . . συνέστηκεν, ἡ μὲν Ἰλιὰς ἁπλοῦν καὶ
παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ Ὀδύσσεια πεπλεγμένον, ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ δι'
ὅλου, καὶ ἠθικόν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ πάντας
ὑπερβέβληκεν.

διαφέρει δὲ κατά τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἡ ἐποποιία
καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὅρος ἱκανὸς ὁ εἰρη-
μένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος·
εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων ἐλάττους αἱ συστάσεις
εἶεν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγῳδιῶν τῶν εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν
τιθεμένων παρήκοιεν. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέ-
γεθος πολύ τι ἡ ἐποποιία ἴδιον διὰ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ
μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα πραττόμενα πολλὰ μέρη μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ
ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνον· ἐν δὲ τῇ
ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν

4 μία ABCD: λεία E. μόλις *: μόνας A pr. m. BCDE: μόναι A corr. Lasc. 5 πλέον ἢ B: om. ἢ ACDE: perhaps πλεῖν ἢ ὀκτώ: om. D (= ἢ η̄). 8 τρωάδες B: τρωιάδες CE: πρωιάδες A pr. m. D. τὰ εἴδη ταῦτα ACDE: ταῦτα τὰ εἴδη B: τὰ εἴδη ταὐτὰ corr. by edd. δεῖ BCD: δὴ AE. 10 δεῖ εἶναι supplied in Ald. 12 Blank in D after λέξιν. 13 ἱκανῶς BC*: ἱκανός ADE. 14 καὶ γὰρ B*: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ACDE. ποιημάτων BCE: πονημάτων AD. ἑκάτερον σῶτες B: om. σῶτες ACDE; some word is wanted, perhaps διττόν. 15 γὰρ om. B. 16 ἠθικόν A corr.: ἠθική ABCDE. πρὸς δὲ D: πρὸς γὰρ ABCE. 17 πάντας B: πάντα ACDE. 19 δ om. E. 20 δεῖ om. E. 22 πρὸς δὲ BC*: πρόσθε A: πρόσθεν DE. 25 πραττόμενα ACDE: πραττομένοις B.

vel aegre duas, sed ex Cypriis multas, et Iliade Parva 1459 b
octo et plures, quae dicuntur Armis. Ex iis sunt dicta
Neoptolemus, et Philoctetes, dictus Ptocheia, Excidium *
Ilii, Reditus Navium, Sinon,* et Troas.

Item hi dei fecerunt epe in tragoedia semper, sive simplicia, sive composita, sive passiva in partibus, eaque sunt extra melopoeiam et visum; postulat enim necessitas analogiam * et curam et passiones, quoniam opinionibus et eloquiis erit constantia, et ad summam haec quibus usus est Homerus primus narrantium et sufficienter. Nam carmen amborum est compositum,* et Ilias quidem simplex et passiva, Oda autem composita estque quae indicat in universo consuetudines; et cum his indicat sermone et sententia omne opus. Et ars narrationum et metrum differunt in longitudine constitutionis eorum; et terminus sufficiens longitudinis est ille terminus qui dictus est: et hic est in quo est potestas in initio et fine. Et hic est quo(d) omnes compositiones antiquorum breviores sunt (2), sed circa tragoedias quae habent sessionem unam affertur magis. Habetque etiam sc. ars epe ascripta Ilio ut producatur in longitudine sua multum propterea quod in Tragoedia non potest dum narratur (2) imitari partes multas, sed illam partem quae est a scaena et partem sumptam ab histrionibus, sed in arte epe possibile est illud, quia notio poematis in ea est narratio ingens

1459 b περαινόμενα, ὑφ' ὧν, οἰκείων ὄντων, αὔξεται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ
30 μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ταχὺ πληροῦν ἐκπίπτειν ποιεῖ τὰς τραγῳδίας.

τὸ δὲ μέτρον τὸ ἡρωικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πείρας ἥρμοκεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ διηγηματικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῖτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο· τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώ-
35 τατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστί (διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα· περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων), τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον
1460 a κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. ἔτι δὲ ἀτοπώτερον, εἰ μιγνύοι τις αὐτά, ὥσπερ Χαιρήμων. διὸ οὐδεὶς μακρὰν σύστασιν ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκεν ἢ τῷ ἡρῴῳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴπομεν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ
5 διαιρεῖσθαι.

Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλου ἀγωνίζονται,
10 μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις. ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα φροιμιασάμενος εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος καὶ οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἀνάλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν εἰς τὸν πράτ-
15 τοντα, ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἕκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα

31 τὰς τραγῳδίας ACDE: τὴν τραγῳδίαν B. 33 διηγηματικὴν BCE: διηγητικὴν AD. 34 στασιμώτατον ACDE: στασιμώτερον B. 37 μίμησις BC*: κίνησις ADE. ἰαμβεῖον ABCD: ἰαμβικὸν EG. 1460 a 1 κινητικὰ καὶ B: κινητικαὶ ACE: κινητικὸν D: perhaps κινητικὼ *. 2 μιγνύοι Lasc.: μιγνύει E: μιγνύη AC: μιγνοίη B: μὴ γνοίη D *. 3 τῷ ἡρῴῳ BCD: τὸ ἡρῴω A: τὸ ἡρωικὸν E. 4 αὐτῇ ABCD: αὐτῆς E. 7 αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ ACD: δ. γ. ἀ B: om. δεῖ E. 9 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν B. 12 ἦθος B: ἤθη ACDE. 14 τὸ ἀνάλογον MSS *: τὸ ἄλογον Itali margo. δι' ὃ C: διὸ ABDE. 15 ἐπεὶ τὰ BC: ἔπειτα τὰ ADE*.

ut existat illi in magnitudine gloriae et decentissimi hoc 1459 b
bonum, sc. ut variet auditorem, et introducat INTRO- 30
DUCTIONES dissimiles; nam simile satietatem affert cito
et facit cadere tragoedias. Metrum quidem carminum
modo convenit ab experientia; * nam si quis fecerit et
mutaverit narrationem aliquam et imitationem quae est
multis videbitur indecorus (2); nam metrum poematis 35
heroius et numerosius est omnibus metris, quare recipit
etiam glossas et translationes (2) et omnia incrementa
nimodum; nam simile quod intrat in genus fabulae (2)
est aliud praesertim.* Carmen autem dictum Iambus
trametrum est, a motibus duo sc. — et practica. Item
ipe est si quis nesciat ut Chaeremon, quia nemo existit 1460 a
qui fecerit systema longum metro alio ac metro quod
est in poemate, sed ut diximus, natura docet nos quid sit
conveniens ei (masc.) in his quae sunt in optione. Ho-
merus autem meretur laudari (2) in aliis rebus multum, 5
quum solus ex omnibus poetis non eum fallit quid facere
deceat. Convenit autem poetae ut quae loquatur sint
pauca (2) neque enim est in his imitator (2). At poetae
reliqui partim certant * multum, estque in iis imitatio
(2) in rebus paucis: ille vero facto prooemio brevi *intro-* 10
ducit statim virum vel feminam vel consuetudinem in
imitatione sua continuo, ita ut non afferat in eorum non
consuetum, sed quod iam consuetum est. Et oportet
facere in tragoediis mirabile, et hoc—praesertim in arte
ipe eaque sunt in quibus res mirabilis occurrit in analogia
eorum, quia non aspicit facientem,* et post haec afferun-
tur circa fugam Hectoris, quemadmodum afferuntur in
scaena ridicula (2), quatenus alii quidem stant (2) neque 15

1460 a ἂν φανείη, οἱ μὲν ἑστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεσι λανθάνει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ· σημεῖον δέ, πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδί-
20 δαχε δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τουδὶ ὄντος τοδὶ ᾖ ἢ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι ψεῦδος. διὸ δεῖ, ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος, ἄλλο δὲ τούτου ὄντος ἀνάγκη
25 εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ᾖ, προσθεῖναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἀληθὲς ὄν, παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς ὄν. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου τὸ ἐκ τῶν Νίπτρων. προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα· τούς τε λόγους μὴ συνίστασθαι ἐκ μερῶν ἀλόγων, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν
30 μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τοῦ μυθεύματος, ὥσπερ Οἰδίπους τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι πῶς ὁ Λάιος ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ δράματι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἡλέκτρᾳ οἱ τὰ Πύθια ἀπαγγέλλοντες ἢ ἐν Μυσοῖς ὁ ἄφωνος ἐκ Τεγέας εἰς τὴν Μυσίαν ἥκων. ὥστε τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἀνῄρητο ἂν ὁ μῦθος γελοῖον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοιούτους· ἂν δὲ θῇ, καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογωτέρως ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄτοπον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτὰ
1460 b δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ταῦτα φαῦλος ποιητὴς ποιήσειε, νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον.

17 *οἱ μὲν* A C D E : *οἱ μὲν οὖν* B. *καὶ οὐ* A C D E : *καὶ οἱ* B. 20 *ὅμηρος* A B C E : *ὁ ὅμηρος* D. 21 *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* B : *οἱ* om. A C D E. 22 *ᾖ ἢ* B C : *ἦν* A D : *ἢ* E. 23 *ἢ εἶναι* B. 24 *δεῖ* B : *δὴ* A C D E. *ψεῦδος εἰ τὸ ὕστερόν ἐστι* B. *ἄλλο δὲ* MS. (?) ap. Robortello : *ἀλλ' οὐδὲ* A B C D : *ἄλλον δὲ* E. 25 *ἢ* for *ᾖ* A B C D E. *τὸ* om. B D. 26 all between two *παρὰ* om. E (*i. e.* reads *ἀληθὲς ὂν παράδειγμα*). 27 *τούτου τὸ* B : *τοῦτο* A C E : *τούτων* D. 28 *δεῖ* A B C : om. D : *δι'* E. *εἰκότα ἀδύνατα* B. *τούς τε* A C D E : *τοὺς δὲ* B. 29 *συνίστασθαι* A B C : *ἐπίστασθαι* D E. 30 *μηδὲν* om. D E. 31 *εἰδέναι* : perhaps *αὐτὸν* should be supplied. *ὁ Λάιος* Paccius : *ὁ ἰόλαος* A C D E : *τὸ ἰόλαος* B. 33 *τεγέας* A C D E : *τεγείας* B. 34 *τὸ λέγειν* A C D E : *τῷ λέγειν* B. 36 *ἐνδέχεσθαι* A B D : *ἀποδέχεσθαι* C E. *καὶ ἄτοπον* A C D E : blank in B. 1460 b 1 *ταῦτα* B : *αὐτὰ* A C D E. *ποιήσειε* B : *ποιήσει* A C D E. 2 *ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ* A B C : *ἐμφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ* E : *ἐμφανίζειν ἡδύνατο* D.

sequuntur (2) mortuos, ille vero prohibet, sed in epe latet 1460 a
neque cernitur. Mirandum vero est

1460 b τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσι καὶ μήτε ἠθικοῖς μήτε διανοητικοῖς· ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λίαν λαμ-
5 πρὰ λέξις τά τε ἤθη καὶ τὰς διανοίας.

περὶ δὲ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων, ἐκ πόσων τε καὶ 25
ποίων ἰδεῶν ἐστιν, ὧδ' ἂν θεωροῦσιν γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι μιμητὴς ὁ ποιητὴς ὥσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἤ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν
10 ἀριθμὸν ἕν τι ἀεί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷά φασι καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. ταῦτα δ' ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις καὶ μεταφοραῖς· καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεως ἐστί, δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ
15 ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς. αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία, ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ᾗ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι ἀδυναμία αὐτῆς ἁμαρτία· ἡ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ἅμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα οἷον τὸ κατ'
20 ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην ᾗ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὁποιανοῦν οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν. ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν.

πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα πεποίηται· ἡμάρτηται, ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς (τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται, εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον

7 ποίων B: ποίων ἂν A C D E. ἰδεῶν: MSS. εἰδῶν. ἐστιν A B C E: εἴη D. γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν A C D E: φανερὸν γένοιτο B. 8 τις ζωγράφος B. ὥσπερ ἂν ἡ E. ἡ B C: εἰ A pr. m. E. 9 τὸν ἀριθμὸν B: τῶν ἀριθμῶν A D: τῷ ἀριθμῷ C: om. E. ἦν ἐστιν E. 10 ἢ καὶ δοκεῖ B. ἢ οἷα B C D: οἷα A E. δεῖ B C E: δεῖν A. 11 ἢ καὶ γλ. καὶ μ. A C E: ἢ γλ. καὶ μετ. D: ἐν ᾗ καὶ γλῶττα καὶ μεταφορά B. 13–14 ἐστι τῆς ποιητικῆς (2) B, omitting the rest. 14 καὶ ποιητικῆς A C E: καὶ πολιτικῆς D. 14–15 διττὴ ἁμαρτία om. B. 15 ᾗ: εἰ A corr.: ἢ εἰ B: ἡ E: ἢ A pr. m. C D. 16 ἀδυναμία B G corr.: ἀδυναμίαν A C D E. αὐτῆς A B D E: αὕτη C. ἡ ἁμαρτία A C D E: om. ἡ B. 17 τὸ om. B. 18–19 κατ' ἄλλην B. ᾗ: ἢ A B C D E. 19–23 all between the two πεποίηται om. B. 23 εἰ A C D E: ἢ B. τυγχάνοι C E. 24 εἰ οὕτως A C D E (om. εἰ): ἢ οὐ κατὰ B.

ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος). παράδειγμα ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος
1460 b δίωξις. εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ἐνεδέχετο ὑπ-
ἀρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην μὴ ἡμαρτῆσθαι, οὐκ
ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ, εἰ ἐνδέχεται, ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτῆσθαι. ἔτι
ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ'
ἄλλο συμβεβηκός; ἔλαττον γάρ, εἰ μὴ ᾔδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια
κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει, ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
ἐὰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ· οἷον καὶ
Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ
οἷοι εἰσί, ταύτῃ λυτέον. εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασίν·
οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν, ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν
1461 a οὔτ' ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης, ἀλλ' οὖν
φασιν. τὰ δὲ ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον μέν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν,
οἷον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὅπλων, "ἔγχεα δέ σφιν Ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρω-
τῆρος·" οὕτω γὰρ τότ' ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς εἰ εἴρηταί τινι ἢ πέπρακται,
οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον
βλέποντα, εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράτ-
τοντα ἢ λέγοντα πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, οἷον ἢ
μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γένηται, ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ, ἵνα ἀπο-
γένηται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον
γλώττῃ τὸ "οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον·" ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους
λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας· καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα "ὃς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος

27 μὴ ἡμαρτῆσθαι: μαρτῆσθαι A: τἠμαρτῆσθαι B: ἡμαρτῆσθαι CDE. 29 πότερον τῶν B. 31 ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως BC: ἦν ἀμιμήτως E: ἢ κἀμιμήτως A: blank in D: κακομιμήτως Lasc. 32 ἴσως δεῖ ABCDE: οἷα δεῖ Lasc.: ἴσως ὡς δεῖ Vahlen: perhaps ἴσως ὥσπερ Σοφοκλῆς. 33 Εὐριπίδην Heinsius: εὐριπίδης MSS. 34 μὴ ἑτέρως B. 35 οὕτω Paccius: οὔτε MSS.: om. Lasc. 1461 a 1 εἰ ἔτυχεν B: εἰ om. ACDE. ξενοφάνης CE: ξενοφάνη A: ξενοφάνει BD. ἀλλ' οὖν Tyrwhitt: ἀλλ' οὐ MSS. 2 φασι. τὰ δὲ B: φασι τάδε ACDE. 4 οὕτω — Ἰλλυριοί om. E. 5 εἰ: om. B: ἢ ACDE. 7 εἰ σπουδαῖον BD: ἢ σπ. ACE. 8 ἢ πρὸς B. 9 οὗ ἕνεκεν BCD: οὐν ἔκεν A: οὐνεκειν E. 9–10 ἢ μείζονος (2) om. D: ἢ om. A pr. m. 11 τὸ οὐρῆας B: τὸ om. ACDE. 12 ὅς ῥ' ἤτοι εἶδος BC: ὡς ῥ' ἤτοι εἶδος A: ὥς ῥά τοι εἶδος E: ὡς blank εἶδος D.

quis est vel quando, 1461 a
vel imperavit aliquid v.c. bonum esse excellens sensu,
ut sit res mala ut id quod non fuit. Et quod spectant *
versus eloquium debet solvi v.c. glossa * quae est in
Ureas primum, fortasse enim non significat eo mulos sed
significat custodes, nam Ureas in lingua Graeca indicat

1461 a μὲν ἔην κακός" οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες τὸ εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι· καὶ τὸ "ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε" οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ θᾶττον. τὰ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, οἷον "ἄλλοι μὲν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες Εὕδον παννύχιοι·" ἅμα δέ φησιν "ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, Αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὅμαδον·" τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοί κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τι· καὶ τὸ "οἴη δ' ἄμμορος" κατὰ μεταφοράν, τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον. κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν, ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος τὸ "διδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι" καὶ "τὸ μὲν ου καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ." τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς "αἶψα δὲ θνητὰ φύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι Ζωρά τε" πρὶν κέκριτο. τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ, "παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ·" τὸ γὰρ πλέων ἀμφίβολόν ἐστιν. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως· τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποίηται "κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο," καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους, ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά τι ὑπεναντίωμά τι δοκῇ σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, οἷον τὸ "τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος" τὸ ταύτῃ κωλυθῆναι ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται· ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδὶ μάλιστ' ἄν τις

14 τὸ γὰρ : perhaps καὶ γὰρ. τὸ εὐπρόσωπον B (apparently) : τὸ om. A C D E. 15 κέραιε A B : κέρασε C E. 16 ἄλλοι MSS. 18 ἀθρήσειε A C : ἀθροίσειε B * : ἀθρήσοιε E : om. D. 19 τό τε γὰρ B : τὸ γὰρ A C D E. 19–20 τὸ -- εἴρηται om. E. τοῦ B : om. A C D. 22 εὖχος ἀρέσθαι B : om. A C D E. 24 θνητὰ φύοντο B : θνητὰ ἐφύοντο A C D E. 25 εἶναι B : om. A C D E. ζωρά Italus : ζῷα A B C D E. κέκριτο B C D E : κέκρητο A pr. m.* 26 πλέων Madius : πλέον C E : πλέω A B D. πλέων Madius : πλεῖον C E : πλείω A B D. τὰ δὲ A C D E : τὸ δὲ B. 27 τὸ ἔθος A C D E : ἔθος B. τὸν κεκραμένον B : τῶν κεκραμένων A C D : τῶν κεκραμμένων E. οἶνον A B C E : οἷον D. 29 ὁ om. B. 30 οἰνοχοεύειν B C D E : οἰνοχοεύει A. οὐ πινόντων B C E : οὐ πεινόντων A : οὐ πειρῶν τὸν D. τοῦτό γε κατὰ A C D E : τοῦτο κατά γε B : εἰ δ' οὐ τοῦτό γε E. 31 ὄνομά τι A C D E : τι om. B. ὑπερεναντίωμα B. 32 ἐπισκοπεῖν σημαίνειν B. σημήνειε B : σημαίνειε C : σημαίνοιε A : σημαίνειεν E. 34 ὠδὶ ἢ ὠδὶ B : ὠδὶ ἢ ὧς A : ὠδικῶς C D E.

mulos et custodes; item ubi dixit eum esse turpem aspectu, 1461 a
non significat eo turpem facie, sed significavit sine symmetria corporis, quamquam Cretenses appellant pulcrum aspectu pulcrum facie, et appellant ebrium acceptum vultu. 15
Et nomina quae indita sunt per translationem suntque per translationem sunt etiam quemadmodum dicit Homerus ' homines reliqui et dei armati in equis dormiebant totam noctem ' dixitque cum eo ' ubi fuerunt Graeci congregati in campo Troados et congregatae sunt inter eos fistulae et tibiae et sibilationes cantandi ' : haec enim omnia secundum translationem tantum dicta sunt loco multorum. Item dixit quod Thasius solvebat equos et facie- 20
bat solutionem ut potiretur ipse dono, et illa quidem non funditur, et nomen vitae dividitur, et Empedocles item dicebat quod ii qui nunquam desierant esse immortales * oriuntur subito mortales et vita quidem est quae mixta est iis antea. Et quod dixit esse loco dicti transiisse 25
noctem magis est locus dubitationis multum; et quae dixit secundum consuetudinem eloquii sunt quemadmodum dixit de vino esse id mixtum : et hinc dictum est quod est cruris conflati e plumbo et artifices ferri : etiam hinc dictum est Ganymedes bibit potum, non quod bibat 30
potum quoniam hoc est secundum translationem etiam. Decetque scrutari super nomine quando illud fit contrario, —haec quae dicta sunt ad modum quantitatis, v.c. quod dictum est dorata aeris separata fuisse, et indicat hic

1461 b ὑπολάβοι; κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ ἢ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, ὅτι ἔνιοι ἀλόγως προυπολαμβάνουσί τι καὶ αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότος ὅ τι δοκεῖ ἐπιτιμῶσιν
B stops ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ
5 Ἰκάριον. οἴονται γὰρ αὐτὸν Λάκωνα εἶναι· ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ ἐντυχεῖν τὸν Τηλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθόντα. τὸ δ' ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ οἱ Κεφαλῆνές φασι· παρ' αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι λέγουσι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ εἶναι Ἰκάδιον ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰκάριον. διαμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα εἰκός ἐστιν. ὅλως
10 δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν. πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατὸν . . . τοιούτους εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν. πρὸς ἃ φασι, τἄλογα· οὕτω
15 τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν· εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. τὰ δ' ὑπεναντία, ὡς εἰρημένα, οὕτω σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν· ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμον ὑποθῆται. ὀρθὴ δ' ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογία καὶ
20 μοχθηρία, ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ, ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε ἰδεῶν φέρουσιν, ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς ἄλογα ἢ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἢ ὡς ὑπεναντία ἢ ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. αἱ
25 δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, εἰσὶ δὲ δώδεκα.

1461 b 1–2 τι ἔνια MSS.: ὅτι Paccius: ἔνιοι Paccii Appendix. 2 προϋπολαμβάνουσί τι B: τι om. ACDE. 3 εἰρηκότος BE: εἰρηκότες ACD. ἐπιτιμῶσιν ἐκ μιμήσεως εἴη B. 6 αὐτὸν E. 7 αὐτῶν MSS. 9 διαμάρτημα — ἐστιν om. *: perhaps διαμαρτήματι — ἔοικεν. 12 Supply ἐπεὶ ἴσως ἀδύνατον *. οἵους Lasc.: οἷον MSS. 14 πρὸς δ' ἃ Ueberweg: cf. *. 19 φρόνιμος Lasc. δὲ ἡ ἐπιτίμησις CE: om. ἡ AD. 21 τῷ αἰγεῖ ἢ τῇ G: τῷ αἰγειήτῃ AE: τῷ αἰγινήτῃ C: τῷ blank πονηρίᾳ D. 22 ἰδεῶν: ἰδῶν P: εἰδῶν ACDE. 25 σκεπτέαι C: σκεπταῖαι ADE.

multa eorum quae prohibita est manus eius quominus 1461 b
solveret, eo usque ut credat quis praesertim de Glauco
eum esse contrarium huic; item quidam eorum addunt et
sumunt sine sermone dum iudicant iis et faciunt ratio-
cinationem, dicunt enim putare illos qui vituperant quod
illud quod facit sit contrarium et hoc tantummodo fuit
casus Icarii, putabant enim eum fuisse Lacona; quare
turpe esse quod non occurrat ei Telemachus in Lacedae- 5
monia, cum veniat illuc; sed fortasse illud fuit quomodo
dicunt Cephalenii : dicunt enim MARITATOS fuisse apud
eos Odyssea et Icarium, nam illud esse probabile. De-
betque esse relatio huius ad poema dico possibile magis
quam impossibile, relatio eius ad praestantius est magis 10
quam impossibile eius ad gloriam; est enim apud artem
quae magis pertinet ad genus quaestionis et persuasionis,
et impossibile; fortasse enim impossibile est fieri similia
horum quae sunt ut fecit Zeuxis; sed qui est bonus
augescet et superabit exemplar.

Etiam ut mereatur * liberari (2) ab irrationalibus;
nam super . . . . et erit illud quod est aliquid non irratio- 15
nale, illud quod non est rationale; idque ut sit . . . et
minus vero: eaque quae dicta sunt contrarie sic debent
conspici . . . *ut* confutationes quae fiunt in sermone, et
in hoc ipso et simili dicunt . . . . in loco cuiuslibet
sagacis. Increpatio vero quae est irrationalis est recta,
ubi est n*ecessitas*, sive ad usum (?) . . sive ad usum
sermonis: quemadmodum usurpavit Euripides m*alitiam* 20
. . . vel ut Orestes in eo quod est Menelai.

Et species quas afferunt ad increpandum (2) sunt
quinque . . . afferant ut impossibile vel ut parum recta,
vel ut contraria, vel ut n*ocentia* arti, vel ut parum ratio-
nalia.

Et solutiones ex numeris qui dicti sunt debent con-
siderari, suntque duodecim. 25

πότερον δὲ βελτίων ἡ ἐποποικὴ μίμησις ἢ ἡ τραγῳδική, διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἧττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατάς ἐστι † δειλίαν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτική· ὡς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ πολλὴν κίνησιν κινοῦντα, οἷον οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι, ἂν δίσκον δέῃ μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ ἕλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον, ἂν Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν· ἡ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδία τοιαύτη ἐστίν, ὡς καὶ οἱ πρότερον τοῦς ὑστέρους αὑτῶν ᾤοντο ὑποκριτάς, ὡς λίαν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα πίθηκον ὁ Μυννίσκος τὸν Καλλιππίδην ἐκάλει, τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα καὶ περὶ τήνδ' Ἀρείου ἦν· ὡς δ' οὗτοι δὴ ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἡ ὅλη τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιίαν ἔχει. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς φασιν εἶναι, . . οὐδὲν δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ τραγικὴν πρὸς φαύλους· ᾗ οὖν φορτική, χείρων δῆλον ὅτι ἂν εἴη.

πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς 26
ὑποκριτικῆς, ἐπεὶ ἔστι περιεργάζεσθαι τοῖς σημείοις καὶ ῥαψῳδοῦντα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ Σωσίστρατος, καὶ διᾴδοντα, ὅπερ ἐποίει Μνασίθεος ὁ Ὀπούντιος. εἶτα οὐδὲ κίνησις ἅπασα ἀποδοκιμαστέα, εἴπερ μηδ' ὄρχησις, ἀλλ' ἡ φαύλων, ὅπερ καὶ Καλλιππίδῃ ἐπετιμᾶτο καὶ νῦν ἄλλοις, ὡς οὐκ ἐλευθέρας γυναῖκας μιμουμένων. ἔτι ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὑτῆς, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐποποιία· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν φανερὰ ὁποία τίς ἐστιν· εἰ οὖν ἐστι τά γ' ἄλλα κρείττων, τοῦτό γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῇ ὑπάρχειν. ἔπειτα διότι πάντ' ἔχει ὅσαπερ ἡ ἐποποιία, καί γὰρ τῷ μέτρῳ ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἔτι οὐ

27 βελτίων C : βέλτιον A D E. ἐποποικὴ A : ἐποποιητικὴ C D E. τραγῳδικὴ E : τραγικὴ A C D. 29 δ' ἡ Madius : δὴ MSS. δειλίαν A C D E : ἀεί, λίαν Vahlen : perhaps δή, λίαν. 31 κινοῦντα A C D E : κινοῦνται Lasc. 34 ὡς MSS. : perhaps οἵους· ὑποκριταί E. 35 πυθικος ἡ E. 1462 a 1 τὴνδαρείου E : τινδαρίου D : πινδάρου A C.* 2 δὴ ἔχουσι : δ' ἔχουσι A D : δ' om. C E. 3 τοὺς θεατὰς D E. 4 Supply οἱ * (Victorius). σχημάτων, τὴν δὲ C D E : σχημάστα αὐτὴν A. 5 ἡ A E : εἰ C D. 8 ὅπερ ἐστὶ A C D E : ὅπερ ἐποίει Lasc.*. διᾴδοντα G corr. (διάδοντα) : διαδόντα A C E : διαδιδόντα D. 9 ὁ ὀπούντιος C : ὁ om. A D E. 16 καὶ ἔτι A C : καὶ ὅτι D E.

Et utrum duorum videatur praestantius inter poe- 1461 b
mata imitationis (2) ars epe an tragica, dubitarit quis
utrum aliquid ex his quae sunt Phortica sit melius an
non, et simile huic quod est apud spectatores praestantes
et illa quae narrat de imitatione (2) est Phortica in
omnibus: nam quia non sentiunt nisi ipsi addunt motum 30
magnum, nam qui movent sunt similes iis qui ludunt
tibiis et fistulis pravis (2) dum circumvolvuntur (2) et
imitantur (2) discum dum vellunt caput si fuerit melos
quod sonant Scylla, et simile huius tragoediae est ut
aestimabant priores eos qui succedebant postea hypo-
critae (2) quia multo praestantiores erant SIMIO quem-
admodum appellabat Mynniscus Callippidem, et ob-
tinebat opinio de Pindaro; sive sit simile * huius illi, 35
et quatenus haec est res huius.*

Et in omni arte est status eius adversus artem epe; 1462 a
est enim status artis epe spectatoribus (dicunt) qui non
egent ulla re ex formis, quia sunt boni admodum, et
tragoedia apud pravos; Phortica vero apparet esse peior.
Possumus autem dicere adversus haec primum quidem
litem non esse artis poeticae, sed hypocriticae (2) quo- 5
niam potest quis nugari in signis dum canit, idque est
quod faciebat Sosistratus, et dum psallit (2) idque est
quod faciebat Mnasitheus Opuntius post illum. Item non
omnis motus contemnendus quemadmodum non omnis
saltatio, nisi fuerit saltatio horum pravorum; idque est
propter quod culpabatur Callippides et propter quod
culpantur in hoc tempore alii, quod non imitentur mulieres 10
——. Item ars *tragica* etiam sine motu facit opus suum
proprium, sicut aliud quod est artis *epe;* nam apparet *
domi quot sint; et si fuerit haec altera praestantior——
debet necessario esse. Tum postea, quia omnes res
habet quot ars epe, decet uti metro; item non est pars 1
eius exigua musica et spectaculum, iisque duobis voluptas

1462 a μικρὸν μέρος τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὰς ὄψεις δι' ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται ἐναργέστατα. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ἐναργὲς ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναγνώσει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. ἔτι τῷ ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει
B recommences
1462 b τὸ τέλος τῆς μιμήσεως εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἀθροώτερον ἥδιον ἢ πολλῷ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ, λέγω δ' οἷον εἴ τις τὸν Οἰδίπουν θείη τὸν Σοφοκλέους ἐν ἔπεσιν ὅσοις . . . ἡ Ἰλιάς. ἔτι ἧττον μία μίμησις ἡ τῶν ἑποποιῶν· σημεῖον δέ, ἐκ γὰρ
5 ὁποιασοῦν μιμήσεως πλείους τραγῳδίαι γίνονται· ὥστε ἐὰν μὲν ἕνα μῦθον ποιῶσιν, ἢ βραχέως δεικνύμενον μύουρον φαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ μέτρου μήκει ὑδαρῆ, λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν ἐκ πλειόνων πράξεων ᾖ συγκειμένη, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη, καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, ἃ καὶ
10 καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔχει μέγεθος· καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματα συνέστηκεν ὡς ἐνδέχεται ἄριστα καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μιᾶς πράξεως μίμησις. εἰ οὖν τούτοις τε διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς τέχνης ἔργῳ (δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην), φανερὸν ὅτι κρείττων ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνουσα τῆς ἑποποιίας.

15 περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγῳδίας καὶ ἑποποιίας, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ πόσα καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦ εὖ ἢ μὴ τίνες αἰτίαι, καὶ περὶ ἐπιτιμήσεων καὶ λύσεων, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

17 δι' ἧς MSS.: perhaps δ' αἷς. 18 συνίστανται A C E: ἐπίστανται D. 19 ἀναγνώσει Madius: ἀναγνωρίσει MSS. * (Madius cites Venetian MSS. for his reading, but Victorius denies their existence). 1462 b 1 ἥδιον ἢ Italus: ἡδονὴ A C D E: ἴδιον B *. 2 οἰδίπουν C D E: δίπουν A pr. m. θείη θείη A E. τὸν C D: τὸ A pr. m. E. 3 ἡ Ἰλιάς Paccius *: ἢ ἰδίας MSS., perhaps συνέστηκεν should be supplied. 4 ἡ μία MSS.: ἡ om. Lasc. 7 μέτρον A C E: λόγου D. ἐὰν δὲ πλείους . . . οὐ μίαν (after συγκειμένη) Lasc. 9 ἃ καὶ Lasc. 10 καίτοι ταῦτα τὰ Lasc.: καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα MSS. 18 εὖ ἢ μὴ Lasc.: εὖ εἰ μὴ MSS.

constat magis operose. Habetque etiam opus in ratiocinatione et operibus. Item quae differunt in magnitudine 1462 b
ut sit finis imitationis (2): nam quod est haec maxime subito maius est quam quod sit itidem sed mixtum in tempore magno. Significo illo quasi quis poneret Oedipum quem fecit Sophocles in epe quae sunt eius, in haec in quibus est Ilias in imitatione quae est iis qui faciunt epe signumque est hoc, sc. unumquodque ex arte epe gignebat tragoedias plures.

GLOSSARY *

THE sign † prefixed to a word indicates that it is not found in the traditional text of the Poetics. Where references showing the meaning of a word have been given in either Introduction or Notes, the page is quoted. Elsewhere the Greek of the Poetics is quoted as usual, but in brackets.

Further references will often be found in that great mine of Greek learning, the Paris edition of STEPHANUS'S *Thesaurus*, quoted as STEPH.

ἀγαθός *skilful* (1450 a 28); a comment on its application to painters is in the Great Ethics 1190 a 31 : "a painter who was an ἀγαθὸς μιμητής would not be praised unless he made it his object to portray the best things." This is reflected in the reading of Ar. and E ἀγαθῶν ἠθογράφος.—ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν *to have an advantage*, Rhetoric 1356 b 18, 1394 a 3 (1459 b 29).

ἀγώνισμα *declamation*, p. 172.

ἀεί with two comparatives *varies with*, *de Caelo* 308 b 27 (1451 a 10).

αἴνιγμα defined (1458 a 26).

αἰσθάνεσθαι "has various uses in connexion with both the soul and the body" which are reflected in the word ἀναίσθητος (Topics 106 b 24). As this word means "incapable of agitation," like a stone (Eudemian Ethics 1221 a 22), αἰσθάνεσθαι may mean *to be agitated* (1455 a 1).

αἴσθησις 1. subjectively πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν *in the concrete* (1451 a 7), like κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν opposed to λογιζόμενοι, Eudemian Ethics 1226 a 37; 2. objectively *an impression given* (1454 b 18).

αἰτία φυσική *instinct* (1448 b 5).

ἀκολουθεῖν 1. *to stand in the relation of general to particular*, p. 34; 2. *to coincide*, Physics 188 b 26 (1449 b 11, 1462 b 7).

ἄλλος in the singular used for *divers*, p. 73.

ἄλογος *unaccountable*, *i. e.* not coming in the order of nature and so *unnatural*, p. 27.

ἁμάρτημα *failing* (1449 a 32). Compare the definition of ἁμαρτία in the Problems 919 b 24 as ἡ τοῦ χείρονος πρᾶξις. As πρᾶξις belongs to fully conscious man, BERGSON'S theory that only man is laughed at is involved in Aristotle's definition of the ludicrous.

ἀμφιβολία *ambiguity* (1461 a 25), when a word has several separate significations. The definition cited by Diogenes Laertius, λέξις δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονα πράγματα σημαίνουσα λεκτικῶς καὶ κυρίως καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔθος, suits this case.

ἀνάγκη *law of nature*, p. 168.

ἀναγνωρίζειν *to restore knowledge concerning* either to oneself or others.

ἀναγνώρισις *disclosure of mistaken identity*, defined (1452 a 30), classified (1454 b 19).

* Reference is made to this elsewhere in the book as Gl.

ἀναίσθητος *actually imperceptible, though potentially perceptible*, p. 165.

ἀνάλογον defined as τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν *fulfilling the same function*, *de Partibus Animalium* 645 b 9; ἀνὰ λόγον ἔχειν πρὸς *to be proportional with* or *analogous to* (1448 b 37), *de Caelo* 304 a 26, 309 b 8; τὸ ἀνάλογον *poetic justice* or *correspondence*, pp. 214, 173.

†ἀνειμένως *grave* of accentuation, p. 52.

ἄνθρωποι οἱ *the Greeks*, *de Partibus Animalium* 644 a 13; *ordinary folk* (1447 b 12, 1460 a 20).

ἀνιέναι *to come up out of the lower world*, Steph. (1455 a 28).

ἀπεικάζειν *to reproduce*, as opposed to creative processes, p. 43.

ἁπλοῦς *having no differentia*, as opposed to συμπεπλεγμένος, *de Partibus Animalium* 643 b 30. There can be no varieties of straight lines, but there can be of curves: since a πρᾶξις is a κίνησις, it follows the laws of motion in being either simple or mixed, *i. e.* a combination of the straight line and the circle (*de Caelo* 268 b end). Inversion of direction is called ἀνάκαμψις. See περιπέτεια. The same thing can be ἁπλοῦν quantitatively and not qualitatively (1452 b 31 and 1453 a 13).

ἁπλῶς applied to the first in each Category, *de Generatione* 317 b 5. At times it is opposed to διορίσαντας, *Sophistici Elenchi* 175 b 31 τὸ μὴ διορίσαντα δοῦναι τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς; hence in (1451 a 11 ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας) ἁπλῶς must itself be the διορισμός.

ἀπό applied to the embryo, whereas ἐκ is applied to the elements (1449 a 9 compared with 1448 b 23).

ἀποδιδόναι *to give what is due* (1454 b 5, 10), opposed to διδόναι *to bestow as a favour* (1460 b 12).

ἀποθνήσκειν has the double sense *to die* and *to be executed*, Rhetoric 1412 b 16. The latter occurs (1452 a 28, 1455 a 12).

ἀπορία *incompetence*, inability to do anything better, Politics 1275 b 27 (1454 b 21).

ἀργός applied to passages in a drama, which are neither psychological nor argumentative (1460 b 3).

ἀρετή, substantive of σπουδαῖος, Categories 10 b 8.

ἄρθρον in Aristotle's terminology (but not that of the spurious *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*) the contrary of σύνδεσμος, viz. some sound marking the beginning and end of a statement or a distinction. Such particles are the Arabic *inna* and Sanskrit *atha*, which mark the beginning; in Sanskrit *iti* marks the end of a quotation. The *Amen* of prayers would come in this definition. (1457 a 8.)

ἁρμονία *a ratio or combination of things mixed* (λόγος τις τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, *de Anima* 407 b 32), or, more accurately, *a fusion of contraries in definite proportions* (κρᾶσις λόγον ἐχόντων ἐναντίων πρὸς ἄλληλα, Problems 921 a 2). Where the contraries are treble and bass the result is melody, p. 127; where they are the familiar and unfamiliar in language, the result is the poetical vocabulary, p. 48.

ἀρχή defined (1450 b 26) = the heart in the case of such animals as have the latter, *de Generatione Animalium* 735 a 23, whence its use in (1450 a 39).

ἀσθένεια τῶν ἀκροατῶν *weakmindedness of the audience* in the matter of aesthetic exertion, p. 179; in that of intellectual effort, Rhetoric 1419 a 18.

ἄτεχνος *unscientific*, *i. e.* dealing with particulars instead of principles, p. 188.

ἄτιμος of animals *imperfectly evolved, low in the scale of creation*, *de Partibus Animalium* 645 a 7, 16; p. 139.

ἄτοπον *preposterous*, as involving a contradiction, *e. g. de Generatione* 316 b 20 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἅπαν σῶμα εἶναι διαιρετὸν καθ' ὁτιοῦν σημειῶν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ; or an impossibility, Great Ethics 1187 a 17 ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη νομοθετῶν ἃ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι πράττειν; or a violation of order, *Sophistici Elenchi* 171 a 1 ἄτοπον περὶ ἐλέγχου διαλέγεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον περὶ συλλογισμοῦ; or generally of a law of nature, *Parva Naturalia* 455 a 29. Hence in (1460 a 32) to say your story would break down if you might not have what is unnatural in it is *ludicrous*, as a confession of weakness; but to say so when there is obviously no need of what is unnatural is *preposterous* as well.

αὐτομάτου, ἀπὸ τοῦ *without human or quasi-human* design, discussed Physics 197 a and Metaphys. 1034 a 10 (1452 a 6).

αὐτός = the essence, p. 124. αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει (1458 b 10) is a reference to Rhetoric 1408 b 34, where it is explained as αὐτὴ ἡ λέξις τῶν πολλῶν, *i. e.* χωρὶς ἁρμονίας according to (1447 a 27), meaning "the vernacular." In Diog. Laert. vii. § 181, it means "to quote the actual words."

βέλτιον *preferable*, *i. e.* more nearly approaching the ideal from the point of view of nature's intentions, *de Partibus Animalium* 680 b 26.

βίος *mode of life worthy of the name*, Nic. Ethics 1177 a 9, species of πρᾶξις, but genus of εὐδαιμονία (1450 a 18).

βούλεσθαι *to mean to*, *i. e.* to be intended by nature to, *de Generatione Animalium* 777 b 18 οἱ χρόνοι τῶν κυήσεων καὶ τῶν γενέσεων μετρεῖσθαι βούλονται κατὰ φύσιν περιόδοις (1448 a 17).

γελοῖον defined (1449 a 2).

γένος *Category*, p. 126.

γίνεσθαι *to occur*, and τὰ γινόμενα *the actual* opposed to τὰ ὄντα *the real*, and τὰ δυνατά *the potential*, pp. 168 and 216.

γνώριμος 1. *familiar*. 2. *scientifically known* Nic. Ethics 1139 b 33, ὅταν γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται; Problems 917 b 11, γνωριμώτερον τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦ ἀορίστου (1451 b 26).

διά : see λόγος, συνήθεια, τέχνη.

διάλεκτος *articulation of the voice with the tongue* (Natural History 535 a 30) used for ἡ εἰωθυῖα διάλεκτος *ordinary conversation* (1458 b 32 etc.) = λέξις. Compare νοῦς and διάνοια.

†διαλλάσσειν *to separate* or *part*, used by Empedocles, p. 98.

διάνοια defined 1450 b 4.

διασπᾶν *to make a cross-division*, *de Partibus Animalium* 642 b 10 (*cf.* 1448 b 24).

διαφέρειν 1. *to differ*. 2. *to make a difference*, impersonal, construed with ἤ — *de Partibus Animalium* 695 b 12, διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ βραχὺ μὲν σαρκωδέστερον δέ, ἢ μακρὸν μὲν ἀσαρκότερον δ' εἶναι (1452 a 22). τοῦτο διαφέρει *this is the point* (1451 b 5). 3. *to excel* = ὑπερέχειν. Politics 1282 b 41 (1448 b 7).

διαφέρεσθαι *to conflict*, Great Ethics 1211 a 38, τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εὖ ἔχουσι μέρη πρὸς ἄλληλα τῷ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι (1451 a 32).

διαφορά = ἐναντίωσις. See p. 36.

δραματικός defined (1459 a 19), *cf.* p. 27.

δρᾶν. See p. 38.

δύναμις, see p. 124. Compare *de Generatione* 326 b 6, οὐ μόνον ἀριθμῷ μία ἀλλὰ καὶ δυνάμει with Metaphys. 1033 b 32 οὐδ' ἓν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει. The matter is explained in *de Partibus Animalium* 640 b 22. Hence δύναμις is synonymous with ἔργον in Politics 1253 a 23. Like the εἶδος it is produced by the διαφορά, Problems 925 a 33.

δυνατά *the Potential, i. e.* the apodosis of a hypothetical protasis, p. 168.

δυστυχία *ill fortune which is considerable in extent,* see εὐτυχία.

δυσχεραίνειν *to be shocked at* impiety or nastiness, Rhetoric 1408 a 17 (1455 a 29).

ἔθος defined Problems 928 b 24, τὸ πολλάκις καὶ συνεχῶς τι ποιεῖν (1461 a 27).

εἴγε, Physics 200 a 18, 255 a 11, 257 a 28, 274 b 5, *de Anima* 406 b 11 seems to mean *on the assumption that* (1455 a 16).

εἶδος 1. *form superimposed on matter, abstraction.* 2. *variety,* p. 73.

εἰκάζειν *to copy,* Metaphys. 1079 b 28 ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον· used of reproductive art only (1448 a 6).

εἰκός defined Rhetoric 1357 a 34, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον οὐχ ἁπλῶς δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, *i. e.* referring to cases admitting of variety, not to natural laws and phenomena : *moral certainty,* p. 168.

εἰκών *copy* as opposed to παράδειγμα *ideal model,* p. 42.

εἰπεῖν with ὡς *roughly speaking* apparently follows no special rule in its usage, Metaphys. 1079 a 1 πλείω γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα αἰσθητῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ εἴδη (1450 a 13).

εἴτε — εἴτε formula of hypothetical alternatives, p. 69.

ἕκαστοι *each community,* Politics 1283 a 35 (1457 b 4).

ἐκστατικός physiologically *liable to have the proportion of the four elements in the body* (heat and cold, moist and dry) *disturbed : passionate* = θυμώδης *de Partibus Animalium* 651 a 3 (1455 a 34).

ἐκτίθεσθαι to state in general or specific terms, avoiding the particular (τόδε τι). Prior Analytics 49 b 33, οὐδὲν γὰρ προσχρώμεθα τῷ τόδε τι εἶναι. The process in 1455 b 2 is to substitute "a girl" for Iphigeneia, "a country" for the Tauric Chersonese, etc. Metaphys. 1031 b 21.

ἐκφέρειν *to issue or publish* Metaphys. 1040 b 2 (1447 b 16). The word to be supplied is λόγῳ, Diogenes Laert. vii. § 49. With Aristotle poets do not *write.*

ἐν of relation of species to genus, p. 29.

ἕν τι = species, p. 88.

ἐνδέχεσθαι defined Prior Analytics 32 b 4–20. May be regarded as the impersonal of δύνασθαι.

†ἐνέχειν, p. 103.

ἔννοια, p. 103. ἔννοιαν ἐνέχειν *to have an image in the mind,* like ἐννόημα οἷον ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος (Diogenes Laert. vii. § 61). ἔννοιαν σχεῖν *to recognize* Papyrus in *Notices et Extraits* xviii. 11. This image in the mind resembles the original *de Motu Animalium* 701 b 20, and is called τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον.. With the Graeculi ἔννοια and διάνοια are synonymous, Bekker's *Anecdota* 758, 19.

ἔντιμος = τίμιος. τιμιώτερα *more fully developed.* According to the Metaphysics, form is more honourable than matter (*de Caelo* 293 b 15), and energeia than dynamis; and the more fully evolved stands to the less fully in the relation of energeia to dynamis. Hence τίμιος is synonymous with τέλειος, Nic. Ethics 1102 a 1. See, too, *Parva Naturalia* 477 a 18 (1449 a 6).

ἑξῆς defined Metaphys. 1068 b 31, οὗ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄντος θέσει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἄλλως πως διορισθέντος μηθὲν μεταξὺ ἐστιν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει.

ἐπίδηλος *showing, capable of being detected,* Natural History 518 a 8, οὐκ ἐπιδήλως δὲ σφόδρα "not so as to show much," 664 a 22, *de Partibus Animalium* 673 a 2 ἐπίδηλον ποιοῦσι τὴν αἴσθησιν (1451 a 34).

ἐπιεικής *not wicked,* opposite of πονηρός, Nic. Ethics 1165 a 9 (1454 b 13).

ἐπίκτητος *acquired*, opposed to σύμφυτος "congenital" Problems 883 a 7 882 a 22, *de Generatione Animalium* 721 b 30 (1454 b 23).

ἐπισκοπεῖν *to study a question*, *Parva Naturalia* 471 b 27 (1449 a 2).

ἐπίτηδες with ὥσπερ opposed to chance (ὡς ἔτυχε) *de Caelo* 290 a 33 (1452 a 8).

ἐποποιία 1. *hexameter-making*. 2. *Romance, unacted fiction of all kinds*, pp. 68–70. ἔπος *a hexameter* occurs in *Sophistici Elenchi* 180 a 21, where μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά is τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ ἔπους. Proclus derived it from ἕπεσθαι, "to follow," supposing it to have originally been applied to the hexametric oracles, which were *followed* by realization.

ἔργον 1. *work of art*, *Sophistici Elenchi* 179 a 34, ὁ ἀνδριὰς σόν ἐστιν ἔργον (1448 b 10). 2. *difficulty* (1456 b 7). 3. *trouble, labour* (1449 a 28).

ἑρμηνεία *interpretation*, performed with the tongue, *Parva Naturalia* 476 a 19 (1450 b 14).

ἕτερα defined Metaphys. 1018 a 9 ὧν ἢ τὰ εἴδη πλείω ἢ ἡ ὕλη ἢ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας. The first meaning *varying in species* is usual where the word is not further defined.

ἕτερόν τι *different things* (1448 a 20), p. 73.

εὐδαιμονία *high or heroic life*, especially that of kings, ὁ βασιλεὺς εὐδαιμονεῖ, *Sophistici Elenchi* 173 a 26; similarly gods (Politics 1323 b 24) and heroes (*cf.* Nic. Ethics 1145 a).

εὐθύς *obviously, as directly recognized*, Physics 248 a 21, εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη, Metaphys. 1004 a 5, ὑπάρχει εὐθύς (1449 a 33).

εὔλογος *suited to the order of nature, natural*, p. 27 (1460 a 35; with the form εὐλογωτέρως compare Physics 206 a 12 ὅταν μηδετέρως φαίνηται ἐνδέχεσθαι).

εὔπλαστος *fictile*, capable of being moulded, and so *impressionable*, *cf.* Meteorology 385 a 15 (1455 a 34).

εὐτελής *cheap, commonplace* of ideas, Metaphys. 984 a 4, τὴν εὐτέλειαν τῆς διανοίας (1448 b 26).

εὐτυχία *external luck, which is considerable in extent*, Physics 197 a 25 εὐτυχία καὶ δυστυχία ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταῦτα, *viz.* ἀγαθόν τι καὶ φαῦλόν τι ἀποβῇ, Metaphys. 1065 b 1. Politics 1323 b 25 confines it to external things, and thereby distinguishes it from εὐδαιμονία.

εὐφυής *finely constituted*, especially endowed with the power of *discernment* (Nic. Ethics 1114 b 8–10, Topics 159 b 14). See p. 193.

ἔχειν *to hold*, i. e. *to admit* either quantitatively or qualitatively, *to encompass, to control, to restrain*, Metaphys. 1023 a.

ζητεῖν *to research*, Meteorology 349 a 27 βέλτιον οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν ἄνευ ζητήσεως τῶν μετὰ ζητήσεως οὕτω λεγόντων (1454 a 10).

ζῷον *animal* or *likeness*, p. 48.

ζωρός *raw*, p. 222. In Arabic *hayy*, "living," is similarly used of raw liquor (Yakut v. 47).

ἤ separates distinct things, p. 118. In certain cases both members of an antiphasis are inserted in Greek where only one seems necessary: only a native could know how to use this idiom. Problems 956 b 27 ὑπὲρ τοῦ φρονιμωτέρους ἢ μοχθηροτέρους εἶναι τοῖς κρίνουσι μάλιστα ὀργίζονται: people are not angry at being called φρονιμώτεροι. Physiognomonics 810 b 22 ὥστε τὰς αἰσθήσεις βεβαρύνθαι διὰ τὰς τῶν σιτίων πληρώσεις ἢ ἐνδείας: the senses are oppressed by surfeit, not by deficiency. Hence (1451 a 33) and (1456 b 14) have been translated so as to recognize this.

ἤ—ἤ formula of balanced alternatives, its import, p. 31.

ἤδη is used of qualities fully acquired, Problems 954 b 21 ἤδη ποιοί τινές εἰσι τὰ ἤθη, Metaphys. 1016 b 16 ὥστε ὑπόδημα εἶναι καὶ εἶδός τι ἤδη

ἔχειν ἕν. Hence the reading ἀνδρείαν ἤδη εἶναι in (1454 a 23) might, were it not for the syntax, have been to some extent defensible.

ἡδυσμα *sweetening, savouring*, opposed to ἔδεσμα, Rhetoric 1406 a 19 (1450 b 16).

ἦθος 1. subjectively *character, moral quality*; 2. objectively *index* of it, *psychology*, p. 161; 3. *dramatis persona* (1460 a 11).

†ἠρέμα *slightly, moderately*, opposite of σφόδρα, Eudemian Ethics 1231 b 14 (1455 b 17).

θεατής 1. with reference to the outer sense, *spectator* (1455 a 30); 2. with reference to the mind, *student*, Nic. Ethics 1098 a 31 ὁ γεωμέτρης θεατὴς τἀληθοῦς (1455 a 28).

θέατρον in Aristotle *audience*.

θεωρεῖν 1. *to contemplate* with the outer sense; 2. *to exercise one's* knowledge, p. 47.

ἴαμβος *hexametric lampoon*, p. 208.

ἰδέα *formula, model* or *pattern* (1456 b 2, etc.).

ἴδιον *peculiarity* (ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῳ δ' ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος), p. 177.

ἰδιωτικός *vulgar* = ταπεινός (1458 b 4, compared with 1458 a 18). Diogenes Laertius x. § 13 κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἥν, ὅτι ἰδιωτικωτάτη ἐστίν, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς αἰτιᾶται. This is rendered with Cobet's approval *quae, quoniam nimis ab usu communi remota sunt Aristophanes grammaticus culpat*. Yet Cobet complains that few people know Greek!

†ἱέναι *to utter*, aor. εἶναι (1448 b 29) gives the etymology of ἴαμβος. Similarly ἔπος was derived from ἕπεσθαι, ἰατρός from ἰός by Sextus Empiricus 608, 27.

ἰέναι *to come in*, of names, etc. Metaphys. 1047 a 30, ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τοὔνομα, Nic. Ethics 1132 b 12 (1448 b 31).

κάθαρσις *removal of* περίττωμα or *superfluity*, in medicine of superfluous heat or cold, hence *cure of madness*, p. 59. Compare our phrase "Clearing-house," καθαραὶ ψῆφοι or ἴσαι, etc.

καθόλου defined *de Partibus Animalium* 644 a 28 τὰ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχοντα καθόλου καλοῦμεν.

καί corresponds with *i. e.*, usually connecting a species with a genus, often a definition with a term (1449 a 22, 1450 a 18, etc.).

καὶ — καί formula of alternating alternatives, meaning *at times—at times* (1450 a 3, 1452 a 4).

κατορθοῦσθαι opposed to ἐκπίπτειν (1453 a 28). The passage is to be interpreted from Nic. Ethics 1106 b 25 ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς, "excess is disapproved and deficiency blamed, whereas the mean is praised and approved; and both these belong to excellence." "If they meet with approval" means, then, "if the spectators do not hiss them off the stage."

κέντρον. εἰς τὸ κέντρον ἐντιθέναι *to make the invariable element*, p. 209. With the mathematicians the centre is τὸ μεμενηκὸς σημεῖον.

κεραννύναι *to mix* in the sense of *fusion*, p. 25.

κόσμος *euphemism*, poetical appellation, p. 204.

κρίνειν *to distinguish*, with καί or with τε καί, p. 73.

λέγειν 1. *to mean*, Rhetoric 1412 a 22 τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων τὰ ἀστεῖά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅ φησι λέγειν, "not meaning what they say" (1458 a 26); 2. *to call*, οἱ λεγόμενοι so-called, Natural History 563 a 18 τοῖς Μουσαίου λεγομένοις ἔπεσι (1449 b 4).

λέξις = διάλεκτος.

λόγος 1. *mode of stating*, διὰ τὸν λόγον, *on account of the mode of stating*, opposed to διὰ τῶν λόγων through the arguments, Rhetoric 1356 a 9 and 19 (1456 b 7); 2. *statement*, defined (1457 a 23); λόγοι sometimes for λόγοι ψιλοί, plain statements, i. e. *prose* (1450 b 15); 3. *matter capable of being stated* (*a*) subject for discussion (1449 a 9), (*b*) principle requiring no irrational numbers, Physics 252 a 13 τάξις δὲ πᾶσα λόγος, hence principle whereon nature compounds things out of elements, hence factor or coefficient, p. 162, (*c*) argument of a play (1455 b 1).

μανθάνειν 1. *to receive knowledge*; 2. *to make out by the use of one's knowledge*, more fully θεωροῦντα μανθάνειν, p. 47.

μανικός *hysterical*, p. 193. τὸ μανικόν is an ἔκστασις of τὸ εὐφυές, Rhetoric 1390 b 28. VICTORIUS rightly remarks that the μανικοί are not ἐκστατικοί, but ἐξεστηκότες.

μεγαλλειωτός (in form like καρυωτός, "walnut-like," from κάρυον) *Megalleion-like, i.e.* made up of many elements, p. 203.

μέγεθος *loudness* according to Rhetoric 1403 b 31, in accordance with which the Syriac translator interpreted (1449 a 18); size is, however, an element in beauty, and this applies to language no less than to other things.

μείζων *fuller-grown*, hence more highly developed (1449 a 6). The explanation of this is given best in *Parva Naturalia* 477 a 20, where it is shown that the higher developed (τιμιώτερα) animals have a larger share of heat, whence those whose lungs are most supplied with hot blood are the largest in size.

μέν followed by ἀλλά, Metaphys. 1030 a 24 τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστι μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς (1454 a 22).

μέρος synonymous with μόριον, Metaphys. 1023 b : 1. *factor*; 2. *member*; 3. *species* (1449 a 32).

μέτρον 1. *that with which we measure*; 2. *that which is capable of measurement, extent*, p. 87. πέραν τοῦ τοιούτου [τοσούτου?] μέτρου in BEKKER'S *Anecdota* 686 14 is precisely parallel; 3. *what is undergoing or has undergone measurement, e. g.* verse.

μή seems to combine with adjectives as οὐ does with substantives (*e. g.* οὐκ ἄνθρωπος), *Parva Naturalia* 478 b 27 σύστασις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιαύτη ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπίκτητόν τι πάθος, whence μὴ ἀναγκαῖον in (1454 a 28) is to be explained. οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον would have meant "an example is unnecessary."

μίμησις 1. *fiction*, p. 41; 2. *imagery*, p. 213.

ὀδυνηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικά (1449 a 33) denote θάνατοι, αἰκίαι σωμάτων, κακώσεις, γῆρας, νόσοι, τροφῆς ἔνδεια, Rhetoric 1386 a 7.

ὄμμα. πρὸ ὀμμάτων, said to mean ἐνεργοῦντα, Rhetoric 1411 b 24 (1455 a 24). π. ὀ. τίθεσθαι = to imagine vividly, Meteorology 349 b 16, Problems 957 a 22, where it is said to lead to dreaming.

ὅμοιος 1. *resembling*, defined Rhetoric 1384 a 11, 1386 a 24; 2. *uniform*, p. 85.

ὅρος *limitation*, varying with the dimensions of the object. Where that is a line, it is a point, hence *term* in a syllogism; where it is a surface, the ὅρος is a line, where it is a solid, it is a surface; for the ὅρος determines the shape, *de Generatione* 335 a 21, Physics 209 a 9, Metaphys. 1002 b 9. Hence where the object is thought of as a surface or solid, it means *compass*, and the *definition* of a term is what hedges in its sense. In this light (1451 a 10) can be construed.

ὅτε μέν followed by πάλιν δέ *de Caelo* 280 b 16, followed by no antithesis *Parva Naturalia* 467 a 14 (*cf.* 1448 a 20).

†ὅτι μὴ *except* after a negative (1454 a 1); after a positive Physiognomonics 809 b 37.

οὗτος ἐκεῖνος formula of identification Rhetoric 1410 b 19 (1448 b 17).

ὄψις 1. *presentation, exhibition* (1449 b 32). 2. ὄψεις *externals* Physiognomonics 805 a 26 (1450 a 13).

πάθος. οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, or ἐν πάθει ὄντες *under the influence of emotion*, Politics 1287 b 3, Rhetoric 1386 b 4 (1455 a 32).

πάλιν *on the other hand, conversely*, *de Caelo* 288 b 23, 28 οὐδ' ἐπιτείνειν ἀεὶ ἢ πάλιν ἀνιέναι δυνατόν, *de Partibus Animalium* 675 a 23, Rhetoric 1364 a 21 (1449 b 30).

παρά *beyond, outside*, with accusative *de Partibus Animalium* 641 a 35, οὐδεμία λείπεται παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην φιλοσοφία (1454 b 15).

παράδειγμα *ideal model*, p. 42.

παρασκευάζειν *to provide*, *de Generatione Animalium* 743 a 33 ἡμεῖς τὴν τῆς θερμοτήτος συμμετρίαν παρασκευάζομεν (1453 b 8).

παραφαίνεσθαι (1449 a 2) cannot, apparently, be illustrated from Aristotle's works.

περαίνειν 1. *to bring through*, compass indirectly Physics 197 b 26 τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπεφύκει (1449 b 27). 2. *to bring to an end, limit or restrain*, p. 49 (1449 b 30), Rhetoric 1408 b 28 δεῖ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μέν, μὴ μέτρῳ δέ.

περίοδος *a natural division of time*, day, night, month or year, *de Generatione Animalium* 777 b 18 (1449 b 14).

περιπέτεια *Irony of Fate*, defined (1452 a 23).

πιθανός *subject of belief, not of scientific knowledge*, p. 170. (The assertion that the possible is probable violates common sense.)

†πλέξις *complication*, Plato, *Politicus* 308 d, ἡ ὑφαντικὴ πάντα παρασκευάζουσα πρὸς τὴν πλέξιν αὐτῆς (1455 a 19). *Cf.* πέμψις.

ποιεῖν connected by Aristotle with ποιός, whence the elements of the body that are κατὰ τὸ ποιόν are the ποιητικά, Meteorology 378 b 12. ποιεῖν means to introduce τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ἐν ἄλλῳ, Metaphys. 1033 a 34, and is equivalent to ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ μετασχηματίζειν, *de Generatione* 335 b 26. Every γένεσις which is not by nature is called ποίησις, Metaphys. 1032 a 25. Special uses: 1. *to versify* (1448 b 35). 2. *to dramatize* (1455 b 2).

πολιτική *moral science, ethics.* Rhetoric 1356 a 26 ἡ περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματεία ἣν δικαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν, Great Ethics 1181 b 26, ἀρχὴ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματεία τῆς πολιτικῆς "and in general it ought in my opinion to be called not ἠθική, but πολιτική" (1450 b 6, 1460 b 13).

πολιτικῶς *naturally, i. e.* like an amateur or layman. Politics 1275 b 25, πολιτικῶς ὁριζομένων "giving an amateur, unscientific, definition." So in Isocrates 190 τὰ πολιτικὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων are "ordinary words" (1450 b 7).

πρᾶγμα *thing, object*, Meteorology 379 a 32, ἐλάττων γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι θερμότης τῆς ἐν τῷ πράγματι and often (1451 a 10).

πρᾶξις τελεία an experience gone through for its own sake, so *never* an action, p. 39.

πράττειν *to fare, go through*, or *experience*, p. 37.

προαίρεσις 1. *intention*. 2. *resolve*. The former is προαίρεσις ᾗ (viz. προαιρεῖταί τις ἢ φεύγει), p. 161.

πρόβλημα defined Topics 104 b 1 as διαλεκτικὸν θεώρημα τὸ συντεῖνον πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν, ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν. The latter kind is meant in § 25.

προορᾶν *to see beforehand* (1448 b 17).

προσεῖναι 1. *to be added* opposed to ἐκλείπειν *de Generatione Animalium* 770 b 11 (1451 a 33). 2. *to be attached* Natural History 525 a 2 (1454 a 4).

προσῳδία in Aristotle *intonation* only. The example in *Sophistici Elenchi* 177 b 3 is rightly interpreted in BEKKER'S *Anecdota* 743, 10, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄρος τυχὸν ὁ Ὑμηττὸς ἢ τὸ Τηΰγετον ἤ τι ἄλλο ὀρὸν νοῆσαι ἠγοῦν τὸ ὑδατῶδες τοῦ γάλακτος. These signs were only just coming into use in Aristotle's time; when they were familiar, all additional signs put on letters were loosely called accents, as by our printers.

πρότερον various senses of this word are distinguished in *de Generatione Animalium* 742 a, and Metaphys. 1018 b. The definition which suits (1453 b 4) best is τὰ κατὰ τάξιν, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα πρὸς ἕν τι ὡρισμένον διέστηκε κατὰ τὸν λόγον. The ideal is that from which other forms depart more and more, and the ideal is the natural.

πρῶτα (τὰ) Rhetoric 1403 b 19 τὸ πρῶτον ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον, Metaphys. 1037 b 30 τό τε πρῶτον λεγόμενον γένος τὰ δ' ἄλλα γένη ἔστι τό τε πρῶτον καὶ μετὰ τούτου αἱ συλλαμβανόμεναι διαφοραί (of the contents of a definition); so the "first" thing to look for is τί ἅπαντα ταὐτὸν ἔχουσι, Prior Analytics 97 b 8 (1447 a 13).

ῥαψῳδία word used by Plato to describe Homer's work, *i. e.* recited epic, Plato, *Laws* 658 b (1447 b 21).

ῥυθμός *rhythm, dance*, p. 127. πᾶς ῥυθμὸς ὡρισμένῃ μετρεῖται κινήσει, Problems 882 b 2.

σεμνός defined Rhetoric 1391 a 28 as having μαλακὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων βαρύτης, "soft and graceful gravity" (1448 b 25).

σημεῖον τὸ συμβαῖνον with ἐπὶ τῶν ἐχίνων *de Partibus Animalium* 680 a 31, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Physics 203 a 13 (1448 b 9).

σπείρειν *to discharge*, p. 116.

σπουδαῖος *hero, man of high station*, p. 44.

συλλογίζεσθαι *to think under one concept, to observe a coincidence*, *Parva Naturalia* 453 a 10, recollection is a sort of συλλογισμός, ὅτι γὰρ πρότερον εἶδεν ἢ ἤκουσεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἔπαθε συλλογίζεται ὁ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος, *i. e.* he observes a coincidence between a former experience and the present (1455 a 8).

συμπαραλαμβάνειν *to take as an auxiliary* or *adventitious aid*, Rhetoric 1358 b 24, 27 (1450 a 22).

σύμφυτος, see ἐπίκτητος.

συνήθεια *familiarity*. "By practice" is not διὰ συνηθείας, but διὰ συνήθειαν = ἀφ' ἕξεως, Rhetoric 1354 a 7, 9, *de Generatione Animalium* 779 a 20, *de Caelo* 290 b 28, *de Generatione* 325 a 22, Meteorology 340 b 22. Similarly δι' ἔθος.

συναπεργάζεσθαι σχήμασι *to assist with gestures*, Rhetoric 1386 a 32 (1455 a 31).

συνάπτειν 1. *to compound* of syllables, Problems 902 b 26 (1447 b 12). 2. *to combine predicate with subject*, Metaphys. 1027 b 32, hence to put together in a statement or state (1458 a 27).

σύνδεσμος *conjunction* defined (1456 b 37).

σύνδηλος *in focus* (1451 a 10).

σύνθεσις *composition, root-meaning* (1458 a 27).

σύνολον (τὸ) *form and matter together*, p. 41.

σύστασις 1. *construction*. 2. *components* (1453 a 30, 31).

σχηματίζειν *to dance, i. e.* make figures with the feet STEPH. (1447 a 27).

τέμνειν medically seems to mean to remove humour, Nic. Ethics 1173 b 13 opposed to ἀναπληροῦν, cf. *de Generatione Animalium* end (1457 b 15).

†τεράμων *easily cooked, digestible,* Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.* VIII. xi. § 1 of the κύαμος, *Caus. Plant.* III. xxiii. § 3 τεράμονα *coctilia.* This last word could not be got into a hexameter (1458 b 10).

τέχνη. διὰ τέχνης *artistic,* p. 126. διὰ τέχνην *by knowledge of principles* (1451 a 22). κατὰ τέχνην *theoretically* (1453 a 22, *cf.* Physics 193 a 32).

τραγικός *in an irregular pitch,* p. 62; *terrifying and drawing tears, ibid.*

τραγῳδικός *belonging to Tragedy* (1461 b 27).

τυγχάνειν verb of fact (passive of αἰσθάνεσθαι) opposed to ὑπάρχειν, p. 125.

ὑπάρχειν verb of principles (passive of ἐπίστασθαι).

ὑπερβάλλειν construed with both genitive, Politics 1284 a 25 ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων, and accusative (1459 b 16). The curious construction of (1456 a 7) is to prevent τῷ ἰδίῳ ἀγαθῷ being regarded as instrumental.

φανερός. Aristotle distinguishes ἐν φανερῷ " in public," Rhetoric 1384 a 35, 1385 a 8, 1372 a 23, from the anatomical ἐν τῷ φανερῷ *on the outside* of the body, Natural History 533 a 4 ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ οὐκ ἔχει, 510 a 9 οἱ δ' ἐκτὸς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ opposed to ἐντός; *de Generatione Animalium* 719 b 4 exhibits ἐν φανερῷ in this sense. —With (1452 b 12) *cf.* Romans ii. 28 ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ Ἰουδαῖος meaning " on the outside," *nam res de qua loquitur celatur.*

φιλόσοφος *man of science, researcher* (1448 b 13, 1451 b 6).

φορτικός *vulgar, accommodated to ordinary minds,* such as love commonplaces, Rhetoric 1395 b 1 (1461 b 30). A commonplace or homely definition is called φορτικόν *de Partibus Animalium* 652 b 8.

φύσις *reality* or *a reality,* Physics 208 b 25 μόνον αὐτῶν νοεῖσθαι τὴν θέσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν φύσιν τούτων ἕκαστον, Metaphys. 1088 a 23, τὸ δὲ πρός τι πάντων ἥκιστα φύσις τις ἡ οὐσία, opposed to στέρησις *de Partibus Animalium* 649 a 18 (1455 a 31). διὰ φύσιν (and not διὰ τῆς φύσεως) *by nature* (1451 a 23).

χρῆσθαι. κεχρῆσθαι *to embody* (relation of matter to form), Posterior Analytics 79 a 7 ἕτερόν τι ὄντα τὴν οὐσίαν κέχρηται τοῖς εἴδεσιν, Metaphys. 1042 b 31 τὰ δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις διαφοραῖς κεχρῆσθαι (1450 a 13).

ψυχή *life-blood:* for the theory that the blood is the soul, see Hippocrates, ed. Littré vi. 44 (1457 b 14).

ONOMASTICON

(NAMES of historical or quasi-historical personages are printed in small capitals; a reference is given to MURRAY'S *Ancient Greek Literature*, where it treats of them; in other cases some details are given. Names of literary works are in italics; the sign † prefixed indicates that the work is lost. Characters of fiction are within inverted commas.)

" **Achilles,**" character in the Iliad, p. 188.
" **Aegeus,**" character in the Medea, pp. 187, 225.
" **Aegisthus,**" character of the Middle Comedy, p. 180.
AESCHYLUS (Murray x) introduced a second actor, concentrated the interest on the dialogue, and (according to cod. C) reduced the time-limit of the action, p. 149; treated the fortunes of Niobe in a series of plays, p. 197; composed a commonplace line, p. 209.
AGATHON (Murray 204) composed a tragedy in which both names and events were fictitious, p. 171; introduced the practice of transferring choric songs from one piece to another, p. 198; failed when he attempted to dramatize a lengthy history, p. 197; was the author of the lines—

τάχ' ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι
βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα,

pp. 198, 204.
Ajax, tragedy of Sophocles and others, p. 196.
ALCIBIADES, type of an historical character, p. 169.
Alcinous, Discourse before, rhapsody in the Odyssey, p. 190.
†*Alcmeon*, tragedy of Astydamas, p. 183.
" Alcmeon," tragic character, pp. 179, 182.
" Amphiaraus," character in a tragedy of Carcinus, p. 192.
†*Antheus*, tragedy of Agathon, p. 171.
Antigone, tragedy of Sophocles, p. 183.
Ares, his emblem the shield, p. 208.
AREUS, tragic actor, called *psaltes* (rendered by MEINEKE *cantor*) by Athenaeus 352 b, just as Callippides appears to be called *auletes* by Aristotle, Rhetoric 1413 a 3. This reading of the MSS. E G O P in 1462 a 1 explains the passage: Areus was a contemporary of Polyidus and Stratonicus, *i. e.* flourished early in the fourth century, whereas Callippides belongs to the end of the fifth century, and Mynniscus to the previous generation; each generation of actors then accuses the next of overdoing the part, and indeed in Aristotle's time the actor was of greater importance than the poet (Rhetoric 1403 b 34). Areus (400 370?) thought the same of Aristotle's contemporaries as Mynniscus had thought of Callippides. Hence in line 11 the author says " Callippides and now other actors."

Besides this it may be urged that the name Pindar is wholly unknown in this context, and had there been an actor of that name of any celebrity, the author of the fourth letter ascribed to Aeschines could scarcely have ignored him; and that the series of corruptions τηνδαρείου τινδαρίου πινδάρου appears more probable than the inverse. This, then, may be urged as one of the very strongest arguments in favour of the independence of the D E groups.

Argos, statue there of Mitys, p. 174; it had disappeared by Pausanias's time, it would seem.

Ariphrades, son of Automenes, mentioned as an ingenious person by Aristophanes (*Vespae* 1280), charged with various vices by Aeschines Socraticus in his *Callias*, where he is said to have been a pupil of Anaxagoras: his criticism on the tragedians refuted, p. 210.

Aristophanes (Murray 280-293), mentioned as a dramatist, p. 136.

Astydamas, tragedian, first produced 395 B.C. and according to Suidas composed 240 tragedies, 15 of which gained prizes; his Alcmeon mentioned, p. 183.

†*Award of the Arms*, tragedy of Aeschylus, p. 212.

Bath-scene, rhapsody in the Odyssey, pp. 189, 216.

Callippides, tragic actor, who flourished at the end of the fifth century (Athenaeus and Plutarch), criticized, p. 226.

Carcinus, tragedian, who, according to Suidas, flourished about 380 B.C., and before the accession of Philip of Macedon; he composed 160 plays, of which one got the prize. In his Thyestes the "children's flesh" was recognized by the father by the bright spot on the shoulders, p. 189, and this is what Aeschylus may have had in mind; his tragedy in which Amphiaraus rose was wrecked by a theological mistake, p. 192.

†*Centaur*, rhapsody by Chaeremon in a variety of metres, pp. 132, 214.

Chaeremon, tragedian and rhapsodist, often cited by Athenaeus, author of the Centaur.

Chionides, earliest Attic comedian, "considerably junior to Epicharmus," must have flourished, therefore, after 480 B.C., p. 137.

Choephoroe, tragedy of Aeschylus, p. 190.

Cleon, typical proper name, p. 202.

Cleophon, author of romances of ordinary life, p. 134, expressed in ordinary language, p. 207, or with tasteless ornaments, Rhetoric 1408 a 15; a piece by him called *Mandrobulus* is cited in the Topics 174 b 27. Suidas makes him also a tragedian.

Clepsydra, hetaera whose real name was Metiche, referred to, p. 166.

"Clytaemnestra," tragic character, p. 182.

Crates, early Attic comedian, introducer of the fictitious plot, p. 152 Said to have won his first prize 449 B.C.

"Creon," character in the Antigone of Sophocles, p. 183.

†*Cresphontes*, tragedy of Euripides, p. 184.

†*Cyclops*, name of dithyrambs by Timotheus and Philoxenus, p. 135.

†*Cypria*, one of the cyclic Epics, p. 212.

†*Cyprians*, tragedy of Dicaeogenes, p. 190.

"Danaus," character in the Lynceus of Theodectes, p. 17.

Departure of the Fleet, rhapsody in the Iliad, p. 187; †name of a tragedy, p. 212.

Dicaeogenes, tragedian, according to Suidas also dithyrambist, author of the Cyprians, p. 190.

†*Diliad*, "Craveniad," parody of the Iliad by Nicochares, p. 134.
Dionysius, painter, p. 134.
Dionysus, his emblem the Cup, p. 205.
"Dolon," character in the Iliad, p. 220.
"Earth," character in the Cyclopes, p. 135.
Electra, tragedy of Sophocles, critized for anachronism, p. 216.
Empedocles, metrical author of scientific works, ob. about 440, not to be called poet, p. 131, yet cited for poetical licences, pp. 205, 206, 222.
Epichares, name of a physician ? p. 208.
Epicharmus (Murray 275), Sicilian author of fiction, probably intended to accompany puppet-shows, p. 137.
"Eriphyle," tragic character, p. 182.
Eucleides, poetic critic, p. 208. A Eucleides of uncertain date wrote on the structure of the drama, p. 83.
Euripides (Murray xii) makes many of his tragedies end unhappily, and so produces the tragic effect, p. 179; his treatment of the Chorus criticized, p. 198; his characters realistic, p. 220; references to his plays Cresphontes, Iphigeneia in Tauris, Iphigeneia in Aulis, Medea, Merope, Orestes.
†*Eurypylus*, name of tragedy based on the Little Iliad, p. 212.
Ganymede, p. 223.
Glaucon, critic, p. 224; author of dialogues, two of which bore the names Euripides and Aristophanes, and therefore may have dealt with poetry (Diogenes Laertius).
"Haemon," character in the Antigone of Sophocles, p. 183.
Hector, Pursuit of, rhapsody in the Iliad, pp. 215, 219.
Hegemon of Thasos (Murray 166), inventor of parody, p. 134; also a comedian, according to Athenaeus (p. 407) so successful that he was able to make the Athenians laugh even on the day when the Sicilian disaster was announced.
†*Helle*, piece of unknown author, p. 184.
†*Heracleid*, name of an epic poem, p. 167.
Heracles, epic character, p. 167.
Hermus, Caicus, and Xanthus, names of rivers in Asia Minor; "H.-C.-X. watered" is probably an epithet of Asia Minor, p. 203.
Herodotus (Murray vi), his chronicle would not be turned into poetry by versification, p. 168.
Hippias, Thasian critic of Homer, endeavoured to remove difficulties by altering the intonation, p. 221, yet thereby introduced worse difficulties, p. 52.
Homer, inventor of "unity of theme," §§ 8, 23, and so of the tragic and comic styles, § 4; also of the picturesque detail, § 24; recognized what part the narrator should take himself, *ibid.* See also Iliad, Margites, Odyssey. His procrustean treatment of language is defended, p. 208, and various objections to his verses are answered in § 25.
"Icadius," true name of Odysseus's father-in-law, p. 224.
"Icarius," *ibid.*
Iliad, a model of unity of theme, embodying two varieties of tragedy, §§ 4, 8, 23, 26; its *deus ex machina* criticized, p. 187.
†*Iliad, Little*, one of the cyclic epics, the source of numerous tragedies, p. 212.
Iphigeneia in Aulis, tragedy of Euripides, criticized for inconsistency in the heroine's character, p. 186.

Iphigeneia in Tauris, tragedy of Euripides, sketch of the argument, p. 194; of the two Disclosures which it requires, p. 176, one is scientific, p. 191, the other not so, p. 190; the scenes are appropriate, p. 194.
†*Iphigeneia in Tauris*, dithyramb by Polyidus, pp. 190, 194.
†*Ixion*, name of a tragedy by Aeschylus, and of others by others, p. 196.
"Laius," conjecture of Paccius for "Iolaus," character in the background of the Oedipus Tyrannus, p. 216.
†*Lynceus*, tragedy of Theodectes, analysed, p. 195, contained a good example of the Irony of Fate, p. 175.
Magnes, early Attic comedian, p. 137; died before 424 B.C. (date of Aristophanes's Knights).
†*Margites* "the Adulterite," burlesque by Homer, p. 144, earliest specimen known to Aristotle of the comic style. [The word μάργος is defined as *qui vult alienum agrum arare*.]
Medea, tragedy of Euripides, criticized for containing a *deus ex machina*, p. 187; old-fashioned in the nature of the crime committed, p. 184.
†*Melanippe*, "the Wise Melanippe," tragedy of Euripides, in which the heroine displayed good qualities unsuited to her sex, p. 186.
"Meleager," tragic character, p. 179.
†*Mendicant*, the, tragedy.
"Menelaus," character in the Orestes of Euripides, and example of unnecessary knavery, pp. 186, 225.
"Merope," character in the Cresphontes of Euripides, p. 184.
Mitys, a man whose statue in Argos fell upon and killed his murderer, p. 174. Plutarch, *de Sera Numinis vindicta*, p. 553 (viii. 189 R), takes the story from this place, misspells the name (Mitios), misconstrues the word θεωροῦντι (θέας οὔσης), and adds from his fancy the details that the statue was of bronze, and that Mitys was killed "seditiously." From Demosthenes (p. 1335) we learn that the children of one Mitys of Argos sold a four-horse chariot to Chabrias, who won with it in the Pythia of 374; probably then Mitys had won with it the Olympia before, and his statue commemorated this victory. Since Aristotle was born 384, this event happened well within his time; and since that lover of the supernatural, Xenophon, makes no mention of it in his History, it probably happened after 363.
Mnasitheus of Opus, criticized for over-gesticulating when he sang, p. 226.
Mynniscus, tragic actor, said to have been employed by Aeschylus, and ridiculed by the comedian Plato for gluttony (Athenaeus 344d); criticized Callippides, p. 226.
†*Mysians*, tragedy of Aeschylus, criticized for something unnatural, p. 216.
†*Neoptolemus*, name of a tragedy based on the Little Iliad, p. 212.
Nichochares, author of the Diliad, p. 134.
†*Niobe*, name of tragedies by Aeschylus and others, p. 197.
Odyssey and "Odysseus," the former not a biography of the latter, p. 167. According to Aristotle's conception of the plot, Penelope identifies Odysseus by his knowing the secret of the bow, whence the introduction of it is not "episodic," but her means of arming him against the suitors, p. 191. Sketch of its contents, p. 195.
Odysseus the False Messenger, rhapsody in the Odyssey, p. 191.
†*Odysseus, the Wounded*, name of a tragedy, identified by some with

the *Niptra* or *Odysseus Acanthoplēx* of Sophocles, p. 183. A piece by Chaeremon had the actual name *the Wounded* (τραυματίας).
Oedipus Tyrannus, tragedy of Sophocles, has an unnatural feature but in the background, p. 216; contains a good example of the Irony of Fate, p. 175, and of Disclosure, p. 191; compressed as compared with the Iliad, p. 227. Nature of the crime in it, p. 183.
" Oedipus," tragic character, p. 178.
Orestes, tragedy of Euripides, criticized, pp. 186, 225.
" Orestes," literally " Rager," tragic character, p. 179; especially in the Iphigeneia in Tauris, pp. 186, 194.
Pauson, caricaturist, p. 134.
†*Peleus*, tragedy of Sophocles, p. 196.
Philoctetes, name of a tragedy, p. 212.
Philoxenus, dithyrambic poet, originally of Cythera, about 435–380 B.C., author of the Cyclops, p. 135.
†*Phinidae*, overture of Timotheus, p. 190.
†*Phorcides*, tragedy of Aeschylus, p. 196.
Phormis, Sicilian comedian, and inventor of plots, p. 152; called Phormos by Athenaeus and Suidas, who says he was tutor to the sons of Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, innovated somewhat in costume and scenery, and composed seven or eight dramas; one of these, " the Storming of Troy," seems to have been a tragedy.
†*Phthiotides*, tragedy of Sophocles, p. 196.
Polygnotus, painter of gods and heroes, p. 133, a good delineator of character, or (according to Cod. E) a delineator of good characters, p. 159.
Polyidus, sophist, *i. e.* instructor of artists, dithyrambic poet, musician and painter, flourished about 397 B.C., invented a " disclosure " for the theme of Iphigeneia, pp. 190, 194. Some poems of his seem to have survived into Byzantine times, since one is quoted by Tzetzes.
Prometheus, tragedy of Aeschylus, p. 196.
Protagoras, sophist, about 480–410 B.C., criticized the first verse of the Iliad, p. 199.
†*Scylla*, name of a dithyramb, pp. 186, 226.
†*Sinon*, tragedy of Sophocles, p. 212.
" Sisyphus," tragic character, p. 197.
Socratic Dialogues, a form of Romance, p. 130.
Sophocles (Murray xi), commended for use of the Chorus, p. 198. References to his plays, Electra, Oedipus, Tereus, by name and to others without name.
Sophron, Syracusan author of prose farces, not intended for acting, contemporary of Euripides, p. 130. Hirzel compares his throwing off the fetters of verse with the Syracusan assertion of political liberty.
Sosistratus, Euboean statesman, called traitor by Demosthenes (p. 324). Aristotle's phrase " rhapsode, which Sosistratus *is*" implies that his ostensible rôle was different, p. 226. The reading of E, *Sosicratos*, is valueless.
†*Spartan Women*, tragedy of Sophocles, p. 212.
Sthenelus, tragedian ridiculed by Aristophanes and others, and criticized by Aristotle for commonplace expressions, p. 207.
Tegea, p. 217.
" Telegonus," character in a tragedy, p. 183.
" Telemachus," character in the Odyssey, p. 224.

"Telephus," tragic character, p. 179.
†*Tereus*, tragedy of Sophocles, p. 190.
THEODECTES, tragedian, contemporary of Aristotle, author of the Lynceus and Tydeus.
†*Theseid*, name of an Epic, p. 167.
†*Thyestes*, tragedy of Carcinus, p. 189.
"Thyestes," tragic character, p. 179.
TIMOTHEUS, dithyrambic poet, flourished according to Diodorus 397, according to Suidas lived 97 years. References to his *Cyclops* and *Phinidae*.
Trojan Women, tragedy of Euripides, p. 212.
†*Troy, Storming of*, identified by LASCARIS with the Ἰλίου πόρθησις of the Syracusan Phormis, p. 212; by others with a tragedy by Iophon.
†*Tydeus*, tragedy of Theodectes, p. 190.
†*Tyro*, tragedy of Sophocles, p. 189.
XENARCHUS, author of mimes, p. 130; said to have been Sophron's son.
XENOPHANES, metrical author on philosophy, lived between 580 and 480 B.C., attacked the Homeric theology, p. 220.
ZEUXIS, painter, fifth century B.C., painted ideally, p. 224, but was deficient in psychology, p. 159.

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